On Feb 5, 1:23 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 05 Feb 2012, at 17:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> I just don't see how beliefs can be primitive.
> >> They are not. You can define "M believes p" in arithmetic. (Bp)
> >> You cannot define "M knows p", but you can still simulate it in
> >> arithmetic by (Bp & p) for each p. So knowledge is not primitive
> >> either.
> > I don't see how 'defining' can be primitive either.
> You are right. We can define "define" in arithmetic, like we can
> define a notion of rational belief, but not of knowledge (that we can
> still meta-define, and the machine can do that too).
> >>>> You should prove what you assert. I can agree because the term
> >>>> "random" has many different meaning. For some meaning of it you are
> >>>> right. Classical digital chaos can be said neither random nor
> >>>> determinist, for some acceptable definition of "random" and
> >>>> "deterministic". Many disagreement here are uninteresting
> >>>> vocabulary
> >>>> problems.
> >>> Classical digital chaos can't be said to be intentional though.
> >>> That's
> >>> the missing element. Machines, arithmetic, chaos, etc can't do
> >>> anything intentionally. We do though.
> >> You are just insulting some possible machines. You make a very strong
> >> assumption, without any other proof than a feeling of being
> >> different.
> > It's not a matter of assumption or proof or feeling, it's a matter of
> > understanding. I understand the difference between chaos and
> > intentionality. Chaos is teleonomy but intention or motive is
> > teleological. They are opposites. Chaos has no opinion, intentionality
> > is the realization of opinion.
> You cannot invoke your own understanding. That's an argument per
> authority (it proves nothing and augment the plausibility that you are
> crackpot in the interlocutor ear).
It's not an argument from authority, it's an argument from sense. Just
as your theory is contingent upon the acceptance of primitive
arithmetic truth, my hypothesis comes out of a sense primitive. In
order to understand the cosmos as a whole, including subjectivity, we
must invoke our own understanding or mechanism will mislead us into
disproving ourselves. Sense is the price of admission to the real
> >>> I don't think intention can be emulated. A Turing machine's behavior
> >>> can only be scripted or else be an unintentional consequence of the
> >>> script. It can't intentionally transcend it's own script.
> >> It can precisely do that. The G and G* logics comes from that very
> >> ability. Universal machine are universal dissident capable of
> >> changing
> >> its own script.
> > You don't know that it can change it intentionally though.
> But this I don't know for anyone else, except myself perhaps.
> But you can't know that they are zombie, though.
All you need to know is that you can change things intentionally
yourself, but again, under sense, we don't need to literally know
everything, we can connect the dots of our many sense channels and
know that we can trust what they are showing us to a realistic extent.
We don't need to doubt other people's awareness and we don't need to
give a machine the benefit of the doubt. Let the machine convince us
it has intention and let the person convince us they do not.
> > It will
> > only change according to what and how it's script allows it to change.
> The "allowing" is a universal machine dependent notion, and they are
But what is allowed can never exceed the range of possibilities of the
script. Living organisms seem to be able to do that.
> >>> Talk with them, meaning internal dialogue?
> >> Public dialog. Like in Boolos 79 and Boolos 93. But the earlier form
> >> of the dialog is Gödel 1931.
> >> Solovay 1976 shows that the propositional part of the dialog, with
> >> the
> >> modal Bp, is formalized soundly and completely by G and G*. It is the
> >> embryo of the mathematics of incompleteness, including the directly
> >> accessible and the indirectly accessible parts, and the explanation
> >> of
> >> the why we feel it is the other way around, etc.
> > When you talk with them, do they answer the same way to the same
> > question every time?
> The conversation is made in Platonia, and is not entangled to our
> history, except for period where I implement it on some machines. Even
> in that case, they didn't dispose on short and long term memories,
> except for their intrinsic basic arithmetical experiences (which
> bifurcate up to you and me).
I can't really interpret that in any way other than an evasion of the
question. You say there have been public dialogs at various times. I
asked if the answers are the same every time. You answered in a way
that sounds like 'talking to machines isn't anything like talking and
it doesn't occur in time, but then somehow they become us and then
talking becomes talking.'
> > Do they ever get tired of answering the same
> > question or tired of remaining silent?
> So, what I say above explains why such a question is senseless.
I think that the answer has to be either yes or no. If one machine has
ever been silent on a question but then answered it under repeated
questioning, then the answer is yes, otherwise I think it has to be
no. It's a factual question, not a description.
> > The idea that Löbian machines
> > are uniform in their response -
> They are universal babies. You can except much. They all drool, cough
> and sleep ...
But you can't talk to babies. Nobody claims that their silence on deep
questions indicates sagacity.
> > that all such machines remain silent
> > on all of these questions every time tells me that they clearly
> > possess no awareness.
> You have frightening telepathic power.
It's not telepathy, it's first hand knowledge that awareness entails
natural variation in response. You cannot ask any question of any
person over and over and expect to get the same response every time
for every person. That's because awareness is not mechanical. That's
what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior.
> > Why wouldn't there be one loose lipped machine
> > who let the secrets of their identity slip?
> Because I limit myself to ideally self-referentially correct machine.
> They already know that it is insane to let the secret of their
> identity slip.
So it's impossible for a machine to go insane? Seems like another
fundamental difference between minds and machines.
> > Rather I think we should
> > take their silence at face value. They know nothing about themselves
> > because there is no self there to know anything.
> Not at all. When you ask them why they remain silent on some question,
> they can find answer and provide (theological) theories/hypothesis.
> >>>> Because they can be aware of the gap between proof and truth. They
> >>>> can
> >>>> even study the rich mathematics of that gap. They already claim
> >>>> having qualia. They are teaching me their theology. That's what
> >>>> AUDA
> >>>> is all about.
> >>> What qualia do they have?
> >> They are given by some semantics of the SGrz1, Z1* and X1* logics.
> >> Intuitively those concerned perceptible fields, in weird topological
> >> spaces.
> > What about them makes them perceptible as opposed to computational?
> But they are perceptible, if the theory is correct.
Only because deciding that they are perceptible is the only way to
preserve the possibility that the theory could be correct.
> >> It should determined the first person plural notion.
> >> I am only translating the mind-body problem in an arithmetic + usual
> >> math. problem, by taking seriously the comp hypothesis (without
> >> throwing consciousness and persons away).
> >>>> The contrary here is also true.
> >>>> And in the case of consciousness attribution, the naive attitude
> >>>> is
> >>>> less damageable than the skeptical attitude.
> >>> Then we should treat corporations as people too?
> >> Above some level of self-referential nasty behavior, why not? So we
> >> can prosecute them and send them to jail, in case of abuse of power.
> >> Good idea!
> > They can't be jailed though. That's the point. The corporation can
> > just be dissolved and reformed under a different name. People can't do
> > that. Jail is a deterrent for most people but not for any program or
> > organization.
> Sure. Good trick to escape responsibilities. But a corporation is not
> a human, and if tretated as an entity, we have to handle it
> correspondingly, with the goal of favoring the general human interest.
My point is that machines cannot be punished or deterred by the threat
> >> <I skip what you say on names>
> >>>>> There is no need to explain sense and matter. They are self
> >>>>> explanatory and non-mysterious.
> >>>> Ah?
> >>> No need to explain those terms in other terms I mean.
> >> Ah?
> > Terms aren't primitive. They arise from sense and matter. If you say
> > terms are primitive, you have infinite regress of what terms make
> > terms.
> I didn't say that. You confuse level. When you say that sense and
> matter are self-explanatory, you just make no sense at all.
You're overthinking it. Sense is the ability to detect and incorporate
what is detected into a larger coherence. Matter is everything which
can be publicly observed in terms like mass, density, relative
location, velocity, etc.
> > Sense already takes infinite regress into account.
> How? Given that sense are primitive, which makes no sense.
If sense is primitive, then it makes sense by definition. It is that
which makes definition possible: sensorimotive electromagnetism.
> > Whatever
> > terms or phenomena you want to make primitive have to first make
> > sense. Nothing can be more primitive than sense because then it
> > wouldn't make -- sense.
> I will not study the brain, nor biology, because we don't need that to
> use the brain and being alive.
not sure what connection you're making.
> >>>>> Only the symmetry between them is not
> >>>>> commonly understood.
> >>>> It might be non symmetrical. Is that symmetry another assumption?
> >>> Not an assumption, an observation/hypothesis.
> >> ?
> > Symmetry can be observed, no?
> Some symmetry can, others cannot, especially those which doesn't
> exist, or mightn't exist.
It seems that way because it is more primitive than arithmetic truth.
It transcends certainty.
> >>>>> Once the symmetry is understood as primitive,
> >>>>> nothing simpler be conjured.
> >>>> This looks like nonsense to me. Honest.
> >>> should be 'nothing simpler need be conjured'
> >> Your symmetry thesis is a way to protect the Aristotelian thesis by
> >> lowering our substitution level down in in the non constructive
> >> transfinite.
> >> You do a reification of transcendence.
> > I don't think it has to do with protecting anything, it's a sensible
> > extrapolation of conditions as we find them - a refinement of common
> > sense.
> But scientist present them in an hypothetical way, trying to be as
> clear so that we can see the difference with other theories. You don't
> present any difference, you just deny a possibility without presenting
> any argument.
I make clear differences from all other theories. I map other theories
along a continuum and explain their shortcomings in terms of their
diametrically opposed theories. When you are trying to reconcile the
entire cosmos, you can't expect that it will fit neatly on the shelf
with instrumental theories.
> >> I think this is against the constitution, Craig. You are believing in
> >> a truth, but keep it to you, and make public a theory instead. You
> >> talk like a prohibitionist.
> >> Nobody can claim truth, for God-sake.
> > Except 17?
> A machine can say "17 is prime".
Can it? Or do we have to define what prime is for it in advance? Most
machines don't know what 17 or prime is.
> This really means "I think and assert
> that 17 is prime".
I think it only means that a certain set of bits meets a pre-
established criteria associated with another set of bits.
>It also means that machine can justify it by the +
> and * laws.
> Ideally correct machine cannot say, in general "True('17 is prime')".
> They can refer to a reality as such. they are modest.
It makes the entire universe into a uniform meaningless exercise of
> >>> Any description of the universe has to make some kind of sense and
> >>> all
> >>> things that make sense describe an aspect of the universe. Sense
> >>> requires the possibility of a foreground/background, subject/object,
> >>> variance/invariance relation. The three things; foreground,
> >>> background, and relation between the two (something that can tell
> >>> the
> >>> difference) are the most primitive possible realism. You cannot have
> >>> just one or two things because there is nothing to tell the
> >>> difference. The most primitive thing that can be real is one thing
> >>> that can tell the difference between itself and the absence of
> >>> itself.
> >>> It's really not much different from Turing binary, but binary
> >>> can't be
> >>> primordial because 1 doesn't know that it's different from 0 (if it
> >>> did it would be redundant to have both). 1 and 0 therefore, are two
> >>> opposite states of the same thing - a boundaryless solitary bit
> >>> which
> >>> can tell whether it is in one state or another. This sense - this
> >>> ability to detect and discern the difference, to make more sense out
> >>> of patterns of the states, that is the primodial monad. It's not
> >>> arithmetic truth, it is the concrete phenomenology of the cosmos
> >>> which
> >>> tells truths and fictions of all sorts.
> >> You might have some talent in poetry, if you were not claiming truth.
> > Poetry can't tell the truth?
> Never. It is logically impossible. If it does, it is no more poetry.
> Some poetry can reveal some truth to some people, but not in the
> affirmative way.
> Poetry can relate ruth, but not claims them as such. It would be a
> confusion of genre.
That doesn't even make sense. Any scientific truth can be expressed in
a poetic form. Genres aren't real.
> >> On the contrary, like Aristotle you go in the intuitive natural
> >> animal
> >> beliefs that reality is WYSIWYG.
> > That's only half of reality, but it is only through that reality that
> > we can know any part of the other half.
The argument is that all truths beyond our senses are known to us only
through our senses. What is the argument against it?
> >> People like that. Billions years of
> >> "eat or being eaten" make us taking our local neighborhood as being
> >> important and primitively given.
> > The whole point of multisense realism is to acknowledge the role of
> > all maps and models, and to organize them in such a way as to reveal
> > their deeper symmetry. Because you argue for devout computationalism
> > (logos), my counterargument has to be anti-comp to pull yours toward
> > the center. The multisense continuum is a framework for seeing not
> > just the relativism and pluralism of the cosmos, but also the non-
> > commutable strengths of each individual approach. The universe needs
> > localists as well as generalists, materialists and idealists, etc.
> No problem with that. I wish only you try harder.
Try harder to be impartial, or try harder to stack the deck in favor
> >> Then you talk again like if you knew the truth. For humans, and LUMs,
> >> possibilities are already enough frightening.
> > Oh, please. Nothing could be more frightening than the actual reality
> > we face in our own civilization as it is every day. It has terrors and
> > nightmares for every appetite. My comments about cell phones not being
> > a member of my family is hardly the sacking of Rome.
> But what about a human with a prosthetic brain?
> (I don't care about cell phones).
A beautiful machine is worth caring about too, but it has nothing to
do with it's awareness. I'm not a big car guy but when they wrecked
that Ferrari for this Dr. Dre video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=VA770wpLX-Q) even I had to think 'well, that's a damn shame'.
> >> By lowering the level you can make sense of quasi panpsychic reality,
> >> and still follow the laws of comp.
> >> By putting the level in the non constructive low levels, you just
> >> build a "don't ask shelter" for your theory. It remains even more
> >> bizarre, if the broken silicon glass makes an experience, why would
> >> not a silicon universal machine have one.
> > A silicon semiconductor does have an experience, just not the
> > incomprehensible human experience that we superimpose on it's nature.
> > If I use a truck to carry a piano, the truck doesn't learn how to play
> > the piano, even though I can run over a series of bumps which will
> > plink out a tune. Is that really such a far out concept? Must I really
> > accept that there could be be built a clever enough track that the
> > truck becomes a virtuoso pianist?
> So machine cannot think because a truck cannot play well piano?
No, a machine cannot think because the only reason that we might be
tempted to think it could can be explained through that example. You
can make the piano more sensitive to bumps, and you can make the bumps
more sophisticated to articulate the piano's mechanism better, but
neither the truck, the piano, nor the bumps can play the piano, they
are all parts of a recording made by humans trying to imitate their
own playing of the piano.
> >>>>>>>> By Gödel's theorem, and the existence of intensional modal
> >>>>>>>> variant,
> >>>>>>>> there is room for quality.
> >>>>>>> Room for quality, or room for anything we care to imagine?
> >>>>>> Room for all machines dreams, and room for all consistent
> >>>>>> machine's
> >>>>>> dream relative realizations.
> >>>>> Is there something it doesn't have room for though?
> >>>> Itself.
> >>> Sense is what makes sense itself make sense of itself. It's the
> >>> universal bootstrap - hence essential, or essence, or oriental (in
> >>> the
> >>> sense of primary orientation).
> >> I could be willing to make sense of this in the comp theory.
> > Are you including the literal meaning of sense as tangible detection
> > as well as the logical sense of coherence? If so, then cool, how does
> > it work?
> The logical sense of coherence is in the "Dt", the tangible detection
> is in "p", and the machine's body and relative belief is in "Bp". The
> Bp & Dt & p is a variant of the self-reference logic. The non first
> person communicable part of the logic of that variant (named X1* in
> AUDA) is the qualia logic, or the sensible matter hypostasis. The
> bootstrap law is given by p ->  <> p, with p defined roughly by Bp
> & Dt & p. Bp is Gödel probability applied on the arithmetical sigma_1
> sentence p. Dp is ~B~p. <> p is ~  ~, and t is "1=1".
The existence of variables like Dt and p already presupposes sense and
detection of visual symbols.
> > It sounds like bones are ontologically less important than brains?
> I don't see why. Brains are also locally stable patterns obtained by a
> relative statistics on
> infinities of (infinite) computations.
So why are brains more associated with human consciousness than bones?
> >> I forget the Paramecium bursaria. Apology.
> >> But can we be sure that the Paramecium can see through them?
> >> It looks more like a paramecium invaded by cyanobacteria, imo.
> > Maybe our cells are invaded by mitochondria? It may still contribute
> > to high level sense.
> >> It is the favorite number of Ramanujan. The guy knew that it makes
> >> sense to say that 1+2+3+4+5+ ... = minus 1/12. 24 plays a peculiar
> >> role in the partition of numbers, also in geometry and gravitation.
> > Interesting.
> In string theory, you can compute the mass of the photon. A long
> computation (from precise general axiom) leads spectacularly to a sum
> of two terms which when evaluated gives (1+2+3+4+ ...) + 1/12.
> Of course this only shows that IF string theory is correct then the
> mass of the photon is zero (because it is obvious that 1+2+3+4+5+ ...
> = minus 1/12, isn't it?).
I don't understand the minus 1/12 part.
> >>>> I don't think we differ. My point is that we can keep the
> >>>> scientific
> >>>> attitude in theology.
> >>>> Usual scientists ignore the mind-body problem. My work has
> >>>> consisted
> >>>> in showing that comp does not solve it per se, but leads to clear
> >>>> and
> >>>> transparent mathematical formulation of it, notably through the
> >>>> subproblem of the justification of the beliefs in physical
> >>>> entities,
> >>>> without postulating them.
> >>> I see it as not a mathematical formulation of the mind-body
> >>> problem as
> >>> much as the expression of the primordial symmetry in a mathematical
> >>> context. The difference being that other expressions of the symmetry
> >>> contain other truths not found within arithmetic sensibility.
> >> Who said this? The pope? The Ayatollah? The government?
> > It's not an authoritative proposition, it's a voluntary interpretation
> > (which, if I'm right, is what half of the universe is anyhow).
> You dream aloud.
Isn't that what you say numbers do also?
> But a part of this might make sense in the comp
> theory. The Löb formula itself is a form of placebo for making true
> some belief.
> >>>> That would be mistake. But the whole point is that the machine can
> >>>> already explain too you that the reason you believe they cannot
> >>>> think
> >>>> is a confusion of the type belief/qualia. It is a confusion between
> >>>> Bp
> >>>> and Bp &p. The machine knows the intensional difference, and can
> >>>> only
> >>>> hope for their possible extensional equivalence (like when saying
> >>>> "yes" to the doctor).
> >>> That reasoning has no lower limit though. Is it confusion to believe
> >>> that a trashcan that says THANK YOU on the lid is not really
> >>> offering
> >>> thanks? Where is the line where it suddenly becomes racist to call a
> >>> puppet a puppet and not a person?
> >> When a puppet acts like a person, or was known to act like that (in
> >> case of comatose state).
> > Acts like a person in whose opinion?
> In our opinion, or in the opinion of the universal numbers in its
We are sharply divided in the US in our opinions about that. Are
universal numbers less conflicted about when life or consciousness
begins and ends? Are they Pro-Life or Pro-Choice?
> >>>>>>> Pain hurts.
> >>>>>> Well, this is tautological.
> >>>>> No, it isn't. Sweet could hurt instead.
> >>>> Define pain, then. I define it by what hurts. If sweet could
> >>>> hurt, it
> >>>> would be painful indeed.
> >>> That's where we disagree. I don't think that qualia is synonymous
> >>> with
> >>> it's function.
> >> I did not say that.
> >>>> Brains have added complexity.
> >>>> Computer add complexity. But locally we feel it makes some task
> >>>> easier. But complexity grows.
> >>> That added complexity isn't to make tasks seem easier for the
> >>> computer
> >>> though.
> >> For the owner of the computer, like for the owner of the brain. The
> >> person will feel thinking as easy as breathing. But it is not.
> > It is not easy in one sense, but in the native 1p sense, it is that
> > easy.
> But here all the problem is in linking the easy 1p and the less easy 3p.
It's not a problem when you realize they are linked in only in their
anomalous symmetry with each other.
> > If you built a universe from scratch and forgot to include this
> > experiential simplicity, you would not have our universe.
> We don't have to include it. Brains are the simplifier tools.
No, brains are just the meaty end of a simplifier tool which is
semantic and experiential.
> >>>>> My solution is to see that they are
> >>>>> both parts of a single irreducible symmetrical ontology.
> >>>> In a too much fuzzy theory, alas (for me).
> >>> I don't see the fuzzy.
> >> Study the work of other people. Address their problem, with or
> >> without
> >> your "theory" as training.
> > That would be worthwhile I'm sure, but unfortunately it would be too
> > much of a distraction.
> OK. That why I am not good in saucer. All those guy running after the
> ball distract me too much. But then I don't pretend marking the goal.
This isn't a game though, it's the truth of reality.
> >>>>> Why qualia help them, or anything do anything? It's reverse
> >>>>> engineering. You are thinking that since qualia helps us, then
> >>>>> logically it must be helpful, but it isn't. Logic doesn't need a
> >>>>> stage
> >>>>> show to help it. Qualia in general does not exist to assist
> >>>>> function.
> >>>>> Of course qualia assists us because we are made of qualia,
> >>>> ?
> >>> Ultimately what we are can be boiled down to experiences.
> >> Inner/outer god confusion.
> > ?
> I think that, like Benjayk, you might be confusing God (which we don't
> know) and the inner God, which we know very well. From the point of
> view of each machine, they are very different. The first one can be
> said to know almost everything, but can do almost nothing. The other
> one, knows almost nothing, but can do almost everything, and is
> responsible for the unavoidable mess in Heaven. (In number's theology).
Through sense I think we can understand them both, or at least
understand why we cannot understand them both.
> >>>> Fast is relative. It is the time you eat your prey, or the time
> >>>> your
> >>>> predator eat you. Relative time are quite enough here.
> >>> The feeling of vigilance doesn't compute though.
> >> But it might supervene on computation.
> > Why would it? If anything, machines supervene on a form of vigilance
> > or READYness (OK, C:>, cursor).
The machine is perpetually vigilant, anticipating commands.
> >>> A computation could
> >>> be any speed but how could it care what that speed is as long as
> >>> it is
> >>> appropriate for the computation context?
> >> As long as you catch the preys, and avoid the predators, things are
> >> cool.
> >>>> It does not. It come from non computable relation between truth and
> >>>> relatively simple self-referential loop.
> >>>> The loop itself is Turing emulable, the link with truth is not.
> >>> Ok. Here we only differ in that I will always say 'a loop of what?'.
> >> A loop of a universal numbers reflecting on itself, at some level.
> >> (They are mathematically definable by the use of Kleene's recursion
> >> theorem). Ideal correct machines have already a rich theory of self-
> >> reference, even before entangling themselves in deep dreams.
> > I don't see anything to support the idea of numbers dreaming.
> You can't dismiss comp in that way.
Why not? What about numbers suggests dreaming?
> > To
> > suppose something that is so radically theoretical and
> > counterintuitive as that, I would need a more interesting reason.
> Study Gödel 1931, or some book on computability and logic.
Incompleteness says the opposite to me that it does to you. I see
Gödel showing the limitation of arithmetic truth in the face of
organic sense, not the omnipotence of it.
> >>> Just because we can conceive of the abstraction of a loop doesn't
> >>> mean
> >>> that such a thing can actually exist independently.
> >> It exists in the same sense that the prime numbers exist. Like the
> >> discourse of the self-referential numbers.
> > Which to me is in a completely figurative sense of existence, having
> > no causal efficacy by itself.
> But it has, in the relevant sense, once you admit there is a
> substitution level.
Substitution level is an indexical of perception.
> >>>> Formulate the problem in the comp theory. You answer it before
> >>>> studying it. There is a still unsolved measure problem, and you
> >>>> talk
> >>>> like if you knew the consequences of comp. You betray again your
> >>>> prejudice in the subject matter.
> >>> I automatically dismiss anything that is along the lines of 'you are
> >>> not qualified to have that curiousity'.
> >> I did not say anything like that.
> >> You have the right of all curiousity. But curiousity is interrgiative
> >> and ask question.
> >> I intervene because you were again talking like if you knew some
> >> truth.
> >> No one can do that in science.
> > My hypothesis is no more presumptuous than any other.
> You are saying that you are superior, in some sense, to other
> entities. You deny a soul to a class of individuals, by invoking fuzzy
> rhetorical trick reifying your own experience.
That is precisely why I am superior to a machine, because I can do
that. A machine can't. It needs a reason to presume it's own
existence. I don't. I can assert my primordial authority because I
feel and know, and understand that I can. I don't need permission from
a program or a script or a rule book. I embody the theory. We don't
view the universe as impartial voyeurs, we are fully immersed within
it. We define it and it defines us.
> >>> Does comp explain the lack of
> >>> new qualia generation or doesn't it? I don't think it can because
> >>> there is no handle on what the show actually is, only the plot of
> >>> the
> >>> content of the show. The entire presentation of qualia is, how do
> >>> you
> >>> say, diagonalized?
> >> Comp can be used to formulate the problems.
> > Yes, the twists that make up the plot. Still it's a script, not a
> > show.
> You confuse the script and the show, for the numbers. The universal
> numbers plays the shows of the numbers.
Why would they play anything? For what audience?
> >>>>> A computer doesn't need me to type on it to compute. Keyboard,
> >>>>> video,
> >>>>> and mouse are for human users, not for the computer.
> >>>> Wait the bandits invent the buying machine. If we let education
> >>>> going
> >>>> as it is going, (since Nixon, say), humans will become subroutine
> >>>> for
> >>>> computations beyond their purposes.
> >>> I don't see the connection.
> >> If we dismiss the machines, the machines will dismissed us.
> >> No worry, we will not dismiss them, but we might dismiss ourselves.
> >> Machines might surpass humans also in the case humans abandon
> >> education and research, and accept to be manipulated.
> > It's not the machines that need help. They are doing just fine. Do you
> > think conscious machines will reward their aboriginal ancestors? That
> > they would be more compassionate than Europeans were to Native
> > Americans or Africans had they only not dismissed them or themselves?
> Well, if we invest a bit more in education in general, there are some
> > Does a computer behave more like a gentle mammal or a relentless
> > insect?
> It depends on its most probable computational history.
> > (notice that I have no fear of insulting the computer I type
> > this on).
> >>>>> Qualia does not merely represent and simplify information, it
> >>>>> presents
> >>>>> and enriches experience also - which is something that comp does
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> do.
> >>>> ?
> >>> Comp only manipulates information and does not decorate experience
> >>> aesthetically.
> >> It does, thanks to the modalities. It is technicolor inside.
> > So you say. Why do we need eyes then? How can anyone be color blind?
> By having some disease in some part of the cortex inside. The
> modalities can be stopped to be handled correctly, or self-
> referentially correctly.
Why wouldn't the machine just route around the disease? If color is
everywhere inside, I don't see why color blindness should be localized
to some part of anything.
> >>>>> Quanta needs no summary or representation - again, that is for the
> >>>>> convenience of human mathematicians and programmers. Programs
> >>>>> themselves operate only in an uncompressed, unencrypted form of
> >>>>> mind-
> >>>>> numbingly repetitive binary units.
> >>>> ?
> >>> Compiling into machine language is necessary to run a program. The
> >>> computer has no need for or tolerance of your human programming
> >>> language.
> >> It is not the computer, nor the brain which does the thinking, but
> >> the
> >> person emulated by layers of intricate universal numbers (with the
> >> brain playing a special relative role in keeping probabilities
> >> reasonable).
> > That sounds to me like the song does the singing and songwriting.
> Yes. That's the magic of the universal numbers. They can do both.
Then the singers and songwriters are innocent bystanders?
> > It
> > can be seen in that sense, but only figuratively.
> >>>> Define those terms.
> >>> Hemisphere meaning, in this context, half of the cosmos.
> >> I don't take cosmos for granted. It is part of the problem, not the
> >> solution.
> > The cosmos is only a problem if you assume theory as primitive instead
> > of cosmos from the beginning.
> I don't assume theory as primitive. Only numbers and +, *.
> The existence of theories and machines is a theorem in N,+, *.
But +, * is already a theory of what can be done with numbers.
> > Which would make sense if we lived in a
> > world of disembodied theories settling into matter but it seems
> > obvious that he opposite is the case.
> Because we are deluded by the fact that we participate to the drama
> from inside.
Why does that prevent us from encountering disembodied theories from
entering our drama?
> >>>> I grant you that. But with comp we don't attribute qualia to
> >>>> physical-
> >>>> machine, only to the immaterial person.
> >>> I agree in part, qualia is not attributable to the physical machine,
> >>> both the qualia and the physical machine are attributed to the story
> >>> that is woven between them.
> >> Good. So all you have to learn is arithmetic,
> > What does arithmetic have to do with storytelling?
> Arithmetic emulate all histories.
Only if you believe in emulation.
> "we" belongs to an infinity of
> histories, which branches in the continuum at each indexical possible
> UD-time step.
> Although each individual universal number can only scratch the surface
> of the Arithmetical Truth, Arithmetical Truth cannot NOT distribute
> that individual universal number in a very complex structure on which
> their most probable experiences are projected (by the 1p-invariance
> for the length of proofs, or length of UD-computations).
> So with comp we have already the infinities protecting both the soul
> of the machines, and matter to be reduced formally or normatively. The
> choice of a level of substitution is eventually intrinsically a
> personal choice.
> The real difficulty is in the question. Does the parents have the
> right to say NO to the doctor, for curing their child, by invoking a
> religious reason. At which age can we ask to the child? (I have no
> answer, but if the child insists for "yes" or "no", I think it is wise
> to take this into consideration).
> Comp is not a truth. It is not an obligation either. But it is a right.
Sure, it's a right. So are the other alternatives.
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