On Jan 23, 2:12 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 23 Jan 2012, at 14:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > Part I...I'll have to get back to this later for Part II
> > On Jan 21, 4:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> Craig,
> >> I assume comp all along.
> > Then why say that you are agnostic about comp?
> If I was knowing that comp is true, or if I was a believer in comp, I
> would not have to assume it.
> I study the consequence of the comp *hypothesis*. Unlike philosophers
> I never argue for the truth of comp, nor for the falsity of comp. But
> as a logician I can debunk invalid refutation of comp. This does not
> mean that comp is true for me.
> During the Iraq war I have invalidated many reasoning against that
> war, but I was not defending it. There were other arguments which were
> valid.
> But I realize some people lacked that nuance. Just for this modal
> logic is very useful, because it is the difference between the
> agnostic (~Bg) and the "atheist" (B~g).
> When doing science, it is better to hide our personal beliefs, and to
> abstract from them.

Okay. I thought by 'I assume comp all along' you meant that you
personally assume it is true.

> >>>>> Why do numbers make machines or tapes? Do the want to? Do they
> >>>>> have a
> >>>>> choice?
> >>>> As much choice and free will than you have. They too cannot
> >>>> predicts
> >>>> themselves and can be confronted to making decision with partial
> >>>> information.
> >>> Where do they get this capacity?
> >> From the laws of addition and multiplication, which makes arithmetic
> >> already Turing Universal.
> > Where in addition and multiplication do we find free will?
> Just addition and multiplication (and some amount of logic, which can
> be made itself very little) appears to be Turing universal. But it is
> a very *low level* programming language, so a proof of the existence
> of a Löbian universal number is *very* long, and not easy at all. But
> it can be done, and free-will, as I defined it, is unavoidable for
> Löbian number. They have the cognitive ability to know that they
> cannot predict themselves and have to take decision using very partial
> information. This is true for all universal machine, but the Löbian
> one are aware of that fact: they know that they have free-will. Of
> course some people defines free-will by a sort of ability of
> disobeying the natural laws, but this makes free-will senseless, as
> John Clark often says.

I'm not sure what John Clark's sense of free-will is. Omnipotence?
Magic? Not sure. I'm just talking about the ordinary difference
between feeling that you are doing something because you are doing it
as opposed to feeling that something is happening through no voluntary
action on your part. How do you know that Löbian machines have
awareness? Or are they defined that way a priori?

> >>> Why do we never see it manifested in
> >>> our ordinary use of numbers?
> >> With the computer and AI enterprise, you can see the embryonic
> >> development of this.
> > It's only embryonic if it develops into a fetus. At this point it
> > appears to be developing into a purely human distribution system for
> > gossip and porn instead.
> OK. But that is contingent of humans. I really don't know if
> "artificial machine" will become intelligent thanks to the willingness
> humans, despite the humans, or thanks to the unwillingness of humans.
> >> You can also interpret, like Jon Clark did, the DNA as number, coded
> >> in the chemistry of carbon, so that we can see it all around.
> >> We don't see it in the usual use of little numbers, because it is not
> >> there. The relations are either too poor, or not exploited enough.
> > Don't all relations have to arise ultimately from the usual use of
> > little numbers?
> Not really. Everything concerning matter and consciousness comes from
> an interplay between little numbers, and many big numbers. This comes
> from the UDA, which explains that the inside view is somehow a
> projection of the whole arithmetical truth.

In my language, 'projection of the whole arithmetical truth' =
diffraction of the primordial monad.

> This leads to something counter-intuitive, but not contradictory. the
> big picture conceived from outside is not so big (it is the whole of
> just arithmetic). But from inside it is provably bigger than any
> formal approximation of the whole of math. It is *very* big. Note that
> arithmetical truth is also bigger by itself than we thought before
> Gödel. It is already not axiomatisable. There are no effective
> theories of numberland.

Wouldn't numbers+names land be even bigger?

> >> Anyway, you are not convincing by pointing on everyday example, when
> >> talking to a theoretician.
> > If the theory doesn't apply to reality, then I have no problem with
> > it. Fantasy sports are not my area of interest. It's only if it
> > conflicts with my ideas of realism that I would be curious.
> Realism of what?

Of experience.

> If comp is true, it has to apply on reality.

Why? Maybe comp only applies to comp reality. Just because such a
reality can be imposed on some material forms (but not all material
forms, as I try to point out) doesn't mean that our way of imagining
that reality is the same as how it is received at the target level.

> That's why UDA makes comp
> a testable hypothesis.
> I assume comp, derive consequences which are observable, and so we can
> make test.
> It gives also a unification of qualia and quanta, consciousness and
> matter. It might be that even false, it will remain interesting as an
> example of theory. It might help to weaken comp to get the correct
> picture.
> To be sure the testable part requires not just comp, but also the
> classical theory of knowledge.

Yes, it definitely will remain interesting, and is more functionally
useful than my sense model, but the sense model is the one that is
more universally explanatory.

> >>> Generally the point of counting is to
> >>> establish a deterministic quantitative relation.. that's sort of
> >>> what
> >>> counting is? If the numbers themselves made choices, then why should
> >>> we consider counting a reliable epistemology?
> >> Counting use only the succession laws. The universal mess comes from
> >> the mixture of addition and multiplication, as the prime numbers
> >> already illustrates by their logarithmic "random" distribution.
> >> Your question is a bit like "if criminals are made of chemical
> >> reactions, should we continue to rely on chemistry?".
> > Are you saying then choice making is an emergent property of certain
> > mixed arithmetic modes only and not inherent in numbers then?
> Yes. The numbers plays a role only through their additive and
> multiplicative structures, and to the relations, which includes the
> computable one, you can define from this.

I think it makes more sense to see choice as an inherent potential of
nesting of awareness. The more that mechanical duties are offloaded to
subsystems the more sensorimotive interiority can develop in a
protected environment. In a universe of simple awareness, there is
only primitive sense detection and motive response. The effect of
having sense organs or nervous systems is to recapitulate the organism
within the organism, allowing a subjective experience of increased
depth of 'now' relative to a less elaborated organism. Human
consciousness is rich, slow roasted, gourmet qualia. Inorganic matter
has fast food qualia. The difference is achieved through
simplification and condensation, not complexity. Complexity is the
back end.

> >>>> Each universal machine is a particular machine. Even the virgin,
> >>>> non
> >>>> programmed one.
> >>>> You are a universal machine, at least. (Even if you have a non
> >>>> machine
> >>>> component).
> >>> Me the person, or me the biography?
> >> The person is not really a number. But in all its histories/
> >> computations it acts as a relative numbers, through its body
> >> described
> >> above his substitution level.
> >>> Is my life a machine within which
> >>> I exist as another machine or are we both the same machine?
> >> Your life is a sequence of machines states, and typically, it is
> >> self-
> >> changing machine. To be more precise would need boring and
> >> distracting
> >> vocabulary issue, the understanding of UDA, etc.
> >> Your life is not a machine. I have translated "to be a machine" by
> >> the
> >> more operational "to accept a digital brain transplant" to study the
> >> consequences without defining completely what person and life are
> >> (which can hardly be done).
> >> Keep in mind that I do not defend mechanism. I just explain that IF
> >> mechanism is true, then Plato/Plotinus are correct, and Aristotle
> >> primitive matter, and physicalism are not correct.
> > My position is that P/P Mechanism and A/pm/p are correct in some
> > sense, incorrect in some sense, both correct and incorrect in another
> > sense, and neither correct nor incorrect in another sense. The
> > invariant universal truth is sense.
> You are basically right. This can be made precise in the comp theory.


> >>>>>> I know that you believe in non-comp.
> >>>>> Is that supposed to invalidate the observations? Programs do get
> >>>>> tired? They do catch colds?
> >>>> With comp, that is obvious.
> >>> At what point do programs develop the capacity to get tired? Is it a
> >>> matter of complexity or degree of self-reference?
> >> Yes, like some robot can feel themselves wet, in the sense of finding
> >> a shelter if it rains.
> >> With some amount of self-reference they can
> >> develop qualia, and rememorable qualia, which can help to speed the
> >> recollection.
> > I think this is critically flawed. Nothing I know of suggests that
> > qualia from quantity can develop at all.
> By Gödel's theorem, and the existence of intensional modal variant,
> there is room for quality.

Room for quality, or room for anything we care to imagine?

> > If that were the case a
> > person should be able to learn to see visual qualia with other sense
> > organs.
> You might provide an argument. Only the brain, and some nerves
> concentrations behaves in a way making them able to use the modal
> (qualitative) relations between numbers.

How do you know that nerves are required? They may be required for us
to make sense (although blindsight suggests even that is not the case)
but they are not necessarily required for worms or protozoa.

> > High resolution greyscale images should turn into color.
> relatively to which person and which brain?

To anyone who can see color.

> > I
> > have not seen anything that suggests to me that qualia would or could
> > speed recollection either. To the contrary, it would be an additional
> > abstraction layer with significant resource overhead. If what you say
> > were true, computers would not need graphics accelerator cards, rather
> > they would need accelerator cards if graphics were not available to
> > speed up computation. I really can't see any credible argument against
> > this.
> You point on the hard part of the consciousness problem. What I can
> show is that machines observing themselves cannot avoid this too.
> Eventually it is part of a Löbian machine to tell you "believe it or
> not, but I am not a zombie, I can't prove this too you, but I know it
> in my bones".
> The difficulty is that the qualia are not associated to a machine, nor
> a machine state, but to a more complex relational structure between
> that states and the set of all possible environment/continuations. The
> Gödelian modalities helps to figure out the structure of those
> relations.

I think the problem is that qualia are not complex, but rather simple.
Pain hurts. Deep blue is introspective. They are the subjective
primitive. In our case they are anthropological gourmet quality, but
they are still the finest grain resolution of human realism possible.
If what you are saying were true, we should expect to resolve more and
more colors as we age as our scope and history of experience expands.

> > Qualia serves users, not machines.
> But of course both "are machine" with the comp hypothesis.
> With "are machine" in the "yes doctor" quasi operational sense.
> I can accept a sense that the first person is not a machine, but this
> might been confusing.

But what is not explained is the service that qualia could provide for

> > It is insurmountably
> > nonsensical and metaphysical.
> You should try to argue for this.

I can't really find anything to argue against though. The idea that
machines can make qualia seems like it comes out of thin air except
without the assumption that we are machines. There doesn't seem to be
any logic supporting it at all to argue against.

> > It is to say, it's faster to count to
> > 1000 if the numbers taste like different fruits.
> ?

If qualia speeds up processing then flavors+numbers should be faster
than just numbers, but they aren't.

> >> In that case they can discover that they cannot prove
> >> that they have *genuine* qualia. This happens with not so much self-
> >> referential abilities.
> > All qualia is genuine. How could it be otherwise?
> A zombie talking about its feeling of the color red, would talk about
> a non genuine qualia. With non-comp, zombie makes sense.

It's not qualia though, it's just words that you can choose to
interpret indirectly as qualia or not. Qualia are only experience
first hand, and so cannot be non genuine.

> >>>>> I know that you believe in comp.
> >>>> Then you are wrong. I am agnostic on this. As I should be: no
> >>>> correct
> >>>> machine believes in comp (nor in non-comp). We just cannot know.
> >>>> That
> >>>> is why I insist that we need some act of faith to say "yes" to the
> >>>> doctor. That is why I insist that it is a theology, and that we are
> >>>> forced to accept that people thinks differently.
> >>> The way I've found to get beyond that is through sense. Sense
> >>> bridges
> >>> the gap and connects the dots. It says to us, you cannot know, but
> >>> yet, it seems like you do, and that has to be good enough. Does it
> >>> seem like the universe is mechanistic and arithmetic?
> >> By UDA, reality is not WYSIWYG. What we see is a reflect of something
> >> bigger, like arithmetical truth. This contains the many non
> >> arithmetical properties leading to person, consciousness, matter,
> >> etc.
> > How do numbers 'see'?
> By having relation with itself semblable to a dreaming robot.

What is the difference between how they see and how they hear? Do they
have the same senses as we do or infinitely more?

> >>> On the outside,
> >>> yes. Everything outside of myself seems like it could be
> >>> quantified as
> >>> a single story with countless discrete parts. Inside myself seems
> >>> like
> >>> there are many stories and meanings, all shifting and catching the
> >>> light in different ways at different times - a constant flux of
> >>> significance which re-contextualizes many stories and meanings
> >>> simultaneously.
> >> Well said.
> > Thanks :)
> >>>>> I propose another possibility. Imagine a universe where things can
> >>>>> become what they actually are without running a program. Running a
> >>>>> program supervenes not only on sequential recursion but on a whole
> >>>>> universe of logical consequence, ideas of representation, memory,
> >>>>> continuous temporal execution, etc. What if those things are
> >>>>> aspects
> >>>>> of particular experience and not universal primitives?
> >>>> I don't know what is a universe. That's part of what I want an
> >>>> explanation for, that is in term of simple things that I can
> >>>> understand, like elementary arithmetic or combinatorics.
> >>> What is it you mean when you talk of universal machines then? What
> >>> are
> >>> they universal to?
> >> A universal machine is just a machine which can simulate any other
> >> machine through their finite description and their inputs. It a
> >> mathematical concept, but nature can emulate (simulate exactly) those
> >> machines. This happened recurrently on this planet, with the
> >> development of the genome, brain cells, thought, mind, language, and
> >> now computer.
> > Ok, so for your theory, the universe is the set of all machines, their
> > inputs, and outputs.
> And their relative code, and their relations with infinities of
> universal numbers, etc.
> > What I'm saying is that inputs and outputs don't
> > need a machine to define them as such.
> Indeed, non computable functions have <input-output> which are not
> effectively describable by machine. In the usual classical set
> theoretic sense, most functions are like that. Most functions are not
> computable. But if you are using such function, you have to tell us
> which one.
> > Instead you have one primordial
> > mass-energy singularity
> I don't take such notion for granted. I want understand them.

I don't take it for granted, I only propose that it's a plausible
creation story. A single everythingness-nothingness that is diffracted
through the sense of symmetry into a multiplicity of somethingness.

> > which multiplies/divides itself spatially and
> > temporally.
> Nor this.
> > Each division entails inherent input-outputs to the other
> > parts and the whole. It's subtractive and implicit, like a spectrum. A
> > prism does not have to illustrate each hue of the spectrum
> > mechanically and digitally, it just exposes the optical sense that is
> > already inherent in white light.
> Sense is inherent in light?
> How? What would that mean?

It means that light is a perceptual experience made of image qualia
like color, contrast, brightness, image, motion, form, beauty, etc.
The visible spectrum is one way of essentializing those qualia. Once
you set aside the assumption that light (and heat, motion, energy) is
a substance, we can see that vision is a channel of sensitivity to
those qualia and nothing more. It's like McLuhan, the medium is the
message. In this case, the sense is the sensation. The spectrum
directly exposes the principles of visual-optical sensation. When you
cut your finger it bleeds. When you cut white light, you expose the
sequence and color within it.

> >>> But you are sidetracking my point:
> >>> **Things may not need to run a program to be what they already
> >>> are.**
> >> I agree. We don't need to implement arithmetic for it being true, for
> >> example.
> > Right. Or for truth to be truth.
> >>> *It is programs which need things to become what they are not.*
> >> But they usually belong to complex histories/computations which
> >> provide them with many things. Indeed, a priori, too much things (the
> >> white rabbit problems).
> > Whatever histories they are part of needs to be fully explicated and
> > projected onto whatever is executing them. The microprocessor never
> > 'learns' the operating system, each structure must be recursively and
> > discretely enacted. Nothing is elided unless it is synthetically
> > condensed with a compression algorithm or something. The hardware
> > doesn't learn or grow in a machine. In a brain/mind it does.
> How. If you can really answer that question, I will be able to tell if
> this already happens in Numberland, or not. So we might see if your
> theory is comp-compatible or not.

The mind is native and organic to the brain. The two are opposite
sides of the same coin. In a mechanism you have two separate coins -
one which is native and organic to the structure (electronic
semiconductors stop, start, and detect the stopping and starting of
electric current, steam engines stop, start, and detect currents of
pressurized water vapor, etc) and one which is alien and a-signifying
to the structure (program logic, industrial process, etc). The mind
grows and learns because it is the sensorimotive receiver-transmitter
of an organ which has been evolutionarily intensified for the
development and concentration of sensorimotive capacity. The brain is
a meta-organism optimized for sensemaking. A machine is an artifact of
assembled components which are relatively senseless on their own but
which can extend our sensemaking in conjunction. On it's own, there is
no sensemaking beyond the most literal physical level.

> >>> This bit of common (universal) sense is what your view seems to be
> >>> missing or hiding or denying. The result is a perfectly logical
> >>> theory
> >>> of an anti-cosmos in which intangible programs simulate thingness to
> >>> achieve irrelevant tangibility as a meaningless side effect. If you
> >>> can just turn it inside out, you will see that we participate in a
> >>> real universe directly,
> >> The old Chinese-Indian-Greek dream argument makes me already doubting
> >> we can see a real universe directly. We see what our brains succeed
> >> to
> >> filter and represent.
> > Think of it not as filtered or represented but condensed and
> > presented. We are directly presented with a real human world,
> That's your assumption, belief, or theorem. It would be nice if you
> could be clearer on your assumptions.
> You are perhaps lucky to talk with a logician, but logician likes when
> you distinguish clearly what you assume, and what you derive.

What is assumed is a split in our experience between external
realities and internal realities in which the two realities overlap
precisely in some ways and diverge sharply and symmetrically in other
ways. In other words, the split itself is also split so that it is a
monism on both extremes and dualistic in the middle. This way interior
and exterior are the same thing in the profound or essential sense,
and the opposite thing in the pedestrian or existential sense. This
means that at any point along this continuum (the multisense
continuum), the sense proximal to the point is privileged as most
real, and the point opposite is disqualified as epiphenomenon.

The idea of filtering or representation arises from privileging the
exterior-occidental monism perspective exclusively, so that qualia is
nothing but the function of identifying parts of the outside world
which is assumed to be unquestionably real. The opposite perspective
is the interior-oriental monism which holds that it is the outside
world which is an illusion (maya, shadow) and our spiritual journey
which is real.

The recognition of the reality and unreality of every point and
perspective along this continuum is what inspires the hypothesis that
what our perceptions are made of is the exact same thing that the rest
of the cosmos is made of, it only seems different because they belong
to us. No point on the continuum serves to only to represent or
support another point, it is the sense and symmetry of the continuum
as a whole which are embodied and reflected by points. This continuum
of multiple senses is what we call reality.

> > which is
> > condensed from the real worlds our dozens of organs, trillions of
> You should better avoid the use of the word "real". Given that our
> discussion is precisely on what is real, or on what is primitively real.

concrete? non-abstract? energetic? direct? presented?

> > cells, (x)tillions of molecules which are literally within us, as well
> > as it is influenced by our fractional participation in the worlds
> > which exist without us - our social group, civilization, species,
> > biosphere, planet, solar system, galaxy, cosmos.
> All those terms make sense. But they do not denote anything
> primitively real.

They don't have to be primitively real, but they are the forms that
are real relative to our perceptual frame. What is a cell to us might
be the equivalent of a planet to the molecules that make up a cell.

> I argue that if we assume digital mechanism, all that emerges from a,
> mathematically complex and counter-intuitive self-referential
> properties of universal 'numbers.

To which I say that numbers emerge from counting, which is a rhythmic
sense and motive.

> All what I say is that if we assume comp we get automatically a "many-
> worlds interpretation, made by universal numbers, of arithmetic. With
> two main parts, the communicable and the non communicable.

I think that's almost right, except I think that numbers are only an
aspect of the sense of bodies, not a cause of bodies or sense. With a
sense monism, any number of worlds can exist within the singularity,
but they all ultimately make the same sense also. All worlds are
ultimately part of the same world, so that nothing gets orphaned
forever and nonsense universes don't exist.

> >>> and that ideas cannot embody things on their
> >>> own.
> >> That's true, but ideas can embody the idea that things can own
> >> bodies.
> > Not actual bodies, only ideal bodies.
> Actual bodies are relative ideal bodies seen from inside. Bodies are
> experience type, not primitively material token, in the comp theory
> (when well understood).

It has some things going for it - out of body experiences, multiple
personality disorders having physiological effects, reincarnation,
ghosts etc, but even if credible, these are not the norm. Their
association with the incredible and uncredible however makes me
categorize them as experiential artifacts close to the interior-
oriental extreme...the vanishing point at which the autobiographical
narrative begins to super-signify and diffract (ACME = Anything Can
Mean Everything).

I would expect a world of avatar impersonations to be much lighter and
looser than the world we live in and physical conditions should not
have such a powerful effect on us. For instance, we discover a drug
like opium, and even after thousands of years, the drug still has an
effect on every living person's body, regardless of experience type.
That substance is active for humans and other animals regardless of
experience type. It's effects can be blocked or amplified by other
substances but not by words or incantations.

I agree that bodies are ideal on the inside and physical on the
outside, but I think that both sides are causally efficacious. The
physical side's form of causality is consequence, entropy, and
teleonomy, while the ideal side is sequence, significance, and

> > My mind doesn't have the first
> > clue how to embody by own body. If I want to stand up, I can only say
> > that I do stand up, not that I provide or process any information that
> > results in a result of 'the body' standing.
> You will not ask a email application to explain how they function at a
> low level.

An email application can't explain any function of anything. We can
though. I would not assume that if an email application had our
awareness that it could not explain how it functions.

> You might be a dreaming butterfly.

If I never find out that I am, then I am no more a dreaming butterfly
than a waking human.

> > My perception is not that
> > I am commanding my body to execute a standing program, but that I am
> > directly standing myself - it costs me effort personally so that I
> > don't want to keep standing all day.
> Please take a seat.

Permane ser sentados por favor.

> To be able to seat without doing too much effort, and "directly" is
> made possible by collection of amoebas who got the cable, and about
> (x)tillions of phone communications. I know you agree with that
> because you asserts that our consciousness is  somehow related of
> their consciousness (is it a sum? what is the function?).

I don't think the amoebas get a cable, I think their behavior is the
embodiment of the cable itself on the body's microcosmic level. Our
experience of sitting down is the same cable but on the macrocosmic
level of our body as a whole.

You are trying to tie it back to a linear mechanism (a summing or
function), but it isn't - no more than white is a summing or function
of the visible spectrum. It's a figurative diffraction across multiple
scales of nested awareness. We feel that we are sitting down. Our
tissues and cells and molecules feel different things. We think that
our tissues and cells feel nothing but only send and receive signals,
but that's only because our awareness is nested so far inward and
upward that we see their world in 'black and white' - qualitatively
desaturated (= generically quantitative.)

> But the higher level of the human person, is indeed a quite
> sophisticate higher level function. We can't think for our cells, nor
> can we know the complex molecular phenomena, except by making theories
> and observations, and reading books, etc.
> Now, what everybody try to tell you is that, all levels having lawful
> description in nature are computable, so that your theory just look
> argument for a low comp substitution level. If not, you invoke a
> particular non computable, and non Turing recoverable by first person
> indeterminacy, and we might be interested in knowing which one.

I'm only invoking our own awareness in micro. The assumption that
because we can only know our cells and molecules through knowledge,
and that knowledge is computable, then we must also as agglomerations
of cells and molecules be computable. The reason this is incorrect is
because the same assumption directed toward other people and animals
would be that they are only what their body is and how it behaves. We
know this is not true because we can see that we ourselves cannot be
known by observing our body from the outside. We also know that we
cannot feel our own cells and neurons, so that what we are, as the
interior of a human body's nervous system may not reduce to the
exterior behaviors of the cells and molecules at all, but rather to a
nested awareness of subselves within those structures. This makes
sense since sensorimotive experience scales up qualitatively rather
than just quantitatively, so that more brain cells does not feel like
more brain cells, it feels like more awareness and sense-making of the

> >>> Codes and mechanisms are what real objects do to each other, but
> >>> objects are not codes themselves. They are a chunks of the
> >>> singularity
> >>> with masses and densities.
> >> I don't know that.
> > That's what they seem like though.
> Yes. But that's the key difference.

Why wouldn't codes just seem like codes?

> > Programs tend to encounter errors
> > and crash, or encounter latency, pixelation, etc. Matter doesn't ever
> > falter in it's own presentation though. An iron anvil never drops it's
> > gravity pointer and flies through the ceiling spontaneously or changes
> > back and forth from iron to cobalt because the anvil class of programs
> > has a bad line of code.
> It just a matter of first person plural probability calculus.

I don't know that. I think it's far more likely that an anvil's
movements can be interpreted as calculus than calculus could or would
turn into an anvil for some reason.

> >>>>> What if the
> >>>>> entire cosmos is a monad; a boundless and implicit firmament
> >>>>> through
> >>>>> which objects and experiences are diffracted? The primordial
> >>>>> dynamic
> >>>>> is not mechanism but stillness and stasis, like a spectrum to a
> >>>>> prism.
> >>>> All that is Turing emulable, and doesn't add to the understanding.
> >>> A boundless and implicit firmament is Turing emulable?
> >> Actually-infinite complex cellular automata might not been Turing
> >> emulable, but they are still Turing recoverable in case such infinite
> >> firmament is necessary for consciousness. So let us reason from comp
> >> and see if an actual infinite firmament is necessary.
> >> If you postulate it exists in some primitive way, you just postulate
> >> an infinitely complex assumption.
> > If we start counting from 0, your way makes sense. I start counting
> > from 1, with 0 being the absence of any number so it has to be an
> > afterthought.
> I don't understand.

If you want to create a number system from scratch, I would start with
1, since you can take it away and call the absence of 1 zero. If I
start with 0, there is no system. Finding 1 from 0 is not logically
possible. You could just as easily find 4 or 100,000 as the next
number after 0.

> > If we start with 0 as the first number, then the second
> > number is no more likely to be 1 than it is to be any number.
> In which theory?

In the one I'm describing?

> > Beginning with unity and singularity is infinite in the sense that
> > without anything else to relate to it can only be boundless, but it is
> > not infinitely complex, it is infinitely simple. Complexity arises
> > through the fragmentation-division and multiplication-recapitulation
> > of the 1.
> Complexity arise from addition and multiplication. With comp, it is
> enough.

What is it that is added and multiplied though?

> > I postulate white light which presents each division
> > (diffraction really, as it is not truly divided but revealed like a
> > sliced onion) as a range of color. The color is the diffraction and
> > the diffraction is the color. You could say that all numbers exist
> > inside of 1 and that 0 does not exist but insists as a potential (ie
> > Cantor Set evanescence).
> I am afraid this does not make much sense for me.

I'm saying that I suspect that the universe makes more sense if all
numbers add up to 1, not 0, even if it means beginning with that as an

> >>>>> Anchored in that stable unity, matter is the more direct
> >>>>> representation of this singularity (ie the many alchemical
> >>>>> references
> >>>>> to 'stone').
> >>>> But what is matter?
> >>> The discrete diffractions of the monad.
> >> Hmm... Why not. But this should be made clear in some context, with
> >> precise definition of discrete (you will need Church thesis, or
> >> topology), monad, and what do you mean by monad diffraction.
> > Cool. I'm putting together a new website, trying to improve it and
> > prep for the TSC conference in April. Give it a look if you like, and
> > see if it's any clearer than the old 
> > site:http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/
> > Monad diffraction is the interior experience of the big bang.
> Words like "interior", "experience" and "big bang" are more complex
> and theory dependent than "Monad diffraction".
> It looks like playing with words.

That's because you are thinking of human experience. I don't think the
big bang is more complex than monad diffraction though. I'm only
talking about a singularity of dense mass-energy expanding - except
that the expansion is relative to itself since there is nothing to
expand out into. The expansion is really a diffraction - an induction
of space and time as distance gaps and episodic threading within the
singularity's experience.

> > Instead
> > of a fragmentation across space (really an induction of space into the
> > 1), it is the induction of frequency and amplitude (time, energy) into
> > the now. 'Now' is what 1 feels like.
> >> The expression might have a sense in the comp theory. In my early
> >> writings I do describe self-observation, under the substitution
> >> level,
> >> as a processes of self-diffraction, putting you into infinities of
> >> computational continuations.  Matter is, well not generated, but
> >> recover, through that process. But this is just a way to describe the
> >> first person indeterminacy, and terms like diffraction have physical
> >> (optical) precise meaning, so I keep that for the pause café.
> > Right, this is more of a figurative diffraction, especially since
> > there is 'nothing' doing the diffracting (literally, it is 0 which
> > gaps the ÷ of the 1?).
> I don't see an atom of sense here. Sorry.

I'm saying that what divides the singularity is only the temporary
absence of itself. 1 is firmament, 0 is temporary and virtual.

> >>> Carved out of the singularity
> >>> using the knife of interior figurative diffraction (feeling/being,
> >>> sequence, significance, time) which is expressed as literal
> >>> diffraction on the exterior (indirect detection, objects, space,
> >>> relativity, topology)
> >> Too much sense here. Sorry. You have to find a way to make your
> >> statement more precise if you want to convince a scientist.
> > I'm trying to get at the primordial interior-exterior divisions, and
> > how the interior is diffracted one way, using an alphabet of feeling
> > and being through time and the exterior is diffracted the opposite
> > way, using indirect representations of objects across space.
> ?

Our experience of space and time are opposites. I'm saying that our
entire interior view of the universe is based on frequency and our
exterior view is based on wavelength. The two meta-topologies are
anomalously symmetrical.

> >>>>> The subjective correlate would be silent and dark void as
> >>>>> well as solar fusion and stellar profusion. This is realism.
> >>>> This is imagination.
> >>> Imagination is part of realism.
> >> At a different level. If you forget this you blur fiction and the
> >> reality we are searching. (Not the reality we would have found).
> > There is a level at which fiction and reality are blurred, and a level
> > at which they are rigorously demarcated. Both levels are real as well
> > as the continuum of levels between them. I am calling the former the
> > profound edge and the latter the pedestrian fold (of the multisense
> > continuum).http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/label_comp8a.jpg
> ?

Not sure how else to explain it. Reality is sense from every
perspective, including the mutually exclusive opposite perspectives..

> >>> It is our experience, but it is
> >>> impossible to emulate mechanically.
> >> This looks like non-comp, but it can be derived from comp.
> >> Experience,
> >> consciousness are NOT Turing emulable. Only local bodies, through
> >> which experience can be manifested relatively to experience and
> >> bodies
> >> of other (universal or not) machines.
> >> The picture we get is counter-intuitive. It is the price of comp, but
> >> it is natural for Platonists, and comp leads to Platonism, even to
> >> some Neoplatonism à-la Plotinus.
> > It's valuable to look at it that way too. My view is counter-intuitive
> > as well, but mainly because our intuition has been numbed by our
> > culture of occidental instrumentalism. We see with our own eyes what
> > happens when we turn on a light, but we disqualify it from
> > consideration because of optics, physics, biology, evolution, blah
> > blah blah.
> Yes. It is a tradition to put the mind body problem under the rug.
> My point is that if we take the comp hyp seriously, simple thought
> experience shows how the express it in arithmetical term and axiomatic
> definition, and that it leads to test. Making it scientific in the
> usual academical sense of the term.

How are simple colors expressed in arithmetic though?

> > We become disenchanted with our own perception in favor of
> > knowledge about the mechanism associated with it's delivery.
> That's the mistake indeed. The beauty is that with the progress in
> machine theory the mistake becomes palpable. That's why I think it is
> interesting to understand that the current materialist theologies are
> not compatible with mechanism.

Which aspects specifically of mechanism are incompatible with

> > All we
> > have to do is realize that seeing is not just a complex process of
> > billions of discrete particles and 'signals', but it is also a very
> > simple and biologically common non-process.
> What do you mean by biological in this context. What makes you think
> that there are no simple biologically common non-processes in
> arithmetic? If they are non computable, why do you want make them non
> Turing 1-recoverable?

I mean that we know our sense of sight is associated with our ocular
biology. I don't see the idea of biology in arithmetic as plausible,
mainly because of the specificity of the materials of biology and the
state of living vs dying. I don't think that arithmetic can die.

> The disenchantment is due to the fact that people believe that
> mechanism is the answer.
> But mechanism is the question.
> Provably so once you assume mechanism. That's the beauty of it.

Or it is the tautological tragedy of it?

> In the least, it provides a non physical frame, yet widespread, the
> belief in arithmetic, where we can explain where the beliefs in
> physical laws come from (even as qualia), and, the hard part, why they
> are locally self-referentially correct.

I'm all for a non physical vocabulary, and even information science as
long as it isn't the basis for a cosmology.

> > Many organisms have eyes,
> > others have antennas, others have cilia. From quorum sensing we can
> > infer that the molecules which make up living bacteria are able to
> > sense molecules of chemicals being produced by other bacteria. How do
> > we know this is not a form of seeing or tasting?
> I bet it is a form of seeing or tasting.
> Cells are already universal, and I can attribute them consciousness,
> and I might think that "me" needs the level of "physics" around the
> Heisenberg uncertainty, to say "yes" to the doctor.  But this is for
> surviving in the closest sense of being "me" in the very long turn.
> "We" can survive, but lost things, at higher level too, and this leads
> to the question who are we, personal identity, etc.
> I am OK with consciousness on some scale, or even perhaps non
> temporal, for very simple entities. Indeed I can attribute
> consciousness to any universal arithmetical relation. I think self-
> consciousness begins with Löbianity, and this leads only to more
> questions for them.
> Mechanism, well understood, is antireductionist for all universal
> numbers. It is as much a re-enchantment as a promise for infinities of
> mess. Universal machines oscillates between freedom and security, they
> want both, but there are local tradeoff. With security you loose
> universality, and with freedom you crash from time to times.

I think of computation like a lattice through which we can extend our
own neurological sensemaking. The lattice is real, but it's not doing
anything by itself.


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