On 26 Jul 2011, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/26/2011 9:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of acomputation.This confuses me. I understand consciousness (according to yourtheory) is not the result of computing some function, i.e. one ofthe infinitely many programs the UD is executing. Rather it is theresult of all those computations. And a state of consciousnesscorresponds to a state of computation which occurs in infinitelymany of the UD programs. But I'm not clear on what getsGodelization. Is it the UD and all the functions it computes? Oris it each program being computed?

`The UD is equivalent, in arithmetic with the proof of the sigma_1`

`sentences. It is the basic "ontology".`

`The GĂ¶delization is what gives all the Bp (B_PA p, B_ZF p,`

`B_Brent_Meeker p, etc). The "B" correponds ideally to some correct 3-`

`description of the body, like when they talk with the doctor. Comp`

`makes all those "B" sigma_1. The UD dovetails on such talk.`

`In AUDA the UD appears in the end, when we restrict the arithmetical`

`interpretation of "p" (in "Bp", "Bp & p") to the sigma_1 propositions.`

`You have to add p->Bp in G, giving G1, to get the corresponding`

`complete and sound theory (by a result of Visser). This is what`

`introduce a basic symmetry at the bottom level of physics, in the`

`"soul" and "matter" hypostases, by making them prove p -> BDp, which`

`makes possible an arithmetical quantization. It is an open problem (in`

`arithmetic/provability logic) if that makes possible already a quantum`

`topological computer (it should, if QM is 100% correct).`

So the Godelization is used twice: - to see the UD in the proof of the sigma_1 sentences by RA, and

`- to see, sparsed in those UD proofs, the proofs made by more complex`

`machines (the LĂ¶bian one) when they try to figure out "what happens",`

`and bet on their possible consistent extension (Dp, p sigma_1). All`

`"Bp" are sigma_1 (by comp).`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.