On Aug 30, 4:06 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 29 Aug 2011, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > Definitely, but the reasons that we have for causing those changes in
> > the semiconductor material are not semiconductor logics. They use
> > hardware logic to to get the hardware to do software logic, just as
> > the mind uses the brain's hardware to remember, imagine, plan, or
> > execute what the mind wants it to. What the mind wants is influenced
> > by the brain, but the brain is also influenced directly by the mind.
>
> A hard-wired universal machine can emulate a self-transforming  
> universal machine, or a high level universal machine acting on its low  
> level universal bearer.

Ok, but can it emulate a non-machine?

> The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory relying on  
> something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it?

Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness. Feeling as
qualitatively distinct from detection. Not to disqualify machines
implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk bottles,
whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those
substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want to
assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like
dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing
HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia equivalence
is invalid.

If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the problem
of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To
physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a
relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you
cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the
biological range.

Craig

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