Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Aren't you restricting your notion of
>> what is explainable of what your own theory labels explainable with  
>> its own
>> assumptions?
> 
> Yes, but this is due to its TOE aspect: it explains what "explanation"  
> are, and what we can hope to be 100% explainable, and what we will  
> never be explained (like the numbers).
It seems to me what it does is assuming what is explained and then explain
that this is so, while not making explicit that it is assumes (see below).
In effect, I believe it shows that our efforts to find fundamental
explantions are bound to fail, because explanations do not apply to the
fundamental thing. Explanations are just relative pointers from one obvious
thing to another.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> You have to study to understand by yourself that it explain mind and
>>> matter from addition and multiplication, and that the explanation is
>>> the unique one maintainable once we say "yes" to the doctor. The
>>> explanation of matter is enough detailed so that we can test the comp
>>> theory with observation.
>> If this were true, show me a document just consisting of addition and
>> multplication that tells ANYTHING about mind and matter or even  
>> anything
>> beyond numbers and addition and multiplication without your  
>> explanation.
>> As long as you can't provide this it seems to me you ask me to study
>> something that doesn't exist.
> 
> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
> 
> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
> 
> Qu = B^(5^60)
> 
> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
> 
> Th +  2Z = B^5
> 
> L = U + TTh
> 
> E = Y + MTh
> 
> N = Q^16
> 
> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +  
> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>           + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
> 
> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
> 
> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
> 
> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
> 
> K = R + 1 + HP - H
> 
> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2
> 
> C = 2R + 1 Ph
> 
> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga
> 
> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1
> 
> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1
> 
> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1
> 
> 
> Thanks to Jones, Matiyasevitch. Some number Nu verifying that system  
> of diophantine equations (the variables are integers) are "Löbian  
> stories", on which the machine's first person indeterminacy will be  
> distributed.
> We don't even need to go farer than the polynomial equations to  
> describe the ROE.
> 
> What you ask me is done in good textbook on Mathematical logic.
You used more than numbers in this example, namely variables. But even then,
I am not convinced this formulas make sense as being "löbian stories"
without an explanation. Surely, I can't prove that.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure. It is main point of the comp theory, and of its TOE, it
>>>>> justifies the unavoidability of faith in science. Even in the non
>>>>> applied science, but far more in the applied science. It does not
>>>>> need
>>>>> to be blind faith, though.
>>>> This confuses me. So we seem to agree completely on this point. Yet
>>>> you
>>>> disagreed with my statement that intuition is needed at a
>>>> fundamental level.
>>>
>>> We don't need it at the *primitive level* in the TOE. Of course we
>>> need it at the meta-level.
>> You assume that by not mentioning it in the TOE the TOE somehow  
>> independent
>> of it. Why is it not possible that we simply failed to mention in,  
>> yet still
>> use it?
> 
> It is up to you to show where it is used.
Arithmetics depends on truth/sense. If there is no truth/sense, no
arithmetical statment can make sense. We have no reason at all to believe
sense is restricted to arithmetics, thus with postulating that there is
truth we can use everything.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Actually it depends on what you mean with universe. If you define  
>> universe
>> as everything that is, not what we commonly call our universe in  
>> physics
>> (that works according to QM and GR). If you think of the universe as  
>> all
>> that is, I would indeed say that it makes not much sense to write on  
>> its
>> origin, as it would have to be its own origin, as there is nothing  
>> outside
>> it.
> 
> With comp, it is absolutely undecidable if the "Universe" is different  
> from N, and with Occam, it is enough.
No. We need the sense in N, which is beyond N. Without sense, N is
non-sensical. It is up to you to prove that sense is only the sense in N.
Everbody assumes it is more than that. And if you say that we need only the
sense in natural numbers, show that the sense in natural numbers makes sense
without sense in general, or can somehow by seperated our from sense in
general.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Why do I say this? Because truth apart from
>> self-knowledge can make no sense to me.
> 
> With you = God, OK.
> 
> But that kind of knowledge explains nothing. (Remember that the goal  
> is in finding a conceptual understanding of mind and matter, or the  
> closer we can get).
> 
> With you = "man", I am not OK.
Indeed that kind of knowledge explains nothing. Maybe there is nothing to
explain on a fundamental level.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But it is all we can use to isolate a publicly sharable TOE.
>>>>>> Provided that this really makes sense! It seems to me all we do  
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> COMP is
>>>>>> interpreting our subjective epistemological insights into numbers,
>>>>>> as there
>>>>>> is no way of interpreting the meaning that is being arithmetized
>>>>>> just with
>>>>>> numbers (even if you claim that numbers do it themselves, WE
>>>>>> certainly can't
>>>>>> do it just with numbers).
>>>>>
>>>>> We do it with just numbers. (with comp + occam).
>>>> Then write a formula just consisting of statements of numbers that
>>>> explains
>>>> something about the mind body problem. You will see that is
>>>> impossible.
>>>
>>> That is in done through the arithmetical hypostases. All what I have
>>> done is exactly that.
>> But all of your papers use alot of words. If you just assume  
>> arithmetics,
>> you shouldn't have to use words. You see, you don't have to express  
>> the mind
>> body problem with numbers. Just state anything with numbers that  
>> points to
>> something specific beyond numbers without an linguistic explanation.
>> You don't have to do it yourself. Just provide a link where purely
>> arithmetic statements are used to show something beyond.
> 
> All textbook in meta-arithmetic. Gödel's 1931 paper. It explains why  
> this is possible.
By virtue of assuming the meta-level that there are arguing from!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> We
>>>> need an interpretation. And that this interpretation can be done
>>>> within
>>>> numbers may well be true, but only if there is another layer of
>>>> interpretation on top of that!
>>>
>>> I can understand your feeling, but you talk like if LUMs don't exist.
>>> But LUMs are like brain, they don't need to be observed for doing
>>> their own thinking (except trivially by God, in our sense).
>> Oh, so we need God.
> 
> Which is arithmetical truth, and with comp we need only Sigma_1  
> arithmetical truth.
You don't know if God is arithmetical truth. Here you really expose
yourself. You presuppose that you know what God is! And if you say we only
need arithmetcical truth, show that it can be seperated from truth in
general.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> How do you know that God isn't all that is, and is what
>> you are?
> 
> This would eliminate "man" and "nature" from the picture. It would be  
> like going in the state of God before the creation. We can do that  
> with meditation, but not in fundamental science, because it avoids the  
> reality of man and nature.
> The goal here is not some infinite joy and peace, but to solve the  
> mind-body problem. Come back on Earth, will you?
> 
As I see it this is important with regards to what COMP can mean.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> In this case you just said that the LUM needs everything beyond
>> LUMs to make sense!
> 
> Yes. The numbers needs *more* than the numbers to understand the  
> numbers. They can find it, in the epistemological space of the  
> numbers. It is big, and "alive".
But how do you know it is just epistemological? Why isn't it included in the
sense that is required for numbers to make sense? And this sense can not be
epistemological, as you can't base something ontological on something
epistemological.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> So could say, but this interpretation can be done within numbers as
>>>> well.
>>>> And then I can say that this interpretation needs something beyond
>>>> numbers
>>>> as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be done within
>>>> numbers
>>>> as well. And then I can say that this interpretation needs something
>>>> beyond
>>>> numbers as well. And then you can say this interpretation can be
>>>> done within
>>>> numbers as well....
>>>
>>> Kleene second recursion theorem, or the Gödel's diagonalization  
>>> lemma,
>>> is the technical "trick" which cut that infinite regress. Of course
>>> you need to accept the axiom, like you need some intuition to accept
>>> the idea that your little sister can manage her life without you  
>>> being
>>> present.
>> I don't see how the proof that natural numbers have the ability of
>> self-reference can cut the infinite regress. it just goes to the  
>> sentence
>> "And then you can say this interpretation can be  done within  
>> numbers as
>> well." and makes an artificial cut here. But it doesn't prove that  
>> the next
>> sentence is not also true ("And then I can say that this  
>> interpretation
>> needs something beyond numbers as well").
> 
> In that case the infinite regress would not been cut. But it is.  
> Provably so if you agree with the truth of the following sentences:
> 
> Classical logic+
> 
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> + the induction axioms.
I do not agree that this axiom can state all that is true, so I can extend
whatever it proves. The infinite regress is cut, fine. And then I can say
that this needs something beyond numbers as well. The infinite regress
continues outside the system.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> I think that what you are saying is just that machine or numbers
>>> cannot think without some human being around.
>>> Unless the something beyond is God, in which case I have already
>>> agree. All waht I say would not lake sense without the notion of
>>> arithmetical truth. But this is not hidden: it is part of the theory.
>> OK. But you hide the possibility that God is consciousness, and is  
>> all that
>> is. In which case you assume something which may already contain the
>> interpretation, yourself, the physical universe, etc...
> 
> It contains all that, in the sense that we can derive the existence of  
> it in the theory, but not in the sense that it is assumes it  
> explicitly in the theory, or implicitly at the meta-level.
OK, it does not assume it explicity, but implicitly. We assume God, and it
contains everything, or at least could contain everything, a priori.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> If it isn't, simply show me something just consisting of arithmetics
>>>> which
>>>> explains something beyond arithmetics, without an interpetation from
>>>> you.
>>>> That would convince me.
>>>
>>> I can do that. But it will be as long as showing you that a brain can
>>> lead a person into believing in a universe. That would be very long.
>>> using G/G* and math, this is shortened, and is the entire object  
>>> study
>>> of the AUDA. This relies on fundamental discoveries made by logicians
>>> and computer scientists. It cannot be shortened much more than what I
>>> have already done. Now, people familiar with Gödel's proof can get  
>>> the
>>> gist of it, without looking at all the detail.
>> It seems to me Gödel's proof needs interpretation in the  
>> representation of
>> statements with numbers. We can't show that numbers can interpret  
>> themselves
>> without already having done /accepting the validity of this step.
> 
> We can, with the axioms above.
But only with the acceptance of a meta-level, that can only be proven to
exist in some sense within numbers by assuming it already!


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I don't
>> think it can logically proven that Gödel numbering is valid.
> 
> Of course we can. The Gödel numbering is very simple. To prove it  
> valid, is like proving some simple program does what it does. Computer  
> scientist does that all the time (explicitly or implicitly).
Show me a proof that Gödel numbering is valid from the axioms of arithmetic.
I don't see any axiom saying that we can encode symbols with numbers. It
doesn't even mention symbols.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> There is no Gödel numbering without encoding,
>> and encoding makes no sense without postulating the sense in what is  
>> encoded
>> (symbols representing number relations, which are not themselves  
>> part of the
>> natural numbers).
> 
> Then you can say that a french will never understand english, because  
> it needs french to use an introductory book on the english language.
What has this do with this? The french does not have the axiom that he can
only understand french. But in mathematics we act like within the theory it
is only true what the axioms say. And they say nothing about encoding.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> PA understand only numbers, so to explain him the meta notion of a  
> variable, we begin to represent the variable x, y, z, ... by number.  
But he doesn't now what representation means. Nowhere in the axiom is the
ability to represent things. 


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> That is, in effect Gödel postulates something beyond
>> numbers to prove his theorem.
> 
> Not at all. In particular the numbers does prove Gödel's theorem  
> themselves, and this a long "time" before Gödel appeared on the planet.
They just do it if you interpet this into them. Of course you can do it.
Just as you can interpret a poem (of course the kind of interpretation Gödel
does is more formal).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Maybe I miss something and there is a way to
>> prove the incompleteness theorem without using any sort of encoding
>> mechanism, but it seems to be the core of his proof.
> 
> The theorem does not depend on the choice of the encoding, and the  
> encoding exists *in* arithmetic.
This is just true after we have proven this. But we need the encoding to
prove it. You are just using the result of a proof as a justification for
the proof. Gödel clearly introduced a meta-level, that is not mentioned in
the axioms. It is debateable whether this is valid or not, but certainly we
should acknowledge that is is done.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I don't want to claim that Gödel's proof is wrong, that would be a
>> preposterous claim from an non-mathematician that doesn't even  
>> understand
>> it. But is seems pretty clear to me that it relies on a meta-level,  
>> that is
>> not implicitly assumed within the natural numbers. This confuses me,  
>> because
>> I would think that this is not in mathematical proofs, but  
>> apparently it is,
>> in some circumstances.
> 
> Not, it is not. It is pure mathematics.
Depends on what you think as pure mathematics. I personally find it cool
that Gödel in some sense subverted the strict formalism of mathematics. But
it certainly requires something beyond the stated axioms to work (that
numbers can represent things).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Since RA is incomplete, this exists. Can you give an example of
>> a statement just with *,+,numbers that is unprovable?
> 
> With RA it is very simple, and I don't need Gödel's theorem/ In RA the  
> following sentences is not provable:
> 
> AxAy  (x + y = y + x)
> 
> It asserts the commutativity of addition.
> 
> It is "easy" (once a bit familiar with logic) to build a model of RA  
> which refutes that formula (and yet satisfies all the axioms of RA).
OK. Interesting. What I don't understand, that it seem like this would be
the case with presburger arithmetics, also. But it is not incomplete?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Same question. If there are limit we will see them.
>>>>> Actually comp imposes limit, but gives also the tools for studying
>>>>> the
>>>>> limit is a scientific way. This is all what the Solovay splitting  
>>>>> G/
>>>>> G*
>>>>> is all about. That is why machine can grasp that there is something
>>>>> bigger than themselves.
>>>> But if this is true we should simply be consistent and say that the
>>>> TOE is
>>>> not a TOE at all.
>>>
>>> That is a vocabulary problem. RA is an ontological theory of
>>> everything. The TOE coming from comp is incomplete, if not it would  
>>> be
>>> reductionist, instead of being anti-reductionist.
>> Yeah, we agree on this. But is an incomplete theory of everything a  
>> theory
>> of everything?
> 
> Well, if you define a TOE by a complete theory, then all TOE will just  
> miss everything, including addition and multiplication.
> A long time ago I have made clear that by TOE I mean a theory which  
> unifies all the forces in nature without eliminating persons.
> Then comp shows that if we don't want to eliminate person, the forces  
> in nature have to be unified through a measure on computational  
> histories driven by some variant of self-reference.
OK. I just find that TOE sounds inherently reductive.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Also, the claim that numbers are the only thing that is ontologically
>> required is unfounded. We need God, as you say yourself, which is  
>> the sense
>> in numbers. And God may include MUCH more than numbers. I'd even say  
>> he
>> trivially does.
> 
> This is your confusion of level again. God is not part of the assumed  
> ontology. It is part of the implicit meta-level, made explicit in the  
> comp assumption, and it reappears in the mind of numbers through  
> simple arithmetical inductive inference principles. Numbers,  
> relatively to universal numbers, tends to infer the existence of  
> universal numbers and arithmetical truth..
But even to state one axiom assumes the sense in the axiom, and as sense is
indivisible we can't seperate the sense in the axiom from sense in general.
So there God is already.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe formally it could be used to
>>>>>> explain something, but this itself is not of much use, if the  
>>>>>> formal
>>>>>> research is fundamentally dependent on our ability to interpret  
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> formality beyond the formality (arithmetics formulas must be
>>>>>> interpreted on
>>>>>> higher levels to make any sense outside of arithmetics)
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no need, nor even sense, for outside of arithmetic. The
>>>>> inside of arithmetic is already far big than arithmetic when view
>>>>> from
>>>>> inside.
>>>> But the inside of arithmetics is outside of arithmetics! What you  
>>>> call
>>>> inside of arithmetics CAN'T make sense without the transcendent
>>>> truth of
>>>> consciousness, which is beyond arithmetics (outside may be less
>>>> accurate).
>>>
>>> Rght. The TOE (arithmetic) can explain why the Löbian machines see,
>>> and even create things far beyond arithmetic. But with comp, such
>>> things belongs to number's imagination. It exists epistemologically,
>>> unlike the numbers which have a basic ontologically status.
>> This assumes that the number's imagination are not already included  
>> in God,
>> which you won't call epistemological, hopefully.
> 
> I am not sure. Like in Plotinus, God is not among the beings, and it  
> transcends the epistemological.
> I have concentrated myself on matter and mind. I keep Gods and  
> Goddesses for pension :)
The problem is, the axioms of arithmetic make no sense without God, if we
think of as God as the sense in things. And this sense might already include
all dreams.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> But honestly, isn't it akward to search
>> for something with the awareness that you never get it?
> 
> Only that I never get it completely, and that I never get it for sure.  
> That's the man condition. The meaning is in the search, not in the  
> finding, and not at all in certainties. 
OK. It just seems simpler to me to just find instead of searching without
hope of finding?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> It's like searching
>> for your key and always say "But what if that's not the key. I can't  
>> be
>> sure.". If we search for the key we will rather say: "Well, that  
>> looks like
>> they key, let's just act like that's the key, but not like it's the  
>> key to
>> secrets of the universe".
> 
> Then the fundamental questions will be given to those who use terror  
> and violence. Look at history. Humans needs to search, it is part of  
> life.
Yeah, until they see that they can just find by looking at what already is.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In fact, even in our theories it naturally appears, and we  
>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>> assume
>>>>>>>> that our theories are just incomplete where it appears.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Not necessarily. In logic we use infinities to make a theory
>>>>>>> complete.
>>>>>>> It is the finite things themsleves which appears to be the  
>>>>>>> trouble
>>>>>>> makers.
>>>>>> OK, from the view of a logician, maybe, but most physicists would
>>>>>> probably
>>>>>> say that their theories are incomplete where infinites appear  
>>>>>> (like
>>>>>> in black
>>>>>> holes, or the big bang).
>>>>>
>>>>> This is because they divide numbers by zero. It means that there  
>>>>> is a
>>>>> problem with their theories.
>>>> Maybe there is a problem with the theory that dividing by zero makes
>>>> no
>>>> sense, or with the concept of zero itself. There may be something
>>>> about the
>>>> universe that is necessarily indescribeable by mathematics, which
>>>> just shows
>>>> itself in the mathematical singularity. Maybe it can't be removed.
>>>> It would
>>>> bet on it, actually. We may find theories that do that, but they
>>>> will be
>>>> found to be false.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will not buy that car because I may have an accident. I will not go
>>> out of my mother womb because I might be in trouble. You cannot use
>>> such kind of super-precaution principle.
>> That is not comparable.  I am not using precaution, I am just using  
>> common
>> sense. Why would there be a complete mathematical theory, if, for  
>> example,
>> Gödel showed, that even the mathematics themselves are not complete.  
>> And the
>> point were it is incomplete will always appear from the perspective  
>> that it
>> is complete as non-sensical.
> 
> The TOE is NOT complete. I insist all the time on that point. It is  
> hugely antireductionist. It is a promise of infinities of surprises.  
> It is leads to humility and modesty. It is a TOE in the sense that it  
> reduces all science to very elementary laws, but those laws can't be  
> used in practice to solve any Löbian questions, except by saying that  
> the solution, if it exists is inside the head, and not in the relative  
> apparently external reality.
> Aristotle theology, basically confuses God and the physical universe,  
> and comp says that in your head a vast bigger truth exists, with the  
> physical universe being only its border.
> 
> I am not saying that comp explains everything. I am just saying that  
> comp prevent physics to explain anything, even physics.
> 
> I submit a problem, not an answer. But, conceptually, we can see the  
> shape of the new big picture, which is more akin to Plato than to  
> Aristotle.
OK. It's just funny to me to even call this a TOE then.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> That a theory might be wrong is not an argument against a theory. On
>>> the contrary, it is an invitation to dig on the details, and to find
>>> out what mmight be wrong (in case the theory is interesting enough).
>> Yes, I agree. But it is important to recognize that it seems like our
>> theories are generally inadequate. You already do this on some  
>> level, but
>> somehow still claim to have a TOE.
> 
> A TOE is a theory which adresses the question of "everything" (God,  
> matter, consciouness, death, and taxes). It is not necessarily a  
> theory which solves all problems related to those matter, but which  
> might put them in a coherent pictures.
> 
> That is why I prefer the label "theology", in the ancient greek sense,  
> than TOE, which looks a bit preposterous.
Using it seems much better to me. it sounds more modest.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> If you want keep primitive matter, just abandon comp, but then give  
>>> me
>>> your theory of the relation between matter and consciousness.
>> What bothers me is that we might sneak primitive matter into COMP by  
>> relying
>> on there being God, who already may include primitive matter.
> 
> Not al all. Matter appears from inside the universal dovetailing (or  
> the proofs of the sigma_1 sentences).
This may make sense, but you can't show that matter wasn't already included
in God. You can't use occam here because God is not reducible.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> which may be sneaking in
>>>> consciousness and with it physical reality through the back door.
>>>
>>> Just study the theory.
>> But the theory won't mention that it does this if it sneaks it in.
> 
> Sure. But it is up to you to prove that it sneaks the things. If not  
> it is just a gratuitous (intuition based, but not proved) accusation.
You presuppose sense, already, and obviously, in order for numbers to make
sense. Why could sense not already include all the stuff you later show to
exist? What makes it plausible that sense is just the sense in numbers?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> You said
>> yourself that your TOE does not assume them, so it is hopeless to  
>> find them
>> within the theory. You see my point?
> 
> But it finds them, without assuming them. You talk like if the theory  
> did not work. But it works very well, up to the open problem (the  
> measure problem, the white rabbit, the derivation of physics, etc.).
> I use comp as a metatheory to say:
> 
> 1) the mind body problem is not solved
> 2) the mind body problem is transformed into this purely mathematical  
> problem, which is partially solved currently, but mathematicians have  
> to improved it.
> 3) all this fit with Plato's TOE/theology, and not with Aristotle TOE/ 
> theology
The theory might work, no doubt about that. I am not critizing the formal
part of the theory, just your interpretation of it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I know
>>>> that we can show that numbers can look at themselves, but it can't
>>>> be shown
>>>> that they can do it without us (some general intelligence).
>>>
>>> They need only God, to make sense of the idea that 17 is prime
>>> independently of any little ego.
>> OK. They need God. But is God anything less than everything (possibly
>> beyond)? If they need everything or more, well, it effectively shows  
>> that it
>> needs every little ego.
> 
> Here God was just the set of all true arithmetical sentences. It is a  
> 3-God.
But true arithmetical sentences need truth itself. Why do you suppose truth
does not include many different things?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In searching the truth it is helpful to not listen to  
>>>>>>> inconsistent
>>>>>>> theory.
>>>>>> But inconsistent with respect to what?
>>>>>
>>>>> Inconsistent is absolute. It means that you prove (assert) p and  
>>>>> ~p.
>>>> But that is just incosistent with classical logic.
>>>
>>> No. It is inconsistent with all logic, except the paraconsistent one.
>> So? This is just what I said.
> No. You said that it is inconsistent with classical logic. I said it  
> is inconsistent in almost all logics, except one.
Uhm, sorry, I misexpressed myself. I didn't mean that it is only
inconsistent with classical logic, I meant that it is just a property of
classical logic (among other logics), and thus is not absolute.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I can easily assert "I am
>>>> big and I am not big (small)" and this is not absolutely  
>>>> inconsistent.
>>>
>>> Yes it is.
>> If it absolutely inconsistent, how come I can easily make sense of it?
> 
> Because you use it as an abbreviation of some other statement. But  
> when we formalize we don't do that.
The statement makes sense in its own right. I could just as well claim that
1+1=2 is an abbreviation of 1+1+0=2, 1+1+0+0=2, 1+1+0+0+0=2, etc...


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> It
>>>> just means I am big with respect to an insect and small with respect
>>>> to the
>>>> sun.
>>>
>>> That is another statement.
>> It is a clarification of the former statement.
> 
> Like I said. But in formal theory, we don't clarify thing, we take the  
> statement as definite. if not, we would not been able to finish a proof.
OK, but this method is limited. It just works as long as we don't talk about
stuff that has too many interpretative possibilities inherent to it. That's
why I critize this approach when we talk about fundamental matters.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> We don't need to restrict ourselves
>>>>>> to classical logic, do we?
>>>>>
>>>>> We don't really need that, but we still need the rule of non
>>>>> contradiction.
>>>> Yes some rule of non contradiction seems useful for saying  
>>>> anything of
>>>> value. But this need not be "p and ~p is not allowed". It may be
>>>> subjective,
>>>> for example. In music non contradiction means that we don't use only
>>>> dissonance, but we can use consonance and dissonance together. But
>>>> what is
>>>> dissonance is itself quite subjective.
>>>
>>> You cannot lift the meaning of words from one domain to another,
>>> without taking some caution.
>> That's right. My point is only that it may be possible to be more  
>> flexible
>> about what is inconsistent than just "p and ~p is not allowed".
> 
> That is possible, and even useful, for example when studying natural  
> languages. But that is not what we do when studying the consequences  
> of the comp. hyp.
I am not sure we can avoid this if we go so near to the source of
everything. I think in interpreting the consequence of COMP we already have
to go beyond classical logic.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Paraconsistent logic can make sense on higher levels,
>>>>> but to accept contradiction at the start does not lead to anything
>>>>> interesting. It is just non comprehensible.
>>>> Why? Of course it makes no sense to not distinguish between false
>>>> and right
>>>> at all (except if you want to point something that is entirely  
>>>> beyond
>>>> words). But this distinction need not lie in not allowing assertions
>>>> of
>>>> classical contradictions (p and ~p).
>>>
>>> Well, you are free to try a fundamental theory in some obscure logic.
>> I am not sure there is a fundamental theory.
> 
> You are restricting science, like the Aristotelians. You abandon the  
> fundamental questions to the fanatics, by doing so.
No. The fanatics claim to have an answer. There is no answer. Just as long
as people think that there is a answer in words they will fall prey to
fanatics. They just could learn to be still and look within.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems to me we can just judge the consistency
>>>>>> of theory with the background of some theory we presume (or with  
>>>>>> our
>>>>>> intuition, but then constistency is subjective).
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not. It is 3-p definable.
>>>> Definable with respect to some theory, eg classical logic. But
>>>> classical
>>>> logic is obviously false if taken as an absolute, in my mind. There
>>>> seem to
>>>> be some inherently true contradictions, like "the world is good and
>>>> not
>>>> good".
>>>
>>> But this is made clear in the TOE. You are confusing (p & ~p) with  
>>> (Bp
>>> and B~p). the first is contradictory and the second is not.
>> But it is not only that I believe that the world is good and it is  
>> not good.
>> It may just be that way. Why not?
> 
> Because to say that "the world is good and not good" is poetical. It  
> is not a statement in a formal theory. A more formal statement would  
> be the world is felt as good in such circumstances by such agent, etc.
The entire point is that a formal theory won't help much in fundamental
matters, and even be confusing, as we are bound to use informal reasoning in
interpreting it. That's why I argue against your use of COMP.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If not, you can say that everybody is right, and work back in
>>>>>>> your garden instead. That is a good philosophical move for real
>>>>>>> life
>>>>>>> happiness, but a bad one in scientific research.
>>>>>> Well, we can still research in what way everybody is right, can  
>>>>>> we?
>>>>>> Or, we
>>>>>> accept that what is accepted in science as consistent or
>>>>>> inconsistent, is
>>>>>> subjective. Maybe the attempt to totally rid science of
>>>>>> inconsistency is
>>>>>> futile. Practically, it certainly seems our science is  
>>>>>> incosistent.
>>>>>
>>>>> But then we work hard to correct the theories. If not, you stop  
>>>>> doing
>>>>> research.
>>>> Yeah, but we can try to be more consistent even if we accept we are
>>>> inconsistent. Why not?
>>>
>>> At some level, but accepting this at the start will just make things
>>> unnecessarily complex.
>> It seems very simple to me. "Let's just forget about getting it  
>> absolutely
>> right, and get on with more practical things".
> 
> Let us abandon fundamental research. With that attitude the  
> authoritative argument in the human affair, and its impending  
> arbitrariness,  will continue to prevail for centuries.
The mistake is to think that the fundamental things can be put into some
theoretical frame, dogmatic rules, etc... Research of fundamental things is
continuing the error on a lesser scale. The fundamental things are not
really researchable, they are just seeable. (Of course I am not referring to
*relatively* fundamental things like quarks or something). It is not wrong
to do research on it, or make dogma out of it, but it is not going to lead
us to where we want to be.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> But we seem to have different
>>>> approaches to widening the scope of science.
>>>
>>> I use the scientific way.
>> If we just use science to extend science, we will be limited by our
>> preconceived notions of what science is.
> 
> Not at all. That is the case for those who confuse science and truth,  
> but science is just modesty and clarity. It is *the* place where  
> people (or their students) can admit having been wrong. That happens  
> rarely in philosophy and current theology.
Modesty and clarity are great. But maybe we should make place in science for
less rigorous methods then these that are accepted now. This has little to
do with modesty, to the contrary, it is being modest with respect to the
limits of rigor.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> And this to avoid the possibility of a truth because *you* don't  
>>>>> like
>>>>> it?
>>>> It's not that primarily that I don't like it, more that it seems
>>>> incoherent
>>>> to me (not provably incoherent). I am not opposed to incoherent
>>>> things, but
>>>> well, they are incoherent, so I feel compelled to argue against  
>>>> them.
>>>
>>> Ha ha! You betrayed yourself here. You need coherence like all
>>> scientists.
>> Sure. I just don't need to dualistically conceive of coherence as not
>> asserting p and ~p.
> 
> Because in most formal logic (p & ~p) -> q for any q.
> If chicken have teeth we can put Paris in a bottle (we say in french).
Yes, but this may just be a shortcoming of most formal logics. They work
fine in math, but only in a limited sense beyond.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> so to say it is just the
>> inside view of numbers hardly makes sense, also.
> 
> I have no clue why, unless you postulate some non-comp theory.
Because in COMP, too, the consciousness may already be presumed in sense
that is needed for anything to make sense, including numbers.

benjayk
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