I think the point of philosophical zombies for Chalmers is not to invoke dualism or epiphenominalism but to point out that we cannot tell from the outside what is going on on the inside. I agree with that, but it's not because human consciousness is a separate thing from human neurology, but rather they are two separate ends of the same continuum. Two sides of the same coin with perpendicular ontologies.
>Can a universe exist just like ours but have different qualia or none at all? The world you see in a mirror is a universe with some different and absent qualia. It has no smell, no sound. Things are backwards. >I believe qualia are a property of the mind, not a property of the physics on >which the mind is built. I reconcile the two by saying that phenomena are quantitative on one side and qualitative on the other, or electro on one side, magnetic on side two, sensory on side three, and motive on side four. Maybe I'm a quadralist. On Jul 12, 5:30 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the > > necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition, > > doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's > > ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a > > physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does > > not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it > > serves no special function that unconscious detection would not > > accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from, > > no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were > > it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color > > perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than > > time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm > > trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between > > zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence. > > I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe > without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads > to substance dualism or epiphenominalism. If zombies are possible, it means > that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without > affecting anything. Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is > against your view. Are you familiar with > this:http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raym... > If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically impossible. > So what is your thought on this subject? Can a universe exist just like > ours but have different qualia or none at all? > > My view is that qualia are necessary and identical anywhere an identical > processing of information, at some substitution level, is performed. Thus, > if it is done by a computer or a human, or a human in this universe or > another universe, or a computer in this universe or a person in a different > universe, the resulting qualia will be the same, because I believe qualia > are a property of the mind, not a property of the physics on which the mind > is built. > > Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.