On 8/30/2011 11:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2011, at 14:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 30, 4:06 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 Aug 2011, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Definitely, but the reasons that we have for causing those changes in
the semiconductor material are not semiconductor logics. They use
hardware logic to to get the hardware to do software logic, just as
the mind uses the brain's hardware to remember, imagine, plan, or
execute what the mind wants it to. What the mind wants is influenced
by the brain, but the brain is also influenced directly by the mind.
A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming
universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its low
level universal bearer.
Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine?
This is meaningless.
Are *all* phenomena subject to representation in terms of recursive
The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on
something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it?
Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness.
If you mean by this, 1-awareness, comp explains its existence and its
non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing emulable
beings in our physical neighborhood. This is enough precise to be
tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum weirdness,
like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple
self-duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to
experience non computable facts without introducing anything non
computable in the third person picture.
qualitatively distinct from detection.
Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a person,
which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference ability.
It would be nice to have a better explanation of how person-hood =
Löb-ness, if that is what you are implying. Personhood seems to involve
a form of regress that we do not ordinarily see in Löbian logics. The
fact that we can think about thinking about our thoughts...
Not to disqualify machines
implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk bottles,
whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those
substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want to
assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like
dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing
HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia equivalence
If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the problem
of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To
physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a
relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you
cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the
But we can emulate a brain with milk bottles, so you agree that there
is zombie in your theory. Above you say that awareness is not Turing
emulable, but my question was: do you know what in the brain is not
Turing emulable? You cannot answer by some 1-notion, because comp
explains why they exist, and why they are not Turing emulable, (albeit
manifestable by Turing emulation with some probability with respect to
you). To negate comp, you have to show something, different than
matter and consciousness, which necessitates an actual infinite amount
The only problem that I see in your reasoning, Bruno, is that you
fail to allow for the possibility that the mind is not 'just' that which
is *Turing* *emulable*. Turing emulable is a very narrow category and it
may be just a special case of information transformation. The unitary
transformation of QM is another form of information transformation! It
can be easily shown that it takes an infinite number of bits for a
Boolean logic to emulate the logic of a QM system (that has more
dimensions than 2). The fact that an orthocomplete algebra can be said
to contain multiple Boolean logics is another example of this idea.
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