On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > If they can only function for a few minutes, then that function may
> > not be 'normal' to anything except us as distantly removed observers.
> This like saying that a plane which crashes at 10 pm, was not really
> flying before.
> That a car which would break at 120 km/h is not really riding when at
> 100 km/h.

Not exactly. I'm saying that a plane that is crashing might be a sign
that the engines don't work. If it's an experimental plane that has
never flown before, it might be a sign that the theory of behind the
design can never work. If you copy the shape of a plane and observe
that the turbines spin because the plane is going fast through the
air, you might assume that the plane doesn't need engines at all and
build a plane with to drop from 30,000 feet and assume that it's going
to fly.

> You assume, or talk like if you were assuming that the level is
> infinitely low.

Is the substitution level of fire infinitely low? Think of
consciousness like fire. It's a potential that already exists in many
materials under specific conditions but it cannot be emulated by
itself. The whole premise of a substitution level for consciousness is
presuming something that I reject, because I see that awareness cannot
be anything other than an inherent potential of all physical
phenomena, so it's just a matter of deciding how closely you want that
awareness to be to our own. You might be able to synthesize emotion-
level experiences on silicon, but I have no reason to assume that.
Instead I see that thought is relatively easy to mimic with 3-p a-
signifying symbol manipulations, whereas understanding and feeling
cannot be accessed symbolically because they are 1p phenomena which do
not arise from a function, but are the interior sense of a physical

> Indeed, only in that case you can affirm systemically
> (for blocking the consequences of the thought experience) that  "there
> may be a lot more input which we have no way to understand from our
> perceptual distance which gets amputated".
> To make the level infinitely low, is a way to introduce an infinite
> complexity, which, if well chosen can contradict the "natural"
> infinities we get from the computationalist assumption. The "well
> chosen" can be very complex. You might need to diagonalize against the
> whole of computer science.
> All that for not bringing a steak to my sun in law who survived some
> fatal brain cancer with a computer?


It's not that the level is infinitely low, it's that there is no
level. Everything from chlorophyll to starfish to Britney Spears has
the same essential ability to be what it is and sense what it is to be
that thing. A computer is no different, except that the software you
impose on it is not it's own software so it has no idea that it's
normal routines are being hijacked for a purpose it can never
understand. It doesn't mean you can't run a simulation of Britney
Spears on a chip, and it may fool everyone including Britney Spears
and your son in law, but to the chip, it has no idea what Britney
Spears is.


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