On 26 Jul 2011, at 21:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:



unless it's made of living biological organisms,

And here you beg the question.

But aren't you saying that it doesn't have to be biological to act
like a brain?

I am neutral on this. I discovered computer science in biology (in the genetical regulatory system). All known biology is Turing emulable. The carbon atom is Turing emulable. It is just a question of levels, and although important in practice (the day we do make artificial brain) it does not change the logic and the deep consequences.




and even if
it appeared to act that way, it will probably not feel like a person,

Again.

I don't see how I'm begging the question. I'm just saying that feeling
is the interior topology of biological cells, and so a brain made of
non-biological cells won't feel the same.


Too bas cells are not Löbian (apparently). But the "soul" of the Löbian machine have a topological space associated to them. Now I am not sure in which sense you talk about "interior topology of biological cells". It looks poetical to me.





it will feel like math. You're wanting to make consciousness into a
function of calculation,

Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a
computation. I know that many computationalists are wrong on this issue.

What are you saying that consciousness is the result of then?

On the first person point of view of a machine whose states belongs to an infinity of computations (those below its substitution level.





but it's not, it's a function of awareness,
which is sense, which is detection, which is 1p physical experience.

Why physical?

Because when we take physical drugs, or push the neurons around
magnetically, it changes our 1p physical experience. We can also move
our voluntary muscles directly through our 1p motive power without any
intermediate translation. Doesn't mean that there couldn't be
disembodied consciousness, it's just not necessary to speculate on to
describe the cosmos adequately.

I don't believe in a "granted" (primitive) cosmos, nor in any thing primitively physical. Nor do I believe in their inexistence. I heard only rumor. I am agnostic on that issue. But I don't believe in the compatibility of such beliefs with comp.





Calculation is a function of consciousness. It's a high level
function. The psychic equivalent of plastic - a feeling of simulated
non-feeling used to represent sequences abstractly. They can't replace
feeling because they are based on feeling and not the other way
around. Even a computer does not compute. It's just physical materials responding to changes in it's environment. It's only us who know that
it's computing for us.

This is a level of confusion, or just a non-comp assertion. But then
you have infinities and zombies. And you have to speculate that QM is
false, etc.

QM doesn't have to be false, the level of sensorimotive experience
would just to a lower bottom of the microcosm, but I think that the
weirdness of QM could be explained a lot better as insistence
phenomena rather than existence phenomena.

OK. But the point remains.



I'm not sure about infinities and zombies. I would have to know
specifically what case you mean.

Frankly it is a consequence of the whole UDA. But you have to do the thought experience to understand, and so accept comp at least for the sake of the argument. Do you accept that comp implies I can accept in principle the use of teletransportation. Do you accept to reason on the assumption such transportation machine reconstitute you at the right level?




Right. I agree. I think of consciousness (loosely) as awareness of
awareness, awareness as sense of sense, sense as detection of
detection. Consciousness implies abstract self-representation.

That's better than Werner. But you ask for an infinite magical sort of
representation. If not will be Turing emulable, and you are then
addressing a question of implementation.

I don't see it as magical or infinite in literal, absolute terms.
Compared to external observables consciousness seems magical and
infinite, but that's just because it's not quantifiable. It is that
which cannot be quantified and that which quantifies.

OK.



A
molecule like chlorophyll is only elaborated to the detection level,
but it brings a new level of flexibility (like carbon does for organic
chemistry) that forms the building blocks of an organism that can
sense more than the molecular sum of it's parts.

This can be explained without magic in computer science.

Only by reverse engineering. There's no mathematical inevitability for
chlorophyll or carbon. Carbon could be as inert as Neon in another
universe. Six could be the saturated valence number instead of ten.
Geometry could work differently.

But we don't escape the Turing emulable realm here.




That's true, your brain has no idea who you are. Which is why if you
build something which is merely like what the brain appears to be, it
won't be able to host a phenomenon who knows who it is.

Not if it has the right software. If you say that all software are
wrong, then you needs special infinities to singularize it.

But you don't have the right software. You would need software that
makes up new colors out of nothing. Software that would rather try to
kill you than do what you program it to do.

? I say, if the right software does not exist, you need infinite specification for your body, and comp is made wrong. That's OK, and coherent with your cosmos religion. No problem. You might just miss a cute and rather natural, theory, and I hope you will be kind enough to give a steak to my son in law (and dont' tell him, nor me, that he is a zombie).





Infinities are an abstraction.

What does that mean? If it means that infinities does not exists, then you are ultrafinitist (and comp is wrong, because comp does bring some
infinities. That is a reason for not bringing them on purpose).

I think that finite is the essence of physical existence. To say that
infinities physically exist is to say that they can be made finite.

That might be in contradiction with comp, again. You can still escape the seven first steps by assuming that the univers is unique and little, or not robust enough to run a big part of the UD. But the step 8 shows that it is a red hearing.




But consciousness is, in my
opinion, much more primitive than Löbianity. You can have
consciousness without self-awareness.

I agree, although I call it awareness. Consciousness to me implies the
potential for self awareness.

That is not saying much.




Awareness is finite though, it's
just not computable because it's qualitative and experiential.

Now, *you* are the one seeming to believe that we can characterize
qualia by something finite. But then you characterize it by itself,
but that is a non explanation: it is an abandon of searching an
explanation.

It's finite but it's not characterized by something other than itself.
Yellow is yellow. Hydrogen is Hydrogen.

And Unicorn are Unicorn. With comp, Hydrogen are convenient fictions, stable patterns in winning (?) computational histories (winning in the sense that they do stabilize coherent first person plural sharable realities.



We're
at a disadvantage to understand what we are because what we are, as
intellectual minds, is literally the intention of something physical
to be unlike anything physical.

I have no clue what you mean by physical in this context.

I'm saying that a physical neuron strives to piggyback the dream of a
post-physical hyperbiology on top if it's cellular sensorimotivations.

Any way, all
what I say is that IF comp is true, then we have a theory which
explains constructively how both mind and matter emerges from addition
and multiplication(*). The quantum is retrieved by the 1-views
coherent with the digital assumption.

What do addition and multiplication emerge from?

I don't know. That is why I assume them. What ever you assume (cosmos?, cells, water, molecules, fields, consciousness?) I will ask where that come from. Comp start from the simplest to get the riddle of the puzzle, not from the complex, which *is* the problem.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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