On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> **
> On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
>> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
>> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
>> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
>> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
>> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
>> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
>> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
>> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
>> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
>> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
>> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
>> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
>> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
>> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
> I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
> without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
> to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
> that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
> affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
> against your view.  Are you familiar with this:
> http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf<http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20%28Raymond%20Smullyan%29.pdf>?
> If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically
> impossible.  So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist
> just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?
> I think there are two different questions in play.  Usually philosophical
> zombies are defined as acting just like us; but  it is left open as to
> whether their internal information processing is just like ours.

That may be one definition.  The way I have heard zombies defined is that
they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no
physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie.  I was
using this definition above in my example and reasoning.


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