Oh, yeah I would agree with you if you are talking real world live
healthy human bodies then they are going to have a human experience.
In a hypothetical, you could not know whether a person was a zombie or
not for sure, just because subjectivity is airtight, but mechanically
there is no way to take away a person's soul without changing them

On Jul 12, 9:57 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> >> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
> >> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
> >> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
> >> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
> >> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
> >> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
> >> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
> >> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
> >> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
> >> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
> >> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
> >> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
> >> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
> >> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.
> > I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe
> > without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads
> > to substance dualism or epiphenominalism.  If zombies are possible, it means
> > that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without
> > affecting anything.  Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is
> > against your view.  Are you familiar with this:
> >http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raym...<http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20%28Ra...>?
> > If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically
> > impossible.  So what is your thought on this subject?  Can a universe exist
> > just like ours but have different qualia or none at all?
> > I think there are two different questions in play.  Usually philosophical
> > zombies are defined as acting just like us; but  it is left open as to
> > whether their internal information processing is just like ours.
> That may be one definition.  The way I have heard zombies defined is that
> they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no
> physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie.  I was
> using this definition above in my example and reasoning.
> Jason

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