Hi Evgenii,

On 02 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Bruno,

Thanks a lot for your answers. I have said Bruno's theory just to keep it short, nothing more, sorry.

No problem. But logicians knows the devil is in the details, and, frankly, "theorem" is just one letter longer than theory, so I don't ask for so much. If you are skeptical it is a theorem, just say "argument".




Your theorem is on my list but presumably I will try to think it over in some time, not right now. At the moment I just follow your answers to others, in other words I am at the stage of gathering information. I should say the list was so far very helpful to learn many things.

Just one thing now. Do I understand correctly that your theorem says that the 1st person view is uncomputable?


You are right. This follows already from UDA 1-6. No need of anything except a rough idea of how most machines works (by obeying simple computable laws).

The first person view is indeterminate, and non local. To predict the precise result of a physical experience, you have to take into account that you don't know, and cannot know, which universal (or not) machine(s) execute(s) you (even just in the physical universe, if that exists). When a physicist uses a physical law, to predict a first person experience (like seeing an eclipse, or a needle pointing on a number), he uses implicitly an identity thesis between his body/neighborhood and its experience. A logician would say that the physicist use an inductive close, like saying that my equation predicts I will see an eclipse, and no other laws or history is playing that role. But when we assume comp, such identity thesis cannot work (this subtle point *is* the main UDA point: basically you can still escape, at step 6 and 7, such conclusion by assuming that the universe is little (finite and not too big).

If you are a machine, you are duplicable. And if you are duplicated, iteratively, you (most of the resulting "you"s) can correctly bet that the outcome of the duplication(s) cannot been predicted in advance. Children get the UDA 1-6 point without problem. OK, for "UDA step 6" they have to be a little bit older and capable to understand the plot in "the prestige" or in "simulacron 3". No need of math, or even of technical or theoretical computer science.

Now, In AUDA, the first person appears also to be "a non machine", from the machine's point of view. This is due to the Theaetetus' connection between belief and truth, to define a knower. That is *much more* technical (to see that we stay *in* the arithmetical, to study an internal vision which escapes completely the arithmetical).

But you don't need this to understand that if we are machine weak materialism becomes a sort of vitalism. We don't need it, and it can only prevent the DM solution of the mind-body problem (the 'solution' being a pure body-appearance problem in arithmetic).

Comp, alias DM, can lead toward a contradiction, but up to now, it leads to a quantum like reality. It leads to a many-words, or better many (shared) dreams, internal interpretations of elementary arithmetic (notably).

Best,

Bruno






On 02.09.2011 18:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 30 Aug 2011, at 19:24, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 30.08.2011 17:11 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:



The subject feels he initiates and has control over the
voluntary movement but not the involuntary movement. That's the
difference between them. Both types of movement, however, are
completely determined by the low level behaviour of the matter in
the brain, which can in theory be modeled by a computer. No
particle moves unless it is pushed by another particle or force,
otherwise it's magic, like a table levitating.

I would appreciate if you could be more specific about the
mechanism on how movement of atoms leads for example to creation of
a book about consciousness. Such a book is after all just a
collection of atoms, this is true. For me however a self-assembly
of such a book is just a magic.

You might be interested in the work of Bennett in computer science.
He has introduced a notion of *deep object*. Roughly speaking an
object is deep when it is the result of *only* a very long
computation. Deep objects are characterized by having a mixture of
redundancy and randomness. Most plausibly, human books and genomes
are deep object. Chaitin's incompressible number is NOT deep, but
Post number is (Post number = 0, 001000111... with the ith decimal =
0 if phi_i stops and = 1 if phi_i does not stop, and phi_i is any
enumeration of 'closed programs' (program without inputs).

On 01.09.2011 05:14 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:



The atoms have to move in order to write the book. They have to
move inside the brain of the author, then his hands have to move,
the keys on the computer keyboard move, and so on. Also, things
have to happen prior to the book being written. The universe
arises, stars and planets form, life evolves, the author is born,
photons from books he has read on consciousness impact on his
retina which then leads to reactions in his visual cortex and
language centre. It's all very complex, of course, but there is a
causal chain of events. If

Well, this was my question, to specify this casual chain of events.
Especially how movement of atoms creates conscious experience.
Otherwise this is just a matter of belief.

If we are machine, movement of atoms does not create consciousness.
It only makes some other person's consciousness relatively
manifestable to you. Consciousness is a non created thing. It is a
(mathematical) fixed point of self-observation by sufficiently rich
machine or numbers (the Löbian one).


you had the right physical theory and enough computing power you
could start with the Big Bang, run a computer simulation and end
up with the book. Quantum mechanics does not preclude such a
simulation.


This is also just a matter of belief, as you cannot prove it.

I like more science based on experimental studies. From such a
viewpoint, all we can say now is that we do not know this. Or can
you prove your viewpoint based on empirical studies?

Once we are interested in 'reality', we can never prove any
statement. But we can disprove some statement, and we can infer some
theories, which some luck remain stable. From experimental studies we
can say that all observable process in nature seems to be computable,
except for the collapse of the quantum wave (but then Everett showed
that we don't need it). Nor is there any evidence that consciousness
or humans violate the current description of the physical world? On
the contrary, we know that self-observation by *machine* leads to
complex uncontrollable computations. We know that from both practice
and theory. And the theory explains that such machine can get stuck
on phenomena that they cannot explain, although they can explain
*why* they cannot explain them assuming themselves that they are
machine. With mechanism we can justify why that is the best we can
hope for.


If it isn't the physical processes in the brain causing
consciousness it must be something else, i.e. something
non-physical, conveniently called a soul. The soul should be
empirically detectable if it has an effect on the body. It would
be detectable by observing that apparently magical physical
processes occur in the brain, such as an ion channel opening for
no reason at all. We have no evidence of such things happening.
If the soul had no effect on the body but simply mirrored its
behaviour we would not have any empirical evidence for it but as
a hypothesis it should be eliminated by Occam's Razor.

Well, you have still not explained how books self-assembly
themselves from atoms. This is some problem with your reasoning.
What Occam's Razor says about the creation of books?

Books are plausibly deep object. They require long computations.
Although, once they are there, they can be duplicated easily.




In general, I do not know what else exists, but I do have conscious
experience and it is unclear how to explain it starting from atoms
and physical laws that we know (in order to accept Bruno's theory I
have first to learn mathematical logic).


"My" theory is just Mechanism, or Digital Mechanism. It is not mine.
Well the idea to let the subst level varying is mine, and is a key
to understand the consequences. The result showing that mechanism is
incompatible with (even very weak) materialism is mine indeed. It is
the UD Argument. It is an informal argument showing both *why* and
*how* the physical laws comes from the numbers. You don't need any
mathematical logic to understand it. You need just (at step seven) a
passive understanding of Church thesis (to understand that the
Universal Dovetailer is a well defined computer science notion).
Mathematical logic is needed only for the arithmetical (and more
abstract) version of UDA (AUDA). AUDA is UDA for the machines. Again,
in this AUDA case, the result is not "my" theory, but the machine's
one. (well the ideal self-referentially correct platonist and
mechanist machines). I am just the guy saying "oh, look, we can
already listen to them". I suggest that people not familiar with
mathematical logic should first completely grasp UDA, if they want to
tackle the AUDA. Only professional logicians find AUDA much more easy
than UDA (but then many of them dislike the very notion of
consciousness, like other scientists, note).


While it is not known if physics involves uncomputable
functions, all of known physics is computable.

Do you agree with Bruno's theory? If I understand him correctly,
then even one starts with comp, the 1st person view is still
uncomputable. Hence something uncomputable does exist.

I would like to insist that I have no theory. Just reasoning,
argument, informal (but rigorous) proof, and formalization of the
proofs in the language of some universal machine (not for making them
more rigorous, by for explaining the technical detail of how the laws
of quanta and qualia emerge). It is not a theory, but a theorem, in
the digital version of the old Milinda-Descartes mechanist theory of
life. "My" theory (mechanism) is believed by 99,9% of the rationalist
today. Unfortunately most are materialists, and ignore that this
makes them inconsistent.

I am currently explaining UDA on the entheogen forum(*), to people
without training in math, and up to now, they seem to get the points.
With the step seven, you can already have a good idea of why and how
the physical laws emerge from the numbers (in a testable) way.
Technically, you can still remain physicalist by postulating that the
physical universe is finite and not too big. The step 8 shows that
this move does not save physicalism.

You can ask any question. I will answer.

Bruno

(*) Here is UDA step 0:
http://www.entheogen.com/forum/showthread.php?t=28604

You will find easily the step 1, 2, and 3. The step 4 is in
preparation. I follow the sane04 presentation. You might help
yourself with the slide:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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