On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a
universe without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it
inevitably leads to substance dualism or epiphenominalism. If zombies
are possible, it means that consciousness is something extra which can
be taken away without affecting anything. Thus, conscious would have
no effects, which I think is against your view. Are you familiar with
this:
http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf
<http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20%28Raymond%20Smullyan%29.pdf>
?
If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically
impossible. So what is your thought on this subject? Can a universe
exist just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?
I think there are two different questions in play. Usually
philosophical zombies are defined as acting just like us; but it is
left open as to whether their internal information processing is just
like ours. I think one might be able to create an artificial person who
acted just like us, but who had somewhat different internal processing.
They might experience qualia somewhat differently - how would you tell.
My wife and I are always disagreeing about where to draw the line
between blue and green. Is she experiencing the color differently?
Part of the reason we assume other people experience qualia the way we
do is that they are built like us. Suppose after building the
artificial person and confirming it acts just like we do, you added a
lot of memory capacity so that everything the artificial person looked
at was recorded - but not accessed. Would this produce a difference in
qualia?
Brent
My view is that qualia are necessary and identical anywhere an
identical processing of information, at some substitution level, is
performed. Thus, if it is done by a computer or a human, or a human
in this universe or another universe, or a computer in this universe
or a person in a different universe, the resulting qualia will be the
same, because I believe qualia are a property of the mind, not a
property of the physics on which the mind is built.
Jason
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