Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Aug 2011, at 14:03, benjayk wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Aren't you restricting your notion of >>>> what is explainable of what your own theory labels explainable with >>>> its own >>>> assumptions? >>> >>> Yes, but this is due to its TOE aspect: it explains what >>> "explanation" >>> are, and what we can hope to be 100% explainable, and what we will >>> never be explained (like the numbers). >> It seems to me what it does is assuming what is explained and then >> explain >> that this is so, while not making explicit that it is assumes (see >> below). >> In effect, I believe it shows that our efforts to find fundamental >> explantions are bound to fail, because explanations do not apply to >> the >> fundamental thing. Explanations are just relative pointers from one >> obvious >> thing to another. > > This might explain why you don't study the argument. If you believe at > the start we cannot do it, I understand the lack of motivation for the > hard work. > > Have you understood the UD Argument: that IF we can survive with a > digital brain, then physics is a branch of computer science or number > theory. > > I think that your misunderstanding of the AUDA TOE comes from not > having seen this point. I can follow that argument, and it seems valid. Of course I can not be sure I really understood it. My point is that, even if physics is a branch of computer science in the theory, this may just be an result of how the theory reasons, and does not follow if we begin to interpret whether the computer science itself needs something *fundmentally* beyond itself, that is just not mentioned by relying on the assumption that the sense in arithmetic can somehow be seperated from sense in general. I am not sure whether this constitutes a rejection of COMP. It seems amibigous. If one insists that arithmetical truth can be seperated from truth in general, then I think COMP is just false because the premise is meaningless. Otherwise, COMP may be true, but just because it implicitly assumes an ontological fundament that transcends numbers.

Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> You have to study to understand by yourself that it explain mind >>>>> and >>>>> matter from addition and multiplication, and that the explanation >>>>> is >>>>> the unique one maintainable once we say "yes" to the doctor. The >>>>> explanation of matter is enough detailed so that we can test the >>>>> comp >>>>> theory with observation. >>>> If this were true, show me a document just consisting of addition >>>> and >>>> multplication that tells ANYTHING about mind and matter or even >>>> anything >>>> beyond numbers and addition and multiplication without your >>>> explanation. >>>> As long as you can't provide this it seems to me you ask me to study >>>> something that doesn't exist. >>> >>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y >>> >>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 >>> >>> Qu = B^(5^60) >>> >>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 >>> >>> Th + 2Z = B^5 >>> >>> L = U + TTh >>> >>> E = Y + MTh >>> >>> N = Q^16 >>> >>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + >>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) >>> + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) >>> >>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 >>> >>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 >>> >>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 >>> >>> K = R + 1 + HP - H >>> >>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 >>> >>> C = 2R + 1 Ph >>> >>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga >>> >>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 >>> >>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1 >>> >>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1 >>> >>> >>> Thanks to Jones, Matiyasevitch. Some number Nu verifying that system >>> of diophantine equations (the variables are integers) are "Löbian >>> stories", on which the machine's first person indeterminacy will be >>> distributed. >>> We don't even need to go farer than the polynomial equations to >>> describe the ROE. >>> >>> What you ask me is done in good textbook on Mathematical logic. >> You used more than numbers in this example, namely variables. > > Statements on numbers can use variable. If you want only numbers, > translate those equation into one number, by Gödel's technic. But that > would lead to a cumbersome gigantic expression. Yes, OK, this objection is invalid. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> But even then, >> I am not convinced this formulas make sense as being "löbian stories" >> without an explanation. Surely, I can't prove that. > > This is like saying that a brain cannot make sense without another > brain making sense of it. Indeed I think brains are meaningless without other brains to reflect themselves in (making mutual sense of each other). You won't find a brain floating in outer space, without any other brain to make sense of it. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The point is technical: numbers + addition and multiplication does > emulate the computational histories. > > You cannot use a personal feeling to doubt a technical result. There is no such a completly technical result, if we use some technique that is not strictly deducable from the axioms of the system. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I am not doing a philosophical point: I assume comp (which assumes > both consciousness and physical reality), and I prove from those > assumption that the TOE is arithmetic, with all the technical details > to extract both quanta and qualia from it. This is fine, yet the results is going to be a formal result, that (even if COMP is true), cannot be uniquely interpreted to mean that we need only arithmetic and the rest follows from it. Why? Because the theory needs some interpretation transcendent of the theory to make sense, even of the purely technical parts. To say that this interpretation is just a epistimological view of the numbers is just ignoring the problem by simply assuming that the numbers interpret themselves ALL by themselves. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Of course, to understand the theory you need a brain, and you need > sense, but once you understand the theory you can understand where you > brain and where your sense comes from. I doubt that. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it >>>>>>> justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non >>>>>>> applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not >>>>>>> need >>>>>>> to be blind faith, though. >>>>>> This confuses me. So we seem to agree completely on this point. >>>>>> Yet >>>>>> you >>>>>> disagreed with my statement that intuition is needed at a >>>>>> fundamental level. >>>>> >>>>> We don't need it at the *primitive level* in the TOE. Of course we >>>>> need it at the meta-level. >>>> You assume that by not mentioning it in the TOE the TOE somehow >>>> independent >>>> of it. Why is it not possible that we simply failed to mention in, >>>> yet still >>>> use it? >>> >>> It is up to you to show where it is used. >> Arithmetics depends on truth/sense. > > This is too much ambiguous. It introduces philosophy at a level where > we cannot use it. Right, in other words, you simply prented the ambigousness is not there and claim to not do philosophy. You cannot define the sense in and transcendent of arithmetic. This is not the fault of my own vague reasoning, it simply is that way. it is that way whether I state it or not, and this is why the results of COMP is not as clear as you wished it to be. it would just be honest to accept that the whole foundation of arithmetic rest on something that is not understandable, and that cannot be assumed to be restricted to arithmetics. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> If there is no truth/sense, no >> arithmetical statment can make sense. We have no reason at all to >> believe >> sense is restricted to arithmetics, thus with postulating that there >> is >> truth we can use everything. > > I assume that I can survive with a digital brain. This gives reasons > to believe sense is BEYOND arithmetic, but we know by UDA that > arithmetic is enough, and so that sense must be epistemological. > Formidably, arithmetic provides the sense. yes: arithmetic provides a > lot of things which are beyond 3-arithmetic: the whole of 1-arithmetic. Arithmetic is not enough, as it can not exist on its own. It needs the underlying sense. Arithmetic cannot provide the sense, as it is not even meaningful without it. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Actually it depends on what you mean with universe. If you define >>>> universe >>>> as everything that is, not what we commonly call our universe in >>>> physics >>>> (that works according to QM and GR). If you think of the universe as >>>> all >>>> that is, I would indeed say that it makes not much sense to write on >>>> its >>>> origin, as it would have to be its own origin, as there is nothing >>>> outside >>>> it. >>> >>> With comp, it is absolutely undecidable if the "Universe" is >>> different >>> from N, and with Occam, it is enough. >> No. We need the sense in N, which is beyond N. Without sense, N is >> non-sensical. > > If you agree that locally your brain is responsible for your local > sense (like when saying "yes" to a doctor), you agree that numbers can > make sense by themselves, like neurons can makes sense by themselves > in the neuro theory of mind. Numbers can make sense by themselves, but this is just a metaphor, because that the numbers make sense by themselves is only something that we (not necessarily humans but consciousness) interpret into them. We can only prove it if we use our own transcendent capability of interpretation. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> It is up to you to prove that sense is only the sense in N. > > That is the object of most of the papers I refer too. Yet you don't show it anywhere. Of couse you don't, as it is not possible. What would it even mean to sense by only the sense in a specific thing? Sense cannot be divided. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Everbody assumes it is more than that. And if you say that we need >> only the >> sense in natural numbers, show that the sense in natural numbers >> makes sense >> without sense in general, or can somehow by seperated our from sense >> in >> general. > > You persist in confusing the levels. You could say to a > neurophysiologist that his brain theory does not make sense because he > needs a brain to understand it. If he wants to reduce consciousness to the brain with his theory, I would indeed say this. But we can make relative theories, but these don't state anything with regards to what is ontologically real. We have to "confuse" levels because there aren't really levels in the first place. This is just a simplification within the theory. But that we do this will not prove that the levels aren't inseperable (or epistemological construct in the first place). The distinction between the level gets blurred by the sense that is within the numbers, and transcendent of them, that is also within the physical, and consciousness. As we postulate it by using numbers, we blur everything at the start. Which is okay, as it can't be any other way, but it should make us careful what we state about the results of the theory. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Why do I say this? Because truth apart from >>>> self-knowledge can make no sense to me. >>> >>> With you = God, OK. >>> >>> But that kind of knowledge explains nothing. (Remember that the goal >>> is in finding a conceptual understanding of mind and matter, or the >>> closer we can get). >>> >>> With you = "man", I am not OK. >> Indeed that kind of knowledge explains nothing. Maybe there is >> nothing to >> explain on a fundamental level. > > In a sense you are right. That is why the TOE has some axioms. We > cannot explain them, and we cannot explain why we believe that those > axioms are true (except by referring to our intuition). But once the > theory is there, we stop using the intuition, and do the derivation in > the theory. Not in practice, but it is a way to ask a machines her > opinion. > If we are lead to statement looking too much weird, we can still > abandon the theory, but weirdness is subjective, and we have to > compare with observations. As we believe the axioms, we cannot be sure that the axioms do not need unstated "axioms" which go way beyond the stated axioms. That's why stopping to use use our intuition may mislead us in subsequent steps. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE. >>>>>>>> Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> COMP is >>>>>>>> interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into >>>>>>>> numbers, >>>>>>>> as there >>>>>>>> is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized >>>>>>>> just with >>>>>>>> numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE >>>>>>>> certainly can't >>>>>>>> do it just with numbers). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam). >>>>>> Then write a formula just consisting of statements of numbers that >>>>>> explains >>>>>> something about the mind body problem. You will see that is >>>>>> impossible. >>>>> >>>>> That is in done through the arithmetical hypostases. All what I >>>>> have >>>>> done is exactly that. >>>> But all of your papers use alot of words. If you just assume >>>> arithmetics, >>>> you shouldn't have to use words. You see, you don't have to express >>>> the mind >>>> body problem with numbers. Just state anything with numbers that >>>> points to >>>> something specific beyond numbers without an linguistic explanation. >>>> You don't have to do it yourself. Just provide a link where purely >>>> arithmetic statements are used to show something beyond. >>> >>> All textbook in meta-arithmetic. Gödel's 1931 paper. It explains why >>> this is possible. >> By virtue of assuming the meta-level that there are arguing from! > > This is confusing. There is certainly a meta-meta-level, but Gödel's > work show how a meta-level is embedded in a level, and that is what is > used in the machine's theology. But Gödel's work needs a meta-level to exist in the first place to even make sense. So even if there provably is a meta-level embedded in a level, we then need a meta-meta-level to make sense of it. And even if there provably is a meta-meta-level embedded in a meta-level, we then need a meta-meta-meta-level to make sense of it. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> We >>>>>> need an interpretation. And that this interpretation can be done >>>>>> within >>>>>> numbers may well be true, but only if there is another layer of >>>>>> interpretation on top of that! >>>>> >>>>> I can understand your feeling, but you talk like if LUMs don't >>>>> exist. >>>>> But LUMs are like brain, they don't need to be observed for doing >>>>> their own thinking (except trivially by God, in our sense). >>>> Oh, so we need God. >>> >>> Which is arithmetical truth, and with comp we need only Sigma_1 >>> arithmetical truth. >> You don't know if God is arithmetical truth. > > Of course. I don't know if comp is true. The problem I see with this, is that God may be arithmetical truth, and thus COMP could be true, and still God could be more than arithmetical truth. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Here you really expose >> yourself. You presuppose that you know what God is! And if you say >> we only >> need arithmetcical truth, show that it can be seperated from truth in >> general. > > Show the step you have a problem with in UDA. This has little to do with the steps in UDA. It has much more to do with how we interpret its conclusion (ontologically we only need arithmetical truth, and the rest follows from it). I might disagree with step 8, if you insist that it has to be in the argument. "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism." Why can't it be this way? Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> In this case you just said that the LUM needs everything beyond >>>> LUMs to make sense! >>> >>> Yes. The numbers needs *more* than the numbers to understand the >>> numbers. They can find it, in the epistemological space of the >>> numbers. It is big, and "alive". >> But how do you know it is just epistemological? Why isn't it >> included in the >> sense that is required for numbers to make sense? And this sense can >> not be >> epistemological, as you can't base something ontological on something >> epistemological. > > Sense is epistemological, in all theories of sense. If you make sense > primitive you are back to vitalism and stuff like that. You might be > true, but with comp we don't need that, nor can we use it. Then show how the axioms of COMP make sense without using any sense it all. But even this sentence is meaningless. Of course we need to use sense to state anything that makes sense. If you insist on the consequences of COMP, prove that this sense is not primitive. Sense is epistemological in all *theories* of sense. But this may just be because there is no valid theory of sense. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I don't take sense, nor matter, as primitive, because the goal > consists in explaining them. If you don't like the explanation, just > say "no" to the doctor. But even if I say yes to the doctor I don't have to agree with the consequences. Please show that you don't take sense as primitve. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> The infinite regress is cut, fine. And then I can say >> that this needs something beyond numbers as well. The infinite regress >> continues outside the system. > > Not if comp is true. > I think that a lot of statements you are saying are just equivalent > with saying "no" to the doctor. You seem to refuse that your 3-local > consciousness is related to a finite machine. Maybe... It might be ambigous. I might say "Yes and no" to the doctor. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> If it isn't, simply show me something just consisting of >>>>>> arithmetics >>>>>> which >>>>>> explains something beyond arithmetics, without an interpetation >>>>>> from >>>>>> you. >>>>>> That would convince me. >>>>> >>>>> I can do that. But it will be as long as showing you that a brain >>>>> can >>>>> lead a person into believing in a universe. That would be very >>>>> long. >>>>> using G/G* and math, this is shortened, and is the entire object >>>>> study >>>>> of the AUDA. This relies on fundamental discoveries made by >>>>> logicians >>>>> and computer scientists. It cannot be shortened much more than >>>>> what I >>>>> have already done. Now, people familiar with Gödel's proof can get >>>>> the >>>>> gist of it, without looking at all the detail. >>>> It seems to me Gödel's proof needs interpretation in the >>>> representation of >>>> statements with numbers. We can't show that numbers can interpret >>>> themselves >>>> without already having done /accepting the validity of this step. >>> >>> We can, with the axioms above. >> But only with the acceptance of a meta-level, > > The meta-level of the theory belongs to the level of the theory. > Of course we assume journal and papers, and people, at some meta-meta- > level. But once you get the point, you get that the theory explains > where journal and papers comes from. > If you want an explanation where journal and papers come from, before > learning the theory, then, no theory at all will ever make sense. You > are just asking for something impossible. Right. That's the point. No theory will ever make sense unless we assume some meta-meta-level. And since everything a theory can show is dependent upon it, its results can not be used to show that the meta-meta-level is not needed (or "ontologically needed"). Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> that can only be proven to >> exist in some sense within numbers by assuming it already! > > All this is addressed by the separation between UDA and AUDA. > You told me you grasped the UDA point, but I am no more sure. You do > seem to have a problem both with Gödel's theorem in AUDA, but also > with the reversal physics/computer science. > Or you are just trying to convince me that comp is false? I have no clue. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> I don't >>>> think it can logically proven that Gödel numbering is valid. >>> >>> Of course we can. The Gödel numbering is very simple. To prove it >>> valid, is like proving some simple program does what it does. >>> Computer >>> scientist does that all the time (explicitly or implicitly). >> Show me a proof that Gödel numbering is valid from the axioms of >> arithmetic. >> I don't see any axiom saying that we can encode symbols with >> numbers. It >> doesn't even mention symbols. > > We don't need them. That's the point of the translation. But to show that we "don't need them", we need them. So we need them after all. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> There is no Gödel numbering without encoding, >>>> and encoding makes no sense without postulating the sense in what is >>>> encoded >>>> (symbols representing number relations, which are not themselves >>>> part of the >>>> natural numbers). >>> >>> Then you can say that a french will never understand english, because >>> it needs french to use an introductory book on the english language. >> What has this do with this? The french does not have the axiom that >> he can >> only understand french. But in mathematics we act like within the >> theory it >> is only true what the axioms say. And they say nothing about encoding. > > The encoding is necessary for a human to understand that the numbers > do computations and reasoning. But a human does not need to understand > that for having the numbers doing the reasoning, all by themselves. But this is just your assumption. The proof for this does not work without the encoding. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> PA understand only numbers, so to explain him the meta notion of a >>> variable, we begin to represent the variable x, y, z, ... by number. >> But he doesn't now what representation means. Nowhere in the axiom >> is the >> ability to represent things. > > Nowhere in the axiom is the ability to represent the prime numbers. > But this can be done. You need to take the time to study Gödel's > arithmetization. I stop at the step where anything is represented, because the axioms don't say anything about ability of representation. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> That is, in effect Gödel postulates something beyond >>>> numbers to prove his theorem. >>> >>> Not at all. In particular the numbers does prove Gödel's theorem >>> themselves, and this a long "time" before Gödel appeared on the >>> planet. >> They just do it if you interpet this into them. > > Not at all. Unless you believe that 17 is prime belongs to human > psychology. This statement woud be missleading, but yes, ultimately 17 is prime and human psychology and numbers can't be sperated. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Maybe I miss something and there is a way to >>>> prove the incompleteness theorem without using any sort of encoding >>>> mechanism, but it seems to be the core of his proof. >>> >>> The theorem does not depend on the choice of the encoding, and the >>> encoding exists *in* arithmetic. >> This is just true after we have proven this. But we need the >> encoding to >> prove it. You are just using the result of a proof as a >> justification for >> the proof. Gödel clearly introduced a meta-level, that is not >> mentioned in >> the axioms. It is debateable whether this is valid or not, but >> certainly we >> should acknowledge that is is done. > > There is nothing debateable here. Unless you mean that all theorems in > math are debateable. > > I should not have said that the encoding is *in* arithmetic, because > this is misleading. The point is that the encoding does what it does: > to show that reasoning and computations appears naturally in the > numbers true relations. Such truth are supposed to be independent of > the us (human mind and physical universe). But the encoding doesn't work without interpretation. There is nothing in the axioms of natural numbers that say that they can encode stuff. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Since RA is incomplete, this exists. Can you give an example of >>>> a statement just with *,+,numbers that is unprovable? >>> >>> With RA it is very simple, and I don't need Gödel's theorem/ In RA >>> the >>> following sentences is not provable: >>> >>> AxAy (x + y = y + x) >>> >>> It asserts the commutativity of addition. >>> >>> It is "easy" (once a bit familiar with logic) to build a model of RA >>> which refutes that formula (and yet satisfies all the axioms of RA). >> OK. Interesting. What I don't understand, that it seem like this >> would be >> the case with presburger arithmetics, also. But it is not incomplete? > > Pressburger Arithmetoc is PA without the multiplication axioms (and > without the multiplication symbol). But with the induction axioms. > But RA has no induction axioms. > > RA is Turing universal, but Pressburger is not, which allows > Pressburger to be complete (on its additive only formula). OK. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> Same question. If there are limit we will see them. >>>>>>> Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for >>>>>>> studying >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting >>>>>>> G/ >>>>>>> G* >>>>>>> is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is >>>>>>> something >>>>>>> bigger than themselves. >>>>>> But if this is true we should simply be consistent and say that >>>>>> the >>>>>> TOE is >>>>>> not a TOE at all. >>>>> >>>>> That is a vocabulary problem. RA is an ontological theory of >>>>> everything. The TOE coming from comp is incomplete, if not it would >>>>> be >>>>> reductionist, instead of being anti-reductionist. >>>> Yeah, we agree on this. But is an incomplete theory of everything a >>>> theory >>>> of everything? >>> >>> Well, if you define a TOE by a complete theory, then all TOE will >>> just >>> miss everything, including addition and multiplication. >>> A long time ago I have made clear that by TOE I mean a theory which >>> unifies all the forces in nature without eliminating persons. >>> Then comp shows that if we don't want to eliminate person, the forces >>> in nature have to be unified through a measure on computational >>> histories driven by some variant of self-reference. >> OK. I just find that TOE sounds inherently reductive. > > Why? > > On the contrary, it kills the reductive view we might have on numbers > and machines, and it guarantie the failure of *any* normative theory > on them. "TOE" most of the time is used to mean a reductionist materialist theory of everything, that's why. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> Also, the claim that numbers are the only thing that is >>>> ontologically >>>> required is unfounded. We need God, as you say yourself, which is >>>> the sense >>>> in numbers. And God may include MUCH more than numbers. I'd even say >>>> he >>>> trivially does. >>> >>> This is your confusion of level again. God is not part of the assumed >>> ontology. It is part of the implicit meta-level, made explicit in the >>> comp assumption, and it reappears in the mind of numbers through >>> simple arithmetical inductive inference principles. Numbers, >>> relatively to universal numbers, tends to infer the existence of >>> universal numbers and arithmetical truth.. >> But even to state one axiom assumes the sense in the axiom, > > No. In informal theory (like comp): that is true. In the formal TOE, > we don't need to assume the sense, no more that I have to make sense > of my own neurons to use them. I have used them before I learned that > they exist. Prove that in the formal TOE, we don't need to assume the sense. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Maybe formally it could be used to >>>>>>>> explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the >>>>>>>> formal >>>>>>>> research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be >>>>>>>> interpreted on >>>>>>>> higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The >>>>>>> inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view >>>>>>> from >>>>>>> inside. >>>>>> But the inside of arithmetics is outside of arithmetics! What you >>>>>> call >>>>>> inside of arithmetics CAN'T make sense without the transcendent >>>>>> truth of >>>>>> consciousness, which is beyond arithmetics (outside may be less >>>>>> accurate). >>>>> >>>>> Rght. The TOE (arithmetic) can explain why the Löbian machines >>>>> see, >>>>> and even create things far beyond arithmetic. But with comp, such >>>>> things belongs to number's imagination. It exists >>>>> epistemologically, >>>>> unlike the numbers which have a basic ontologically status. >>>> This assumes that the number's imagination are not already included >>>> in God, >>>> which you won't call epistemological, hopefully. >>> >>> I am not sure. Like in Plotinus, God is not among the beings, and it >>> transcends the epistemological. >>> I have concentrated myself on matter and mind. I keep Gods and >>> Goddesses for pension :) >> The problem is, the axioms of arithmetic make no sense without God, >> if we >> think of as God as the sense in things. > > Why? > Did you go out of the classroom when your teacher told you that 2+8 = > 10, without mentioning God? We don't need to mention it. But it is still there. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> It's like searching >>>> for your key and always say "But what if that's not the key. I can't >>>> be >>>> sure.". If we search for the key we will rather say: "Well, that >>>> looks like >>>> they key, let's just act like that's the key, but not like it's the >>>> key to >>>> secrets of the universe". >>> >>> Then the fundamental questions will be given to those who use terror >>> and violence. Look at history. Humans needs to search, it is part of >>> life. >> Yeah, until they see that they can just find by looking at what >> already is. > > You are really pleading for prohibiting modesty in the fundamental > questioning. The goal is to explain what already is, not to just enjoy > it. I am not prohibiting anything. I am not sure explantion and enjoyment of it can be seperated. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> If you want keep primitive matter, just abandon comp, but then give >>>>> me >>>>> your theory of the relation between matter and consciousness. >>>> What bothers me is that we might sneak primitive matter into COMP by >>>> relying >>>> on there being God, who already may include primitive matter. >>> >>> Not al all. Matter appears from inside the universal dovetailing (or >>> the proofs of the sigma_1 sentences). >> This may make sense, but you can't show that matter wasn't already >> included >> in God. You can't use occam here because God is not reducible. > > Oh! Then I will say that my car is pulled by invisible horses, which > might be also already included in God. That will prevent people to use > Occam to mock my invisible horses. Indeed you have a point there. Ultimately it might not be wrong to say that the car is pulled by invisible horses, because we can't seperate the stories about what's happening totally from what is "really" happening. All ideas about what is happening (invisible horses pull my car, santa claus pushes the car,the engine drives the car,..) converge into what is "really" happening. Like the dreams glue in a way of producing physical reality in COMP. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I thought you were OK with the disappearance of "primitive matter". > You seem to backtrack a lot, and I don't see why, except you would > like consciousness to be primitive. I am OK with the disappearance of "primitive matter", if we conceive of primitive matter, like most materialist do, as being unconscious. And yes, I would like consciousness to be primitive, because it seems primitive to me, and I want to acknowledge what is so. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> which may be sneaking in >>>>>> consciousness and with it physical reality through the back door. >>>>> >>>>> Just study the theory. >>>> But the theory won't mention that it does this if it sneaks it in. >>> >>> Sure. But it is up to you to prove that it sneaks the things. If not >>> it is just a gratuitous (intuition based, but not proved) accusation. >> You presuppose sense, already, and obviously, in order for numbers >> to make >> sense. > > Not at all. ? Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Why could sense not already include all the stuff you later show to >> exist? What makes it plausible that sense is just the sense in >> numbers? > > Comp. ? Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> You said >>>> yourself that your TOE does not assume them, so it is hopeless to >>>> find them >>>> within the theory. You see my point? >>> >>> But it finds them, without assuming them. You talk like if the theory >>> did not work. But it works very well, up to the open problem (the >>> measure problem, the white rabbit, the derivation of physics, etc.). >>> I use comp as a metatheory to say: >>> >>> 1) the mind body problem is not solved >>> 2) the mind body problem is transformed into this purely mathematical >>> problem, which is partially solved currently, but mathematicians have >>> to improved it. >>> 3) all this fit with Plato's TOE/theology, and not with Aristotle >>> TOE/ >>> theology >> The theory might work, no doubt about that. I am not critizing the >> formal >> part of the theory, just your interpretation of it. > > The whole point is that the interpretation is done by the numbers/ > numbers relation. Which just works by interpreting the interpretation into numbers. You can say 10000 times that the interpretation is done by numbers. Fine, so it is. Because *this is what we interpret into the numbers*. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to >>>>>>>>> inconsistent >>>>>>>>> theory. >>>>>>>> But inconsistent with respect to what? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and >>>>>>> ~p. >>>>>> But that is just incosistent with classical logic. >>>>> >>>>> No. It is inconsistent with all logic, except the paraconsistent >>>>> one. >>>> So? This is just what I said. >>> No. You said that it is inconsistent with classical logic. I said it >>> is inconsistent in almost all logics, except one. >> Uhm, sorry, I misexpressed myself. I didn't mean that it is only >> inconsistent with classical logic, I meant that it is just a >> property of >> classical logic (among other logics), and thus is not absolute. > > OK, but to use this against the TOE, it is up to you to give me an > arithmetical sentence which would be neither true nor false. I am not sure I want to use it against the TOE. I am just arguing for the possibility of a theory that is not restricted to narrow notions of inconsistency. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I can easily assert "I am >>>>>> big and I am not big (small)" and this is not absolutely >>>>>> inconsistent. >>>>> >>>>> Yes it is. >>>> If it absolutely inconsistent, how come I can easily make sense of >>>> it? >>> >>> Because you use it as an abbreviation of some other statement. But >>> when we formalize we don't do that. >> The statement makes sense in its own right. > > No. If you say "I am big and not big", I have to infer much more than > what is said. It is a poetical expression. If you say 1+1=2 it just makes sense if I infer more than that. We can't understand 1+1=2 apart from the fact that one apple and one apple gives two apples, for examples. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> I could just as well claim that >> 1+1=2 is an abbreviation of 1+1+0=2, 1+1+0+0=2, 1+1+0+0+0=2, etc... > > No problem with that. In this case, the first one is the simplest, > though. But then your own criticism would apply to it. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> It >>>>>> just means I am big with respect to an insect and small with >>>>>> respect >>>>>> to the >>>>>> sun. >>>>> >>>>> That is another statement. >>>> It is a clarification of the former statement. >>> >>> Like I said. But in formal theory, we don't clarify thing, we take >>> the >>> statement as definite. if not, we would not been able to finish a >>> proof. >> OK, but this method is limited. It just works as long as we don't >> talk about >> stuff that has too many interpretative possibilities inherent to it. >> That's >> why I critize this approach when we talk about fundamental matters. > > Why? > There is no worry given that the TOE is a negation theology which > protect machine/souls against normative and reductive theory. Ineed, your TOE is not really ethically problematic. Still there is a sublte reductionism inherent to it (ontological reductionism - you reduce the ontology to numbers), which I dislike. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels, >>>>>>> but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to >>>>>>> anything >>>>>>> interesting. It is just non comprehensible. >>>>>> Why? Of course it makes no sense to not distinguish between false >>>>>> and right >>>>>> at all (except if you want to point something that is entirely >>>>>> beyond >>>>>> words). But this distinction need not lie in not allowing >>>>>> assertions >>>>>> of >>>>>> classical contradictions (p and ~p). >>>>> >>>>> Well, you are free to try a fundamental theory in some obscure >>>>> logic. >>>> I am not sure there is a fundamental theory. >>> >>> You are restricting science, like the Aristotelians. You abandon the >>> fundamental questions to the fanatics, by doing so. >> No. The fanatics claim to have an answer. There is no answer. > > That's my point. To decide that there is no answer, gives the audience > to the fanatics. To accept there is no answer YET, open the mind to > questioning an research. It is subtle. As long as we feel that there has to be an answer, yes saying that there is no answer will tend to give the fanatics more power. But if we accept that there is no need for an answer, we can relax and be open to "answers". Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Just as long >> as people think that there is a answer in words they will fall prey to >> fanatics. They just could learn to be still and look within. > > No. History illustrates that the human fits the hole, with anything, > like vitalism, primary matter (perhaps) and other phlogiston. You are right. Still, we might evolve beyond this. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It seems to me we can just judge the consistency >>>>>>>> of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with >>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>> intuition, but then constistency is subjective). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is not. It is 3-p definable. >>>>>> Definable with respect to some theory, eg classical logic. But >>>>>> classical >>>>>> logic is obviously false if taken as an absolute, in my mind. >>>>>> There >>>>>> seem to >>>>>> be some inherently true contradictions, like "the world is good >>>>>> and >>>>>> not >>>>>> good". >>>>> >>>>> But this is made clear in the TOE. You are confusing (p & ~p) with >>>>> (Bp >>>>> and B~p). the first is contradictory and the second is not. >>>> But it is not only that I believe that the world is good and it is >>>> not good. >>>> It may just be that way. Why not? >>> >>> Because to say that "the world is good and not good" is poetical. It >>> is not a statement in a formal theory. A more formal statement would >>> be the world is felt as good in such circumstances by such agent, >>> etc. >> The entire point is that a formal theory won't help much in >> fundamental >> matters, and even be confusing, as we are bound to use informal >> reasoning in >> interpreting it. That's why I argue against your use of COMP. > > What do you mean by "My use of comp"? I make it precise so that > people can find a flaw if there is one. The conclusions you draw (numbers are needed ontologically, the rest follow epistemologically). That these conclusions are a consequence of COMP is just an interpretation. COMP itself just assumes numbers, but it doesn't say whether they are ontological or epistimological entities. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in >>>>>>>>> your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real >>>>>>>>> life >>>>>>>>> happiness, but a bad one in scientific research. >>>>>>>> Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can >>>>>>>> we? >>>>>>>> Or, we >>>>>>>> accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or >>>>>>>> inconsistent, is >>>>>>>> subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of >>>>>>>> inconsistency is >>>>>>>> futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is >>>>>>>> incosistent. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> research. >>>>>> Yeah, but we can try to be more consistent even if we accept we >>>>>> are >>>>>> inconsistent. Why not? >>>>> >>>>> At some level, but accepting this at the start will just make >>>>> things >>>>> unnecessarily complex. >>>> It seems very simple to me. "Let's just forget about getting it >>>> absolutely >>>> right, and get on with more practical things". >>> >>> Let us abandon fundamental research. With that attitude the >>> authoritative argument in the human affair, and its impending >>> arbitrariness, will continue to prevail for centuries. >> The mistake is to think that the fundamental things can be put into >> some >> theoretical frame, dogmatic rules, etc... > > Dogma is exactly what is 100% disallowed in (ideal) science. On the > contrary, science uses ONLY hypothesis. > I know some scientist are dogmatic, but this is because they fail to > do science, and come to confuse hypothesis and truth. > > To admit theorization is a prevention against dogma. In some sense, yes. But ultimately, to suppose there is some theoretical answer to our deepest question is itself a dogma. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Research of fundamental things is >> continuing the error on a lesser scale. The fundamental things are not >> really researchable, they are just seeable. > > ? I have no clue what you mean by "seeing" a fundamental thing. Being conscious of. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> (Of course I am not referring to >> *relatively* fundamental things like quarks or something). It is not >> wrong >> to do research on it, or make dogma out of it, but it is not going >> to lead >> us to where we want to be. > > I am not sure what you are defending. I worry because it looks like > pseudo-religious critics of the scientific inquiry. I defend the idea that scientifc inquiry will not provide us with fundamental answers, just as religion, or any other belief. Fundamental "answers" are to be found in direct experience of reality (which itself need not be a belief). Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> But we seem to have different >>>>>> approaches to widening the scope of science. >>>>> >>>>> I use the scientific way. >>>> If we just use science to extend science, we will be limited by our >>>> preconceived notions of what science is. >>> >>> Not at all. That is the case for those who confuse science and truth, >>> but science is just modesty and clarity. It is *the* place where >>> people (or their students) can admit having been wrong. That happens >>> rarely in philosophy and current theology. >> Modesty and clarity are great. But maybe we should make place in >> science for >> less rigorous methods then these that are accepted now. > > The more you are rigorous, the less you are manipulable, and the more > you are free. > If the human science were rigorous, the human would be much more free, > and I think happy and living well. Hm, I disagree. Both rigor and non-rigor have a place, in my opinion. Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> so to say it is just the >>>> inside view of numbers hardly makes sense, also. >>> >>> I have no clue why, unless you postulate some non-comp theory. >> Because in COMP, too, the consciousness may already be presumed in >> sense >> that is needed for anything to make sense, including numbers. > > COMP is an assumption of invariance of consciousness for digital > substitution of a body/brain/universe. It certainly assumes > consciousness. > Then the reasoning explain how comp leads to an explanation of how > consciousness "appears" (not in time, but in a logical frame). I doubt it explains this. Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Just that current humans still look for authoritative arguments, in > all direction. I'm afraid I will have to come back next millennium. You are right. I am more optimistic, though, I would advise you to take a shot next century ;). -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p32341088.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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