On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 9:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
>> If your visual cortex is replaced by an electronic device that
>> produces the appropriate outputs at its borders, the rest of your
>> brain will respond normally.
>
> This is just an assumption. I guess that at present one cannot prove or
> disprove it. Let me quote an opposite assumption from Jeffrey Gray (p. 232,
> section 15.5 Consciousness in a brain slice?)

How could the rest of your brain possibly respond differently if it
receives exactly the same stimulation? Perhaps you mean that it would
be able to tell that there is an artificial device there due to
electric fields and so on; but in that case the artificial device is
not appropriately reproducing the I/O behaviour of the original
tissue.

> "Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this way,
> it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a clear
> answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected from its
> normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the functions
> associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a theory that
> started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it would give a
> different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been
> proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!".

It's not clear that an isolated piece of brain tissue would have
normal qualia since it may require the whole brain or at least a large
part of the brain to produce qualia. A neuron in the language centre
won't have an understanding of a small part of the letter "a".


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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