Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>>>> It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
>>>>>>> What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
>>>>>>> build a
>>>>>>> theory.
>>>>>> You could define this as primitive ontological entity, but  
>>>>>> honestly
>>>>>> this has
>>>>>> nothing to do with what I call a primitive ontological entity.  
>>>>>> As I
>>>>>> understand a primitive ontological entity, it doesn't need to be
>>>>>> assumed,
>>>>>> and even less explicitly. It is just there whether we assume it or
>>>>>> not, and
>>>>>> this is what makes it primitive and ontological.
>>>>> You confuse a theory and its (intended) model (or subject matter).
>>>>> This is a widespread confusion, and that is related to the fact  
>>>>> that
>>>>> physicists use "model" where logicians use "theory".
>>>> Hm, I don't understand where my confusion lies. If anything, it
>>>> seems to me
>>>> confusing theory and subject matter lies in considering anything  
>>>> that
>>>> depends on assumptions within a theory a primitive ontological
>>>> entity. If it
>>>> dependent on assumptions, it doesn't seem to be ontological.
>>> In that case I understand why you want consciousness to be  
>>> "primitive".
>>> But in a theory, by definition, you have to assume what exists. All
>>> existence on anything we want to talk in a theoretical frmaework as  
>>> to
>>> be assumed, or derived from what we assumed, even consciousness. If
>>> not, such theories are no more 3-communicable. In fact I think that
>>> you are confusing the ontology, and the theoretical description of
>>> that ontology. I think this is due to a lack of familiarity with
>>> "theoretical reasoning".
>> Hm... OK. I am not sure that there are valid 3-communicable theories  
>> about
>> fundamental issues. I guess that is what it comes down to. I am not  
>> against
>> science, I am just skeptical that it can really touch fundamental  
>> issues. It
>> seems to me we always sneak 3-incommunable things into such a theory.
> This is the case for all theorizing. Like we often use the intuition  
> of natural numbers implicitly.
So we agree on this. My point is than that we must be careful if we claim
that some theory explains in a 3-communicable fundamental matters. It may be
we sneak our intuition into the theory. Our intuition of natural numbers may
be fundamentally inseparable from our intution of what is beyond. So it
might be we use numbers + our intuition what is beyond and claim that we
derived it from just numbers. It seems to me to be what COMP does.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> So in
>> COMP, I think the 3-communicable part doesn't ultimately explain much
>> fundamental, as it totally relies on the subjective interpretation,  
>> that you
>> call the "inside view of arithmetics", that seems to me just to be the
>> primary conciousness.
> Comp explains a lot, but you have to study it to grasp this by yourself.
> The inside views are recovered by the intensional variant of the  
> provability predicate.
> It makes comp (the classical theory of knowledge) testable, because  
> the physical reality is among those views.
Honestly I can't see that studying COMP will help with what is my problem.
It seems to be more fundamental than some issue of understanding a theory in

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> For me it is
>>>>>>>> just so integral to everything that I can't see how calling it
>>>>>>>> primitive
>>>>>>>> could be wrong.
>>>>>>> Both matter and consciousness have that feature, but this means
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> they are fundamental, not that they are primitive.
>>>>>> In the sense above you may be right, but then I don't agree with
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> definition.
>>>>> Let us use primitive in my sense, to fix the idea, and let us use
>>>>> "fundamental" for your sense.
>>>>> Those are the sense used in this list for awhile, and it would be
>>>>> confusing to change suddenly the terming.
>>>> OK. The terminology doesn't really matter. But then I have to say  
>>>> that
>>>> primitive has nothing to do with what is primary in reality. It is
>>>> just what
>>>> we treat as primary in a theory, which may have little do to with
>>>> what is
>>>> primary in reality.
>>> With comp, you can take the numbers, or the combinators, or any  
>>> finite
>>> data structures. It does not matter at all. It does not makes sense  
>>> to
>>> ask what are the real one, because they are ontologically equivalent.
>>> With the numbers, you can prove that the combinators (or the  
>>> programs)
>>> exist. With the combinators, you can prove that the numbers exists
>>> (and do what they are supposed to do). But, to talk and search for  
>>> the
>>> consequences, we have to fix the initial theory. They all leads to  
>>> the
>>> same theory of consciousness and matter.
>> Good, but this doesn't really change what I wrote.
>> Just because we assume the numbers to be ontological and derive
>> consciousness from that, which we *assume* to be epistemological  
>> from the
>> start, doesn't mean that this reflects reality. It might as well be  
>> the case
>> that consciousness is ontologically there from the start, gives rise  
>> to
>> numbers, and numbers can reflect their source ("derive" its  
>> existence). I
>> think this question cannot be settled rationally. We can just ask  
>> ourselves
>> "What does really make sense to me?".
> With comp consciousness is platonistically co-extensive with the  
> numbers (including their additive and multiplicative laws), but this  
> reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem.
> And the mind problem is reduce to the study of what is true *about*  
> the machine (this includes many things true for the machine but not  
> justifiable by her).
But couldn't it be that the notion of what is true about something is
extending so far that it encompasses so much that it is practically false to
say that it is what is true about something? For example, we could say that
is true about frogs that there is something beyond them that is called a
universe that has such and such properties. Yet, for all intents and
purposes this is nothing about frogs at all. Couldn't it be possible that
this is what COMP does with machines?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> It's a bit like saying that existence isn't primitive. What
>>>>>>>> would that even mean? Deriving the existence of existence, or
>>>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>>>> seems quite meaningless to me.
>>>>>>> Existence can be handled by simple rule (like deducing ExP(x)  
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> P(m) for some m).
>>>>>>> Consciousness has no similar rules.
>>>>>> But the existence you speak of is not existence as such. It is  
>>>>>> just
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> existence of a thing in a particular theory.
>>>>> That is always the case when we do science. (3-discourse).
>>>> Right, that is why science cannot touch existence as such. It can
>>>> just make
>>>> relative sense of phenomena within existence.
>>> That is not entirely true, although a big part of it is true. But it
>>> would be long to explain, when such things explains themselves better
>>> once we grasp comp well enough.
>>> In fact science deals all the time with existence, and this without
>>> doing an ontological commitment. But when we apply science, some  
>>> local
>>> and global ontological commitment can be done. So with a TOE, we need
>>> to take seriously some term of our theory, if not we remain
>>> "academical".
>> OK. I guess I don't agree with that because I don't agree with the  
>> concept
>> of a TOE.
>> Of course science deals with existence, everything does. But it can't
>> explain existence, or formalize existence.
> Explaining for a scientist does not mean so much. It means basically  
> to reduce something to something which we can explain, or accept.
> But a TOE can do one think more: explain that its primitive terms are  
> no more reducible. The TOE isolated by comp does that.
This is semantics again but you just showed yourself why it doesn't make
much sense to call this a TOE, as theory says that it specifically does NOT
explain everything. You might say that it explains everything explainable,
but this may just be an artifact of what you consider explainable within the

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just  
>>>>>>>>>>>> stating a
>>>>>>>>>>>> (strong)
>>>>>>>>>>>> intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.
>>>>>>>>>>> Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge,
>>>>>>>>>>> suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
>>>>>>>>>> This may be a strong point against COMP.
>>>>>>>>> Why? On the contrary, it mirrors the emergence of a mind-body
>>>>>>>>> problem
>>>>>>>>> in the discourse of the universal numbers.
>>>>>>>>> Once I say "yes" to the doctor, I lost the option of taking  
>>>>>>>>> those
>>>>>>>>> discourses as zombies one.
>>>>>>>> The problem is that we rely on our intuition to say yes
>>>>>>> We can't. We have to rely on some theories, which are always
>>>>>>> hypothetical. It is not different than taking a plane.
>>>>>> But then to rely on some theories, we can just use our intuition  
>>>>>> to
>>>>>> judge
>>>>>> whether they are reliable (or we talk us into some "rational"
>>>>>> reason, that
>>>>>> is ultimately just as dependent on some intuition). So we are
>>>>>> again at
>>>>>> square one.
>>>>> Not really. The intuition needed to understand a theory is equal to
>>>>> the intuition needs to understand the natural numbers. Not a lot.
>>>>> Then
>>>>> the theory, if precise enough, is refutable, and that is all we can
>>>>> hope for. (Yes, a scientist is *happy* when someone is kind  
>>>>> enough to
>>>>> show him/her wrong).
>>>> OK. But I don't understand how this would lead us to accept COMP.
>>>> How can we
>>>> accept COMP due to understanding natural numbers?
>>> "digital" = natural number theoretical. The digitalist doctor will  
>>> put
>>> your "soul" on a disk, and from a 3-view, this is only a number.
>>> COMPuters, from a 3-view, are well know to be "number crunching
>>> machine". Etc.
>> Fine, but even if we understand this intuitive faith is required  
>> that we
>> will survive our digital substitution.
> Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it  
> justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non  
> applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not need  
> to be blind faith, though.
This confuses me. So we seem to agree completely on this point. Yet you
disagreed with my statement that intuition is needed at a fundamental level.
Do you think there is faith apart from inuition? This doesn't seem to make
much sense to me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> It might be that all good theories about reality as a whole show
>>>>>>>> that it
>>>>>>>> makes sense to reject them, as they are always incomplete, and  
>>>>>>>> if
>>>>>>>> they are
>>>>>>>> good they will reflect that.
>>>>>>>> In the limit this could lead us to reject theories as such, in
>>>>>>>> accordance
>>>>>>>> with what they say!
>>>>>>> Who knows. But that is a speculation, and it would be unwise to
>>>>>>> reject
>>>>>>> a theory by speculating that the theories in the future will say
>>>>>>> so.
>>>>>> It is really so speculative? The more sophisticated our theories
>>>>>> get, the
>>>>>> more they seem to point towards something beyond theories. COMP
>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>> does that very powerfully.
>>>>>> That this will lead us to abandon theories as such seems to be  
>>>>>> just
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> conclusion of that.
>>>>> That is an argument against science is general.
>>>> Right, it is an argument that science in general is quite a limited
>>>> tool.
>>> But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
>> Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do with  
>> COMP is
>> interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers,  
>> as there
>> is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized  
>> just with
>> numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE  
>> certainly can't
>> do it just with numbers).
> We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam).
Then write a formula just consisting of statements of numbers that explains
something about the mind body problem. You will see that is impossible. We
need an interpretation. And that this interpretation can be done within
numbers may well be true, but only if there is another layer of
interpretation on top of that!
So could say, but this interpretation can be done within numbers as well.
And then I can say that this interpretation needs something beyond numbers
as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be done within numbers
as well. And then I can say that this interpretation needs something beyond
numbers as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be done within
numbers as well....
It it clear that there can be no formal settling of the argument, as within
formality it is not expressable that we need an interpretation transcendent
of the numbers. Yet it can be intuitively clear that this is the case.
If it isn't, simply show me something just consisting of arithmetics which
explains something beyond arithmetics, without an interpetation from you.
That would convince me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> So the TOE is not a TOE at all, because it just a
>> way of representing all of our knowledge (that is practically  
>> outside of the
>> TOE) within the TO"E".
> No. But really you have to study it. Knowledge is not representable in  
> any TOE. The theaetetus theory needs to invoke God, or Truth. But we  
> can define it for simpler machine than us, and then the comp hyp lifts  
> the theory up to us, at the meta-level, for technical reason of  
> soundness. When we do that, the "divine intellect" warn us that it is  
> at our own risk and peril.
Anyway, then the point is that we do it at a meta-level. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> That doesn't have to lead us to abandon doing science, anymore than
>>>> seeing
>>>> that being a baby is limited is leading us to abandoning babies. But
>>>> we may
>>>> outgrow being babies, and science.
>>> Science is like a lantern, when used properly it shows us our
>>> ignorance, like when you put light on darkness and see how big the
>>> place you were in is.
>> Yes, that's how I see the role of science, too.
> Really? Then why could we note use the lantern on fundamental question?
It is not sufficient. It is like using a candle to light up the universe. It
will only show you a small part. See, science on its own can never show you
what a transcendental meditative state can show you. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I am not sure if theories can even be true, ultimately. They are
>>>> just a tool
>>>> for explaining our observations, and they can only be relatively
>>>> true in the
>>>> sense that they serve that purpose. You say yourself that we can
>>>> only refute
>>>> theories, and never show them to be true. So why even suspect they
>>>> could be
>>>> true?
>>> Why not? It works that way.
>>> Fireman know that a call for fire might be a (bad) joke, yet they  
>>> will
>>> go on he place, because it might be true.
>>> We use theory all the time. They can also be approximatively true,  
>>> and
>>> very useful. All this becomes more delicate when searching a TOE. But
>>> that is not a reason to abandon the research.
>> No, I am not arguing for abandoning research. I just think that  
>> there is
>> limits to what is researchable.
> Same question. If there are limit we will see them.
> Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for studying the  
> limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting G/G*  
> is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is something  
> bigger than themselves.
But if this is true we should simply be consistent and say that the TOE is
not a TOE at all. There is something beyond it. And so there is a truth that
is beyond scientific truth. And in this sense no theory is true, as it can't
capture this truth. Ultimately, it comes down to our notion of truth. We
might seperate relative truth and absolute truth, and true theories can only
be relatively true, not absolutely true.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> It seems to me a TOE is beyond what is
>> researchable.
> Not only we can search it, but we can derive it rigorously from the  
> comp assumption. If the brain works like a machine, then the TOE is  
> arithmetic.
What is akward that COMP says the brain can't be a machine, as nothing
physical can be a machine. OK, probably you mean works practically like a
machine (for the purpose of accepting a digital substitution). But then you
can just expect COMP to be true on some level, not absolutely true, as
working like a machine is just an approximation.
Also, I still doubt that the TOE works with arithmetic alone. Numbers
interpreting themselves doesn't convince me, as this just works if we
interpet into them that they interpret themselves (which is possible and
coherent, no doubt about that).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Not because I am not open to the idea, but I don't see how any
>> proposed TOE really explains much at all.
> Arithmetic not only explain quanta and qualia, but it does so in a  
> precise technical way, so that we can test, refute it, etc.
But it does so in a very limited way. Like "What is true is true" explains
everything (of course it explains a lot more, but it is just an anology).
The big limitation seems to me that it needs  a big amount of
trans-arithmetic interpretation to make sense. But maybe you can show me
something that transcends numbers just with numbers, I am interested in your

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Maybe formally it could be used to
>> explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the formal
>> research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret the
>> formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be  
>> interpreted on
>> higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics)
> There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The  
> inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view from  
> inside.
But the inside of arithmetics is outside of arithmetics! What you call
inside of arithmetics CAN'T make sense without the transcendent truth of
consciousness, which is beyond arithmetics (outside may be less accurate).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> - which makes the
>> formality somewhat superflous.
>> As I see it, we will just exhaust ourselves with trying to find  
>> truth in
>> theories. This doesn't mean we can't use them. Just that we don't  
>> treat them
>> as being true. Like we don't hope to find the truth in our keyboard.  
>> It is
>> just a tool, and as such not true or false.
> My keyboard does not assert propositions. Machines and theories do. So  
> we can listen to them and compare with what we believe, know, guess,  
> observe, etc.
Yes, clearly we can. Yet this will only show us what theories can believe,
know, guess, and not the truth itself.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> What can make me a bit nervous is when people believes that comp is
>>>>> false, based on invalid reasoning, or prejudice against some idea.
>>>>> I have no clue why you could have any problem with comp, given that
>>>>> 1)
>>>>> you have admitted not having study the theory, 2) you seem to  
>>>>> have no
>>>>> problem with its main consequences (that physics is secondary to
>>>>> consciousness, non materialism, soul immortality, coming back to
>>>>> Plato
>>>>> and the mystics, etc.).
>>>> I have not studied it in detail, but I have read and roughly
>>>> understood the
>>>> main argument, and consequences. I simply am not sure that a digital
>>>> substition of our brain will leave our experience relatively
>>>> invariant.
>>> But that is only the comp assumption. Not only you cannot be sure,  
>>> but
>>> the theory will explain why you should not be sure about this.
>> OK. But then it just natural that I don't accept it. Even the theory  
>> itself
>> seems to agree with me if I reject it.
> No. It agrees with your 1-p, in the sense that it shows that if is  
> true, it can only be in virtue of some truth extending yourself. It  
> explains why we feel like solipsist, IF solipsism is false. If you  
> reject the theory you can't use it for rejecting the theory.
No, not direclty. But that the theory is close to self-refuting may lead us
to believe it is indeed false, even if it can't be absolutely shown within
the theory.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I
>>>> don't see why I would necessarily bet on that.
>>> To see the next soccer club, or the marriage of your dear grand- 
>>> grand-
>>> grand-grand-grand-daughter, or for making one more salvia experience,
>>> or for taking one more cup of coffee on a terrace some sunny day.
>>> People will have their own motivations.
>> Alright, but even if I try it this doesn't make me accept COMP.
> ?
> Operationally, if you say yes to the doctor *qua computatio* (without  
> adding magical thing in matter and mind), it means that you accept,  
> and then you have to accept its consequence (if you are rational in  
> the field).
No. I might just try it because I have no other possibility. Just because I
pray to God in a very horrific situation, does not mean I believe in God.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we merely
>>>> assume
>>>> that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.
>>> Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory  
>>> complete.
>>> It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the trouble
>>> makers.
>> OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would  
>> probably
>> say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear (like  
>> in black
>> holes, or the big bang).
> This is because they divide numbers by zero. It means that there is a  
> problem with their theories.
Maybe there is a problem with the theory that dividing by zero makes no
sense, or with the concept of zero itself. There may be something about the
universe that is necessarily indescribeable by mathematics, which just shows
itself in the mathematical singularity. Maybe it can't be removed. It would
bet on it, actually. We may find theories that do that, but they will be
found to be false.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Also, in quantum mechanics, the whole universe is fundamentally
>>>> entagled,
>>>> calling the very idea of emulation into question. You can't emulate
>>>> the
>>>> whole universe.
>>> A priori you can, except with comp, because the physical universe
>>> appears to be a sum on all what you cannot emulate.
>>> Remember that the quantum is Turing emulable. The UD does emulate an
>>> infinity of quantum objects.
>> It comes down to the idea that the UD exists apart from physical  
>> reality.
> Which is the case if you still agree with your statement that "17 is  
> prime" is true (or a facet of God).
No, not necessarily. That we can't seperate "17 is prime" from physical
reality does not mean that 17 is contigent on particularities of physical
reality, that could or could not be the case. It may be interwoven with all
of physical reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Even though I don't believe that physics are more primary than  
>> numbers, I
>> don't think that we can say that numbers existence independently of  
>> them.
>> They may be interdependent.
> Once numbers exists (always assumed to be obeying the + and * laws),  
> their dreams exist, logically. So you can say that their are  
> interdependent, in a sort of trivial way.
Yes. But this may make it inconsistent to conceive of numbers existing
independently of physical reality.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I don't believe we can seperate existence neatly
>> into physical existence and arithmetical existence.
> Physical existence is entirely explained by an unavoidable way numbers  
> can look at themselves.
If you assume that numbers can look at themselves, which may be sneaking in
consciousness and with it physical reality through the back door. I know
that we can show that numbers can look at themselves, but it can't be shown
that they can do it without us (some general intelligence). This is just an 
IMHO unfounded assumption of yours.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> as the emulation itself -
>> being within the universe -  could change the universe (as, if I  
>> understood
>> QM correctly, there is always some entaglement between everything,  
>> even
>> though it may be extremely weak), rendering the emulation invalid.
> QM is not assumed, but recovered. And the UD emulates itself  
> infinitely often without any problem. QM and the UD does not live on  
> the same reality layer.
Hm, I question that. It assumes that numbers are independent of the physical
universe. Well, I guess that assumptions is in COMP, is it?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> Maybe making formalized theories is just a transitory
>>>>>>>> phenomenon, it
>>>>>>>> may
>>>>>>>> ultimately be a dead end.
>>>>>>> In that case, life is a dead end.
>>>>>> ?
>>>>>> Life is not a formalized theory.
>>>>> The 'life of consciousness' is not, but the life of a body is,  
>>>>> unless
>>>>> you have an evidence of concrete special infinities.
>>>> I need no infinities for that. The word theory, especially "formal
>>>> theory",
>>>> just doesn't applies to life as such, except in a metaphorical way.
>>> A formal theory just means a finite things with some shape.
>> Hm, I am not sure life is a finite thing.
> It is not. But living being are (locally) finite. That's the  
> assumption. Mechanism is a form of local self-finitude of the body  
> assumption.
> I don't defend the idea, just that it entails in a verifiable way that  
> the TOE is arithmetic.
For not defending this idea you.... umh, are defending this idea quite much.
At least it appear that way to me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> ...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming  
>>>>>>>>>>>> that WE
>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>> all God,
>>>>>>>>>>>> though. :D
>>>>>>>>>>> They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify  
>>>>>>>>>>> you,
>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>>>> course censor the discovery.
>>>>>>>>>>> It can make sense when you see how far some are able to
>>>>>>>>>>> misunderstand
>>>>>>>>>>> the statement.
>>>>>>>>>>> In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that,  
>>>>>>>>>>> but if
>>>>>>>>>>> assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself  
>>>>>>>>>>> into
>>>>>>>>>>> bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
>>>>>>>>>> Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom.
>>>>>>>>> Because you will become inconsistent.
>>>>>>>> So? We need formal consistency only in math, apart from math
>>>>>>>> inconsistencies
>>>>>>>> are abundant, and acceptable. Even in science. General  
>>>>>>>> relativity
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> quantum mechanics are quite inconsistent with each other!
>>>>>>> We need consistency if only to have a reality to look for.
>>>>>>> Inconsistency makes people saying about anything. It is very  
>>>>>>> easy,
>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>> boring and unproductive, and eventually it leads to suffering. In
>>>>>>> fact
>>>>>>> suffering is the reaction of the soul in front of threat of
>>>>>>> inconsistency.
>>>>>> To me consistency and inconsistency can coexist. Inconsistency  
>>>>>> just
>>>>>> means
>>>>>> that our mind has no coherent understanding of something. 1=0 just
>>>>>> appears
>>>>>> inconsistent because it doesn't fit with your internal
>>>>>> representation of
>>>>>> natural numbers. Someone might just explain that he uses the  
>>>>>> symbols
>>>>>> 0 and 1
>>>>>> interchangeably, and 2 means what you understand as 1, etc....
>>>>> If someone says that 0 = 1, and later makes clear he is not talking
>>>>> on
>>>>> the natural numbers 0 and 1, then he was consistent, and we were  
>>>>> just
>>>>> not talking on the same subject. It was not inconsistency, but  
>>>>> just a
>>>>> vocabulary problem.
>>>> The point is that inconsistencies are relative to some theoretical
>>>> system
>>>> that we use. So we don't need to be worried if something is
>>>> inconsistent
>>>> from a particular point of view, since we aren't forced to believe
>>>> that this
>>>> theoretical system is the ultimate arbiter of what is true.
>>> In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to inconsistent
>>> theory.
>> But inconsistent with respect to what?
> Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and ~p.
But that is just incosistent with classical logic. I can easily assert "I am
big and I am not big (small)" and this is not absolutely inconsistent. It
just means I am big with respect to an insect and small with respect to the
sun. You won't argue that this is an absolutely inconsistent statement, do

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> We don't need to restrict ourselves
>> to classical logic, do we?
> We don't really need that, but we still need the rule of non  
> contradiction.
Yes some rule of non contradiction seems useful for saying anything of
value. But this need not be "p and ~p is not allowed". It may be subjective,
for example. In music non contradiction means that we don't use only
dissonance, but we can use consonance and dissonance together. But what is
dissonance is itself quite subjective. 

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels,  
> but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to anything  
> interesting. It is just non comprehensible.
Why? Of course it makes no sense to not distinguish between false and right
at all (except if you want to point something that is entirely beyond
words). But this distinction need not lie in not allowing assertions of
classical contradictions (p and ~p).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
>> of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with our
>> intuition, but then constistency is subjective).
> It is not. It is 3-p definable.
Definable with respect to some theory, eg classical logic. But classical
logic is obviously false if taken as an absolute, in my mind. There seem to
be some inherently true contradictions, like "the world is good and not

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
>>> your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real life
>>> happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
>> Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can we?  
>> Or, we
>> accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or  
>> inconsistent, is
>> subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of  
>> inconsistency is
>> futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is incosistent.
> But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop doing  
> research.
Yeah, but we can try to be more consistent even if we accept we are
inconsistent. Why not?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Imagine that your doctor tell you that you have to stay in your bed  
> all the time for three days, and do some walk every morning.
> You will not say: OK doctor, Life is inconsistent and I will follow  
> your recommendation in some inconsistent way.
I will. It is not always wise to follow your doctors recommendations
(especially psychiatrists!). Or your own recommendations. Sometimes we just
act utterly "irrational", and I think this is fine. Rationality is limited,
we can't rely on it alone. It doesn't even make sense on its own. There is
no rationality without transrational things.
The relationship between rationaliy and irrationality is very subtle and
puzzling. For the most part we (seemingly?) just rely on our rationality,
but in critical points it totally fails (like justifying rationality). It is
like having a map that's very accurate, but at the point that is really
interesting to you it just embeds itself into an infite fractal that's not
telling you anything.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> You look like trying to justify that you don't want to do scientific
>>> research. But I never say that people should do scientific  
>>> research. I
>>> do it, and like to discuss results and questions with others. I like
>>> also to debunk invalid argument, like the quantum and the Godel based
>>> argument against comp. It is part of my job.
>> I am not saying you shouldn't do that. I am just reminding you that  
>> maybe
>> you are restricting your view on what science is, or should be.
> Who is the one saying that something is not searchable?
I am not *claiming* that. I don't *want* to restrict science. I just see
that is apparently is restricted. That's why I want to enhance it,
ultimately going beyond science. Actually I think you go in the same
direction, by inviting theology into science. But we seem to have different
approaches to widening the scope of science.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> And this to avoid the possibility of a truth because *you* don't like  
> it?
It's not that primarily that I don't like it, more that it seems incoherent
to me (not provably incoherent). I am not opposed to incoherent things, but
well, they are incoherent, so I feel compelled to argue against them.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I have the same problem since 40 years. Those who like the conclusion  
> does not like them to be consequence of logical reasoning, and those  
> who like the logical reasoning are sick when they begin the grasp the  
> conclusion. Interdisciplinary Science is less advanced than politics.  
> The only interdisciplinary agreement seems to be on killing the  
> diplomats.
I just get the feeling you are sneaking something
translogical/-rational/-arithmetical into your logical reasoning. Which is
fine, but we should make it explicit, and not hide it under the "numbers are
interpreting themselves" rug.
View this message in context:
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to