On 25 Aug 2011, at 14:03, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Aren't you restricting your notion of
what is explainable of what your own theory labels explainable with
its own
assumptions?

Yes, but this is due to its TOE aspect: it explains what "explanation"
are, and what we can hope to be 100% explainable, and what we will
never be explained (like the numbers).
It seems to me what it does is assuming what is explained and then explain that this is so, while not making explicit that it is assumes (see below).
In effect, I believe it shows that our efforts to find fundamental
explantions are bound to fail, because explanations do not apply to the fundamental thing. Explanations are just relative pointers from one obvious
thing to another.

This might explain why you don't study the argument. If you believe at the start we cannot do it, I understand the lack of motivation for the hard work.

Have you understood the UD Argument: that IF we can survive with a digital brain, then physics is a branch of computer science or number theory.

I think that your misunderstanding of the AUDA TOE comes from not having seen this point.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

You have to study to understand by yourself that it explain mind and matter from addition and multiplication, and that the explanation is
the unique one maintainable once we say "yes" to the doctor. The
explanation of matter is enough detailed so that we can test the comp
theory with observation.
If this were true, show me a document just consisting of addition and
multplication that tells ANYTHING about mind and matter or even
anything
beyond numbers and addition and multiplication without your
explanation.
As long as you can't provide this it seems to me you ask me to study
something that doesn't exist.

Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
         + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1


Thanks to Jones, Matiyasevitch. Some number Nu verifying that system
of diophantine equations (the variables are integers) are "Löbian
stories", on which the machine's first person indeterminacy will be
distributed.
We don't even need to go farer than the polynomial equations to
describe the ROE.

What you ask me is done in good textbook on Mathematical logic.
You used more than numbers in this example, namely variables.

Statements on numbers can use variable. If you want only numbers, translate those equation into one number, by Gödel's technic. But that would lead to a cumbersome gigantic expression.




But even then,
I am not convinced this formulas make sense as being "löbian stories"
without an explanation. Surely, I can't prove that.

This is like saying that a brain cannot make sense without another brain making sense of it. The point is technical: numbers + addition and multiplication does emulate the computational histories.

You cannot use a personal feeling to doubt a technical result. Probably you are putting too much sense where a study would convince you that there is no such sense.

I am not doing a philosophical point: I assume comp (which assumes both consciousness and physical reality), and I prove from those assumption that the TOE is arithmetic, with all the technical details to extract both quanta and qualia from it.

Of course, to understand the theory you need a brain, and you need sense, but once you understand the theory you can understand where you brain and where your sense comes from.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it
justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non
applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not
need
to be blind faith, though.
This confuses me. So we seem to agree completely on this point. Yet
you
disagreed with my statement that intuition is needed at a
fundamental level.

We don't need it at the *primitive level* in the TOE. Of course we
need it at the meta-level.
You assume that by not mentioning it in the TOE the TOE somehow
independent
of it. Why is it not possible that we simply failed to mention in,
yet still
use it?

It is up to you to show where it is used.
Arithmetics depends on truth/sense.

This is too much ambiguous. It introduces philosophy at a level where we cannot use it.





If there is no truth/sense, no
arithmetical statment can make sense. We have no reason at all to believe sense is restricted to arithmetics, thus with postulating that there is
truth we can use everything.

I assume that I can survive with a digital brain. This gives reasons to believe sense is BEYOND arithmetic, but we know by UDA that arithmetic is enough, and so that sense must be epistemological. Formidably, arithmetic provides the sense. yes: arithmetic provides a lot of things which are beyond 3-arithmetic: the whole of 1-arithmetic.







Bruno Marchal wrote:

Actually it depends on what you mean with universe. If you define
universe
as everything that is, not what we commonly call our universe in
physics
(that works according to QM and GR). If you think of the universe as
all
that is, I would indeed say that it makes not much sense to write on
its
origin, as it would have to be its own origin, as there is nothing
outside
it.

With comp, it is absolutely undecidable if the "Universe" is different
from N, and with Occam, it is enough.
No. We need the sense in N, which is beyond N. Without sense, N is
non-sensical.

If you agree that locally your brain is responsible for your local sense (like when saying "yes" to a doctor), you agree that numbers can make sense by themselves, like neurons can makes sense by themselves in the neuro theory of mind.




It is up to you to prove that sense is only the sense in N.

That is the object of most of the papers I refer too.



Everbody assumes it is more than that. And if you say that we need only the sense in natural numbers, show that the sense in natural numbers makes sense without sense in general, or can somehow by seperated our from sense in
general.

You persist in confusing the levels. You could say to a neurophysiologist that his brain theory does not make sense because he needs a brain to understand it.






Bruno Marchal wrote:

Why do I say this? Because truth apart from
self-knowledge can make no sense to me.

With you = God, OK.

But that kind of knowledge explains nothing. (Remember that the goal
is in finding a conceptual understanding of mind and matter, or the
closer we can get).

With you = "man", I am not OK.
Indeed that kind of knowledge explains nothing. Maybe there is nothing to
explain on a fundamental level.

In a sense you are right. That is why the TOE has some axioms. We cannot explain them, and we cannot explain why we believe that those axioms are true (except by referring to our intuition). But once the theory is there, we stop using the intuition, and do the derivation in the theory. Not in practice, but it is a way to ask a machines her opinion. If we are lead to statement looking too much weird, we can still abandon the theory, but weirdness is subjective, and we have to compare with observations.




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:


But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do
with
COMP is
interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers,
as there
is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized
just with
numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE
certainly can't
do it just with numbers).

We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam).
Then write a formula just consisting of statements of numbers that
explains
something about the mind body problem. You will see that is
impossible.

That is in done through the arithmetical hypostases. All what I have
done is exactly that.
But all of your papers use alot of words. If you just assume
arithmetics,
you shouldn't have to use words. You see, you don't have to express
the mind
body problem with numbers. Just state anything with numbers that
points to
something specific beyond numbers without an linguistic explanation.
You don't have to do it yourself. Just provide a link where purely
arithmetic statements are used to show something beyond.

All textbook in meta-arithmetic. Gödel's 1931 paper. It explains why
this is possible.
By virtue of assuming the meta-level that there are arguing from!

This is confusing. There is certainly a meta-meta-level, but Gödel's work show how a meta-level is embedded in a level, and that is what is used in the machine's theology.

You can't ask for solving the QM equation of your brain to see if you have really understand why 1+1=2, OK?




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

We
need an interpretation. And that this interpretation can be done
within
numbers may well be true, but only if there is another layer of
interpretation on top of that!

I can understand your feeling, but you talk like if LUMs don't exist.
But LUMs are like brain, they don't need to be observed for doing
their own thinking (except trivially by God, in our sense).
Oh, so we need God.

Which is arithmetical truth, and with comp we need only Sigma_1
arithmetical truth.
You don't know if God is arithmetical truth.

Of course. I don't know if comp is true.



Here you really expose
yourself. You presuppose that you know what God is! And if you say we only
need arithmetcical truth, show that it can be seperated from truth in
general.

Show the step you have a problem with in UDA.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

How do you know that God isn't all that is, and is what
you are?

This would eliminate "man" and "nature" from the picture. It would be
like going in the state of God before the creation. We can do that
with meditation, but not in fundamental science, because it avoids the
reality of man and nature.
The goal here is not some infinite joy and peace, but to solve the
mind-body problem. Come back on Earth, will you?

As I see it this is important with regards to what COMP can mean.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

In this case you just said that the LUM needs everything beyond
LUMs to make sense!

Yes. The numbers needs *more* than the numbers to understand the
numbers. They can find it, in the epistemological space of the
numbers. It is big, and "alive".
But how do you know it is just epistemological? Why isn't it included in the sense that is required for numbers to make sense? And this sense can not be
epistemological, as you can't base something ontological on something
epistemological.

Sense is epistemological, in all theories of sense. If you make sense primitive you are back to vitalism and stuff like that. You might be true, but with comp we don't need that, nor can we use it.

I don't take sense, nor matter, as primitive, because the goal consists in explaining them. If you don't like the explanation, just say "no" to the doctor.

I am not pretending any truth. Just that IF DM is correct, then quanta and qualia is described by AUDA, itself justified entirely by addition and multiplication. It is amazing, and you have to grasp this by yourself, or perhaps to find a flaw (we never know).





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

So could say, but this interpretation can be done within numbers as
well.
And then I can say that this interpretation needs something beyond
numbers
as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be done within
numbers
as well. And then I can say that this interpretation needs something
beyond
numbers as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be
done within
numbers as well....

Kleene second recursion theorem, or the Gödel's diagonalization
lemma,
is the technical "trick" which cut that infinite regress. Of course
you need to accept the axiom, like you need some intuition to accept
the idea that your little sister can manage her life without you
being
present.
I don't see how the proof that natural numbers have the ability of
self-reference can cut the infinite regress. it just goes to the
sentence
"And then you can say this interpretation can be  done within
numbers as
well." and makes an artificial cut here. But it doesn't prove that
the next
sentence is not also true ("And then I can say that this
interpretation
needs something beyond numbers as well").

In that case the infinite regress would not been cut. But it is.
Provably so if you agree with the truth of the following sentences:

Classical logic+

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

+ the induction axioms.
I do not agree that this axiom can state all that is true,

That is ambiguous.



so I can extend
whatever it proves.

All LUMs can do that, and most does it. I don't see any problem with that.



The infinite regress is cut, fine. And then I can say
that this needs something beyond numbers as well. The infinite regress
continues outside the system.

Not if comp is true.
I think that a lot of statements you are saying are just equivalent with saying "no" to the doctor. You seem to refuse that your 3-local consciousness is related to a finite machine.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

I think that what you are saying is just that machine or numbers
cannot think without some human being around.
Unless the something beyond is God, in which case I have already
agree. All waht I say would not lake sense without the notion of
arithmetical truth. But this is not hidden: it is part of the theory.
OK. But you hide the possibility that God is consciousness, and is
all that
is. In which case you assume something which may already contain the
interpretation, yourself, the physical universe, etc...

It contains all that, in the sense that we can derive the existence of
it in the theory, but not in the sense that it is assumes it
explicitly in the theory, or implicitly at the meta-level.
OK, it does not assume it explicity, but implicitly.

It is explicit in comp.
And it is a theorem in arithmetic.



We assume God, and it
contains everything, or at least could contain everything, a priori.



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

If it isn't, simply show me something just consisting of arithmetics
which
explains something beyond arithmetics, without an interpetation from
you.
That would convince me.

I can do that. But it will be as long as showing you that a brain can lead a person into believing in a universe. That would be very long.
using G/G* and math, this is shortened, and is the entire object
study
of the AUDA. This relies on fundamental discoveries made by logicians and computer scientists. It cannot be shortened much more than what I
have already done. Now, people familiar with Gödel's proof can get
the
gist of it, without looking at all the detail.
It seems to me Gödel's proof needs interpretation in the
representation of
statements with numbers. We can't show that numbers can interpret
themselves
without already having done /accepting the validity of this step.

We can, with the axioms above.
But only with the acceptance of a meta-level,

The meta-level of the theory belongs to the level of the theory.
Of course we assume journal and papers, and people, at some meta-meta- level. But once you get the point, you get that the theory explains where journal and papers comes from. If you want an explanation where journal and papers come from, before learning the theory, then, no theory at all will ever make sense. You are just asking for something impossible.





that can only be proven to
exist in some sense within numbers by assuming it already!

All this is addressed by the separation between UDA and AUDA.
You told me you grasped the UDA point, but I am no more sure. You do seem to have a problem both with Gödel's theorem in AUDA, but also with the reversal physics/computer science.
Or you are just trying to convince me that comp is false?





Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't
think it can logically proven that Gödel numbering is valid.

Of course we can. The Gödel numbering is very simple. To prove it
valid, is like proving some simple program does what it does. Computer
scientist does that all the time (explicitly or implicitly).
Show me a proof that Gödel numbering is valid from the axioms of arithmetic. I don't see any axiom saying that we can encode symbols with numbers. It
doesn't even mention symbols.

We don't need them. That's the point of the translation.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

There is no Gödel numbering without encoding,
and encoding makes no sense without postulating the sense in what is
encoded
(symbols representing number relations, which are not themselves
part of the
natural numbers).

Then you can say that a french will never understand english, because
it needs french to use an introductory book on the english language.
What has this do with this? The french does not have the axiom that he can only understand french. But in mathematics we act like within the theory it
is only true what the axioms say. And they say nothing about encoding.

The encoding is necessary for a human to understand that the numbers do computations and reasoning. But a human does not need to understand that for having the numbers doing the reasoning, all by themselves.

Like a human is needs for a human brain to understand that rabbit have brains. But a human is not needed for a rabbit to enjoy eating some herb. His brain is enough. Likewise it is shown that addition and multiplication of numbers is enough for the numbers and numbers relations enjoying their own lives.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

PA understand only numbers, so to explain him the meta notion of a
variable, we begin to represent the variable x, y, z, ... by number.
But he doesn't now what representation means. Nowhere in the axiom is the
ability to represent things.

Nowhere in the axiom is the ability to represent the prime numbers. But this can be done. You need to take the time to study Gödel's arithmetization. But the 'magic' there is contained in the functioning of any universal machine. You might study a bit of computer science, and study how computer science is faithfully embedded in arithmetical truth.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is, in effect Gödel postulates something beyond
numbers to prove his theorem.

Not at all. In particular the numbers does prove Gödel's theorem
themselves, and this a long "time" before Gödel appeared on the planet.
They just do it if you interpet this into them.

Not at all. Unless you believe that 17 is prime belongs to human psychology.




Of course you can do it.
Just as you can interpret a poem (of course the kind of interpretation Gödel
does is more formal).


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Maybe I miss something and there is a way to
prove the incompleteness theorem without using any sort of encoding
mechanism, but it seems to be the core of his proof.

The theorem does not depend on the choice of the encoding, and the
encoding exists *in* arithmetic.
This is just true after we have proven this. But we need the encoding to prove it. You are just using the result of a proof as a justification for the proof. Gödel clearly introduced a meta-level, that is not mentioned in the axioms. It is debateable whether this is valid or not, but certainly we
should acknowledge that is is done.

There is nothing debateable here. Unless you mean that all theorems in math are debateable.

I should not have said that the encoding is *in* arithmetic, because this is misleading. The point is that the encoding does what it does: to show that reasoning and computations appears naturally in the numbers true relations. Such truth are supposed to be independent of the us (human mind and physical universe).





Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't want to claim that Gödel's proof is wrong, that would be a
preposterous claim from an non-mathematician that doesn't even
understand
it. But is seems pretty clear to me that it relies on a meta-level,
that is
not implicitly assumed within the natural numbers. This confuses me,
because
I would think that this is not in mathematical proofs, but
apparently it is,
in some circumstances.

Not, it is not. It is pure mathematics.
Depends on what you think as pure mathematics. I personally find it cool that Gödel in some sense subverted the strict formalism of mathematics. But
it certainly requires something beyond the stated axioms to work (that
numbers can represent things).

Gödel's incompleteness is Dt -> ~BDt, and it is a theorem of PA, via some definition made in PA, and for PA.
*you* need also some definition. But no need to go outside PA, for this.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

Since RA is incomplete, this exists. Can you give an example of
a statement just with *,+,numbers that is unprovable?

With RA it is very simple, and I don't need Gödel's theorem/ In RA the
following sentences is not provable:

AxAy  (x + y = y + x)

It asserts the commutativity of addition.

It is "easy" (once a bit familiar with logic) to build a model of RA
which refutes that formula (and yet satisfies all the axioms of RA).
OK. Interesting. What I don't understand, that it seem like this would be
the case with presburger arithmetics, also. But it is not incomplete?

Pressburger Arithmetoc is PA without the multiplication axioms (and without the multiplication symbol). But with the induction axioms.
But RA has no induction axioms.

RA is Turing universal, but Pressburger is not, which allows Pressburger to be complete (on its additive only formula).




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Same question. If there are limit we will see them.
Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for studying
the
limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting
G/
G*
is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is something
bigger than themselves.
But if this is true we should simply be consistent and say that the
TOE is
not a TOE at all.

That is a vocabulary problem. RA is an ontological theory of
everything. The TOE coming from comp is incomplete, if not it would
be
reductionist, instead of being anti-reductionist.
Yeah, we agree on this. But is an incomplete theory of everything a
theory
of everything?

Well, if you define a TOE by a complete theory, then all TOE will just
miss everything, including addition and multiplication.
A long time ago I have made clear that by TOE I mean a theory which
unifies all the forces in nature without eliminating persons.
Then comp shows that if we don't want to eliminate person, the forces
in nature have to be unified through a measure on computational
histories driven by some variant of self-reference.
OK. I just find that TOE sounds inherently reductive.

Why?

On the contrary, it kills the reductive view we might have on numbers and machines, and it guarantie the failure of *any* normative theory on them.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

Also, the claim that numbers are the only thing that is ontologically
required is unfounded. We need God, as you say yourself, which is
the sense
in numbers. And God may include MUCH more than numbers. I'd even say
he
trivially does.

This is your confusion of level again. God is not part of the assumed
ontology. It is part of the implicit meta-level, made explicit in the
comp assumption, and it reappears in the mind of numbers through
simple arithmetical inductive inference principles. Numbers,
relatively to universal numbers, tends to infer the existence of
universal numbers and arithmetical truth..
But even to state one axiom assumes the sense in the axiom,

No. In informal theory (like comp): that is true. In the formal TOE, we don't need to assume the sense, no more that I have to make sense of my own neurons to use them. I have used them before I learned that they exist.



and as sense is
indivisible we can't seperate the sense in the axiom from sense in general.
So there God is already.

In comp, yes. In the TOE, false for the ontic level, and true at the meta-level. But this is not a problem: we know that we cannot explain why we believe in 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Maybe formally it could be used to
explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the
formal
research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret
the
formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be
interpreted on
higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics)

There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The
inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view
from
inside.
But the inside of arithmetics is outside of arithmetics! What you
call
inside of arithmetics CAN'T make sense without the transcendent
truth of
consciousness, which is beyond arithmetics (outside may be less
accurate).

Rght. The TOE (arithmetic) can explain why the Löbian machines see,
and even create things far beyond arithmetic. But with comp, such
things belongs to number's imagination. It exists epistemologically,
unlike the numbers which have a basic ontologically status.
This assumes that the number's imagination are not already included
in God,
which you won't call epistemological, hopefully.

I am not sure. Like in Plotinus, God is not among the beings, and it
transcends the epistemological.
I have concentrated myself on matter and mind. I keep Gods and
Goddesses for pension :)
The problem is, the axioms of arithmetic make no sense without God, if we
think of as God as the sense in things.

Why?
Did you go out of the classroom when your teacher told you that 2+8 = 10, without mentioning God?



And this sense might already include
all dreams.



Bruno Marchal wrote:

But honestly, isn't it akward to search
for something with the awareness that you never get it?

Only that I never get it completely, and that I never get it for sure.
That's the man condition. The meaning is in the search, not in the
finding, and not at all in certainties.
OK. It just seems simpler to me to just find instead of searching without
hope of finding?

But with comp, we have find it. It is not perfect, but it explains why no TOE can be perfect. It is the only theory which explains both matter and persons. People who dislike it are those attached to some Aristotelian dogma, like the existence of a primitive matter.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

It's like searching
for your key and always say "But what if that's not the key. I can't
be
sure.". If we search for the key we will rather say: "Well, that
looks like
they key, let's just act like that's the key, but not like it's the
key to
secrets of the universe".

Then the fundamental questions will be given to those who use terror
and violence. Look at history. Humans needs to search, it is part of
life.
Yeah, until they see that they can just find by looking at what already is.

You are really pleading for prohibiting modesty in the fundamental questioning. The goal is to explain what already is, not to just enjoy it.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:

In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we
merely
assume
that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.

Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory
complete.
It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the
trouble
makers.
OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would
probably
say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear
(like
in black
holes, or the big bang).

This is because they divide numbers by zero. It means that there
is a
problem with their theories.
Maybe there is a problem with the theory that dividing by zero makes
no
sense, or with the concept of zero itself. There may be something
about the
universe that is necessarily indescribeable by mathematics, which
just shows
itself in the mathematical singularity. Maybe it can't be removed.
It would
bet on it, actually. We may find theories that do that, but they
will be
found to be false.


I will not buy that car because I may have an accident. I will not go
out of my mother womb because I might be in trouble. You cannot use
such kind of super-precaution principle.
That is not comparable.  I am not using precaution, I am just using
common
sense. Why would there be a complete mathematical theory, if, for
example,
Gödel showed, that even the mathematics themselves are not complete.
And the
point were it is incomplete will always appear from the perspective
that it
is complete as non-sensical.

The TOE is NOT complete. I insist all the time on that point. It is
hugely antireductionist. It is a promise of infinities of surprises.
It is leads to humility and modesty. It is a TOE in the sense that it
reduces all science to very elementary laws, but those laws can't be
used in practice to solve any Löbian questions, except by saying that the solution, if it exists is inside the head, and not in the relative
apparently external reality.
Aristotle theology, basically confuses God and the physical universe,
and comp says that in your head a vast bigger truth exists, with the
physical universe being only its border.

I am not saying that comp explains everything. I am just saying that
comp prevent physics to explain anything, even physics.

I submit a problem, not an answer. But, conceptually, we can see the
shape of the new big picture, which is more akin to Plato than to
Aristotle.
OK. It's just funny to me to even call this a TOE then.


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

That a theory might be wrong is not an argument against a theory. On the contrary, it is an invitation to dig on the details, and to find out what mmight be wrong (in case the theory is interesting enough).
Yes, I agree. But it is important to recognize that it seems like our
theories are generally inadequate. You already do this on some
level, but
somehow still claim to have a TOE.

A TOE is a theory which adresses the question of "everything" (God,
matter, consciouness, death, and taxes). It is not necessarily a
theory which solves all problems related to those matter, but which
might put them in a coherent pictures.

That is why I prefer the label "theology", in the ancient greek sense,
than TOE, which looks a bit preposterous.
Using it seems much better to me. it sounds more modest.

That's funny. Even in this list, most prefer "TOE" than "theology". But I do agree with you. Now, this is only vocabulary issue.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

If you want keep primitive matter, just abandon comp, but then give
me
your theory of the relation between matter and consciousness.
What bothers me is that we might sneak primitive matter into COMP by
relying
on there being God, who already may include primitive matter.

Not al all. Matter appears from inside the universal dovetailing (or
the proofs of the sigma_1 sentences).
This may make sense, but you can't show that matter wasn't already included
in God. You can't use occam here because God is not reducible.

Oh! Then I will say that my car is pulled by invisible horses, which might be also already included in God. That will prevent people to use Occam to mock my invisible horses.

I thought you were OK with the disappearance of "primitive matter". You seem to backtrack a lot, and I don't see why, except you would like consciousness to be primitive.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

which may be sneaking in
consciousness and with it physical reality through the back door.

Just study the theory.
But the theory won't mention that it does this if it sneaks it in.

Sure. But it is up to you to prove that it sneaks the things. If not
it is just a gratuitous (intuition based, but not proved) accusation.
You presuppose sense, already, and obviously, in order for numbers to make
sense.

Not at all.



Why could sense not already include all the stuff you later show to
exist? What makes it plausible that sense is just the sense in numbers?

Comp.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

You said
yourself that your TOE does not assume them, so it is hopeless to
find them
within the theory. You see my point?

But it finds them, without assuming them. You talk like if the theory
did not work. But it works very well, up to the open problem (the
measure problem, the white rabbit, the derivation of physics, etc.).
I use comp as a metatheory to say:

1) the mind body problem is not solved
2) the mind body problem is transformed into this purely mathematical
problem, which is partially solved currently, but mathematicians have
to improved it.
3) all this fit with Plato's TOE/theology, and not with Aristotle TOE/
theology
The theory might work, no doubt about that. I am not critizing the formal
part of the theory, just your interpretation of it.

The whole point is that the interpretation is done by the numbers/ numbers relation.

This is common in comp and in Everett. The theory explains where self- aware substructures appears and develop the theory and its interpretation(s).





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

I know
that we can show that numbers can look at themselves, but it can't
be shown
that they can do it without us (some general intelligence).

They need only God, to make sense of the idea that 17 is prime
independently of any little ego.
OK. They need God. But is God anything less than everything (possibly
beyond)? If they need everything or more, well, it effectively shows
that it
needs every little ego.

Here God was just the set of all true arithmetical sentences. It is a
3-God.
But true arithmetical sentences need truth itself. Why do you suppose truth
does not include many different things?

Because arithmetical truth justifies the beliefs in the many different things.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to
inconsistent
theory.
But inconsistent with respect to what?

Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and
~p.
But that is just incosistent with classical logic.

No. It is inconsistent with all logic, except the paraconsistent one.
So? This is just what I said.
No. You said that it is inconsistent with classical logic. I said it
is inconsistent in almost all logics, except one.
Uhm, sorry, I misexpressed myself. I didn't mean that it is only
inconsistent with classical logic, I meant that it is just a property of
classical logic (among other logics), and thus is not absolute.

OK, but to use this against the TOE, it is up to you to give me an arithmetical sentence which would be neither true nor false.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

I can easily assert "I am
big and I am not big (small)" and this is not absolutely
inconsistent.

Yes it is.
If it absolutely inconsistent, how come I can easily make sense of it?

Because you use it as an abbreviation of some other statement. But
when we formalize we don't do that.
The statement makes sense in its own right.

No. If you say "I am big and not big", I have to infer much more than what is said. It is a poetical expression.



I could just as well claim that
1+1=2 is an abbreviation of 1+1+0=2, 1+1+0+0=2, 1+1+0+0+0=2, etc...

No problem with that. In this case, the first one is the simplest, though.



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It
just means I am big with respect to an insect and small with respect
to the
sun.

That is another statement.
It is a clarification of the former statement.

Like I said. But in formal theory, we don't clarify thing, we take the statement as definite. if not, we would not been able to finish a proof.
OK, but this method is limited. It just works as long as we don't talk about stuff that has too many interpretative possibilities inherent to it. That's
why I critize this approach when we talk about fundamental matters.

Why?
There is no worry given that the TOE is a negation theology which protect machine/souls against normative and reductive theory.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

We don't need to restrict ourselves
to classical logic, do we?

We don't really need that, but we still need the rule of non
contradiction.
Yes some rule of non contradiction seems useful for saying
anything of
value. But this need not be "p and ~p is not allowed". It may be
subjective,
for example. In music non contradiction means that we don't use only
dissonance, but we can use consonance and dissonance together. But
what is
dissonance is itself quite subjective.

You cannot lift the meaning of words from one domain to another,
without taking some caution.
That's right. My point is only that it may be possible to be more
flexible
about what is inconsistent than just "p and ~p is not allowed".

That is possible, and even useful, for example when studying natural
languages. But that is not what we do when studying the consequences
of the comp. hyp.
I am not sure we can avoid this if we go so near to the source of
everything. I think in interpreting the consequence of COMP we already have
to go beyond classical logic.

You are right. That is illustrated by AUDA: it attaches 8 non classical logics to any (correct) machines.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels,
but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to anything
interesting. It is just non comprehensible.
Why? Of course it makes no sense to not distinguish between false
and right
at all (except if you want to point something that is entirely
beyond
words). But this distinction need not lie in not allowing assertions
of
classical contradictions (p and ~p).

Well, you are free to try a fundamental theory in some obscure logic.
I am not sure there is a fundamental theory.

You are restricting science, like the Aristotelians. You abandon the
fundamental questions to the fanatics, by doing so.
No. The fanatics claim to have an answer. There is no answer.

That's my point. To decide that there is no answer, gives the audience to the fanatics. To accept there is no answer YET, open the mind to questioning an research.



Just as long
as people think that there is a answer in words they will fall prey to
fanatics. They just could learn to be still and look within.

No. History illustrates that the human fits the hole, with anything, like vitalism, primary matter (perhaps) and other phlogiston.

And I do not provide answer, on the contrary to understand comp = to understand that the mind-body problem is two times more hard than the materialist believes. Yes, AUDA paves the way to reread Plato, and to listen to the Mystics intuition, and to listen to the machines themselves. Through math, they already chat a lot.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with
our
intuition, but then constistency is subjective).

It is not. It is 3-p definable.
Definable with respect to some theory, eg classical logic. But
classical
logic is obviously false if taken as an absolute, in my mind. There
seem to
be some inherently true contradictions, like "the world is good and
not
good".

But this is made clear in the TOE. You are confusing (p & ~p) with
(Bp
and B~p). the first is contradictory and the second is not.
But it is not only that I believe that the world is good and it is
not good.
It may just be that way. Why not?

Because to say that "the world is good and not good" is poetical. It
is not a statement in a formal theory. A more formal statement would
be the world is felt as good in such circumstances by such agent, etc.
The entire point is that a formal theory won't help much in fundamental matters, and even be confusing, as we are bound to use informal reasoning in
interpreting it. That's why I argue against your use of COMP.

What do you mean by "My use of comp"? I make it precise so that people can find a flaw if there is one. And I recall you that Bp & p leads to a meta-formalization, by the machine, of something necessarily informal. This allows to attribute consciousness to machine in a highly non reductive way. Actually AUDA is not my theory, it is the one anyone can get by just listening to platonicians LUMs (and, studying a bit universal machine functioning (computer science, mathematical logic).





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real
life
happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can
we?
Or, we
accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or
inconsistent, is
subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of
inconsistency is
futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is
incosistent.

But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop
doing
research.
Yeah, but we can try to be more consistent even if we accept we are
inconsistent. Why not?

At some level, but accepting this at the start will just make things
unnecessarily complex.
It seems very simple to me. "Let's just forget about getting it
absolutely
right, and get on with more practical things".

Let us abandon fundamental research. With that attitude the
authoritative argument in the human affair, and its impending
arbitrariness,  will continue to prevail for centuries.
The mistake is to think that the fundamental things can be put into some
theoretical frame, dogmatic rules, etc...

Dogma is exactly what is 100% disallowed in (ideal) science. On the contrary, science uses ONLY hypothesis. I know some scientist are dogmatic, but this is because they fail to do science, and come to confuse hypothesis and truth.

To admit theorization is a prevention against dogma.




Research of fundamental things is
continuing the error on a lesser scale. The fundamental things are not
really researchable, they are just seeable.

? I have no clue what you mean by "seeing" a fundamental thing.




(Of course I am not referring to
*relatively* fundamental things like quarks or something). It is not wrong to do research on it, or make dogma out of it, but it is not going to lead
us to where we want to be.

I am not sure what you are defending. I worry because it looks like pseudo-religious critics of the scientific inquiry.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

But we seem to have different
approaches to widening the scope of science.

I use the scientific way.
If we just use science to extend science, we will be limited by our
preconceived notions of what science is.

Not at all. That is the case for those who confuse science and truth,
but science is just modesty and clarity. It is *the* place where
people (or their students) can admit having been wrong. That happens
rarely in philosophy and current theology.
Modesty and clarity are great. But maybe we should make place in science for
less rigorous methods then these that are accepted now.

The more you are rigorous, the less you are manipulable, and the more you are free. If the human science were rigorous, the human would be much more free, and I think happy and living well.




This has little to
do with modesty, to the contrary, it is being modest with respect to the
limits of rigor.

The rigor consists to put "?". Less rigor would mean more arbitrariness, and more cruelty.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

And this to avoid the possibility of a truth because *you* don't
like
it?
It's not that primarily that I don't like it, more that it seems
incoherent
to me (not provably incoherent). I am not opposed to incoherent
things, but
well, they are incoherent, so I feel compelled to argue against
them.

Ha ha! You betrayed yourself here. You need coherence like all
scientists.
Sure. I just don't need to dualistically conceive of coherence as not
asserting p and ~p.

Because in most formal logic (p & ~p) -> q for any q.
If chicken have teeth we can put Paris in a bottle (we say in french).
Yes, but this may just be a shortcoming of most formal logics. They work
fine in math, but only in a limited sense beyond.

Formal logic is not used in math.
Formal logics are basically machines, and they are the *object* of studies of logicians, which makes that study out the forma systems, by using informal mathematics and reasoning, like any scientists.

Shortcomings of formalism are related to shortcomings of machine, and machines are well aware of their shortcomings. It is not by insulting them, or telling everybody that they are irremediably stupid that you will help them.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

so to say it is just the
inside view of numbers hardly makes sense, also.

I have no clue why, unless you postulate some non-comp theory.
Because in COMP, too, the consciousness may already be presumed in sense
that is needed for anything to make sense, including numbers.

COMP is an assumption of invariance of consciousness for digital substitution of a body/brain/universe. It certainly assumes consciousness. Then the reasoning explain how comp leads to an explanation of how consciousness "appears" (not in time, but in a logical frame). It is when numbers develop persisting "relatively correct hallucinations" of realities. There is no possible government in the entire arithmetical truth capable of preventing numbers to do love and drugs, you know.

Just that current humans still look for authoritative arguments, in all direction. I'm afraid I will have to come back next millennium.

My father, who was a judge, told me a long time ago, that I can chose between the human science and the exact sciences, as profession. He told me that in science, the most important thing is rigor. Not so much in the exact science, where the errors are easily found by colleagues, machines or quick catastrophes, but mainly in the human sciences, where errors can persist and destroy lifes for centuries if not millennia.

That's why I propose only reasoning, and debunk (or try to debunk) invalid reasoning.

I can do nothing against 'fancy theories'. People have the right to cross the ocean with a sieve.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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