On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical >> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for >> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of >> "epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute" >> anything further. This should seem, to say the least, odd. > > > I'm not sure on why this should be odd. The physical world is a model we > created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded > ontology. First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain > them. The model defines our ontology.
My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in "primitive materiality". As Bruno says, this often seems to be at least an implicit assumption. But even in it own terms, such a theory can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it) in terms of its "epistemological properties", because the very object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed abstractions. Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation of the "reversal" of matter-computation, since, given that CTM mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining motivation to appeal to inconsequential "primitively-material" properties, except as a sort of religious commitment. Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you. David > On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> The "frank incoherence" comment was directed towards the case where, >> rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the "single primitive" horn >> of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather >> than the arithmetical alternative. But for those willing to >> contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made >> explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction. >> >> My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned >> acceptance of composite material structure which seems to underpin >> the notion of a "primitively physical machine". As you once put it >> "ontological reduction entails ontological elimination". IOW, the >> reduction of "materiality" to a causally-complete micro-physical >> "mechanism" automatically entails that macro-physical composites must >> be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological, >> realities. Micro-physics "qua materia" entails no such additional >> ontological levels of organisation. >> >> Consequently, it would have to be the case that any "physical >> computer" (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for >> experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of >> "epistemological properties" before it could begin to "compute" >> anything further. This should seem, to say the least, odd. > > > I'm not sure on why this should be odd. The physical world is a model we > created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded > ontology. First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain > them. The model defines our ontology. > > Brent > > >> It might >> even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from >> computational supervenience. >> >> David > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
