On 12/19/2011 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as above, and
continue on.
When I say that PA is conscious, I mean it literally.
When I say that RA is conscious, I mean "the universal machine RA" is conscious
literally. But RA can also play the role of a universal dovetailer, which is not a
person, and thus not conscious. RA can play both, somehow. Like any universal machine,
even a Löbian one, can implement a universal dovetailing (if patient enough!).
But this can't be done here.
I agree that the UD is not a person, and as such its consciousness is even non-sensical.
But if you agree that the UD instantiates consciousness, then the MGA applies to it. I
can say yes to a doctor because it takes a much lower level than the correct one,
putting much to much in the artificial brain. And you were saying MGA does not work in
case of a physical supervenience based on a multiverse. That is why I put the level so
down so that I emulate that multiverse, making MGA working on that structure. An
infinitely low level can only force me to implement (as my brain) a multiverse, or even
the universal dovetailing itself. This will subsumes all multi-multi-multi-multi ....
(^alpha) universes (alpha constructive ordinal).
This is related to my point that consciousness is relative to some context. ISTM that
pushing the substitution level down so low that you are emulating the physics of the
environment as well as the brain vitiates the argument. If I emulate a universe or
multiverse in order to instantiate consciousness then I have not shown consciousness to be
independent of physics. I've only shown that consciousness supervenes on the physics of
the emulated multiverse.
Brent
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