On 31 Aug 2011, at 23:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 31, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 31 Aug 2011, at 15:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Ok, so how do we know that human awareness is not both a machine and a
non-machine, and therefore not completely Turing emulable?

On the contrary, we know that if we have a Turing emulable body, then
our first person being are not Turing emulable.
Even the Universal Dovetailer cannot emulate one soul. By the first
person indeterminacy (but not only that) the soul emerges from the
whole block structure of the UD-work (which I denote often by UD*).
The notion of soul refers to truth which is not even definable.

I'm confused. I thought that the whole point of comp is to say that
our first person being can be emulated digitally.

This expression is ambiguous. The self-duplication experiment illustrates that comp entails that the first person experiences are not necessarily emulable, because it relies on the first person indeterminacy. That is why I "define" comp by saying yes for a digital version of your (generalized) body or brain. Then the thought experiments makes clear the gap between the 1 and the 3 views.




The point is just this one: do you or not make your theory
relying on
something non-Turing emulable. If the answer is yes: what is it?

Yes, biological, zoological, and anthropological awareness.

If you mean by this, 1-awareness,

No, I mean qualitatively different phenomenologies which are all
types
of 1-awareness. Since 1-awareness is private, they are not all the
same.

Most plausibly.

comp explains its existence and its
non Turing emulability, without introducing ad hoc non Turing
emulable
beings in our physical neighborhood.

Whose physical neighborhood are comp's non Turing emulable 1-
awareness
beings living in? Or are they metaphysical?

They are (sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view.
And unboundedly complex, in the 1-views (personal, plurals)

What makes them seem local to a spatiotemporal axis in a way that
seems simple in the 1p? How does an unboundedly complex phenomena 'go
to the store for some beer'?

Look at what is beer in a first approximation. You need stars planet,
life, .. up to he human story including perhaps soccer, adverstizing,
prohibition of cannabis, and incredibly complex phenomenon related to
other complex phenomenon.

That's the 3-p externality, but why and how is there a 1-p simplicity
on top of that?

If it was difficult for a cow to eat grass, or for plant to do photosynthesis, those things would not exist. yet such task are very complex. The simplicity is apparent thanks of many years of evolution.




We do we experience a beer and not stars, planets,
life, human civilization, etc.? What is served by it seeming simple if
it isn't?

Survival. It helps for eating, and avoiding to be eaten.
Like it helps to use a computer with a friendly interface, hiding the extreme complexity of the processing behind, like with the first computer. Drinking a bear is easy from a human high level points of view, but it requires billions of neuronal interactions.




It seems simple to you because a large part of that story is already
encapsulate by the complexity of your cells and brains, the deepness
of the thirst sensation, etc. The 1-person find that simple, because
it looks at the process from its end.

Why and how would complexity encapsulate itself?

By self-organization in front of lack of energy (economy), competitors, etc.




But back to this "(sigma_1 )arithmetical, in the 3-view". That's a yes
to the question of whether they are metaphysical, right?

No, it means it is arithmetical. Like "17 is prime".
And the 1-person is theological, if you want. Like "17 is prime" and
17 is prime. The second "17 is prime" refers implicitly to truth,
which is arguably metaphysical or theological.

To me the arithmetic truth is a human cognitive experience with a
large set of 3-p demonstrable consequences.

Are you saying that 17 would not be a prime number if humans did not exist? This is close to nonsense to me.



Primeness is conceptual.

Sure. I agree with this. But platonist have no problem to believe in concept and ideas independent of the human mind.



You could just name an imaginary number i17 that = whatever quantity
17 is divisible by other than one, or just alter your state of
consciousness until 17 seems even.

I suggest you alter your state of consciousness until you feel OK with the comp hypothesis, then.



This is enough precise to be
tested, and we can argue that some non computable quantum
weirdness,
like quantum indeterminacy, confirmed this. The simple self-
duplication illustrates quickly how comp makes possible to
experience
non computable facts without introducing anything non computable in
the third person picture.

I'm not suggesting anything non-computable in the third person
picture. Third person is by definition computable.

Of course not. I mean, come on, Gödel, 1931. Or just by Church thesis as I explain from time to time (just one double diagonalization). The
third person truth is bigger than the computable.

I don't know enough about it to say whether I agree yet, so I'll take
your word for it, but would you agree that Third person truth is by
definition more computable than first person?

I'm afraid it is not.
A famous theorem (following works by Post, Skolem, Kleene, Mostowski)
makes it possible to classify the arithmetical insolubilities by the
alternation of the quantifiers in front of a decidable predicate.
Hereafter P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is a decidable predicate containing
only the symbols *, +, s, 0, together with variables x, y, z, ..., and
the usual propositional logical symbol (&, V, ~, "(", ")"°, but NO
quantifiers.

P(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_0, or Pi_0, or Delta_0. They are
recursive, decidable, completely computable.
ExP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_1 = semi-decidable (decidable when
true) = partial computable = Turing emulable
AxP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_1 = semi-refutable (decidable when
false) = already non computable, non Turing emulable
ExAyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_2 (much more non computable)
AxEyP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Pi_2 (even much more non computable)
ExAyEzP(x, y, z, r, s, t ...) is Sigma_3
etc.

What's Ex, Ay, Ax, Ey, Ez stand for?

Ex = "it exists x such that"
Ax = "for all x such that"
x intended meaning (not use in syntactic proofs) is for natural numbers.


Arithmetical truth can be seen as the union of all Sigma_i (or of all
Pi_i). Computability stops at sigma_1.

Now the 1-person is orthogonal to that hierarchy. It does not even
compare.

If this hierarchy is all 3-p, does that mean that 1-p is neither more
nor less computable than 3-p?

The 1-p has nothing to do with this. I was just explaining that the 3- p view of numbers escape terribly the computable. But the 1-p are not computable for different reasons (like personal indeterminacy).




Some of those
computations are influenced by 1p motives though.

OK. But the motive might be an abstract being or engram (programmed
by
nature, evolution, that is deep computational histories).
No need to introduce anything non Turing emulable in the picture
here.

Doesn't that just push first cause back a step? What motives influence
the abstract being, nature, or deep computational histories?

The nice thing, which is disliked a little bit some mystics, is that
the motive emerges from the number relations.

Can numbers 'exist' without relations with each other? I would say no.

You can do a theory of numbers with only addition. You will lose many relations. It just happens that with addition + multiplication, you get all the computable relations and functions. It is tedious to show this: but you cannot define multiplication with only addition and logic.



Can they relate without motive?

Yes, but you have to postulate a minimal number of axioms.



If not, then that makes motive
primitive, does it not?

But you don't need the motive. Initial axioms and inference rules are enough. Of course you need motive to be personally interested in numbers, to get the point, etc. But this is not part of the theories. Acr-tually you can explain the motives from the number relations (qaui- directly with comp, and by accepting some formal theory of knowledge to do it without explcitly assuming comp.



Which is what my hypothesis is. Motive and
sense are sort of the precursors of 1-p and 3-p symmetry but within 1-
p. Our main divergence here is that you see arithmetic truth as
primitive and I see it as a secondary category of sense.

Which makes you explaining what is simple with undefined complex term (like motive, sense, etc.). On the numbers everyone agree on simple axioms. On "sense" human fight since the beginning.



Truth is a
kind of sense.

I don't see this at all. It participates to sense, and you can trivially call it "God sense", but this does not add anything to an explanation of what numbers are.


Arithmetic deals in a kind of truth. There are many
other kinds of truths and senses which are equally primitive though.

Like the combinators, java, LISP, prolog, etc. For the theology of machines, all can be used. They are equivalent for most purpose, notably to explains the origin of qualia and quanta without postulating them at the start.




Once those motives
are expressed externally, they are computable.

But with comp, you just cannot express them externally, just
illustrate them and hope others grasp. They are not computable,
because the experience is consciousness filtered by infinities of
'brains'.

Illustrating them isn't an external expression? It sounds like you're
saying that nothing is computable now?

Only the sigma_1 relations are computable. So yes, very few things are
computable or emulable. The hypothesis that we are Turing emulable is
very strong.

You're saying that we are sigma_1? What's an example of something that
is sigma_1 other than us, and what's an example of sigma_2 and 3?

"To be the code of a stopping program" is sigma_1 because it is equivalent with P(x) = Ey(y is the code a of a finite terminating computation of x).

"To be the code of a finite set" is sigma_2

"to be the code of a total computable function" is pi_2 (it means P(x) = for all y there a z such that on all r phi_x(y) = z)

sigma_n = ExAyEz .... P(x, y, z, ...) with n quantifiers. (it begins with "E"). pi_n = AxEyAz .... P(x, y, z, ...) with n quantifiers. (the difference is that it begins with "A" = "for all")

To be the code of a decidable set is sigma_3. And so much more complex than a decidable set!




But there are also very strong evidence in its favors, if
only the fact that we don't meet public sharable third person non
computable process. (And this is a sort of miracle that we have to
justify in the comp theory).

miracle?

A priori, with comp it is rather miraculous that our neighborhoods looks computable, given that arithmetical truth contains so much non computable things. The first person indeterminacy is so strong that a priori it makes the lawfulness of nature rather strange. But when you do the math, you can see where such miracle appears, notably in the high constraints of correct self-references.







Comp shows a problem. What problem shows your theory?

You mean what problem does my theory solve? Or what's an example of a
problem which arises from not using my model? It's the mind/body
problem. The role of awareness in the cosmos. The nature of our
relation to the microcosm and macrocosm. What energy, time, space, and
matter really are. The origins of the universe.

No. I was asking to the problem arising in your theory. A theory is
interesting if, by solving or putting light on a problem, it leads to
new problems.

The problem that my theory leads to is how to get minds which are
pegged to either the extreme of Occidental materialism or Oriental
idealism to break their philosophical addiction.

You take the truth of your theory for granted. I am not easy with this. In science *all* axioms are explicit hypotheses.



It seems almost
impossible since both extremes are self-reinforcing. You cannot reason
that the universe arises from the relation between essential
subjectivity and existential objectivity with a mind that denies it's
own subjective authority or the reality of the world outside of faith.

We can be sure of our own consciousness here and how (I can agree with that), but not of an outside world. We have to make an hypothesis (even if we are programmed to do it instinctively). No doubt that we have to contradict our instinct when trying to understand how brain and realities work together.





Comp solves conceptually the problem of the origin of consciousness,
and of the appearance of matter. But it shows the price: we have to
isolate some mathematical measure on the sigma_1 sentences and their
proofs (computations).

Doesn't it just move it to the origin of comp? Which is metaphysical
or theological, yes?


But simple and explanativaely very powerful. With non-comp you have to reify matter and/or the mind and justify a link between them. It leads to infinities or magic.


You can't always
reverse engineer the 1-p motives from the 3-p though.

You are right, that is why, with comp, most 1-p notion are not 3-
definable. Still, comp allows to study the case of the ideally
correct
machine, and have metatheories shedding light on that non
communicability.

Sounds good to me. I think there is tremendous value in studying ideal principles, although I would not limit them to arithmetic minimalism.
There's a whole universe of ideally correct non-machine intelligence
out there (in here) that needs metatheories too.

With comp too (like with the Sigma_i and Pi_i complete sets: they are
universal, but not effective except for sigma_1).
There is no evidence that human are more than sigma_1 complete. A Pi_1
complete set/machine can solve the halting machine problem. But we
can't.
Note that AUDA is still valid for most "gods" (non-machines). So those
"Gods" lives in similar "physical universe" than us.

I'll reread that if I can figure out more of what you mean by sigma_1.

It is better to begin with the UDA, which is not mathematical at all, except the minimal amount of computer science, to understand that we can write a program (finite piece of code) capable of generating all programs + their executions (in all possible programming languages). This follows easily from Church thesis.

sigma_1 is the name of arithmetical formula having the shape Ex(Px) with P(x) decidable. They have the fundamental property that if they are true, they are provable. you can intuit that If "there is a number x such that P(x)" is true, then you can find it by testing the (decidable predicate) P on 0, 1, 2, ... until you find it. This is clearly not necessarily the case. "To be consistent" is pi_1, because it means that for all x, x is not the code of a proof of "0 = 1".





Feeling as
qualitatively distinct from detection.

Of course. Feeling is distinct from detection. It involves a
person,

Yes! A person, or another animal. Not a virus or a silicon chip or a
computer made of chips.

This is racism.

A silicon chip is not a member of a race.

But it can be the clothe of one.

How could it be if comp makes no distinction between milk bottles and
semiconductors? Isn't your view that it's the same arithmetic race no
matter how it's dressed?

At some level, yes. I cannot know right know if I am executed by a program executed by a milk-bottle computer or by a semi-conductors computer, or whatever. I can only make relative bets.




It does nothing at all that
could be considered an expression of feeling.

Even today, that is not clearly true. But if it is, it is not true in
general (with comp).

So you say.

It follows directly from the comp. hypothesis.



It might have feeling,
but whatever it has, we have something more, at least in our own eyes.
Racism is to look at another human being with prejudice, not to look
at an inanimate object and fail to give it the benefit of the doubt as
a human being.

But a human with an artificial brain will not be inanimate.

It depends how literally you mean 'inanimate'. A car or a marionette
is still an inanimate object to me in that it's motives are not self-
generated and therefore it's motion is not self-directed. I think that
is the case with any machine - it is dependent upon external motives
for defining it's process.

This is like using God to explain the original of life. But computer science shows that we can write programs such that we know they will become intelligent (like "help yourself"). We don't use this in practice, because we would have to need waiting for billions of years.



Even a fine automobile or supercomputer is
still not in the same category as a mouse as far as having feeling.

Obviously. From the human perspective an automobile is less natural than an orange. But this is a *human* perspective, and without introducing magic, we can bet we are natural machine. We just have a longer history than our man made computer.



A
barely conscious mouse has more feeling that a contemporary
supercomputer the size of a mountain. Why would that be the case if
there were no significant qualitative difference?


But there are. Comp does not say that actual computer are conscious. I do like that idea, but it is not part of my work. Anyway, if computer are conscious today, it would be the same conscious as bacteria. No human made machine approach the complexity of a bacteria. The reasoning is based on principle, not on practical things. My point is just that IF we are machine, then Plato's theology is correct, and Aristotle's theology (used mostly by atheists and christians) is wrong, and this in a testable way.




Your
theory makes it a zombie, but that is what does not really make sense
with the comp hyp (and without: you need special magic which just
makes the MB problem insoluble).

No, it doesn't make it anything except what it is. We make it a zombie
by our pseudognostic projection.

You do. But the computationalist does not.



I understand that you see no reason in principle why a chip should be different from anything else as far as being able to host a universal
machine, and that's true, but I'm not talking about universal
machines, I'm talking about universal non-machines, which I think are
made of sense (awareness,etc), and which would indeed vary from
substance to substance in a qualitative way which could not be
quantitatively emulated.

But that is like introducing magic. Each time humans use magic to
justify the fact that "they are more", it leads to bad behavior
against others (human, or animals, ...).

Why is it like introducing magic? I'm not saying humans feel more than
animals, but whatever feeling that we share with animals seems awfully
likely to be missing in things that are not alive. Even if there is no
objective 3-p justification, it's still an extremely important
distinction in our 1-p experience, so I see no reason to invoke some
kind of ambi-biotic political correctness.

If we are not Turing emulable, it means there is some magic, or very special sort of infinities playing a role in our computation.





It is a confusion of what is a person and its body. No doubt billions years of engramming, make them hard to separate technologically, but
nothing prevent to survive with digital brain, or even to live in
virtual environment in principle, at some level, some day.
And in this picture we can formulate precise (sub) problem of the
hard
mind body problem.

Survive where?

On earth for those who want to elongate the samsara.
In arithmetical truth with the usual shortcuts (death, salvia,
meditations, etc.)

On Earth where? In human bodies? Silicon computers?

Whatever the digitalist doctor suggest you, and that suits your need.



which involves some (not big) amount of self-reference ability.

You don't have to be able to refer to yourself to feel something.

You don't have to refer to yourself explicitly, but *feeling* still
involves implicit self-references, I think.

I don't agree. The self-references are a cognitive-cortical level
afterthought.

No doubt that the cortex has been specialized for high level self-
references, but I think elementary, but important self-reference
appears in many parts of the brain, and in cells already.

I agree that self-reference is likely 1p ubiquitous, but every cell or
part of the brain that has self-reference may also have perceptions or
qualia which are not tied to that.

Indeed, the 1-p needs self-reference, and a "lucky" (not necessarily computable or even justifiable) link with Truth (or God).



Our pain doesn't require our self-
reference, quite the opposite, it seems to often pull us toward
solipsistic self-absorption.

Yes. OK. Not sure of the relevance here.






Pain
is primitive.

It is very simple at the base and very deep, but, hmm.... I don't
know, perhaps 1-primitive (with some of the "1"-views described by
the
arithmetical or self-referential hypostases).

Not 3-primitive, with mechanism.

Not human pain, but there is not necessarily any mechanism if pain
originates in cells (and how could it really not?)

I personally tend to believe that pain, and thus consciousness, arise
already with bacteria.

Sure, bacteria pain seems like a plausible ancestor for human pain.

You cannot say "sure". This is certainly speculative. With our without comp.




No magic here: it is due to an already highly
complex self-reference emulated by the interaction between its genome,
its metabolical cycles and the concentration of molecules in their
neighborhood. Those are UMs, and deserves some respect. Self-
consciousness comes with the LUMs. The LUMs develop easily a notion of
time, of other person, of death-what-is-that-?, etc.

It makes sense that pain arises when the 1-p sensorimotive quality is
robust enough to include the possibility of the organism being able to
do something to avoid or stop the pain, otherwise it seems superfluous
(like it would be in a mineral). I don't think that it's automatic
though. I don't think that you can train a mineral to pretend that it
cares desperately if it stays alive.

We can program a computer to care, to defend itself, to develop itself, to transform its own code, etc. Such programs can become in the long run quite unpredictable.






Not to disqualify machines
implemented in a particular material - stone, silicon, milk
bottles,
whatever, from having the normal detection experiences of those
substances and pbjects, but there is nothing to tempt me to want
to
assign human neurological qualia to milk bottles stacked up like
dominoes. We know about synesthesia and agnosia, and I am positing
HADD or prognosia to describe how the assumption of qualia
equivalence
is invalid.

If we make a machine out of living cells, then we run into the
problem
of living cells not being easily persuaded to do our bidding. To
physically enact the design of universal machine, you need a
relatively inanimate substance, which is the very thing that you
cannot use to make a living organism with access to qualia in the
biological range.

But we can emulate a brain with milk bottles,

I don't think that we can. It's just a sculpture of a brain. It's
like
emulating a person with a video image.

You are wrong on this. We can. In principle. We cannot afford wasting our time doing it. But the point is that the person will be a zombie,
where it is just badly connected to our reality.

The program will (asymptotically) approach p-zombie because it's just
a sculpture of a brain.

This is a bit ridiculous, to be franc. You are saying that comp with
an infinitely low level is still wrong.

Right, the painting of a buffalo never jumps out of the wall as a real
buffalo no matter how great of a painting it is.

That image is not valid, because a computing is not a painting. It is a relatively dynamical being.





You can, if you wish, but this means that a "person", in your theory
can diagonalize against the whole (semi or partial) computable reality.
By reading your post, and your conversation with Stathis, you will
eventually convince me that comp is true! (and that is wrong, in the
comp theory!).

You don't think that comp is true?

Indeed. I don't think that comp is true.
Nor do I think that comp is false. I am agnostic.

Now, here is something a bit diabolical: I know that IF comp is true, then I cannot rationally believe in it. Comp justifies that comp is unbelievable. That is why it needs an act of faith, and that is why I insist that comp is an hypothesis in theology.

What I do believe is that if comp is true, then arithmetic is quite enough to explain everything explainable.


Comp entails the consistency of non-comp (like a LUM can prove that
its own consistency would implies its the unprovability of its own
consistency). Consistency is not a lot (for example 'the provability
of the 0=1' is consistent in Peano Arithmetic!).

Nevertheless, to refute comp directly, by providing a non-comp theory,
including the proof that its object are not Turing emulable, need not
just an infinite level, but a very awkward non computable
diagonalization against all partial computable functions.

In directly, you can refute comp by showing the existence of some
primitive matter, also. Or by showing a discrepancy between machines'
intelligible matter and nature, but this would probably refute only
the Theaetetus' knowledge theory.

I'm not sure what that all means, but my feeling is that you're saying
on the one hand that some things are non-comp but on the other hand
those things still are defined entirely by comp. I don't get it. To me
non-comp means apples to oranges. They don't grow on orange trees or
in an orange grove.

This comes from your lack of familiarity with computer science. Comp is the belief that you can survive with a digital brain. It is an humble self-finitude assumption. It makes you "little". That makes you possible to go through much more hole in the fabric of reality, to met much more possible entities and object. The more you are little (comp), the bigger is reality (non-comp). This is so true that comp predicts white rabbits and other non computable objects to appear all the time. We have to explain why they don't happen. But comp is subtle mathematically, so we cannot use those white rabbits to refute comp. The number relations, or the program relations are quite sophisticated, and self-reference logics already points on the existence of phase randomization making those white rabbits plausibly very rare.







so you agree that there
is zombie in your theory.

I don't think it would never get that far. A zombie implies that the behavior is identical to a typical person, and I don't think that's
possible to emulate through mathematics alone. It's always going
to be
a stiff.

The arithmetical reality does emulate the computation, where they are
solidly defined (with Church thesis).
Now the experience of the machine themselves will not be of the type
of Turing emulable object.

But the computation is blind to any feeling that is driving the
person's motives through the brain being emulated.

You are right. A computation, like a computing machine is blind as the
person's motive.
If you want, the person's motive is a limiting concept, and as such it
leaves on the limit of UD*. It drives the behavior of the machine
nonetheless, as far as the machine mirrors itself in the limiting self
correct sense.

I don't think that a predictive model which does not have access to
the sense and motive of what it emulates will inevitably diverge from
it (unless it has real time access to the genuine original - like a
live TV broadcast).

But UD* is not a predictive model. It is a reality, not a theory. It is part of arithmetical truth. The entities there have full access to their motives when they have enough self-reference abilities, and when they are sufficiently connected to some truth.







Above you say that awareness is not Turing
emulable, but my question was: do you know what in the brain is not
Turing emulable?

The awareness of the brain is not emulable in a non-brain.

Which evidence have you for saying that the brain is aware?

I'm saying that we are the awareness of our brain (as opposed to us
being the awareness of our foot our a basketball in our closet). MRI
and TMS technologies have convincingly shown that the activity of the
brain correlates with subjective awareness and can be manipulated in
ways that it cannot be through the foot or the basketball.

That looks like authoritative argument, but I am OK with this.
In fact my brain, if ever it existed in some sense, might be
conscious, but then such consciousness might be unrelated to mine.
Strictly speaking we cannot know, and that is why theology attracts so
much 'fancy theories', and people can become hot with them.

We can't be certain, but we can be reasonable.

And then the question is: is it currently reasonable to pretend that comp is false?







In addition, the brain may host many kinds of awareness other than our
own conscious experience. Why wouldn't it?

I have no doubt about that. We are already many ourselves, and can
relinquish the one self emulation the night so that we can look at
ourselves in some first person plural ways. Dissociative molecules can
help to study such altered state of consciousness, form variate first
person perspectives.

Agreed.



We have evidence that the brain supports awareness and self- awareness
of a person, sometimes persons, not that it is aware itself.

Right, but if we are that awareness then our knowledge of the brain as
an object *is* the brain discovering it's own objective topology.

In metaphorical way, like saying that when we look at far away
galaxies, the universe is discovering itself.

I think it's literally doing that.

I don't. When the universe do that, it looks only to the shadows of reality, not on reality.




But the brain might be a construct of the brain, leading to artificial
separation between subject and object.

With comp it is suggested that, like the heart is a pump, like blood
is an oxygen transporter and deliverer, the brain is a computer, not
in the metaphorical sense, but in the mathematical sense. It can
imitate all machines, it *is*, in a sense, *all* machines, relatively
to the data.

Right. That's why I'm careful to talk about neurology as a meta-
biological phenomena. The nervous system is like a transparent animal
within an animal. It feels what the body feels, and the body feels the
world as well as itself. We feel the body's world through the body, as
well as projecting our interior sense and motive outward into the
world through the body. It's not a simulation though. Sense is
presentation, not representation. Blue doesn't stand for anything, it
is a non-Turing complete phenomenon.

I doubt this. I don't see any evidence to believes this. We can already make machine capable of distinguishing colors. Then if they are LUMs, there is strong evidence they will have the associated qualia. *They* will pretend that. *they* will certainly behave as if you insult them when considering them as zombie. LUMs have the cognitive ability to know that they are not zombie.






Our
awareness is the 1p (heads) side of the coin of the brain (tails),

That is a metaphore. It does not fits to well with comp. With comp, to
extend your metaphore, you need to take a dice, or a polygonal with
much more sides. Then variate 1-p notions are some sides, and variate
3-p are some antipode sides, and reality is in that superdice. But
that's very metaphoric.

I like that. I'm not sure if it minimizes the 1-p 3-p duality though.
Being antipodal facets on dice could be confused with a casual
consequence of position rather than being a inseparable poles of an
involuted continuum.

Hmm... That 1004. The precision of my metaphor is given by the 8 arithmetical hypostases (or the 4 + 4*infinity).




so
I wouldn't expect the tails side of a coin to have it's own heads side as distinct from the heads side of the coin. Our awareness isn't only
the brain (or regions of it), but what we are aware of runs through
the brain.

That does not make sense. Only intellectually, using an (hypothetical)
theory, can I interpret some thought as a run in my brain.
Brain typically have no sensitive cells.

Think of the brain as sense-translucent, hosting a grand concordance
of sensorimotive experience. It's optimized to carry the sense of the
body and the world that scales to the body's life/environment.

Even is that is true, it would not entail that comp is false. Unless you reify all concepts that you are using. But why ever doing that. Only pseudo-mystics and pseudo-scientists reify concepts. Of course we do it instinctively in "real life", but there is no reason to do that in fundamental inquiries.







It's not a
matter of what can't be emulated, it's that all emulation is itself
subjective. It's a modeling technique. A model of a brain is never
going to be much like a brain unless it is built out of something
that
is a lot like a brain.

What makes you so sure that nature is experimenting modelling all the
time?

It might model on the inside, but it experiments without modeling on
the outside. Each instance of something we sense in 3-p is a genuine
phenomenon. There aren't any disembodied theories wandering around
Earth.

I know what you want. But I don't take Earth as a primitive object
either.

Primitive or not, what Earth is constructed of is not models or
theories, but enactments (of theory sequences + entropic
consequences).

Well, even with comp, you are partially true, if by Earth you mean the material object. But no one has even seen a "material object". We "see" only qualia, we measure only numbers, and we build only relations.








If the modelling of the brain fails at all substitution level, it
means you will get zombie at some level.

The thing itself is not a zombie, it's just what it is.

If it is not a zombie, then he thinks like you and me.

Not at all. There isn't even a he or a thing there. Like a puppet
isn't a zombie, and it's not even a puppet, it's bundle of dyed felt
and stuffing which serves as a prop for HADD/pseudognosia.

You cannot change the definition of "philsophical" zombie. By definition it has the exact human shape, and the exact human behavior. Nobody can distinguish them from a human, yet, by definition, they have no private life. With comp, the notion is not even definable, because bodies, strictly speaking do not exist at all. Bodies exist only in the imagination of numbers. With comp, to put it bluntly, we *are* in the matrix.






It's our
failure to fool ourselves into thinking it's genuine

So it is a zombie after all ... ?

It's not anything but what it is. If it's made of bologna, then it's a
piece of bologna we almost mistook for a person. If it's a computer,
then it's warm circuits that we almost believed was intelligent. If
it's CGI, it's colored pixels that we almost imagine is a talking
dragon.

which projects
zombiehood (let's call it pseudognosia from now on?) on the model.

I don't understand.

I'm saying that zombies are in the eye of the beholder.

That does not make sense, because the beholder does usually not think that there are zombie at all. The beholder believe that they are genuine human being. Only God tell us, or better, by definition, they have no soul or no private life or consciousness.
It is a concept in the philosophy of mind.







You cannot answer by some 1-notion, because comp
explains why they exist, and why they are not Turing emulable,
(albeit
manifestable by Turing emulation with some probability with respect
to
you).

Comp is generalizing 1-awareness. Human awareness cannot be located that way. It's not a matter of running human software on a universal
machine, because the essence of 1-p is non-universality.

Yeah ... A typical 1-move, to abandon universality for ... control.

That is the essence of 1p. The motive of sensorimotive. Actually two
distinguishable aspects: the sensory experience represents the
abandonment universality for locality (being something means
collapsing the superposition of universality into a specific
phenomenological range of experiences and relations), while the
projection of the sense of that entity's 1p private involution of it's
self-created universe is, of course, the intent to assert the self
through control (even if that means intentionally seeking to be
controlled).

The hardware
is what makes the software possible.

Locally. Globally it is the other way round.

Sort of. Globally, the hardware is just the software's rear end. They
are the same thing but appear opposite to the software.

All that is quite like comp.

I'm ok with that. I'm just not sure that comp's version of 'appear
opposite' is as strong as I want.

Wishful thinking?


They should be as opposite as
possible, just short of being completely unrelatable to each other.

?







To negate comp, you have to show something, different than
matter and consciousness, which necessitates an actual infinite
amount
of bits.

It's the whole premise underlying comp that is circular reasoning.
If
you assume that matter and consciousness are both bits,

I don't do that. I just assume there is a level of description of the brain which makes it digitally emulable. And neither consciousness or
matter become bits in that picture.

What is the digital emulation made of if not bits?

It is made of elementary arithmetical (or digital) relations. A lot of
them.

Isn't a bit an example of an elementary digital arithmetic relation?

Yes, but a trivial one. It the relation "being equal to 1 or to 0". An emulation is really like a complete story. Think of the emulation of the wave equation of the galaxy at the level of quantum strings. It is full of Bruno and Craig, except that in your theory those Bruno and Craig are immaterial zombies, despite they talk about their bodies, and about zombies, and have our conversation, in all details.




Classical information is made of bits, but computations are dynamical
process. Stopping or not stopping, in which case they are infinite.

hm. I don't know enough about the implications of stopping a
computation to say.

Some process stop and the computer deliver some message. With a non stopping computation, the computer never stop. Either it loops, or it expands its memory up to asking/wanting more memory.




What would any
consciousness arising from that emulation be made of?

Why would ever need consciousness to be made of something.
Consciousness is of a type related to 17. Except it is more subtle: it is the state of a UMs when it knows something, or believe what happens
to be something true.

What keeps those beliefs and truths bound locally to a UM?

They are not. They are bound to all UMs having those beliefs. I mean: all UMs in arithmetic.






then you frame
the argument as a quantitative information theory. Sense is what
makes
information meaningful. Sense is the phenomena of being informed and
informing. It's the I, me, and you experiential aspects of the
cosmos.
Comp is limited to the 'it' aspects of the cosmos,

No. It get the it (Bp) and the 1-me (Bp & p), and 7 other variants
which offer an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. It is very
rich. You can't dismiss computer science, when UMs look deep inside,
they see some non trivial things.

I accept that UMs and computer science can deliver non trivial
insights, but I don't think that we are going to find ourselves in
there, except by contrast.

Too late. I already find myself in there.

haha. well, yeah. you will be the first UM immortal.

That is not argument, of course.
How can you be so sure.
You have some intuition, but your ruin them by opposing them to your
reductionist conception of numbers.

I think you mistake my conception of numbers as reductionist because
you don't accept qualitative phenomena as primitive.

They are fundamental, and in a sense physically primitive, but we can derive them from arithmetic. Your conception is reductive because it does not allow consciousness from abstract UMs and LUMs.




We may find a negative image of the self
that could be the only way of truly seeing the positive.

and insists that I,
me, and you can be emulated by 'it'.

You meant "can't" I guess.

No, I'm saying that comp is insisting that digitalness (it) can
emulate I, me, and you.

That's one way of looking at it,
but it's biased against 1-p from the start.

Not at all. It is explicitely taken into account at the start of comp
by a question. And then recovered later by Theaetetus+machine self-
reference. Comp, the weak version I study, is biased explicitly in
favor of the 1-p at the start.

It's great for designing
AGI, but it does nothing to explain the origin of red or the meaning
of a conversation like this.

I think it does, but you can only understand by yourself, and this by
being able to at least assume comp for the sake of the reasoning.

I think I can assume comp for the sake of reasoning, but it still
doesn't explain specific qualia and signifying meaning for me.

That is in AUDA. Can you accept Theatetus theory of knowledge. Put in
another equivalent (but that is not trivial) way, do you accept that
we cannot know if we are awake (not dreaming) ?

If we can have the concept of being awake or dreaming, then we have a
way of knowing that the two states are different when we are awake,
but that distinction is not as clear in the dream state. Otherwise our
dream lives and our waking lives would be considered equivalent in
every way. We cannot know if we are awake with certainty, but even if
we are dreaming we know that being awake is different from dreaming,
and different in specific non-trivial ways (which are related to
significance and cumulative entanglement).

Eventually, to be awake is relative. For each layer of reality, there is some possible 'red pill'. I think. (The plant seems to disagree on this in many reports).



Comp share with the Theaetetus theory that we can know that we are
dreaming, but never that we are not dreaming.

It may
plot where they come into play on a map, but it has no opinion on the
redness of red.

That is true. It leaves the opinion to the UMs and LUMs themselves.

Where do they get their opinions from?

From faith in the number relations, then from faith in themselves, and then from faith in the possible realities they can hope for.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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