Part II On Jan 21, 4:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > >> Locally it looks like that. But I want an explanation of where such > >> things come from. > >> Your "theory" takes too much as granted. > > > I want an explanation of where non-locally is and how it comes to > > influence us locally. > > Non locality is easy. It comes from the fact that each observer's body > is repeated in an infinity of computational histories, so that its > experiences of experiment outputs is determined on infinities of > relative locations. > > Locality is assumed through comp at the meta-level, and more difficult > to recover at the physical level. Comp might be too much quantum. It > might have a too big first person indeterminacy, a too big non > locality, etc. but this remains to be shown, and the logic of self- > references, including the modal nuances we inherit from > incompleteness, suggests that the locality comes from the semantics of > those logics, as UDA somehow makes obligatory. > That seems like another facet of the comp assumption that material is unnecessary - it makes it hard to think of a reason for material qualities like locality to arise. Reality doesn't fit the comp model, unless you decide a priori that comp is reality and reality is the model that has to fit into it, which I would call pathological if taken literally. > > >>> Heh. Now who is discriminating against inanimate objects? > > >> Because they are inanimate, and the evidence that they are dreaming > >> is > >> weak and non refutable. But mainly because they don't exist by > >> themselves. Matter is a consciousness creation, or view from inside > >> arithmetic. It is an epistemological precise notion. That is what I > >> like in the comp hyp: it explains the origin of the beliefs, by > >> "numbers" in physical things, without the need to assume them. > > > But it doesn't explain beliefs themselves. > > Yes, it does. the beliefs are whatever number arithmetical predicate > B(x) verifying the axioms of beliefs, of the machine that we want > interview. Precisely they belief in the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic > (the theory of everything), they believe in the induction axioms, they > might have supplementary local recursively enumerable set of beliefs, > and their beliefs are close for the modus ponens rule. I can't really make any sense out of anything after "Yes, it does." > That is, if > they believe A -> B, then if they believe A they will, soon or later, > believe B. Thanks to the induction axioms, they can be shown to be > Löbian, and they get the octalist view of the arithmetical reality > (with God, Intellect, Soul, intelligible matter, and sensible matter, > to use the Plotinian vocabulary, all this splitted into true and > provable by the incompleteness phenomenon. The belief is rather well > explained, it seems to me, by the Intellect hypostases (the one I > refer often by Bp, and which is Gödel provability predicate). It is > the study of the introspection of the ideally self-referentially > correct machine. What little I can understand of that, it seems like logic defining itself tautologically. It doesn't tell me what is a belief, just what logic does with them once they exist. It's sort of like describing the internet in terms of IP addresses communicating with each other. > > Those machines are clever. They can already refute Penrose-Lucas use > of Gödel's theorem against mechanism. Mechanism cannot be defeated by any mechanistic theorem. That's the key. Subjectivity is the primordial authoritative orientation. It trumps mechanism by asserting itself in it's own terms, not by logical analysis. It needs no proof because it has everything else except proof already. Mechanism has proof and nothing else. It is hollow inside. It doesn’t even ‘have proof’ so much as it can be used subjectively to prove something to oneself or to another subject (if they accept it). > > > Which [beliefs] are much more likely > > to be a figment of consciousness than an asteroid. > > Yes. > > > What believes an > > asteroid into existence? How do we happen to subscribe to all of these > > beliefs? > > Because we share deep computations, linear at the core bottom. Similar to my view of nested awareness, except that the core bottom is just the most linear/literal level of who we (all of us) are. Computations are the relations amongst embodied agents at that level, not disembodied causally efficacious entities. > I guess something like this from both empiric extrapolations, and > from the universal machine introspection. > > > > >>> I understand completely. You are channeling my exact worldview circa > >>> 1990. > > >> That's comp. > > > The comp that you claim to be agnostic about? > > Yes. that is the one. It is my favorite working hypothesis in the > field of theology, or if you prefer, search of theories of everything. > the unification of all forces, from gravitation to love. > First result: assuming comp, the numbers (and their two laws) are > enough for the ontology, the rest are gluing dreams. What what is required to generate numbers and their laws? To me, two things: Sense and motive, aka Significance. Inherent within sensorimotive significance is it's absence - spatiotemporal entropy. If you look at sense and motive from the perspective of a hypothetical logical* voyeur, you see electromagnetic forces and fields. * logic is our neocortical-cognitive sense of sense-without-sensation. > > > > >> But the notion of UD-recoverable illusion is new, I > >> think. That's the key notion, given that both consciousness and > >> matter > >> are not Turing emulable, but still Turing recoverable though the > >> unavoidable (by incompleteness) number's epistemology. > > > Where did the UD come from? Does it run on itself? What is the > > hardware? > > It depends which UD you are talking about. I have implemented a UD in > 1991 and let it run for one week. The hardware was first an Explorer > computer, then an Apple Macintosh. The software was Allegro Common LISP. > > But remember that I assume the numbers and their two laws. From that > alone I can prove the existence of infinitely many UDs in arithmetic. > Even the UD I ran is the results of infinitely many UDs operating in > arithmetic below our common substitution level. Too bad my Apple > machine couldn't exploit that, but I can wait for a quantum Apple. > So by UD you mean actual computer software. > > > >>> Since then I have explored some other ideas which make more > >>> sense to me, and which I think will eventually make more sense to > >>> others. We are extending a noosphere or a technocortex, yes, but > >>> like > >>> the brain, we do not discard our limbic system and brain stem. We > >>> might like to, but we can't or there will be no 'we' left. > > >> I can agree. But again, that's not an argument for saying that comp > >> is > >> false. As we said before, you need to add non Turing emulable things > >> locally in the brain to get that. Your theory makes matter and mind > >> more hard to make intelligible a priori. > > > If they were intelligible a priori, > > I did not say that. It is the theoretical tools used to explore the > territory which have to be intelligible. The theory must be simpler > than the reality. > If not, you can look at Hubble pictures and just say: 'that's my > theory of everything'. The Hubble pictures are a visual presentation of astronomy. If you could see the every atom, molecule, cell, and body in the same pictures as well as see seeing and feeling and thinking, then you would have a visual presentation or 'theory' of everything. That's more or less the level of coherence I am after. A still picture of everything. To extend that visual presentation into a cognitive presentation requires much more explication. Seeing is believing but a cognitive theory has to sound better than other competing theories. > > > there would be no point in going > > through the formality of experiencing them. > > You are right. the "a priori" was for "your theory makes ...", not for > "intelligible". Sorry for my unclear sentence. We agree here. > > > This is why the universe > > exists. > > Oops, I missed something. > > > To do what theory cannot. > > OK. Nice. I see the point. That's how I justify arithmetical truth. > Since Gödel, I have motivation to describe reality by what is beyond > all effective theories. It is The ONE, better know by his nickname > God, but which typically (in machine's theology) has no name, no > description. It is, roughly speaking Plato's Truth. (and even > Pythagorus' one, rehabilitated by Turing Church thesis, or Post law). I use the name 'singularity' (or primordial singularity, or everythingness) to avoid human, religious, or patriarchal associations. But as far as going beyond theory I think we only need the symmetrical complement of theory. Energized matter is the container/vehicle of theory, and vice versa...sensorimotive significance (theory being an aspect of the cognitive channel of significance) is the driver/audience of the energized material vehicle. > > > > >>>>> It sounds like I can name anything 'knower' and have that be a > >>>>> theorem > >>>>> for subjectivity. > > >>>> On the contrary. the definition I gave is quite specific, yet very > >>>> general. It leads to the ideal theology of the self-referentially > >>>> correct universal machine, including its physics (as it should by > >>>> UDA, > >>>> MGA). > > >>> It still sounds like it means that knowers must be subjects since > >>> subjects are knowers. > > >> A knower is anything satisfying the axioms of knowledge logic (Kp -> > >> p, K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq), and, for rich subject, also Kp -> KKp: they > >> know p implies that they know that they know p). > >> With Kp = Bp & p, all enough rich machine are knower. > > > Knowing is contingent upon biochemistry. > > I disagree. Biochemistry is just a local implementation. > Token knower are contingent on number relations, but knowing itself is > the fate of all universal numbers, by logical necessity. I see where you are coming from, but I think that kind of knowing is an aspect of trivial intelligence. It's just pattern matching, like a square peg 'knows' it can't fit in a round hole. I think it overestimates the peg radically to project 'knowing' on it, when the more likely scenario is a detection-reaction level sense on the inter- molecular (solid object) level. > > > > > "When I'm rushing on my run. And I feel just like Jesus' son. And I > > guess that I just don't know. And I guess that I just don't know." - > > Heroin, Velvet Underground > > :) > > > > >>> Not racism, taxonomy. Kingdom, phylum, class, order... you have > >>> heard > >>> of this, yes? > > >> I was troubled (say) by the expression "not likely very high quality > >> subjects"). Like the Sapinsh considering Indians humans, but lesser > >> humans. > > > I understand, but I'm not using it in pejorative sense, I'm making a > > material distinction. In the comp theology it seems though that > > machine selfhood is not so much elevated to human levels, but that all > > subjectivity is flattened to machine levels. > > It is not flattened. You make an error often attributed to Descartes, > but I think Descartes did not make it. La Mettrie and the Marquis de > Sade did it. You confuse both a machine and a human with its body, and > its body with its apparent constitution. At least you (try to) recover > the person, by adding "sense" (how, I still don't see). I recover the person and it's body as symmetrical anomalies which together form two poles (like collector and emitter to a transistor) of a unified sense. Sense is the base which modulates the relation between defining and defying that symmetry. When sense defines that symmetry, it's eyes open, straight ahead realism where theory is insignificant, and when it defies the symmetry, it's visionary realism where theoretical (figurative) generalizations are significant and literal tangibility is backgrounded. The person embodiment is direct sensorimotive experience through time, and the body impersonation is indirectly experienced as matter across space. > But neither > physicalism, nor mechanism makes the flattening, once you take into > account the informational layering of levels. That is why physicalism > + mechanism leads to an incorrect nihilist reduction: like "I am just > some impermanent piece of mud" (La Mettrie), or (truth = Power, Sade). > But Physicalism can admit non reductive interpretation, and then > mechanism is directly contradictory with physicalism. > Comp entails a flattening of the ontological, but justifies the > complex inside divine epistemological matrix. If you allow informational layering of levels, then I would just put mechanism at one extreme (the Western extreme, actually) of the stack of layers. With subjectivity at the opposite extreme, you have a torus manifold. If you conflate subjectivity with mechanism though, then that flattens the torus. > > > It makes us all what the > > Spanish considered the Indians to be - even less...had the Spanish had > > Kp = Bp & p, they would not have bothered torturing them to save their > > souls, they would have just reformatted the continent completely with > > their guns, germs, and steel program. > > Mechanism, well understood, can only make you more humble and cautious > toward any living one, even jumping spiders, and even, in some > different sense, toward pebbles and inanimate object. And then toward > the unknown. Only if you project subjectivity outward. If you follow Dennett's flavor of computationalism, which is by far the most popular version, you project objectivity inward and see that we are all only pebbles or jumping spiders - unworthy of consideration beyond functional instrumentalism. > > > > >>>>> I just don't think the parts know each other unless they > >>>>> naturally grew as parts of a whole. > > >>>> Man made machines already do that, they grow as a part of the same > >>>> whole we share with them. > >>>> Babies also look dumb, weak and so dependent. > > >>> What is an example of a man made machine whose parts naturally > >>> grow as > >>> part of the same whole? > > >> Buildings, cars, industries, cities, computers, ... well, basically > >> all of them. > > > None of those things grow out of a whole. They are all assembled from > > disparate parts manufactured in different places all over the world. > > Cars and computers are not born, they are put together. > > Same for us, at some level. That's what ribosomes and enzymes do all > the time. > The modality is different because the history is different. Cars are > 100 years old, plants and animals are *much* older, and have a more > complex and deep history, involving selfs more early. But cars don't come from a single car seed or car zygote. Our ribosomes and enzymes are created at the behest of our cells and molecules. Sure, they get more molecules from food and water and air but they are integrated in the whole through anabolic growth, not mechanical assembly. > > Here I use the term "self" in the computer science sense of "if Dx > gives F(xx), then DD gives F(DD)". > Self-reproduction happens when a duplicator meets itself, and self- > reference can be made by the same diagonalization procedure at a > symbolical level. > > Sense comes from an attempt made by one self to build a model of > itself, relatively to the information at his disposal. I see it differently. Duplication does not arise from an attempt to duplicate but arises semantically from sense. It's a virtuous cycle of 'likeness'. Something likes doing something, so it does it again. The cycle of liking and repeating is rhythm or frequency which also makes sense to similar somethings who also begin to adopt the same cycle. There is no model or construction, only recruitment and imitation. Models and constructs come much much later as intelligence. I'm not sure that any organism builds models other than humans, do they? Imitation seems apparent in all animal life though. Below that I think that it's trivial imitation - beneath the threshold of awareness and volition, it's just sense synchronized motive. > > > > >>>> Anyway, my point is that mechanism is a testable hypothesis. If > >>>> mechanism is false, we will find this out more easily by reasoning > >>>> from its assumption, than by criticizing it superficially at the > >>>> start > >>>> through racist prejudices. > > >>> If you say so. Who are we waiting on to complete the test? > > >> Test have been already done, and QM confirms comp up to now. > > > QM is the black and white television that 'confirms' color is a > > hallucination. Comp is literally a non-sense view of a non-local non- > > universe which is based on the fantasy that recursive enumeration can > > embody itself in objectively real patterns. > > OK. Here we differ. I love comp, and you don't like it. I used to love comp, but now I love post-comp Sense more. I broke up with comp and gave her back all of the metaphysics and wishful abstraction that I don't need anymore. > > > As the Bohr quote goes, > > the opposite of a great truth is also true, so comp will prove to be > > quite useful, and is true in an inside out way. It may be the only way > > to predict and control ourselves and the universe, but if we don't > > understand that the image it presents of reality is an inverted truth, > > we will never comprehend what the universe actually is. > > That's very close to my point. Comp is normative theory killer. It is > a vaccine against conceptual reductionism. > It will lead more to the notion of machine's right, than to the idea > that its explains something psychological. It does lead more to the notion of machine's right but at the expense of people's rights. Corporations are the embodiment of comp. They are literally computational entities programmed to privatize profits and socialize costs. Their success is the ultimately the failure of civilization. > > Yet, comp explains where the hallucinations come from (elementary > arithmetic), and why they lead to very long (from inside) persistent > and shared dreams among many. But it makes the unknown even more > unknown. It leads to a bigger ignorance. It points on something bigger > than the Aristotelians seem to forget or to try to evacuate. All this > in case comp is not refuted. Why does elementary arithmetic hallucinate? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.