On Jul 26, 12:50 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > There's a difference between hurtling forward on momentum and having > > functioning engines. Just because a chicken runs around for a while > > after losing it's head doesn't mean that headless chickens are viable. > > But it means that he is still not dead, yet.
Why not? Just because running around is something that chickens do while they are alive doesn't mean that running around makes them alive. Residual momentum. Just because the stove is still hot doesn't mean that you aren't out of fuel. I think that consciousness isn't consciousness if it's not burning fuel so to speak. I think it becomes a semantic argument...euthanasia, abortion, etc. there is no literal line of separation - no threshold of functional inequivalence, there's too many functions and meta functions. Then someone comes along and electrocutes your dead froglegs. > > If the plane is flying then it's tautology. If you're saying that the > > plane could fly at any time then you are eliminating the possibility > > that it can't fly. You're just saying 'suppose I build a brain that > > acts just like a conscious brain in every possible way...is it > > conscious?' To which I'm saying, the brain will probably not act like > > a brain > > You just changed the premise. What did I change it from? > > unless it's made of living biological organisms, > > And here you beg the question. But aren't you saying that it doesn't have to be biological to act like a brain? > > and even if > > it appeared to act that way, it will probably not feel like a person, > > Again. I don't see how I'm begging the question. I'm just saying that feeling is the interior topology of biological cells, and so a brain made of non-biological cells won't feel the same. > > it will feel like math. You're wanting to make consciousness into a > > function of calculation, > > Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a > computation. I know that many computationalists are wrong on this issue. What are you saying that consciousness is the result of then? > > but it's not, it's a function of awareness, > > which is sense, which is detection, which is 1p physical experience. > > Why physical? Because when we take physical drugs, or push the neurons around magnetically, it changes our 1p physical experience. We can also move our voluntary muscles directly through our 1p motive power without any intermediate translation. Doesn't mean that there couldn't be disembodied consciousness, it's just not necessary to speculate on to describe the cosmos adequately. > > Calculation is a function of consciousness. It's a high level > > function. The psychic equivalent of plastic - a feeling of simulated > > non-feeling used to represent sequences abstractly. They can't replace > > feeling because they are based on feeling and not the other way > > around. Even a computer does not compute. It's just physical materials > > responding to changes in it's environment. It's only us who know that > > it's computing for us. > > This is a level of confusion, or just a non-comp assertion. But then > you have infinities and zombies. And you have to speculate that QM is > false, etc. QM doesn't have to be false, the level of sensorimotive experience would just to a lower bottom of the microcosm, but I think that the weirdness of QM could be explained a lot better as insistence phenomena rather than existence phenomena. I'm not sure about infinities and zombies. I would have to know specifically what case you mean. > > Right. I agree. I think of consciousness (loosely) as awareness of > > awareness, awareness as sense of sense, sense as detection of > > detection. Consciousness implies abstract self-representation. > > That's better than Werner. But you ask for an infinite magical sort of > representation. If not will be Turing emulable, and you are then > addressing a question of implementation. I don't see it as magical or infinite in literal, absolute terms. Compared to external observables consciousness seems magical and infinite, but that's just because it's not quantifiable. It is that which cannot be quantified and that which quantifies. > > A > > molecule like chlorophyll is only elaborated to the detection level, > > but it brings a new level of flexibility (like carbon does for organic > > chemistry) that forms the building blocks of an organism that can > > sense more than the molecular sum of it's parts. > > This can be explained without magic in computer science. Only by reverse engineering. There's no mathematical inevitability for chlorophyll or carbon. Carbon could be as inert as Neon in another universe. Six could be the saturated valence number instead of ten. Geometry could work differently. > > That's true, your brain has no idea who you are. Which is why if you > > build something which is merely like what the brain appears to be, it > > won't be able to host a phenomenon who knows who it is. > > Not if it has the right software. If you say that all software are > wrong, then you needs special infinities to singularize it. But you don't have the right software. You would need software that makes up new colors out of nothing. Software that would rather try to kill you than do what you program it to do. > > Infinities are an abstraction. > > What does that mean? If it means that infinities does not exists, then > you are ultrafinitist (and comp is wrong, because comp does bring some > infinities. That is a reason for not bringing them on purpose). I think that finite is the essence of physical existence. To say that infinities physically exist is to say that they can be made finite. > But consciousness is, in my > opinion, much more primitive than Löbianity. You can have > consciousness without self-awareness. I agree, although I call it awareness. Consciousness to me implies the potential for self awareness. > > Awareness is finite though, it's > > just not computable because it's qualitative and experiential. > > Now, *you* are the one seeming to believe that we can characterize > qualia by something finite. But then you characterize it by itself, > but that is a non explanation: it is an abandon of searching an > explanation. It's finite but it's not characterized by something other than itself. Yellow is yellow. Hydrogen is Hydrogen. > > We're > > at a disadvantage to understand what we are because what we are, as > > intellectual minds, is literally the intention of something physical > > to be unlike anything physical. > > I have no clue what you mean by physical in this context. I'm saying that a physical neuron strives to piggyback the dream of a post-physical hyperbiology on top if it's cellular sensorimotivations. >Any way, all > what I say is that IF comp is true, then we have a theory which > explains constructively how both mind and matter emerges from addition > and multiplication(*). The quantum is retrieved by the 1-views > coherent with the digital assumption. What do addition and multiplication emerge from? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
