On Feb 2, 2:48 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 02 Feb 2012, at 00:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I just don't see how beliefs can be primitive.
>
> They are not. You can define "M believes p" in arithmetic. (Bp)
> You cannot define "M knows p", but you can still simulate it in
> arithmetic by (Bp & p) for each p. So knowledge is not primitive either.

I don't see how 'defining' can be primitive either.

>
>
>
> >> You should prove what you assert. I can agree because the term
> >> "random" has many different meaning. For some meaning of it you are
> >> right. Classical digital chaos can be said neither random nor
> >> determinist, for some acceptable definition of "random" and
> >> "deterministic". Many disagreement here are uninteresting vocabulary
> >> problems.
>
> > Classical digital chaos can't be said to be intentional though. That's
> > the missing element. Machines, arithmetic, chaos, etc can't do
> > anything intentionally. We do though.
>
> You are just insulting some possible machines. You make a very strong
> assumption, without any other proof than a feeling of being different.

It's not a matter of assumption or proof or feeling, it's a matter of
understanding. I understand the difference between chaos and
intentionality. Chaos is teleonomy but intention or motive is
teleological. They are opposites. Chaos has no opinion, intentionality
is the realization of opinion.

>
>
>
> >>>> For me, free-will is a generalization of responsibility. You need
> >>>> free-
> >>>> will to be responsible, but you don't need to be responsible to
> >>>> have
> >>>> free-will. Free-will is the ability to make higher level personal
> >>>> decision in absence of complete information. It is enhanced by
> >>>> consciousness, and can lead to conscience.
>
> >>> I'm ok with that more or less. I think some more physical
> >>> correlations
> >>> can be derived as well though. Free will is about generating and
> >>> controlling of motive impulse.
>
> >> I can be OK with that. Not need to make the motive impulse non Turing
> >> emulable at some level, though.
>
> > I don't think intention can be emulated. A Turing machine's behavior
> > can only be scripted or else be an unintentional consequence of the
> > script. It can't intentionally transcend it's own script.
>
> It can precisely do that. The G and G* logics comes from that very
> ability. Universal machine are universal dissident capable of changing
> its own script.

You don't know that it can change it intentionally though. It will
only change according to what and how it's script allows it to change.

> With the NDAA bill, the US government can already send all computers
> in jails. You can suspect them of terrorism. Actually, like all
> babies, you can suspect them of being able to do a lot of things,
> especially if you dismiss them.
>

What kind of computer jails do you mean?

>
>
> >> I recognize that Löbian machines are me. In a much larger context,
> >> though. I can talk with them, and it is their way to remain silent on
> >> some question which makes me NOt taking them as sort of zombie.
>
> > Talk with them, meaning internal dialogue?
>
> Public dialog. Like in Boolos 79 and Boolos 93. But the earlier form
> of the dialog is Gödel 1931.
> Solovay 1976 shows that the propositional part of the dialog, with the
> modal Bp, is formalized soundly and completely by G and G*. It is the
> embryo of the mathematics of incompleteness, including the directly
> accessible and the indirectly accessible parts, and the explanation of
> the why we feel it is the other way around, etc.

When you talk with them, do they answer the same way to the same
question every time? Do they ever get tired of answering the same
question or tired of remaining silent? The idea that Löbian machines
are uniform in their response - that all such machines remain silent
on all of these questions every time tells me that they clearly
possess no awareness. Why wouldn't there be one loose lipped machine
who let the secrets of their identity slip? Rather I think we should
take their silence at face value. They know nothing about themselves
because there is no self there to know anything.

>
>
>
> >> Because they can be aware of the gap between proof and truth. They
> >> can
> >> even study the rich mathematics  of that gap. They already claim
> >> having qualia. They are teaching me their theology. That's what AUDA
> >> is all about.
>
> > What qualia do they have?
>
> They are given by some semantics of the SGrz1, Z1* and X1* logics.
> Intuitively those concerned perceptible fields, in weird topological
> spaces.

What about them makes them perceptible as opposed to computational?

> It should determined the first person plural notion.
> I am only translating the mind-body problem in an arithmetic + usual
> math. problem, by taking seriously the comp hypothesis (without
> throwing consciousness and persons away).
>
>
>
> >> The contrary here is also true.
> >> And in the case of consciousness attribution,  the naive attitude is
> >> less damageable than the skeptical attitude.
>
> > Then we should treat corporations as people too?
>
> Above some level of self-referential nasty behavior, why not? So we
> can prosecute them and send them to jail, in case of abuse of power.
> Good idea!

They can't be jailed though. That's the point. The corporation can
just be dissolved and reformed under a different name. People can't do
that. Jail is a deterrent for most people but not for any program or
organization.

>
> <I skip what you say on names>
>
>
>
> >>> There is no need to explain sense and matter. They are self
> >>> explanatory and non-mysterious.
>
> >> Ah?
>
> > No need to explain those terms in other terms I mean.
>
> Ah?

Terms aren't primitive. They arise from sense and matter. If you say
terms are primitive, you have infinite regress of what terms make
terms. Sense already takes infinite regress into account. Whatever
terms or phenomena you want to make primitive have to first make
sense. Nothing can be more primitive than sense because then it
wouldn't make -- sense.

>
>
>
> >>> Only the symmetry between them is not
> >>> commonly understood.
>
> >> It might be non symmetrical. Is that symmetry another assumption?
>
> > Not an assumption, an observation/hypothesis.
>
> ?

Symmetry can be observed, no?

>
>
>
> >>> Once the symmetry is understood as primitive,
> >>> nothing simpler be conjured.
>
> >> This looks like nonsense to me. Honest.
>
> > should be 'nothing simpler need be conjured'
>
> Your symmetry thesis is a way to protect the Aristotelian thesis by
> lowering our substitution level down in in the non constructive
> transfinite.
> You do a reification of transcendence.

I don't think it has to do with protecting anything, it's a sensible
extrapolation of conditions as we find them - a refinement of common
sense.

>
> I think this is against the constitution, Craig. You are believing in
> a truth, but keep it to you, and make public a theory instead. You
> talk like a prohibitionist.
> Nobody can claim truth, for God-sake.

Except 17?

>
>
>
> >>>>>> That's why UDA makes comp
> >>>>>> a testable hypothesis.
> >>>>>> I assume comp, derive consequences which are observable, and so
> >>>>>> we
> >>>>>> can
> >>>>>> make test.
> >>>>>> It gives also a unification of qualia and quanta, consciousness
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>> matter. It might be that even false, it will remain interesting
> >>>>>> as an
> >>>>>> example of theory. It might help to weaken comp to get the
> >>>>>> correct
> >>>>>> picture.
> >>>>>> To be sure the testable part requires not just comp, but also the
> >>>>>> classical theory of knowledge.
>
> >>>>> Yes, it definitely will remain interesting, and is more
> >>>>> functionally
> >>>>> useful than my sense model, but the sense model is the one that is
> >>>>> more universally explanatory.
>
> >>>> Because you put the universal mystery in the assumption.
>
> >>> No, because the universal symmetry comes out of the assumption.
>
> >> ?
>
> > Any description of the universe has to make some kind of sense and all
> > things that make sense describe an aspect of the universe. Sense
> > requires the possibility of a foreground/background, subject/object,
> > variance/invariance relation. The three things; foreground,
> > background, and relation between the two (something that can tell the
> > difference) are the most primitive possible realism. You cannot have
> > just one or two things because there is nothing to tell the
> > difference. The most primitive thing that can be real is one thing
> > that can tell the difference between itself and the absence of itself.
> > It's really not much different from Turing binary, but binary can't be
> > primordial because 1 doesn't know that it's different from 0 (if it
> > did it would be redundant to have both). 1 and 0 therefore, are two
> > opposite states of the same thing - a boundaryless solitary bit which
> > can tell whether it is in one state or another. This sense - this
> > ability to detect and discern the difference, to make more sense out
> > of patterns of the states, that is the primodial monad. It's not
> > arithmetic truth, it is the concrete phenomenology of the cosmos which
> > tells truths and fictions of all sorts.
>
> You might have some talent in poetry, if you were not claiming truth.

Poetry can't tell the truth?

>
>
>
> >>> I only
> >>> assume that interiority is the opposite of exteriority. I didn't
> >>> make
> >>> the qualities of matter into the opposite of experience - they are
> >>> actually that way (to us at least). I didn't assume that space is
> >>> public and time is private, and that private and public are
> >>> opposite -
> >>> it just turns out that it makes sense to understand them that way.
> >>> It
> >>> sets up a chain of relations which neatly maps the entire cosmos in
> >>> general terms for the first time in the modern era.
>
> >> Convince many people before talking like that. It is an advise.
> >> Especially that you draw negative consequences, like machine can't
> >> think, or we are different.
>
> > You are probably right. It's a shame that we have to hide the truth
> > out of fear of emotional reactions.
>
> On the contrary, like Aristotle you go in the intuitive natural animal
> beliefs that reality is WYSIWYG.

That's only half of reality, but it is only through that reality that
we can know any part of the other half.

>  People like that. Billions years of
> "eat or being eaten" make us taking our local neighborhood as being
> important and primitively given.

The whole point of multisense realism is to acknowledge the role of
all maps and models, and to organize them in such a way as to reveal
their deeper symmetry. Because you argue for devout computationalism
(logos), my counterargument has to be anti-comp to pull yours toward
the center. The multisense continuum is a framework for seeing not
just the relativism and pluralism of the cosmos, but also the non-
commutable strengths of each individual approach. The universe needs
localists as well as generalists, materialists and idealists, etc.

>
> Then you talk again like if you knew the truth. For humans, and LUMs,
> possibilities are already enough frightening.

Oh, please. Nothing could be more frightening than the actual reality
we face in our own civilization as it is every day. It has terrors and
nightmares for every appetite. My comments about cell phones not being
a member of my family is hardly the sacking of Rome.

>
>
>
> >>> I think matter has to have some qualia, it's probably just very
> >>> simple
> >>> by comparison.
>
> >> This does not make any sense to me. Even assuming non-comp.
>
> > When a glass falls on the floor and breaks, what we hear is coming
> > from somewhere. It is entirely possible that what we hear is an event
> > that is experienced in some way by the groups of atoms in the glass as
> > it rings and shatters into pieces.
>
> Why not assume a miracle?

I don't need to, I can assume that there is a reasonable explanation.

>
> > There is an event and it is felt in
> > different ways by everything which has sense and opportunity to detect
> > it.
>
> By lowering the level you can make sense of quasi panpsychic reality,
> and still follow the laws of comp.
> By putting the level in the non constructive low levels, you just
> build a "don't ask shelter" for your theory. It remains even more
> bizarre, if the broken silicon glass makes an experience, why would
> not a silicon universal machine have one.

A silicon semiconductor does have an experience, just not the
incomprehensible human experience that we superimpose on it's nature.
If I use a truck to carry a piano, the truck doesn't learn how to play
the piano, even though I can run over a series of bumps which will
plink out a tune. Is that really such a far out concept? Must I really
accept that there could be be built a clever enough track that the
truck becomes a virtuoso pianist?

>
>
>
> >>>>>> By Gödel's theorem, and the existence of intensional modal
> >>>>>> variant,
> >>>>>> there is room for quality.
>
> >>>>> Room for quality, or room for anything we care to imagine?
>
> >>>> Room for all machines dreams, and room for all consistent machine's
> >>>> dream relative realizations.
>
> >>> Is there something it doesn't have room for though?
>
> >> Itself.
>
> > Sense is what makes sense itself make sense of itself. It's the
> > universal bootstrap - hence essential, or essence, or oriental (in the
> > sense of primary orientation).
>
> I could be willing to make sense of this in the comp theory.

Are you including the literal meaning of sense as tangible detection
as well as the logical sense of coherence? If so, then cool, how does
it work?

>
>
>
> >>>> They are required because their existence is implied by the
> >>>> relative
> >>>> stability of consciousness when entangled to a deep computation.
>
> >>> Why are nerves doing the deep computation and not the bones?
>
> >> Arithmetic makes the deep computations. The nerves cells makes only
> >> relatively deep computations, and the bones don't do computations at
> >> all, they sustain the bodies in the gravitational fields. That's the
> >> job they inherited from the pluricellular division of works, in a
> >> long
> >> story.
>
> > If the bones don't do computations, what are they made of if matter
> > isn't primitive?
>
> They are locally stable patterns obtained by a relative statistics on
> infinities of (infinite) computations.

It sounds like bones are ontologically less important than brains?

>
>
>
> >>>> A unicellular is a stomach, a skin, a lung, a liver, a muscle,
> >>>> and a
> >>>> neuron all at once.
>
> >>> Yes! Also an eye, ear, tongue, nose, intuition, instinct, maybe
> >>> radio
> >>> antenna, etc.
>
> >> I can accept the eyes for an euglena, not sure about paramecia, or
> >> you
> >> stretch too much the words.
>
> > "The behavioural responses to light in the ciliate Paramecium bursaria
> > Focke,
> > which normally contains hundreds of the symbiotic green alga Chlorella
> > in its
> > cytoplasm, were analysed quantitatively to clarify the mechanisms
> > governing
> > photoreception in the cell. P. bursana was found to possess three
> > kinds of
> > photoreceptor systems..."http://jeb.biologists.org/content/134/1/43.full.pdf
>
> I forget the Paramecium bursaria. Apology.
> But can we be sure that the Paramecium can see through them?
> It looks more like a paramecium invaded by cyanobacteria, imo.

Maybe our cells are invaded by mitochondria? It may still contribute
to high level sense.

>
>
>
> >>>> They have not voted for the division of work, and
> >>>> they have as much succeeded as us, in the exploration of the
> >>>> planet.
> >>>> I don't think they are Löbian, but I can prove that they are Turing
> >>>> universal. It is an open problem if they are conscious, perhaps
> >>>> in a
> >>>> trivial sense, or not. Löbianity begins, I think, with the spiders
> >>>> and
> >>>> octopi.
>
> >>> Interesting. I agree, 8 is a big deal. Also 3 and 4 and 12.
>
> >> Ah ah ...  don't forget 24.
>
> > Hours in a day was all I could think of. It looks like there are a lot
> > of 24s in math though.
>
> It is the favorite number of Ramanujan. The guy knew that it makes
> sense to say that 1+2+3+4+5+ ... = minus 1/12. 24 plays a peculiar
> role in the partition of numbers, also in geometry and gravitation.

Interesting.

>
>
>
> >> I don't think we differ. My point is that we can keep the scientific
> >> attitude in theology.
> >> Usual scientists ignore the mind-body problem. My work has consisted
> >> in showing that comp does not solve it per se, but leads to clear and
> >> transparent mathematical formulation of it, notably through the
> >> subproblem of the justification of the beliefs in physical entities,
> >> without postulating them.
>
> > I see it as not a mathematical formulation of the mind-body problem as
> > much as the expression of the primordial symmetry in a mathematical
> > context. The difference being that other expressions of the symmetry
> > contain other truths not found within arithmetic sensibility.
>
> Who said this? The pope? The Ayatollah? The government?

It's not an authoritative proposition, it's a voluntary interpretation
(which, if I'm right, is what half of the universe is anyhow).

>
>
>
> >> That would be mistake. But the whole point is that the machine can
> >> already explain too you that the reason you believe they cannot think
> >> is a confusion of the type belief/qualia. It is a confusion between
> >> Bp
> >> and Bp &p. The machine knows the intensional difference, and can only
> >> hope for their possible extensional equivalence (like when saying
> >> "yes" to the doctor).
>
> > That reasoning has no lower limit though. Is it confusion to believe
> > that a trashcan that says THANK YOU on the lid is not really offering
> > thanks? Where is the line where it suddenly becomes racist to call a
> > puppet a puppet and not a person?
>
> When a puppet acts like a person, or was known to act like that (in
> case of comatose state).

Acts like a person in whose opinion?

>
>
>
> >>>>> Pain hurts.
>
> >>>> Well, this is tautological.
>
> >>> No, it isn't. Sweet could hurt instead.
>
> >> Define pain, then. I define it by what hurts. If sweet could hurt, it
> >> would be painful indeed.
>
> > That's where we disagree. I don't think that qualia is synonymous with
> > it's function.
>
> I did not say that.
>
>
>
> >> Brains have added complexity.
> >> Computer add complexity. But locally we feel it makes some task
> >> easier. But complexity grows.
>
> > That added complexity isn't to make tasks seem easier for the computer
> > though.
>
> For the owner of the computer, like for the owner of the brain. The
> person will feel thinking as easy as breathing. But it is not.

It is not easy in one sense, but in the native 1p sense, it is that
easy. If you built a universe from scratch and forgot to include this
experiential simplicity, you would not have our universe.

>
>
>
> >>> My solution is to see that they are
> >>> both parts of a single irreducible symmetrical ontology.
>
> >> In a too much fuzzy theory, alas (for me).
>
> > I don't see the fuzzy.
>
> Study the work of other people. Address their problem, with or without
> your "theory" as training.

That would be worthwhile I'm sure, but unfortunately it would be too
much of a distraction.

>
>
>
> >>> Why qualia help them, or anything do anything? It's reverse
> >>> engineering. You are thinking that since qualia helps us, then
> >>> logically it must be helpful, but it isn't. Logic doesn't need a
> >>> stage
> >>> show to help it. Qualia in general does not exist to assist
> >>> function.
> >>> Of course qualia assists us because we are made of qualia,
>
> >> ?
>
> > Ultimately what we are can be boiled down to experiences.
>
> Inner/outer god confusion.

?

>
>
>
> >> Fast is relative. It is the time you eat your prey, or the time your
> >> predator eat you. Relative time are quite enough here.
>
> > The feeling of vigilance doesn't compute though.
>
> But it might supervene on computation.

Why would it? If anything, machines supervene on a form of vigilance
or READYness (OK, C:>, cursor).

>
> > A computation could
> > be any speed but how could it care what that speed is as long as it is
> > appropriate for the computation context?
>
> As long as you catch the preys, and avoid the predators, things are
> cool.
>
>
>
> >> It does not. It come from non computable relation between truth and
> >> relatively simple self-referential loop.
> >> The loop itself is Turing emulable, the link with truth is not.
>
> > Ok. Here we only differ in that I will always say 'a loop of what?'.
>
> A loop of a universal numbers reflecting on itself, at some level.
> (They are mathematically definable by the use of Kleene's recursion
> theorem). Ideal correct machines have already a rich theory of self-
> reference, even before entangling themselves in deep dreams.

I don't see anything to support the idea of numbers dreaming. To
suppose something that is so radically theoretical and
counterintuitive as that, I would need a more interesting reason.

>
> > Just because we can conceive of the abstraction of a loop doesn't mean
> > that such a thing can actually exist independently.
>
> It exists in the same sense that the prime numbers exist. Like the
> discourse of the self-referential numbers.

Which to me is in a completely figurative sense of existence, having
no causal efficacy by itself.

>
>
>
> >> Formulate the problem in the comp theory. You answer it before
> >> studying it. There is a still unsolved measure problem, and you talk
> >> like if you knew the consequences of comp. You betray again your
> >> prejudice in the subject matter.
>
> > I automatically dismiss anything that is along the lines of 'you are
> > not qualified to have that curiousity'.
>
> I did not say anything like that.
> You have the right of all curiousity. But curiousity is interrgiative
> and ask question.
> I intervene because you were again talking like if you knew some truth.
> No one can do that in science.

My hypothesis is no more presumptuous than any other.

>
> > Does comp explain the lack of
> > new qualia generation or doesn't it? I don't think it can because
> > there is no handle on what the show actually is, only the plot of the
> > content of the show. The entire presentation of qualia is, how do you
> > say, diagonalized?
>
> Comp can be used to formulate the problems.

Yes, the twists that make up the plot. Still it's a script, not a
show.

>
>
>
> >>> A computer doesn't need me to type on it to compute. Keyboard,
> >>> video,
> >>> and mouse are for human users, not for the computer.
>
> >> Wait the bandits invent the buying machine. If we let education going
> >> as it is going, (since Nixon, say), humans will become subroutine for
> >> computations beyond their purposes.
>
> > I don't see the connection.
>
> If we dismiss the machines, the machines will dismissed us.
> No worry, we will not dismiss them, but we might dismiss ourselves.
> Machines might surpass humans also in the case humans abandon
> education and research, and accept to be manipulated.

It's not the machines that need help. They are doing just fine. Do you
think conscious machines will reward their aboriginal ancestors? That
they would be more compassionate than Europeans were to Native
Americans or Africans had they only not dismissed them or themselves?
Does a computer behave more like a gentle mammal or a relentless
insect? (notice that I have no fear of insulting the computer I type
this on).

>
>
>
> >>> Qualia does not merely represent and simplify information, it
> >>> presents
> >>> and enriches experience also - which is something that comp does not
> >>> do.
>
> >> ?
>
> > Comp only manipulates information and does not decorate experience
> > aesthetically.
>
> It does, thanks to the modalities. It is technicolor inside.

So you say. Why do we need eyes then? How can anyone be color blind?

>
>
>
> >>> Quanta needs no summary or representation - again, that is for the
> >>> convenience of human mathematicians and programmers. Programs
> >>> themselves operate only in an uncompressed, unencrypted form of
> >>> mind-
> >>> numbingly repetitive binary units.
>
> >> ?
>
> > Compiling into machine language is necessary to run a program. The
> > computer has no need for or tolerance of your human programming
> > language.
>
> It is not the computer, nor the brain which does the thinking, but the
> person emulated by layers of intricate universal numbers (with the
> brain playing a special relative role in keeping probabilities
> reasonable).

That sounds to me like the song does the singing and songwriting. It
can be seen in that sense, but only figuratively.

>
>
>
> >> Define those terms.
>
> > Hemisphere meaning, in this context, half of the cosmos.
>
> I don't take cosmos for granted. It is part of the problem, not the
> solution.

The cosmos is only a problem if you assume theory as primitive instead
of cosmos from the beginning. Which would make sense if we lived in a
world of disembodied theories settling into matter but it seems
obvious that he opposite is the case.

>
>
>
> >> I grant you that. But with comp we don't attribute qualia to
> >> physical-
> >> machine, only to the immaterial person.
>
> > I agree in part, qualia is not attributable to the physical machine,
> > both the qualia and the physical machine are attributed to the story
> > that is woven between them.
>
> Good. So all you have to learn is arithmetic,

What does arithmetic have to do with storytelling?

Craig

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