On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:



It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.

What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
build a
theory.
You could define this as primitive ontological entity, but honestly
this has
nothing to do with what I call a primitive ontological entity. As I
understand a primitive ontological entity, it doesn't need to be
assumed,
and even less explicitly. It is just there whether we assume it or
not, and
this is what makes it primitive and ontological.

You confuse a theory and its (intended) model (or subject matter).

This is a widespread confusion, and that is related to the fact that
physicists use "model" where logicians use "theory".
Hm, I don't understand where my confusion lies. If anything, it
seems to me
confusing theory and subject matter lies in considering anything that
depends on assumptions within a theory a primitive ontological
entity. If it
dependent on assumptions, it doesn't seem to be ontological.

In that case I understand why you want consciousness to be "primitive".
But in a theory, by definition, you have to assume what exists. All
existence on anything we want to talk in a theoretical frmaework as to
be assumed, or derived from what we assumed, even consciousness. If
not, such theories are no more 3-communicable. In fact I think that
you are confusing the ontology, and the theoretical description of
that ontology. I think this is due to a lack of familiarity with
"theoretical reasoning".
Hm... OK. I am not sure that there are valid 3-communicable theories about fundamental issues. I guess that is what it comes down to. I am not against science, I am just skeptical that it can really touch fundamental issues. It
seems to me we always sneak 3-incommunable things into such a theory.

This is the case for all theorizing. Like we often use the intuition of natural numbers implicitly.




So in
COMP, I think the 3-communicable part doesn't ultimately explain much
fundamental, as it totally relies on the subjective interpretation, that you
call the "inside view of arithmetics", that seems to me just to be the
primary conciousness.

Comp explains a lot, but you have to study it to grasp this by yourself.
The inside views are recovered by the intensional variant of the provability predicate. It makes comp (the classical theory of knowledge) testable, because the physical reality is among those views.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:

For me it is
just so integral to everything that I can't see how calling it
primitive
could be wrong.

Both matter and consciousness have that feature, but this means
that
they are fundamental, not that they are primitive.
In the sense above you may be right, but then I don't agree with
this
definition.

Let us use primitive in my sense, to fix the idea, and let us use
"fundamental" for your sense.
Those are the sense used in this list for awhile, and it would be
confusing to change suddenly the terming.
OK. The terminology doesn't really matter. But then I have to say that
primitive has nothing to do with what is primary in reality. It is
just what
we treat as primary in a theory, which may have little do to with
what is
primary in reality.

With comp, you can take the numbers, or the combinators, or any finite data structures. It does not matter at all. It does not makes sense to
ask what are the real one, because they are ontologically equivalent.
With the numbers, you can prove that the combinators (or the programs)
exist. With the combinators, you can prove that the numbers exists
(and do what they are supposed to do). But, to talk and search for the consequences, we have to fix the initial theory. They all leads to the
same theory of consciousness and matter.
Good, but this doesn't really change what I wrote.
Just because we assume the numbers to be ontological and derive
consciousness from that, which we *assume* to be epistemological from the start, doesn't mean that this reflects reality. It might as well be the case that consciousness is ontologically there from the start, gives rise to numbers, and numbers can reflect their source ("derive" its existence). I think this question cannot be settled rationally. We can just ask ourselves
"What does really make sense to me?".

With comp consciousness is platonistically co-extensive with the numbers (including their additive and multiplicative laws), but this reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem. And the mind problem is reduce to the study of what is true *about* the machine (this includes many things true for the machine but not justifiable by her).






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It's a bit like saying that existence isn't primitive. What
would that even mean? Deriving the existence of existence, or
consciousness
seems quite meaningless to me.

Existence can be handled by simple rule (like deducing ExP(x) from
P(m) for some m).
Consciousness has no similar rules.
But the existence you speak of is not existence as such. It is just
the
existence of a thing in a particular theory.

That is always the case when we do science. (3-discourse).
Right, that is why science cannot touch existence as such. It can
just make
relative sense of phenomena within existence.

That is not entirely true, although a big part of it is true. But it
would be long to explain, when such things explains themselves better
once we grasp comp well enough.
In fact science deals all the time with existence, and this without
doing an ontological commitment. But when we apply science, some local
and global ontological commitment can be done. So with a TOE, we need
to take seriously some term of our theory, if not we remain
"academical".
OK. I guess I don't agree with that because I don't agree with the concept
of a TOE.
Of course science deals with existence, everything does. But it can't
explain existence, or formalize existence.

Explaining for a scientist does not mean so much. It means basically to reduce something to something which we can explain, or accept. But a TOE can do one think more: explain that its primitive terms are no more reducible. The TOE isolated by comp does that.





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

But obviously I can't prove that it isn't. I am just stating a
(strong)
intuition. I guess there is no point argueing over that.

Especially that the comp theory, + the classical theory of
knowledge,
suggests clearly that machine's intuition will conflict with
the
correct self-referentially provable, and true, propositions.
This may be a strong point against COMP.

Why? On the contrary, it mirrors the emergence of a mind-body
problem
in the discourse of the universal numbers.
Once I say "yes" to the doctor, I lost the option of taking those
discourses as zombies one.
The problem is that we rely on our intuition to say yes

We can't. We have to rely on some theories, which are always
hypothetical. It is not different than taking a plane.
But then to rely on some theories, we can just use our intuition to
judge
whether they are reliable (or we talk us into some "rational"
reason, that
is ultimately just as dependent on some intuition). So we are
again at
square one.

Not really. The intuition needed to understand a theory is equal to
the intuition needs to understand the natural numbers. Not a lot.
Then
the theory, if precise enough, is refutable, and that is all we can
hope for. (Yes, a scientist is *happy* when someone is kind enough to
show him/her wrong).
OK. But I don't understand how this would lead us to accept COMP.
How can we
accept COMP due to understanding natural numbers?

"digital" = natural number theoretical. The digitalist doctor will put
your "soul" on a disk, and from a 3-view, this is only a number.
COMPuters, from a 3-view, are well know to be "number crunching
machine". Etc.
Fine, but even if we understand this intuitive faith is required that we
will survive our digital substitution.

Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not need to be blind faith, though.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:

and then have a
theory that calls our intuition heavily into question, so that
from
the
theory itself it makes sense to reject it.

On the contrary, the theory explains why the intuition is
misleading
fro that kind of operation. Evolution did not prepare our brains
for
the technological speeding up.
But what to use other than intuition? We can't base our faith on
some
rational thing, as this would require faith as well.

Science is based on some faith in some reality and in some
rationality.
Right, that's what I am saying. Faith is required to do science. And
faith
comes out of our intuition.

Not only. Some reality (God, physical universe, arithmetic) play some
roles.
Sure, but without intuition we can't access God, the physical universe
(perception is intuitive) and arithmetics (the understanding of natural
numbers is intuitive).

Sure.



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


It might be that all good theories about reality as a whole show
that it
makes sense to reject them, as they are always incomplete, and if
they are
good they will reflect that.
In the limit this could lead us to reject theories as such, in
accordance
with what they say!

Who knows. But that is a speculation, and it would be unwise to
reject
a theory by speculating that the theories in the future will say
so.
It is really so speculative? The more sophisticated our theories
get, the
more they seem to point towards something beyond theories. COMP
certainly
does that very powerfully.
That this will lead us to abandon theories as such seems to be just
the
conclusion of that.

That is an argument against science is general.
Right, it is an argument that science in general is quite a limited
tool.

But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do with COMP is interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers, as there is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized just with numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE certainly can't
do it just with numbers).

We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam).


So the TOE is not a TOE at all, because it just a
way of representing all of our knowledge (that is practically outside of the
TOE) within the TO"E".

No. But really you have to study it. Knowledge is not representable in any TOE. The theaetetus theory needs to invoke God, or Truth. But we can define it for simpler machine than us, and then the comp hyp lifts the theory up to us, at the meta-level, for technical reason of soundness. When we do that, the "divine intellect" warn us that it is at our own risk and peril.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

That doesn't have to lead us to abandon doing science, anymore than
seeing
that being a baby is limited is leading us to abandoning babies. But
we may
outgrow being babies, and science.

Science is like a lantern, when used properly it shows us our
ignorance, like when you put light on darkness and see how big the
place you were in is.
Yes, that's how I see the role of science, too.

Really? Then why could we note use the lantern on fundamental question?




Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am not sure if theories can even be true, ultimately. They are
just a tool
for explaining our observations, and they can only be relatively
true in the
sense that they serve that purpose. You say yourself that we can
only refute
theories, and never show them to be true. So why even suspect they
could be
true?

Why not? It works that way.
Fireman know that a call for fire might be a (bad) joke, yet they will
go on he place, because it might be true.
We use theory all the time. They can also be approximatively true, and
very useful. All this becomes more delicate when searching a TOE. But
that is not a reason to abandon the research.
No, I am not arguing for abandoning research. I just think that there is
limits to what is researchable.

Same question. If there are limit we will see them.
Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for studying the limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting G/G* is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is something bigger than themselves.



It seems to me a TOE is beyond what is
researchable.

Not only we can search it, but we can derive it rigorously from the comp assumption. If the brain works like a machine, then the TOE is arithmetic.



Not because I am not open to the idea, but I don't see how any
proposed TOE really explains much at all.

Arithmetic not only explain quanta and qualia, but it does so in a precise technical way, so that we can test, refute it, etc.



Maybe formally it could be used to
explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the formal
research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret the
formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be interpreted on
higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics)

There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view from inside.



- which makes the
formality somewhat superflous.
As I see it, we will just exhaust ourselves with trying to find truth in theories. This doesn't mean we can't use them. Just that we don't treat them as being true. Like we don't hope to find the truth in our keyboard. It is
just a tool, and as such not true or false.

My keyboard does not assert propositions. Machines and theories do. So we can listen to them and compare with what we believe, know, guess, observe, etc.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

What can make me a bit nervous is when people believes that comp is
false, based on invalid reasoning, or prejudice against some idea.

I have no clue why you could have any problem with comp, given that
1)
you have admitted not having study the theory, 2) you seem to have no
problem with its main consequences (that physics is secondary to
consciousness, non materialism, soul immortality, coming back to
Plato
and the mystics, etc.).
I have not studied it in detail, but I have read and roughly
understood the
main argument, and consequences. I simply am not sure that a digital
substition of our brain will leave our experience relatively
invariant.


But that is only the comp assumption. Not only you cannot be sure, but
the theory will explain why you should not be sure about this.
OK. But then it just natural that I don't accept it. Even the theory itself
seems to agree with me if I reject it.

No. It agrees with your 1-p, in the sense that it shows that if is true, it can only be in virtue of some truth extending yourself. It explains why we feel like solipsist, IF solipsism is false. If you reject the theory you can't use it for rejecting the theory.




Bruno Marchal wrote:


I
don't see why I would necessarily bet on that.

To see the next soccer club, or the marriage of your dear grand- grand-
grand-grand-grand-daughter, or for making one more salvia experience,
or for taking one more cup of coffee on a terrace some sunny day.
People will have their own motivations.
Alright, but even if I try it this doesn't make me accept COMP.

?
Operationally, if you say yes to the doctor *qua computatio* (without adding magical thing in matter and mind), it means that you accept, and then you have to accept its consequence (if you are rational in the field).





Bruno Marchal wrote:

You might say that we have no evidence of infinities within the
brain. But
we just avoid infinity in physics because we can not make formal
sense of
it.

I am not sure of that. Infinities makes things easier. Classical
physics contains more infinities than quantum physics, which still
contains a lot.
OK. But in some places infinities just let us lose all capability of making
predictions. Like if there is infinite energy everywhere.

That's a too vague statement. In some physical theories, a part of that infinity (of energy) is exploitable. I cannot judge, and it is weak because it assumes some solution to the problem of marrying relativity and the quantum.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we merely
assume
that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.

Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory complete.
It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the trouble
makers.
OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would probably say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear (like in black
holes, or the big bang).

This is because they divide numbers by zero. It means that there is a problem with their theories.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

Also, in quantum mechanics, the whole universe is fundamentally
entagled,
calling the very idea of emulation into question. You can't emulate
the
whole universe.

A priori you can, except with comp, because the physical universe
appears to be a sum on all what you cannot emulate.
Remember that the quantum is Turing emulable. The UD does emulate an
infinity of quantum objects.
It comes down to the idea that the UD exists apart from physical reality.

Which is the case if you still agree with your statement that "17 is prime" is true (or a facet of God).
The UDS exist in the same sense that the prime numbers exist.



Even though I don't believe that physics are more primary than numbers, I don't think that we can say that numbers existence independently of them.
They may be interdependent.

Once numbers exists (always assumed to be obeying the + and * laws), their dreams exist, logically. So you can say that their are interdependent, in a sort of trivial way.




I don't believe we can seperate existence neatly
into physical existence and arithmetical existence.

Physical existence is entirely explained by an unavoidable way numbers can look at themselves.



And in this case, we can't emulate the universe,

We can't, but numbers can explain that fact.



as the emulation itself -
being within the universe - could change the universe (as, if I understood QM correctly, there is always some entaglement between everything, even
though it may be extremely weak), rendering the emulation invalid.

QM is not assumed, but recovered. And the UD emulates itself infinitely often without any problem. QM and the UD does not live on the same reality layer.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

The idea that quantum effects do not matter to the functioning of
the brain
rests on a reductionist idea of how the brain functions, which is just
another faith that I simply do not share.

But this only betrays that you have a reductionist idea of the finite
numbers and machines. Comp remains correct if the brain is a quantum
machine.
What I said above applies.


Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:

Again, it is also very different from the divine and terrestrial
points of view. A brain, or even a cells can be considered as a
machine, or a word, or a theory. We are divine hypothesis.
But this is a metaphor. No one in science says the brain is a
theory. This
is just a category error.

No. It is a theory, written in the language of chemistry, which is
itself written in the language of quantum mechanics, which is itself written in the language of machine's theology (assuming comp). It is not a metaphor at all, but a bet on some 3-self-finitude (which leads
to some 1-self-infinitude).
With your reasoning, just about everything is a theory,

Everything finite, asserting finite things (propositions) from time to
time.
That's a very broad definition, but anyways, I don't really want to discuss
definitions, so fine, call a brain a theory if you want.


Bruno Marchal wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Maybe making formalized theories is just a transitory
phenomenon, it
may
ultimately be a dead end.

In that case, life is a dead end.
?
Life is not a formalized theory.

The 'life of consciousness' is not, but the life of a body is, unless
you have an evidence of concrete special infinities.
I need no infinities for that. The word theory, especially "formal
theory",
just doesn't applies to life as such, except in a metaphorical way.


A formal theory just means a finite things with some shape.
Hm, I am not sure life is a finite thing.

It is not. But living being are (locally) finite. That's the assumption. Mechanism is a form of local self-finitude of the body assumption. I don't defend the idea, just that it entails in a verifiable way that the TOE is arithmetic.




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

...I don't think the vatican would like me proclaiming that WE
are
all God,
though. :D

They will burn you, but in some century they will sanctify you,
and
of
course censor the discovery.
It can make sense when you see how far some are able to
misunderstand
the statement.

In comp you are true, and all machine can discover that, but if assert, or even if taken as an axiom, it transform itself into
bewesibar ('0 = 1") which is the arithmetical version of BS.
Hm, I don't see why it shouldn't be taken as an axiom.

Because you will become inconsistent.
So? We need formal consistency only in math, apart from math
inconsistencies
are abundant, and acceptable. Even in science. General relativity
and
quantum mechanics are quite inconsistent with each other!

We need consistency if only to have a reality to look for.
Inconsistency makes people saying about anything. It is very easy,
but
boring and unproductive, and eventually it leads to suffering. In
fact
suffering is the reaction of the soul in front of threat of
inconsistency.
To me consistency and inconsistency can coexist. Inconsistency just
means
that our mind has no coherent understanding of something. 1=0 just
appears
inconsistent because it doesn't fit with your internal
representation of
natural numbers. Someone might just explain that he uses the symbols
0 and 1
interchangeably, and 2 means what you understand as 1, etc....

If someone says that 0 = 1, and later makes clear he is not talking
on
the natural numbers 0 and 1, then he was consistent, and we were just not talking on the same subject. It was not inconsistency, but just a
vocabulary problem.
The point is that inconsistencies are relative to some theoretical
system
that we use. So we don't need to be worried if something is
inconsistent
from a particular point of view, since we aren't forced to believe
that this
theoretical system is the ultimate arbiter of what is true.

In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to inconsistent
theory.
But inconsistent with respect to what?

Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and ~p.



We don't need to restrict ourselves
to classical logic, do we?

We don't really need that, but we still need the rule of non contradiction. Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels, but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to anything interesting. It is just non comprehensible.



It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with our
intuition, but then constistency is subjective).

It is not. It is 3-p definable.




Bruno Marchal wrote:

If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real life
happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can we? Or, we accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or inconsistent, is subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of inconsistency is
futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is incosistent.

But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop doing research. Imagine that your doctor tell you that you have to stay in your bed all the time for three days, and do some walk every morning. You will not say: OK doctor, Life is inconsistent and I will follow your recommendation in some inconsistent way.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

You look like trying to justify that you don't want to do scientific
research. But I never say that people should do scientific research. I
do it, and like to discuss results and questions with others. I like
also to debunk invalid argument, like the quantum and the Godel based
argument against comp. It is part of my job.

I am not saying you shouldn't do that. I am just reminding you that maybe
you are restricting your view on what science is, or should be.

Who is the one saying that something is not searchable?
And this to avoid the possibility of a truth because *you* don't like it?

I have the same problem since 40 years. Those who like the conclusion does not like them to be consequence of logical reasoning, and those who like the logical reasoning are sick when they begin the grasp the conclusion. Interdisciplinary Science is less advanced than politics. The only interdisciplinary agreement seems to be on killing the diplomats.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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