On 12/28/2011 11:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for "epistemological properties" (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about "mere seeming") is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational "existence"? Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to "exist" per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?
That seems to implicitly assume computation is fundamental and asks why
fundamental matter only implements some of them.
Surely a "dual property" approach to CTM must entail the assumption
that both computation and matter are somehow both fundamental, in the
sense of their both being distinctively "real", though non-identical?
If so, it seems reasonable to pose such a question.
Particularly since these particular machines require to be "epistemologically
assembled" for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?
I think you're taking it backwards. If primitive matter exists simply as a
marker of what exists and what doesn't, then it is our model of it that is
epistemologically assembled and the existence is independent of our
descriptive model. That's the common sense view of the world.
Sure, but that independent existence does not spontaneously take the
form of conveniently classically isolated macroscopic digital machines
like brains (i.e. according to CTM). That identification itself seems
to be a highly-complex epistemological derivative. So we find
ourselves proposing that a device, which requires our prior
epistemological participation to differentiate it from the physical
environment in general, is same device responsible for the performance
of that very process.
However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within "somethingist" limits.
But to take it seriously you have to assume that mathematics exists. That
it is not just a set of logically conditional tautologies.
Yes, but there it is: if consciousness is real, and "computation" is
taken seriously as its supervenience base, is there a coherent
alternative? One could try to believe that matter is unconscious
unless in some relevant sense it is in the process of "computing",
but, rearrange matter how you will, nothing apparently material will
have changed, nor need to. Do we nevertheless feel justified in
saying that consciousness is a some sort of "reality" that comes and
goes just because of these rearrangements?
I don't see anything incoherent in the conventional view that it is certain "computing"
that distinguishes conscious instantiating physical processes from unconscious ones; yet
still holding that only some such processes exist (the ones we call "material" or "physical").
I agree that it is hard for us (Aristotelean bigots, as Bruno might
think) to take seriously the idea that "mathematics exists".
I don't think even Bruno takes seriously the idea that all mathematics exist, as sometimes
suggested by Tegmark.
Clearly,
our ideas about mathematics aren't what exist - at least, not as a
primitive basis of reality. But does something primitive exist which
is consistent with our idea - our description - of mathematics: well,
why not? After all, we are all too familiar with the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences, and it seems to
become even more unreasonably effective the more science extends its
reach. And it's not just in deep down in microphysical structure that
we seem to observe such uncanny effectiveness, but up there in the big
cosmological picture.
I don't see that at all. Of course mathematics is effective for the physical (and other)
sciences, because (a) it is invented for the purpose and (b) any explicit, coherent model
is going to be "mathematical" because that's all mathematics is, being logically explicit
and consistent in drawing inferences. Secondly, it's effectiveness is somewhat
overstated. For example, general relativity, a paradigm of mathematical physics, is
famous for predicting singularities which are almost certainly unphysical.
Everyone seems to be headed in the "everything"
direction with observer selection as the ultimate filter.
Still, all this may just be the thunder of the herd heading for some
theoretical abyss. I guess my judgement is still suspended.
Me too.
Brent
David
On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization. Being material is the property of
existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist. Of course this is not a
popular view on an "Everything" list, but it's consistent with our
epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't, some
things exist and others don't.
I'm not sure that he was arguing purely in terms of CTM - I think he
is agnostic on that particular theory of mind (as indeed am I).
However, if one does restrict one's reasoning carefully to what is
consistent with CTM, it's surely questionable whether this move is
still open. Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for "epistemological properties" (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about "mere seeming") is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational "existence"? Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to "exist" per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?
That seems to implicitly assume computation is fundamental and asks why
fundamental matter only implements some of them.
Particularly
since these particular machines require to be "epistemologically
assembled" for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?
I think you're taking it backwards. If primitive matter exists simply as a
marker of what exists and what doesn't, then it is our model of it that is
epistemologically assembled and the existence is independent of our
descriptive model. That's the common sense view of the world.
As I say, I'm personally agnostic about CTM, although in the past, I
have been a vigorous opponent of the idea. I was much impressed by
Searle and his Chinese Room argument, which made it perfectly obvious
that computation doesn't (indeed doesn't need to) "exist" in a
primitively material universe, and hence couldn't be a candidate for
hosting anything as "real" as consciousness. However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within "somethingist" limits.
But to take it seriously you have to assume that mathematics exists. That
it is not just a set of logically conditional tautologies.
Brent
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