On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> ** > On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> >> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the >> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition, >> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's >> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a >> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does >> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it >> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not >> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from, >> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were >> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color >> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than >> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm >> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between >> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence. >> >> > I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe > without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads > to substance dualism or epiphenominalism. If zombies are possible, it means > that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without > affecting anything. Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is > against your view. Are you familiar with this: > http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raymond%20Smullyan).pdf<http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20%28Raymond%20Smullyan%29.pdf>? > If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically > impossible. So what is your thought on this subject? Can a universe exist > just like ours but have different qualia or none at all? > > > I think there are two different questions in play. Usually philosophical > zombies are defined as acting just like us; but it is left open as to > whether their internal information processing is just like ours. > That may be one definition. The way I have heard zombies defined is that they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie. I was using this definition above in my example and reasoning. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.