On 28 Dec 2011, at 21:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps)
that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of
machine's
theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among
others,
it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.
Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects
(number,
particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/
multiplication,
forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being
able to
develop self-reference and first person views.
But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce
physics as a
mathematical theory, but as a precise "machine's theological
phenomenon".
Yes, I have always had the strong feeling that the self-reference of
experience to a "localised" point-of-view must somehow be fundamental,
or at least very deep, not circumstantial or trivial. Since
childhood, I've always been puzzled by questions like "why am I me and
not you?", which just made most other people smile or frown. Usually
they would point at two objects (my body and theirs) and say with
finality "well, that's you and this is me".
I was, unwillingly, more cruel. I exigate from my parents a proof,
before going to bed, that I will wake up being me, and not someone
else. That 'consciousness swapping' possibility terrified me, until I
discover it makes no sense or it makes to much sense: I do wake up as
you, every day, as you know, but don't remember.
With comp the question is non sensical, like we can introspect ourself
on the WM duplication, and understand that both the one in M and the
one in W will feel like if a miracle occurs: they get one bit of
information from the sky! Why am I the one in Moscow and not the one
in Washington?
However even then I felt - and more so now - that the real "subject"
of personal identity was not to be so easily characterised. ISTM that
a straightforward physicalist approach - even a mathematical one - can
provide no real insight into this question of "who or what am I?" and
in effect must either assume, trivialise, ignore or deny it. In
contrast to this, assuming CTM, the UDA gives a step-wise
demonstration of the way the indispensable role played by observation
leads inexorably to indeterminism in the localisation of the
first-person, independent (until the MGA) of issues of ultimate
ontological primitivity. This is already a powerful indication that
there is something "computationally real" in play over and above the
structures of matter that characterise an observer's point-of-view.
OK.
So I believe you are right that computational reality must be
characterised primarily in such a way as to account for the
localisation of observers and the emergence of appearances, as opposed
to merely substituting an imaginary god's-eye description of
materiality. Unfortunately (?) this also implies that reality must
then be Vastly larger and perhaps even more daunting than we could
have imagined.
Well said!
In fact it is like with the Mandelbrot set, which looks like a little
spot, but zooming in shows the devils in the pattern details. Like
with comp, from outside you don't need a lot (numbers, +, *), but from
inside it escapes all the bounds. The whole of observable (and even
non observable) physical reality is just a part or a border of that
inside. We can expect surprises.
PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.
D'accord. J'attend avec un grand plaisir vos observations.
Merci,
Bruno
On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
"epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute"
anything further. This should seem, to say the least, odd.
I'm not sure on why this should be odd. The physical world is a
model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology. First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain
them. The model defines our ontology.
My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
"primitive materiality". As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption. But even in it own terms, such a
theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on
it)
in terms of its "epistemological properties", because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in
terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions. Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the "reversal" of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with
matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential "primitively-material"
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.
Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.
This is correct as an argument against "primitive matter". At least
it makes
sense.
But I am not sure it will address the case of the immaterialist
physicalist,
on a type close to Tegmark.
What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps)
that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of
machine's
theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among
others,
it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.
Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects
(number,
particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/
multiplication,
forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being
able to
develop self-reference and first person views.
But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce
physics as a
mathematical theory, but as a precise "machine's theological
phenomenon".
It explains, perhaps wrongly, the origin of observables and its
invariants.
The physical supervenes on the border of numbers' consciousness. So
the
reversal is both ontological (switch particles ---> numbers/
programs) and
epistemological (physics = science of the universal numbers
multiplying and
fusing dreams).
*
I don't think the model defines the ontology, like Brent says. Our
models
define our belief about what we are searching.
Bruno
PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.
David
On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The "frank incoherence" comment was directed towards the case
where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the "single primitive"
horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism,
rather
than the arithmetical alternative. But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always
made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious
contradiction.
My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the
unquestioned
acceptance of composite material structure which seems to
underpin
the notion of a "primitively physical machine". As you once put
it
"ontological reduction entails ontological elimination". IOW, the
reduction of "materiality" to a causally-complete micro-physical
"mechanism" automatically entails that macro-physical composites
must
be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not
ontological,
realities. Micro-physics "qua materia" entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical
computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
"epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute"
anything further. This should seem, to say the least, odd.
I'm not sure on why this should be odd. The physical world is a
model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology. First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain
them. The model defines our ontology.
Brent
It might
even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
computational supervenience.
David
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