Oh, yeah I would agree with you if you are talking real world live healthy human bodies then they are going to have a human experience. In a hypothetical, you could not know whether a person was a zombie or not for sure, just because subjectivity is airtight, but mechanically there is no way to take away a person's soul without changing them physically.
On Jul 12, 9:57 pm, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 6:10 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > ** > > On 7/12/2011 2:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 8:17 AM, Craig Weinberg > > <[email protected]>wrote: > > >> Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the > >> necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition, > >> doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's > >> ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a > >> physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does > >> not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it > >> serves no special function that unconscious detection would not > >> accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from, > >> no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were > >> it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color > >> perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than > >> time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm > >> trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between > >> zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence. > > > I think the problem with Chalmer's view, is that by assuming a universe > > without qualia (or philosophical zombies) are possible, it inevitably leads > > to substance dualism or epiphenominalism. If zombies are possible, it means > > that consciousness is something extra which can be taken away without > > affecting anything. Thus, conscious would have no effects, which I think is > > against your view. Are you familiar with this: > >http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20(Raym...<http://www.philforum.org/documents/An%20Unfortunate%20Dualist%20%28Ra...>? > > If not, it can give you a feel for why zombies may be logically > > impossible. So what is your thought on this subject? Can a universe exist > > just like ours but have different qualia or none at all? > > > I think there are two different questions in play. Usually philosophical > > zombies are defined as acting just like us; but it is left open as to > > whether their internal information processing is just like ours. > > That may be one definition. The way I have heard zombies defined is that > they are in all ways, physically indistinguishable; that there is no > physical test that could ever tell apart a zombie from a non-zombie. I was > using this definition above in my example and reasoning. > > Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
