On 21 Jan 2012, at 01:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jan 20, 2:03 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Jan 2012, at 02:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:


What machine makes the infinite tape?

Eventually the numbers themselves. It is simpler than the universal
unitary rotation of the physicist, but if you want an infinite tape,
you need to postulate at least once infinite thing. At the meta- level,
or in the epistemology, or in the ontology.

Why do numbers make machines or tapes? Do the want to? Do they have a
choice?

As much choice and free will than you have. They too cannot predicts themselves and can be confronted to making decision with partial information.







That error comfort me in talking about universal numbers, and
defining
them by the relation

phi_u(<x, y>) = phi_x(y).    u is the universal machine, x is a
program and y is a data. "phi" refer to some other universal number
made implicit (in my context it is explicited by elementary
arithmetic).

So a universal machine's universal number made implicit from data in a
program = a program's universal number from data. I don't understand
what it means.

A number (code, body) transforms itself into a function relatively to
a universal number.
u is a computer. Phi_u is the universal function computed by u. If you
a program x and a data y to the computer u, it will simulate x on the
input y, and will output phi_x(y). u does that for all program x, and
so is a universal simulator.

It sounds like you are saying that what makes a machine universal is
if it computes any given program the same way as every other universal
machine. I don't have a problem with that. By that definition though,
it still appears to me that consciousness, being both
idiosyncratically unique to each individual and each moment and
sharable through common sense and experience is the opposite of a
universal and the opposite of a machine.

Each universal machine is a particular machine. Even the virgin, non programmed one. You are a universal machine, at least. (Even if you have a non machine component).






It's an object oriented syntax that is limited to
particular kinds of functions, none of which include biological
awareness (which might make sense since biology is almost entirely
fluid-solution based.)

This worth than the notion of primitive matter. It is mystification
of
primitive matter.

It's not an assertion of mysticism, it's just a plain old
generalization of ordinary observations. Programs don't get excited or tired, they don't get sick and die, they don't catch a cold, etc. They
share none of the differences which make biology different from
physics.

I know that you believe in non-comp.


Is that supposed to invalidate the observations? Programs do get
tired? They do catch colds?

With comp, that is obvious.














Do asteroids and planets exist "out there" even if no one perceives
them?

They don't need humans to perceive them to exist, but my view is
that
gravity is evidence that all physical objects perceive each other.
Not
in a biological sense of feeling, seeing, or knowing, but in the
most
primitive forms of collision detection, accumulation, attraction to
mass, etc.

I can agree with that. This is in the spirit of Everett, which treat
observation as interaction. But there is no reason to associate
primitive qualia and private sensation from that. It lacks the
"retrieving memory" and self-reference.

Doesn't an asteroid maintain it's identity through it's trajectory?

I can agree with this.

Can't the traces of it's collisions be traced forensically by
examining it.

Yes.

Memory and self reference have to come from somewhere,
why not there?

Because self-reference needs a non trivial programming loop (whose
existence is assured by computer science theorem like Kleene second
recursion theorem).

I know that you believe in comp.

Then you are wrong. I am agnostic on this. As I should be: no correct machine believes in comp (nor in non-comp). We just cannot know. That is why I insist that we need some act of faith to say "yes" to the doctor. That is why I insist that it is a theology, and that we are forced to accept that people thinks differently.




I propose another possibility. Imagine a universe where things can
become what they actually are without running a program. Running a
program supervenes not only on sequential recursion but on a whole
universe of logical consequence, ideas of representation, memory,
continuous temporal execution, etc. What if those things are aspects
of particular experience and not universal primitives?

I don't know what is a universe. That's part of what I want an explanation for, that is in term of simple things that I can understand, like elementary arithmetic or combinatorics.




What if the
entire cosmos is a monad; a boundless and implicit firmament through
which objects and experiences are diffracted? The primordial dynamic
is not mechanism but stillness and stasis, like a spectrum to a prism.

All that is Turing emulable, and doesn't add to the understanding.




Anchored in that stable unity, matter is the more direct
representation of this singularity (ie the many alchemical references
to 'stone').

But what is matter?



The subjective correlate would be silent and dark void as
well as solar fusion and stellar profusion. This is realism.

This is imagination.




A prism
is not a machine, it is an object which reveals the essential
coherence of visual qualia. Machines are the second tier of
sensemaking. A dedication of what already exists to a specific
function which arises from the consequence of it's existence rather
than as the cause of it.

Locally it looks like that. But I want an explanation of where such things come from.
Your "theory" takes too much as granted.





there are no evidence that such program is at play
in an asteroid above your substitution level. Below your substitution
level, the asteroids implement all computations, but this is relevant
only to your observation, not to the asteroid.

Assuming comp. I don't.


Don't forget, without human consciousness going as a
comparison, we can't assume that the experience of raw matter is
ephemeral like ours is. It may not be memory which is the invention of
biology, but forgetting.

Profound remark, and I agree. But subjective memory is an attribute of
a subject, and there are no evidence the asteroid is a subject, at
least related in the sense of having private experiences. It lacks too
much ability in self-representation, made possible by complex
cooperation between cells in living systems, and programs in computers.

Heh. Now who is discriminating against inanimate objects?

Because they are inanimate, and the evidence that they are dreaming is weak and non refutable. But mainly because they don't exist by themselves. Matter is a consciousness creation, or view from inside arithmetic. It is an epistemological precise notion. That is what I like in the comp hyp: it explains the origin of the beliefs, by "numbers" in physical things, without the need to assume them.





Other have well commented this, as you have admitted. You should read
the little book by Jacques Lafitte, in french, "la science des
machines" which in the early 20th century describe machine as natural
extension of life. "we" call that "artificial", but machines are as
natural product of earth than apple and jumping spiders.

Oh I actually agree with that, and have for a long time. Life emerged
from inorganic matter. I think that self replicating crystals began to
add organic molecules to their repertoire for greater flexibility and
convenience. Biology is geological technology. We have come full
circle now and are impregnating inorganic crystals with the honey of
our anthropological hive - the skimmed cream of our evolutionary
organic journey is going to return toward the inorganic from which it
came but not backward to trivial intelligence, forward to post-organic
synthesis. We can't lose the organic matter, we will always have to
live in it or we will not be us. The challenge is to integrate and
hybridize without losing sight of who we are and why we care about
living in the first place.

Today's
computers and net can be seen as neo or neoneocortex, and the math
shows this can develop autonomously and we have only partial control
on the process.
But we use the term machine in both its natural and man made sense. It
basically means no magic, made precise with Church-Turing thesis,
magic means precisely non-Turing emulable nor 1-person UD recoverable.

I understand completely. You are channeling my exact worldview circa
1990.

That's comp. But the notion of UD-recoverable illusion is new, I think. That's the key notion, given that both consciousness and matter are not Turing emulable, but still Turing recoverable though the unavoidable (by incompleteness) number's epistemology.


Since then I have explored some other ideas which make more
sense to me, and which I think will eventually make more sense to
others. We are extending a noosphere or a technocortex, yes, but like
the brain, we do not discard our limbic system and brain stem. We
might like to, but we can't or there will be no 'we' left.

I can agree. But again, that's not an argument for saying that comp is false. As we said before, you need to add non Turing emulable things locally in the brain to get that. Your theory makes matter and mind more hard to make intelligible a priori.



It sounds like I can name anything 'knower' and have that be a theorem
for subjectivity.

On the contrary. the definition I gave is quite specific, yet very
general. It leads to the ideal theology of the self-referentially
correct universal machine, including its physics (as it should by UDA,
MGA).

It still sounds like it means that knowers must be subjects since
subjects are knowers.

A knower is anything satisfying the axioms of knowledge logic (Kp -> p, K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq), and, for rich subject, also Kp -> KKp: they know p implies that they know that they know p).
With Kp = Bp & p, all enough rich machine are knower.







Now, there is no reason to expect a *human* subject. Unless the
machine is a copy of a human at some genuine level. But most machines
are not a priori human machines.

Right. I don't have a problem with natural holarchies of the parts of
a material machine being subjects, just not likely very high quality
subjects.

Looks racist to me.

Not racism, taxonomy. Kingdom, phylum, class, order... you have heard
of this, yes?

I was troubled (say) by the expression "not likely very high quality subjects"). Like the Sapinsh considering Indians humans, but lesser humans.





I just don't think the parts know each other unless they
naturally grew as parts of a whole.

Man made machines already do that, they grow as a part of the same
whole we share with them.
Babies also look dumb, weak and so dependent.

What is an example of a man made machine whose parts naturally grow as
part of the same whole?

Buildings, cars, industries, cities, computers, ... well, basically all of them.



Anyway, my point is that mechanism is a testable hypothesis. If
mechanism is false, we will find this out more easily by reasoning
from its assumption, than by criticizing it superficially at the start
through racist prejudices.

If you say so. Who are we waiting on to complete the test?

Test have been already done, and QM confirms comp up to now.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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