Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 16 Aug 2011, at 17:27, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Aug 2011, at 20:50, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on
>>>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>>>> is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean
>>>>>>>> it's
>>>>>>>> independent of it, or prior to it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would say of course, except that "independent" and 'prior"  
>>>>>>> are a
>>>>>>> bit
>>>>>>> fuzzy.
>>>>>> I can only to invite you to be skeptic of this "of course". For me
>>>>>> it isn't
>>>>>> obvious at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And the fact that it derived from numbers
>>>>>>>> within the theory still doesn't mean that it is in actuality the
>>>>>>>> reason for
>>>>>>>> it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Logically you are right. But remember the invisible horses.
>>>>>> From a scientific standpoint this remark makes sense. But I  
>>>>>> believe
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> point is beyond science. From my intuition the simple difference  
>>>>>> is
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> invisible horses are not primary or necessary and consciousness  
>>>>>> is.
>>>>>
>>>>> Necessary with logic and numbers: yes.
>>>>> Necessary as a primitive ontological entity? I am not sure.
>>>> It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
>>>
>>> What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we build a
>>> theory.
>> You could define this as primitive ontological entity, but honestly  
>> this has
>> nothing to do with what I call a primitive ontological entity. As I
>> understand a primitive ontological entity, it doesn't need to be  
>> assumed,
>> and even less explicitly. It is just there whether we assume it or  
>> not, and
>> this is what makes it primitive and ontological.
> 
> You confuse a theory and its (intended) model (or subject matter).
> 
> This is a widespread confusion, and that is related to the fact that  
> physicists use "model" where logicians use "theory".
Hm, I don't understand where my confusion lies. If anything, it seems to me
confusing theory and subject matter lies in considering anything that
depends on assumptions within a theory a primitive ontological entity. If it
dependent on assumptions, it doesn't seem to be ontological.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> For me it is
>>>> just so integral to everything that I can't see how calling it
>>>> primitive
>>>> could be wrong.
>>>
>>> Both matter and consciousness have that feature, but this means that
>>> they are fundamental, not that they are primitive.
>> In the sense above you may be right, but then I don't agree with this
>> definition.
> 
> Let us use primitive in my sense, to fix the idea, and let us use  
> "fundamental" for your sense.
> Those are the sense used in this list for awhile, and it would be  
> confusing to change suddenly the terming.
OK. The terminology doesn't really matter. But then I have to say that
primitive has nothing to do with what is primary in reality. It is just what
we treat as primary in a theory, which may have little do to with what is
primary in reality.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It's a bit like saying that existence isn't primitive. What
>>>> would that even mean? Deriving the existence of existence, or
>>>> consciousness
>>>> seems quite meaningless to me.
>>>
>>> Existence can be handled by simple rule (like deducing ExP(x) from
>>> P(m) for some m).
>>> Consciousness has no similar rules.
>> But the existence you speak of is not existence as such. It is just  
>> the
>> existence of a thing in a particular theory.
> 
> That is always the case when we do science. (3-discourse).
Right, that is why science cannot touch existence as such. It can just make
relative sense of phenomena within existence.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a
>>>>>>>> (strong)
>>>>>>>> intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of
>>>>>>> knowledge,
>>>>>>> suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with the
>>>>>>> correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
>>>>>> This may be a strong point against COMP.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why? On the contrary, it mirrors the emergence of a mind-body  
>>>>> problem
>>>>> in the discourse of the universal numbers.
>>>>> Once I say "yes" to the doctor, I lost the option of taking those
>>>>> discourses as zombies one.
>>>> The problem is that we rely on our intuition to say yes
>>>
>>> We can't. We have to rely on some theories, which are always
>>> hypothetical. It is not different than taking a plane.
>> But then to rely on some theories, we can just use our intuition to  
>> judge
>> whether they are reliable (or we talk us into some "rational"  
>> reason, that
>> is ultimately just as dependent on some intuition). So we are again at
>> square one.
> 
> Not really. The intuition needed to understand a theory is equal to  
> the intuition needs to understand the natural numbers. Not a lot. Then  
> the theory, if precise enough, is refutable, and that is all we can  
> hope for. (Yes, a scientist is *happy* when someone is kind enough to  
> show him/her wrong).
OK. But I don't understand how this would lead us to accept COMP. How can we
accept COMP due to understanding natural numbers?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> and then have a
>>>> theory that calls our intuition heavily into question, so that from
>>>> the
>>>> theory itself it makes sense to reject it.
>>>
>>> On the contrary, the theory explains why the intuition is misleading
>>> fro that kind of operation. Evolution did not prepare our brains for
>>> the technological speeding up.
>> But what to use other than intuition? We can't base our faith on some
>> rational thing, as this would require faith as well.
> 
> Science is based on some faith in some reality and in some rationality.
Right, that's what I am saying. Faith is required to do science. And faith
comes out of our intuition.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It might be that all good theories about reality as a whole show
>>>> that it
>>>> makes sense to reject them, as they are always incomplete, and if
>>>> they are
>>>> good they will reflect that.
>>>> In the limit this could lead us to reject theories as such, in
>>>> accordance
>>>> with what they say!
>>>
>>> Who knows. But that is a speculation, and it would be unwise to  
>>> reject
>>> a theory by speculating that the theories in the future will say so.
>> It is really so speculative? The more sophisticated our theories  
>> get, the
>> more they seem to point towards something beyond theories. COMP  
>> certainly
>> does that very powerfully.
>> That this will lead us to abandon theories as such seems to be just  
>> the
>> conclusion of that.
> 
> That is an argument against science is general.
Right, it is an argument that science in general is quite a limited tool.
That doesn't have to lead us to abandon doing science, anymore than seeing
that being a baby is limited is leading us to abandoning babies. But we may
outgrow being babies, and science.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Sometimes we can be  
> true, even if we cannot know that for sure. Science is a risky  
> enterprise. You seem to look for a certainty, which makes you abandon  
> theories before they are refuted.
To the contrary, I am saying there is no certainty in the relative. We can
only have certain of what is right here, right now.
I am not sure if theories can even be true, ultimately. They are just a tool
for explaining our observations, and they can only be relatively true in the
sense that they serve that purpose. You say yourself that we can only refute
theories, and never show them to be true. So why even suspect they could be
true?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> What can make me a bit nervous is when people believes that comp is  
> false, based on invalid reasoning, or prejudice against some idea.
> 
> I have no clue why you could have any problem with comp, given that 1)  
> you have admitted not having study the theory, 2) you seem to have no  
> problem with its main consequences (that physics is secondary to  
> consciousness, non materialism, soul immortality, coming back to Plato  
> and the mystics, etc.).
I have not studied it in detail, but I have read and roughly understood the
main argument, and consequences. I simply am not sure that a digital
substition of our brain will leave our experience relatively invariant. I
don't see why I would necessarily bet on that.
You might say that we have no evidence of infinities within the brain. But
we just avoid infinity in physics because we can not make formal sense of
it. In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we merely assume
that our theories are just incomplete where it appears. For example, if we
don't use renormalization, the vacuum energy is infinite, suggesting that
infinities are everywhere.
Also, in quantum mechanics, the whole universe is fundamentally entagled,
calling the very idea of emulation into question. You can't emulate the
whole universe.
The idea that quantum effects do not matter to the functioning of the brain
rests on a reductionist idea of how the brain functions, which is just
another faith that I simply do not share.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Again, it is also very different from the divine and terrestrial
>>> points of view. A brain, or even a cells can be considered as a
>>> machine, or a word, or a theory. We are divine hypothesis.
>> But this is a metaphor. No one in science says the brain is a  
>> theory. This
>> is just a category error.
> 
> No. It is a theory, written in the language of chemistry, which is  
> itself written in the language of quantum mechanics, which is itself  
> written in the language of machine's theology (assuming comp). It is  
> not a metaphor at all, but a bet on some 3-self-finitude (which leads  
> to some 1-self-infinitude).
With your reasoning, just about everything is a theory, which leads the idea
of a theory ad absurdum. Sure you could call the brain a theory, but it just
doesn't fit with what is generally defined as a theory, eg  "A plausible or
scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to
explain phenomena".



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Maybe making formalized theories is just a transitory phenomenon, it
>>>> may
>>>> ultimately be a dead end.
>>>
>>> In that case, life is a dead end.
>> ?
>> Life is not a formalized theory.
> 
> The 'life of consciousness' is not, but the life of a body is, unless  
> you have an evidence of concrete special infinities.
I need no infinities for that. The word theory, especially "formal theory",
just doesn't applies to life as such, except in a metaphorical way.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming that WE  
>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>> all God,
>>>>>>>> though. :D
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify you,  
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> course censor the discovery.
>>>>>>> It can make sense when you see how far some are able to
>>>>>>> misunderstand
>>>>>>> the statement.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that, but if
>>>>>>> assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself into
>>>>>>> bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
>>>>>> Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom.
>>>>>
>>>>> Because you will become inconsistent.
>>>> So? We need formal consistency only in math, apart from math
>>>> inconsistencies
>>>> are abundant, and acceptable. Even in science. General relativity  
>>>> and
>>>> quantum mechanics are quite inconsistent with each other!
>>>
>>> We need consistency if only to have a reality to look for.
>>> Inconsistency makes people saying about anything. It is very easy,  
>>> but
>>> boring and unproductive, and eventually it leads to suffering. In  
>>> fact
>>> suffering is the reaction of the soul in front of threat of
>>> inconsistency.
>> To me consistency and inconsistency can coexist. Inconsistency just  
>> means
>> that our mind has no coherent understanding of something. 1=0 just  
>> appears
>> inconsistent because it doesn't fit with your internal  
>> representation of
>> natural numbers. Someone might just explain that he uses the symbols  
>> 0 and 1
>> interchangeably, and 2 means what you understand as 1, etc....
> 
> If someone says that 0 = 1, and later makes clear he is not talking on  
> the natural numbers 0 and 1, then he was consistent, and we were just  
> not talking on the same subject. It was not inconsistency, but just a  
> vocabulary problem.
The point is that inconsistencies are relative to some theoretical system
that we use. So we don't need to be worried if something is inconsistent
from a particular point of view, since we aren't forced to believe that this
theoretical system is the ultimate arbiter of what is true.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> We also may abandon things that the ego felt deeply
>>>> responsible for, though.
>>>
>>> I am not sure of that. The least I can say is that it is an open
>>> problem in comp, and in arithmetic.
>> I don't see how this is a problem of arithmeitc. It just seems to be  
>> the
>> case empirically that many enlightened ones give up many of the  
>> things they
>> once considered important.
> 
> That does not mean they abandon their responsibility. It means only  
> that they lived a change of perspective, and might make change in the  
> spectrum of what they did consider as important.
Right. But from the perspective of ego, this could sometimes be judged as
abandoning responsibilities.

benjayk
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