Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Aug 2011, at 22:43, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
>>>> Hm... OK. I am not sure that there are valid 3-communicable theories
>>>> about
>>>> fundamental issues. I guess that is what it comes down to. I am not
>>>> against
>>>> science, I am just skeptical that it can really touch fundamental
>>>> issues. It
>>>> seems to me we always sneak 3-incommunable things into such a
>>>> theory.
>>>
>>> This is the case for all theorizing. Like we often use the intuition
>>> of natural numbers implicitly.
>> So we agree on this. My point is than that we must be careful if we
>> claim
>> that some theory explains in a 3-communicable fundamental matters.
>> It may be
>> we sneak our intuition into the theory. Our intuition of natural
>> numbers may
>> be fundamentally inseparable from our intution of what is beyond. So
>> it
>> might be we use numbers + our intuition what is beyond and claim
>> that we
>> derived it from just numbers. It seems to me to be what COMP does.
>
> COMP use the intuition we have on consciousness, machine, etc.
> But the TOE isolated with the help of comp does not. You need only to
> agree with the axioms, and to accept some axiomatic for knowledge,
> belief, etc.
Just because we formally isolate the theory does not mean it is only
dependent on the axioms that are explicitly stated. In some limited context
this may be basically valid, or at least has no consequences because the
theory isn't about fundamental issues. But a TOE will run into the trap of
exposing that the stated axioms are not everything that is required for the
theory to make sense.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> So in
>>>> COMP, I think the 3-communicable part doesn't ultimately explain
>>>> much
>>>> fundamental, as it totally relies on the subjective interpretation,
>>>> that you
>>>> call the "inside view of arithmetics", that seems to me just to be
>>>> the
>>>> primary conciousness.
>>>
>>> Comp explains a lot, but you have to study it to grasp this by
>>> yourself.
>>> The inside views are recovered by the intensional variant of the
>>> provability predicate.
>>> It makes comp (the classical theory of knowledge) testable, because
>>> the physical reality is among those views.
>> Honestly I can't see that studying COMP will help with what is my
>> problem.
>
> You can only decide this by studying it (or it means you have a
> prejudice).
It is not a prejudice (I hope!). It is a problem that I see with your
interpretation of what a theory could possibly mean, regardless of specific
content. Honestly, the details of it are beyond my head, without intensive
study.
But since I don't even critize the formal content of the theory as such, I
don't see it as necessary to know the details.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It seems to be more fundamental than some issue of understanding a
>> theory in
>> depth.
>
> Of course it does. Like the physical universe is more than any theory
> about it. You confuse a theory and its subject matter. Nobody claim
> that a TOE *is* the everything, but it talks *about* the everything.
I don't get what you interpreting into what I said here. I just meant that I
don't see that it important to know the specifcs of the theory to criticize
its interpretation. Like I don't have to know much about QM to criticize the
Kopenhagen interpretation.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>
>>> With comp consciousness is platonistically co-extensive with the
>>> numbers (including their additive and multiplicative laws), but this
>>> reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem.
>>> And the mind problem is reduce to the study of what is true *about*
>>> the machine (this includes many things true for the machine but not
>>> justifiable by her).
>> But couldn't it be that the notion of what is true about something is
>> extending so far that it encompasses so much that it is practically
>> false to
>> say that it is what is true about something? For example, we could
>> say that
>> is true about frogs that there is something beyond them that is
>> called a
>> universe that has such and such properties. Yet, for all intents and
>> purposes this is nothing about frogs at all.
>
> Why? Without the universe there would be no frog.
That's true. But if you go this far, everything is a fact about everything
about in particular. So you could just build the sentence "It is true about
*thing* that there is something beyond (or other than) them that is *another
thing* that has such and such propterties". It is not, in principle, false.
But it is still bad use of language. It is just confusing to say that it is
a true fact about a pebble on a beach that I stepped on that the core of the
sun is 14 million kelvin hot.
Especially if we then claim that the pebble is ontological and the core of
the sun is just an epistemological fact about the pebble.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Couldn't it be possible that
>> this is what COMP does with machines?
>
> Yes it does. There is no problem with that.
So we agree it does. But do you see why I think it is confusing?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Explaining for a scientist does not mean so much. It means basically
>>> to reduce something to something which we can explain, or accept.
>>> But a TOE can do one think more: explain that its primitive terms are
>>> no more reducible. The TOE isolated by comp does that.
>> This is semantics again but you just showed yourself why it doesn't
>> make
>> much sense to call this a TOE, as theory says that it specifically
>> does NOT
>> explain everything. You might say that it explains everything
>> explainable,
>> but this may just be an artifact of what you consider explainable
>> within the
>> theory.
>
> It explain everything explainable, + an explanation of why there are
> things not explainable, and why. And this from the starting assumption.
But what does it mean explainable. Aren't you restricting your notion of
what is explainable of what your own theory labels explainable with its own
assumptions?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> You have to study to understand by yourself that it explain mind and
> matter from addition and multiplication, and that the explanation is
> the unique one maintainable once we say "yes" to the doctor. The
> explanation of matter is enough detailed so that we can test the comp
> theory with observation.
If this were true, show me a document just consisting of addition and
multplication that tells ANYTHING about mind and matter or even anything
beyond numbers and addition and multiplication without your explanation.
As long as you can't provide this it seems to me you ask me to study
something that doesn't exist.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it
>>> justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non
>>> applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not
>>> need
>>> to be blind faith, though.
>> This confuses me. So we seem to agree completely on this point. Yet
>> you
>> disagreed with my statement that intuition is needed at a
>> fundamental level.
>
> We don't need it at the *primitive level* in the TOE. Of course we
> need it at the meta-level.
You assume that by not mentioning it in the TOE the TOE somehow independent
of it. Why is it not possible that we simply failed to mention in, yet still
use it? The meta-level may be included in God that is the basis of
arithmetics, as it is the sense in arithmetics.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> To confuse those two level prevent science of doing anything. I could
> not write a book on the origin of the universe, because you would stop
> me saying that I suppose there is a universe for writing a book.
But you can write a book on the origin of the universe, and I won't stop
you. It just makes no sense to pretend that the origin of the universe can
explain the universe without assuming the universe. Not just on a
"meta-level" or epistemological. It REALLY is there.
Actually it depends on what you mean with universe. If you define universe
as everything that is, not what we commonly call our universe in physics
(that works according to QM and GR). If you think of the universe as all
that is, I would indeed say that it makes not much sense to write on its
origin, as it would have to be its own origin, as there is nothing outside
it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> You keep confusing level in a filed which is all based on confusing
> level in some proper way which avoid regress and contradiction.
I am not sure I confuse level. I think say are inseperable. And to say the
TOE can't be independent of the so called meta-level is not confusion but a
statment of the inherent dependence between them. Or if you want it this
way, I'd say we have to confuse level. But if one sees why this has to be
so, one probably wouldn't call it confusion.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Do you think there is faith apart from inuition? This doesn't seem
>> to make
>> much sense to me.
>
> Because, as I told you already: you confuse God and the inner God. You
> confuse Truth and knowledge. We have gone through this.
> If you study the theory (and this does not mean that you have to
> believe in it), you might eventually understand a model where those
> notion are kept distinct.
I might, but then I would delude myself, or wouldn't really understand what
I am speaking about here. I just don't see that this question can be settled
rationally. We can distinguish God and inner God in some relative way (like
divine intuition versus ego intuition). Also Truth and knowledge (like
direct experience and expression of experience). But ultimately they are
inseperable. There is no rational argument for this. It is self-evident.
Truth is self-knowledge (not rational knowledge). Truth is itself, and in
this it knows itself. Why do I say this? Because truth apart from
self-knowledge can make no sense to me. I just can't see what this would
mean. And why would I study something that is meaningless to me?
I am aware that I am stating incommunicable truth here. I am just stating
what is the subjective expression of what I see and I invite you to look if
you can't see the same.
I would just say "I have not studied COMP in depth, I can't comment on that"
if it was a disagreement with some specific logical mistake. But this is not
what this about. It is about transrational insight... Maybe it is foolish to
argue for that. This may quite well be the case. I just get the feeling
that you are not that far from my perspective, so I just try to point to
what I see.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>>
>>>>> But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
>>>> Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do with
>>>> COMP is
>>>> interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers,
>>>> as there
>>>> is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized
>>>> just with
>>>> numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE
>>>> certainly can't
>>>> do it just with numbers).
>>>
>>> We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam).
>> Then write a formula just consisting of statements of numbers that
>> explains
>> something about the mind body problem. You will see that is
>> impossible.
>
> That is in done through the arithmetical hypostases. All what I have
> done is exactly that.
But all of your papers use alot of words. If you just assume arithmetics,
you shouldn't have to use words. You see, you don't have to express the mind
body problem with numbers. Just state anything with numbers that points to
something specific beyond numbers without an linguistic explanation.
You don't have to do it yourself. Just provide a link where purely
arithmetic statements are used to show something beyond.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> We
>> need an interpretation. And that this interpretation can be done
>> within
>> numbers may well be true, but only if there is another layer of
>> interpretation on top of that!
>
> I can understand your feeling, but you talk like if LUMs don't exist.
> But LUMs are like brain, they don't need to be observed for doing
> their own thinking (except trivially by God, in our sense).
Oh, so we need God. How do you know that God isn't all that is, and is what
you are? In this case you just said that the LUM needs everything beyond
LUMs to make sense!
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> So could say, but this interpretation can be done within numbers as
>> well.
>> And then I can say that this interpretation needs something beyond
>> numbers
>> as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be done within
>> numbers
>> as well. And then I can say that this interpretation needs something
>> beyond
>> numbers as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be
>> done within
>> numbers as well....
>
> Kleene second recursion theorem, or the Gödel's diagonalization lemma,
> is the technical "trick" which cut that infinite regress. Of course
> you need to accept the axiom, like you need some intuition to accept
> the idea that your little sister can manage her life without you being
> present.
I don't see how the proof that natural numbers have the ability of
self-reference can cut the infinite regress. it just goes to the sentence
"And then you can say this interpretation can be done within numbers as
well." and makes an artificial cut here. But it doesn't prove that the next
sentence is not also true ("And then I can say that this interpretation
needs something beyond numbers as well"). It is an unprovable truth, indeed
(it seems to me) it is beyond the provability capabilities of ANY formal
system. Gödel just proves that there are always unprovable yet true
statements in every system, but I am not sure he proves that there are
(statements)/truths that are true, yet not provable in any system. Well,
anyway there seems to be a way to prove this, as COMP implies that there are
qualia, that cannot be named within formal systems. But it is not provable
whether these are ontologically real, or secondary to numbers.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I think that what you are saying is just that machine or numbers
> cannot think without some human being around.
> Unless the something beyond is God, in which case I have already
> agree. All waht I say would not lake sense without the notion of
> arithmetical truth. But this is not hidden: it is part of the theory.
OK. But you hide the possibility that God is consciousness, and is all that
is. In which case you assume something which may already contain the
interpretation, yourself, the physical universe, etc...
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Yet it can be intuitively clear that this is the case.
>
> But here the theory explains that the intuition is correct for the
> inner God, and false for God. They don't necessarily disagree because
> they are aware that they don't look at the picture from the same angle.
What does it mean that inner God and God are distinct? I see no God that is
not the inner God.
OK, if COMP shows that this is the case, I guess I just have to say
vehemently NO, even though I don't really know why. This bothers me a bit.
If I disagree, it shouldn't be hard to say where exactly.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If it isn't, simply show me something just consisting of arithmetics
>> which
>> explains something beyond arithmetics, without an interpetation from
>> you.
>> That would convince me.
>
> I can do that. But it will be as long as showing you that a brain can
> lead a person into believing in a universe. That would be very long.
> using G/G* and math, this is shortened, and is the entire object study
> of the AUDA. This relies on fundamental discoveries made by logicians
> and computer scientists. It cannot be shortened much more than what I
> have already done. Now, people familiar with Gödel's proof can get the
> gist of it, without looking at all the detail.
It seems to me Gödel's proof needs interpretation in the representation of
statements with numbers. We can't show that numbers can interpret themselves
without already having done /accepting the validity of this step. I don't
think it can logically proven that Gödel numbering is valid. It itself needs
a meta-level to make sense. There is no Gödel numbering without encoding,
and encoding makes no sense without postulating the sense in what is encoded
(symbols representing number relations, which are not themselves part of the
natural numbers). That is, in effect Gödel postulates something beyond
numbers to prove his theorem. Maybe I miss something and there is a way to
prove the incompleteness theorem without using any sort of encoding
mechanism, but it seems to be the core of his proof.
I don't want to claim that Gödel's proof is wrong, that would be a
preposterous claim from an non-mathematician that doesn't even understand
it. But is seems pretty clear to me that it relies on a meta-level, that is
not implicitly assumed within the natural numbers. This confuses me, because
I would think that this is not in mathematical proofs, but apparently it is,
in some circumstances.
By the way, one thing that is bothering me about Gödel's incompleteness
theorem, is that I never heard of a purely arithmetic statement which is
unprovable. Since RA is incomplete, this exists. Can you give an example of
a statement just with *,+,numbers that is unprovable?
Abother question about GIT: Why can it not be proved within presburger
arithmetics? Can't we use another encoding mechanism, that does not rely on
prime factorization, but instead a fixed coding scheme, that assigns a
unique number to every possible formula in a regular manner (as the possible
formulas are countable)? So this step seems to work, so what is the step
that doesn't work?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> That doesn't have to lead us to abandon doing science, anymore
>>>>>> than
>>>>>> seeing
>>>>>> that being a baby is limited is leading us to abandoning babies.
>>>>>> But
>>>>>> we may
>>>>>> outgrow being babies, and science.
>>>>>
>>>>> Science is like a lantern, when used properly it shows us our
>>>>> ignorance, like when you put light on darkness and see how big the
>>>>> place you were in is.
>>>> Yes, that's how I see the role of science, too.
>>>
>>> Really? Then why could we note use the lantern on fundamental
>>> question?
>> It is not sufficient.
>
> Sufficient to get the whole picture? Of course. But that is not a
> reason for not using it.
Of course not. Obviously it makes sense to use science. I never said "don't
do science". I just said that it might be possible that science is
transcended, and even that science itself may point into this direction.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> Same question. If there are limit we will see them.
>>> Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for studying
>>> the
>>> limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting G/
>>> G*
>>> is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is something
>>> bigger than themselves.
>> But if this is true we should simply be consistent and say that the
>> TOE is
>> not a TOE at all.
>
> That is a vocabulary problem. RA is an ontological theory of
> everything. The TOE coming from comp is incomplete, if not it would be
> reductionist, instead of being anti-reductionist.
Yeah, we agree on this. But is an incomplete theory of everything a theory
of everything? If it incomplete, it is not "of everything", except in a
trivial sense that everything is about everything.
Also, the claim that numbers are the only thing that is ontologically
required is unfounded. We need God, as you say yourself, which is the sense
in numbers. And God may include MUCH more than numbers. I'd even say he
trivially does.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It seems to me a TOE is beyond what is
>>>> researchable.
>>>
>>> Not only we can search it, but we can derive it rigorously from the
>>> comp assumption. If the brain works like a machine, then the TOE is
>>> arithmetic.
>> What is akward that COMP says the brain can't be a machine, as nothing
>> physical can be a machine. OK, probably you mean works practically
>> like a
>> machine (for the purpose of accepting a digital substitution). But
>> then you
>> can just expect COMP to be true on some level, not absolutely true, as
>> working like a machine is just an approximation.
>
> Comp shows that Plato was right in the sense that it is the physical
> which approximate the mathematical, not the contrary.
I couldn't say which way it is. I don't think COMP is completely clear on
this point either, because it assumes God, and we don't know whether God
includes the physical.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Also, I still doubt that the TOE works with arithmetic alone. Numbers
>> interpreting themselves doesn't convince me, as this just works if we
>> interpet into them that they interpret themselves (which is possible
>> and
>> coherent, no doubt about that).
>
>
> I have discussed this. We don't need "we", "God" is enough.
This supposed that we ≠ God. Why?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Not because I am not open to the idea, but I don't see how any
>>>> proposed TOE really explains much at all.
>>>
>>> Arithmetic not only explain quanta and qualia, but it does so in a
>>> precise technical way, so that we can test, refute it, etc.
>> But it does so in a very limited way. Like "What is true is true"
>> explains
>> everything (of course it explains a lot more, but it is just an
>> anology).
>
> "What is true is true" is tautological: none of the following are
> tautological:
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
0 ≠ s(x) is true because we defined s(x) to be a successor and it is an
axiom that 0 is not a successor. So it just another formulation of the
axioms, so is everything else you wrote down. Of course the fact that we
formulated it in another way is what makes it not tautological in the usual
sense. But the point is that we just explain everything explainable with
regards to what we assume it means that something is explainable.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Maybe formally it could be used to
>>>> explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the formal
>>>> research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret the
>>>> formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be
>>>> interpreted on
>>>> higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics)
>>>
>>> There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The
>>> inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view
>>> from
>>> inside.
>> But the inside of arithmetics is outside of arithmetics! What you call
>> inside of arithmetics CAN'T make sense without the transcendent
>> truth of
>> consciousness, which is beyond arithmetics (outside may be less
>> accurate).
>
> Rght. The TOE (arithmetic) can explain why the Löbian machines see,
> and even create things far beyond arithmetic. But with comp, such
> things belongs to number's imagination. It exists epistemologically,
> unlike the numbers which have a basic ontologically status.
This assumes that the number's imagination are not already included in God,
which you won't call epistemological, hopefully.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What can make me a bit nervous is when people believes that
>>>>>>> comp is
>>>>>>> false, based on invalid reasoning, or prejudice against some
>>>>>>> idea.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have no clue why you could have any problem with comp, given
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> 1)
>>>>>>> you have admitted not having study the theory, 2) you seem to
>>>>>>> have no
>>>>>>> problem with its main consequences (that physics is secondary to
>>>>>>> consciousness, non materialism, soul immortality, coming back to
>>>>>>> Plato
>>>>>>> and the mystics, etc.).
>>>>>> I have not studied it in detail, but I have read and roughly
>>>>>> understood the
>>>>>> main argument, and consequences. I simply am not sure that a
>>>>>> digital
>>>>>> substition of our brain will leave our experience relatively
>>>>>> invariant.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But that is only the comp assumption. Not only you cannot be sure,
>>>>> but
>>>>> the theory will explain why you should not be sure about this.
>>>> OK. But then it just natural that I don't accept it. Even the theory
>>>> itself
>>>> seems to agree with me if I reject it.
>>>
>>> No. It agrees with your 1-p, in the sense that it shows that if is
>>> true, it can only be in virtue of some truth extending yourself. It
>>> explains why we feel like solipsist, IF solipsism is false. If you
>>> reject the theory you can't use it for rejecting the theory.
>> No, not direclty. But that the theory is close to self-refuting may
>> lead us
>> to believe it is indeed false, even if it can't be absolutely shown
>> within
>> the theory.
>
> That is not convincing at all.
> If someone explains me that something is an optical illusion, I will
> not deduce that the theory is wrong because it contradicts my
> intuition. With reasoning like that the earth would be still believed
> to be flat, and Einstein would have been considered as a crackpot.
> We bet there is something beyond the intuition.
That the earth is flat relies on preconvceived notions of how the earth
looks. Which may be a kind of intuition, but not the only kind of intuition.
The intuition that some scientific observations point to the earth being
round may simply be stronger.
We can bet that there is something beyond the intuition, but then we have to
be aware that this also within our intuition! As you said yourself, natural
numbers can just be known intutively. We just bet on something beyond
earthly intuition. But there is divine intuition, also.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I
>>>>>> don't see why I would necessarily bet on that.
>>>>>
>>>>> To see the next soccer club, or the marriage of your dear grand-
>>>>> grand-
>>>>> grand-grand-grand-daughter, or for making one more salvia
>>>>> experience,
>>>>> or for taking one more cup of coffee on a terrace some sunny day.
>>>>> People will have their own motivations.
>>>> Alright, but even if I try it this doesn't make me accept COMP.
>>>
>>> ?
>>> Operationally, if you say yes to the doctor *qua computatio* (without
>>> adding magical thing in matter and mind), it means that you accept,
>>> and then you have to accept its consequence (if you are rational in
>>> the field).
>> No. I might just try it because I have no other possibility. Just
>> because I
>> pray to God in a very horrific situation, does not mean I believe in
>> God.
>
> I just never address the question of the truth of comp. That is
> philosphy, and I am not a philosopher. I just debunked invalid
> refutations of comp. But I am open that my own work might lead some
> day to a refutation of comp.
> Scientist serach the truth, but never pretend having got it. And
> indeed that is again well explain in the comp meta-theory, and, in the
> comp theory (arithmetic).
This might show some problems with our conceptions of science. Perhaps the
truth is right here, right know, obviously... We can not get it, because we
are it. And science just expresses the truth. It makes no sense to search
for the truth within science, as this will always be a shadow of truth. Not
that we can't do science, but preferably not with the intent of searching
truth. What sense is there in searching something which is already there. We
can just search for relative explanations, but not the truth.
You might say I restrict science. But honestly, isn't it akward to search
for something with the awareness that you never get it? It's like searching
for your key and always say "But what if that's not the key. I can't be
sure.". If we search for the key we will rather say: "Well, that looks like
they key, let's just act like that's the key, but not like it's the key to
secrets of the universe".
Maybe science is never pretending to get the truth because it makes no sense
to search truth in the first place, and as many scientist are quite wise
they at least admit that they have not found the truth through science. But
the truth is already there! Just look at it. And then we can search for
things within what is already there, but not for the truth itself!
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we merely
>>>>>> assume
>>>>>> that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.
>>>>>
>>>>> Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory
>>>>> complete.
>>>>> It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the trouble
>>>>> makers.
>>>> OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would
>>>> probably
>>>> say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear (like
>>>> in black
>>>> holes, or the big bang).
>>>
>>> This is because they divide numbers by zero. It means that there is a
>>> problem with their theories.
>> Maybe there is a problem with the theory that dividing by zero makes
>> no
>> sense, or with the concept of zero itself. There may be something
>> about the
>> universe that is necessarily indescribeable by mathematics, which
>> just shows
>> itself in the mathematical singularity. Maybe it can't be removed.
>> It would
>> bet on it, actually. We may find theories that do that, but they
>> will be
>> found to be false.
>
>
> I will not buy that car because I may have an accident. I will not go
> out of my mother womb because I might be in trouble. You cannot use
> such kind of super-precaution principle.
That is not comparable. I am not using precaution, I am just using common
sense. Why would there be a complete mathematical theory, if, for example,
Gödel showed, that even the mathematics themselves are not complete. And the
point were it is incomplete will always appear from the perspective that it
is complete as non-sensical.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> That a theory might be wrong is not an argument against a theory. On
> the contrary, it is an invitation to dig on the details, and to find
> out what mmight be wrong (in case the theory is interesting enough).
Yes, I agree. But it is important to recognize that it seems like our
theories are generally inadequate. You already do this on some level, but
somehow still claim to have a TOE.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Comp is believed (not always consciously) by almost everybody,
> including the belief in primary matter. My point is that such a theory
> (comp+matter) is non sensical.
I don't buy that COMP is believed by almost everybody. Many people believe
that there is some transcendental aspect of our functioning, that can't be
substituted by digital machines.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> If you want keep primitive matter, just abandon comp, but then give me
> your theory of the relation between matter and consciousness.
What bothers me is that we might sneak primitive matter into COMP by relying
on there being God, who already may include primitive matter. I am not sure
there is a ultimate theory about the relation between matter and
consciousness. It seems they are too inseperable to do this. The best we can
do is discovering relative relations of specific aspects of matter and
consciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I don't believe we can seperate existence neatly
>>>> into physical existence and arithmetical existence.
>>>
>>> Physical existence is entirely explained by an unavoidable way
>>> numbers
>>> can look at themselves.
>> If you assume that numbers can look at themselves,
>
> I do not assume this. This is a fact or a theorem, with reasonable
> definition of "looking".
OK... But you can't conclude from this that we only numbers to do this. As
you said yourself, we need God. And it appears God is most reasonably
conceived of to be everything (and beyond). So we just show tht numbers can
look at themselves with the help of everything, which is no suprise, as this
everything includes many intelligent entities which provide interpretation
of the numbers.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> which may be sneaking in
>> consciousness and with it physical reality through the back door.
>
> Just study the theory.
But the theory won't mention that it does this if it sneaks it in. You said
yourself that your TOE does not assume them, so it is hopeless to find them
within the theory. You see my point?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I know
>> that we can show that numbers can look at themselves, but it can't
>> be shown
>> that they can do it without us (some general intelligence).
>
> They need only God, to make sense of the idea that 17 is prime
> independently of any little ego.
OK. They need God. But is God anything less than everything (possibly
beyond)? If they need everything or more, well, it effectively shows that it
needs every little ego.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> This is just an
>> IMHO unfounded assumption of yours.
>
> Of *all* scientists.
> Of any one taking a plane. If 17 is prime depend on mister X, plane
> would crash the day Mister X dies.
No. If Mister X dies, mister X still existed, and thus 17 is still prime, as
the primeness of a numbers is determined from a timeless perspective.
Of course, relatively speaking it is not dependent upon whether mister X is
there or not. But the relative perspective may be misleading in the context
of a TOE. If you want everything, you have to take absolutely everything
into account.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> as the emulation itself -
>>>> being within the universe - could change the universe (as, if I
>>>> understood
>>>> QM correctly, there is always some entaglement between everything,
>>>> even
>>>> though it may be extremely weak), rendering the emulation invalid.
>>>
>>> QM is not assumed, but recovered. And the UD emulates itself
>>> infinitely often without any problem. QM and the UD does not live on
>>> the same reality layer.
>> Hm, I question that. It assumes that numbers are independent of the
>> physical
>> universe. Well, I guess that assumptions is in COMP, is it?
>
> Not at all. Comp is only: I can survive with a digital brain.
> Now, what is true, is that I need Church thesis, and so I need to bet
> on the excluded middle principle, which is a sort of assumption that
> arithmetical truth does not depend on my little ego.
I don't see how the exluded middle principle is a sort of assumption that
arithmetical truth does not depend on my little ego.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to inconsistent
>>>>> theory.
>>>> But inconsistent with respect to what?
>>>
>>> Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and ~p.
>> But that is just incosistent with classical logic.
>
> No. It is inconsistent with all logic, except the paraconsistent one.
So? This is just what I said.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I can easily assert "I am
>> big and I am not big (small)" and this is not absolutely inconsistent.
>
> Yes it is.
If it absolutely inconsistent, how come I can easily make sense of it?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It
>> just means I am big with respect to an insect and small with respect
>> to the
>> sun.
>
> That is another statement.
It is a clarification of the former statement.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> We don't need to restrict ourselves
>>>> to classical logic, do we?
>>>
>>> We don't really need that, but we still need the rule of non
>>> contradiction.
>> Yes some rule of non contradiction seems useful for saying anything of
>> value. But this need not be "p and ~p is not allowed". It may be
>> subjective,
>> for example. In music non contradiction means that we don't use only
>> dissonance, but we can use consonance and dissonance together. But
>> what is
>> dissonance is itself quite subjective.
>
> You cannot lift the meaning of words from one domain to another,
> without taking some caution.
That's right. My point is only that it may be possible to be more flexible
about what is inconsistent than just "p and ~p is not allowed".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels,
>>> but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to anything
>>> interesting. It is just non comprehensible.
>> Why? Of course it makes no sense to not distinguish between false
>> and right
>> at all (except if you want to point something that is entirely beyond
>> words). But this distinction need not lie in not allowing assertions
>> of
>> classical contradictions (p and ~p).
>
> Well, you are free to try a fundamental theory in some obscure logic.
I am not sure there is a fundamental theory. So when speaking a about
fundamental things, it won't make sense from a theoretical standpoint.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
>>>> of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with our
>>>> intuition, but then constistency is subjective).
>>>
>>> It is not. It is 3-p definable.
>> Definable with respect to some theory, eg classical logic. But
>> classical
>> logic is obviously false if taken as an absolute, in my mind. There
>> seem to
>> be some inherently true contradictions, like "the world is good and
>> not
>> good".
>
> But this is made clear in the TOE. You are confusing (p & ~p) with (Bp
> and B~p). the first is contradictory and the second is not.
But it is not only that I believe that the world is good and it is not good.
It may just be that way. Why not?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
>>>>> your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real
>>>>> life
>>>>> happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
>>>> Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can we?
>>>> Or, we
>>>> accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or
>>>> inconsistent, is
>>>> subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of
>>>> inconsistency is
>>>> futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is incosistent.
>>>
>>> But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop doing
>>> research.
>> Yeah, but we can try to be more consistent even if we accept we are
>> inconsistent. Why not?
>
> At some level, but accepting this at the start will just make things
> unnecessarily complex.
It seems very simple to me. "Let's just forget about getting it absolutely
right, and get on with more practical things".
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> You look like trying to justify that you don't want to do
>>>>> scientific
>>>>> research. But I never say that people should do scientific
>>>>> research. I
>>>>> do it, and like to discuss results and questions with others. I
>>>>> like
>>>>> also to debunk invalid argument, like the quantum and the Godel
>>>>> based
>>>>> argument against comp. It is part of my job.
>>>>>
>>>> I am not saying you shouldn't do that. I am just reminding you that
>>>> maybe
>>>> you are restricting your view on what science is, or should be.
>>>
>>> Who is the one saying that something is not searchable?
>> I am not *claiming* that. I don't *want* to restrict science. I just
>> see
>> that is apparently is restricted. That's why I want to enhance it,
>> ultimately going beyond science.
>
> Comp invites you to go beyond science in a scientific way. That is
> what happens already when you say "yes" to a doctor, given that such
> an act cannot be entirely rational, provably so.
OK. But I am talking about going beyond science within science. Merging
science with art and philosophy and theology, if you will.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But we seem to have different
>> approaches to widening the scope of science.
>
> I use the scientific way.
If we just use science to extend science, we will be limited by our
preconceived notions of what science is.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> And this to avoid the possibility of a truth because *you* don't like
>>> it?
>> It's not that primarily that I don't like it, more that it seems
>> incoherent
>> to me (not provably incoherent). I am not opposed to incoherent
>> things, but
>> well, they are incoherent, so I feel compelled to argue against them.
>
> Ha ha! You betrayed yourself here. You need coherence like all
> scientists.
Sure. I just don't need to dualistically conceive of coherence as not
asserting p and ~p.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> I have the same problem since 40 years. Those who like the conclusion
>>> does not like them to be consequence of logical reasoning, and those
>>> who like the logical reasoning are sick when they begin the grasp the
>>> conclusion. Interdisciplinary Science is less advanced than politics.
>>> The only interdisciplinary agreement seems to be on killing the
>>> diplomats.
>> I just get the feeling you are sneaking something
>> translogical/-rational/-arithmetical into your logical reasoning.
>> Which is
>> fine, but we should make it explicit, and not hide it under the
>> "numbers are
>> interpreting themselves" rug.
>
> I don't think anything is hidden. Not even the mystery of
> consciousness which is the staring point of the thought experience. I
> do think you should study the theory instead on speculating on its
> meaning and compare it to your intuition. You must compare only your
> intuition with what the theory says on intuition.
But you claim to remove the assumption of consciousness in the TOE. What the
theory says doesn't really matter, as the very assumption that this possible
is non-sensical. You might say this is just a prejudice. But removing the
assumption won't help, because it is even there if it is not assumed, and it
is obviously not dependent on notions of numbers, so to say it is just the
inside view of numbers hardly makes sense, also. Why would we believe this
if it is there without any notions of numbers?
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