Part I...I'll have to get back to this later for Part II

On Jan 21, 4:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> Craig,
> I assume comp all along.

Then why say that you are agnostic about comp?

> >>> Why do numbers make machines or tapes? Do the want to? Do they
> >>> have a
> >>> choice?
> >> As much choice and free will than you have. They too cannot predicts
> >> themselves and can be confronted to making decision with partial
> >> information.
> > Where do they get this capacity?
>  From the laws of addition and multiplication, which makes arithmetic
> already Turing Universal.

Where in addition and multiplication do we find free will?

> > Why do we never see it manifested in
> > our ordinary use of numbers?
> With the computer and AI enterprise, you can see the embryonic
> development of this.

It's only embryonic if it develops into a fetus. At this point it
appears to be developing into a purely human distribution system for
gossip and porn instead.

> You can also interpret, like Jon Clark did, the DNA as number, coded
> in the chemistry of carbon, so that we can see it all around.
> We don't see it in the usual use of little numbers, because it is not
> there. The relations are either too poor, or not exploited enough.

Don't all relations have to arise ultimately from the usual use of
little numbers?

> Anyway, you are not convincing by pointing on everyday example, when
> talking to a theoretician.

If the theory doesn't apply to reality, then I have no problem with
it. Fantasy sports are not my area of interest. It's only if it
conflicts with my ideas of realism that I would be curious.

> > Generally the point of counting is to
> > establish a deterministic quantitative relation.. that's sort of what
> > counting is? If the numbers themselves made choices, then why should
> > we consider counting a reliable epistemology?
> Counting use only the succession laws. The universal mess comes from
> the mixture of addition and multiplication, as the prime numbers
> already illustrates by their logarithmic "random" distribution.
> Your question is a bit like "if criminals are made of chemical
> reactions, should we continue to rely on chemistry?".

Are you saying then choice making is an emergent property of certain
mixed arithmetic modes only and not inherent in numbers then?

> >> Each universal machine is a particular machine. Even the virgin, non
> >> programmed one.
> >> You are a universal machine, at least. (Even if you have a non
> >> machine
> >> component).
> > Me the person, or me the biography?
> The person is not really a number. But in all its histories/
> computations it acts as a relative numbers, through its body described
> above his substitution level.
> > Is my life a machine within which
> > I exist as another machine or are we both the same machine?
> Your life is a sequence of machines states, and typically, it is self-
> changing machine. To be more precise would need boring and distracting
> vocabulary issue, the understanding of UDA, etc.
> Your life is not a machine. I have translated "to be a machine" by the
> more operational "to accept a digital brain transplant" to study the
> consequences without defining completely what person and life are
> (which can hardly be done).
> Keep in mind that I do not defend mechanism. I just explain that IF
> mechanism is true, then Plato/Plotinus are correct, and Aristotle
> primitive matter, and physicalism are not correct.

My position is that P/P Mechanism and A/pm/p are correct in some
sense, incorrect in some sense, both correct and incorrect in another
sense, and neither correct nor incorrect in another sense. The
invariant universal truth is sense.

> >>>> I know that you believe in non-comp.
> >>> Is that supposed to invalidate the observations? Programs do get
> >>> tired? They do catch colds?
> >> With comp, that is obvious.
> > At what point do programs develop the capacity to get tired? Is it a
> > matter of complexity or degree of self-reference?
> Yes, like some robot can feel themselves wet, in the sense of finding
> a shelter if it rains.

> With some amount of self-reference they can
> develop qualia, and rememorable qualia, which can help to speed the
> recollection.

I think this is critically flawed. Nothing I know of suggests that
qualia from quantity can develop at all. If that were the case a
person should be able to learn to see visual qualia with other sense
organs. High resolution greyscale images should turn into color. I
have not seen anything that suggests to me that qualia would or could
speed recollection either. To the contrary, it would be an additional
abstraction layer with significant resource overhead. If what you say
were true, computers would not need graphics accelerator cards, rather
they would need accelerator cards if graphics were not available to
speed up computation. I really can't see any credible argument against
this. Qualia serves users, not machines. It is insurmountably
nonsensical and metaphysical. It is to say, it's faster to count to
1000 if the numbers taste like different fruits.

> In that case they can discover that they cannot prove
> that they have *genuine* qualia. This happens with not so much self-
> referential abilities.

All qualia is genuine. How could it be otherwise?

> >>> I know that you believe in comp.
> >> Then you are wrong. I am agnostic on this. As I should be: no correct
> >> machine believes in comp (nor in non-comp). We just cannot know. That
> >> is why I insist that we need some act of faith to say "yes" to the
> >> doctor. That is why I insist that it is a theology, and that we are
> >> forced to accept that people thinks differently.
> > The way I've found to get beyond that is through sense. Sense bridges
> > the gap and connects the dots. It says to us, you cannot know, but
> > yet, it seems like you do, and that has to be good enough. Does it
> > seem like the universe is mechanistic and arithmetic?
> By UDA, reality is not WYSIWYG. What we see is a reflect of something
> bigger, like arithmetical truth. This contains the many non
> arithmetical properties leading to person, consciousness, matter, etc.

How do numbers 'see'?

> > On the outside,
> > yes. Everything outside of myself seems like it could be quantified as
> > a single story with countless discrete parts. Inside myself seems like
> > there are many stories and meanings, all shifting and catching the
> > light in different ways at different times - a constant flux of
> > significance which re-contextualizes many stories and meanings
> > simultaneously.
> Well said.
Thanks :)

> >>> I propose another possibility. Imagine a universe where things can
> >>> become what they actually are without running a program. Running a
> >>> program supervenes not only on sequential recursion but on a whole
> >>> universe of logical consequence, ideas of representation, memory,
> >>> continuous temporal execution, etc. What if those things are aspects
> >>> of particular experience and not universal primitives?
> >> I don't know what is a universe. That's part of what I want an
> >> explanation for, that is in term of simple things that I can
> >> understand, like elementary arithmetic or combinatorics.
> > What is it you mean when you talk of universal machines then? What are
> > they universal to?
> A universal machine is just a machine which can simulate any other
> machine through their finite description and their inputs. It a
> mathematical concept, but nature can emulate (simulate exactly) those
> machines. This happened recurrently on this planet, with the
> development of the genome, brain cells, thought, mind, language, and
> now computer.

Ok, so for your theory, the universe is the set of all machines, their
inputs, and outputs. What I'm saying is that inputs and outputs don't
need a machine to define them as such. Instead you have one primordial
mass-energy singularity which multiplies/divides itself spatially and
temporally. Each division entails inherent input-outputs to the other
parts and the whole. It's subtractive and implicit, like a spectrum. A
prism does not have to illustrate each hue of the spectrum
mechanically and digitally, it just exposes the optical sense that is
already inherent in white light.

> > But you are sidetracking my point:
> > **Things may not need to run a program to be what they already are.**
> I agree. We don't need to implement arithmetic for it being true, for
> example.

Right. Or for truth to be truth.
> > *It is programs which need things to become what they are not.*
> But they usually belong to complex histories/computations which
> provide them with many things. Indeed, a priori, too much things (the
> white rabbit problems).

Whatever histories they are part of needs to be fully explicated and
projected onto whatever is executing them. The microprocessor never
'learns' the operating system, each structure must be recursively and
discretely enacted. Nothing is elided unless it is synthetically
condensed with a compression algorithm or something. The hardware
doesn't learn or grow in a machine. In a brain/mind it does.

> > This bit of common (universal) sense is what your view seems to be
> > missing or hiding or denying. The result is a perfectly logical theory
> > of an anti-cosmos in which intangible programs simulate thingness to
> > achieve irrelevant tangibility as a meaningless side effect. If you
> > can just turn it inside out, you will see that we participate in a
> > real universe directly,
> The old Chinese-Indian-Greek dream argument makes me already doubting
> we can see a real universe directly. We see what our brains succeed to
> filter and represent.

Think of it not as filtered or represented but condensed and
presented. We are directly presented with a real human world, which is
condensed from the real worlds our dozens of organs, trillions of
cells, (x)tillions of molecules which are literally within us, as well
as it is influenced by our fractional participation in the worlds
which exist without us - our social group, civilization, species,
biosphere, planet, solar system, galaxy, cosmos.

> > and that ideas cannot embody things on their
> > own.
> That's true, but ideas can embody the idea that things can own bodies.

Not actual bodies, only ideal bodies. My mind doesn't have the first
clue how to embody by own body. If I want to stand up, I can only say
that I do stand up, not that I provide or process any information that
results in a result of 'the body' standing. My perception is not that
I am commanding my body to execute a standing program, but that I am
directly standing myself - it costs me effort personally so that I
don't want to keep standing all day.

> > Codes and mechanisms are what real objects do to each other, but
> > objects are not codes themselves. They are a chunks of the singularity
> > with masses and densities.
> I don't know that.

That's what they seem like though. Programs tend to encounter errors
and crash, or encounter latency, pixelation, etc. Matter doesn't ever
falter in it's own presentation though. An iron anvil never drops it's
gravity pointer and flies through the ceiling spontaneously or changes
back and forth from iron to cobalt because the anvil class of programs
has a bad line of code.

> >>> What if the
> >>> entire cosmos is a monad; a boundless and implicit firmament through
> >>> which objects and experiences are diffracted? The primordial dynamic
> >>> is not mechanism but stillness and stasis, like a spectrum to a
> >>> prism.
> >> All that is Turing emulable, and doesn't add to the understanding.
> > A boundless and implicit firmament is Turing emulable?
> Actually-infinite complex cellular automata might not been Turing
> emulable, but they are still Turing recoverable in case such infinite
> firmament is necessary for consciousness. So let us reason from comp
> and see if an actual infinite firmament is necessary.
> If you postulate it exists in some primitive way, you just postulate
> an infinitely complex assumption.

If we start counting from 0, your way makes sense. I start counting
from 1, with 0 being the absence of any number so it has to be an
afterthought. If we start with 0 as the first number, then the second
number is no more likely to be 1 than it is to be any number.
Beginning with unity and singularity is infinite in the sense that
without anything else to relate to it can only be boundless, but it is
not infinitely complex, it is infinitely simple. Complexity arises
through the fragmentation-division and multiplication-recapitulation
of the 1. I postulate white light which presents each division
(diffraction really, as it is not truly divided but revealed like a
sliced onion) as a range of color. The color is the diffraction and
the diffraction is the color. You could say that all numbers exist
inside of 1 and that 0 does not exist but insists as a potential (ie
Cantor Set evanescence).

> >>> Anchored in that stable unity, matter is the more direct
> >>> representation of this singularity (ie the many alchemical
> >>> references
> >>> to 'stone').
> >> But what is matter?
> > The discrete diffractions of the monad.
> Hmm... Why not. But this should be made clear in some context, with
> precise definition of discrete (you will need Church thesis, or
> topology), monad, and what do you mean by monad diffraction.

Cool. I'm putting together a new website, trying to improve it and
prep for the TSC conference in April. Give it a look if you like, and
see if it's any clearer than the old site:

Monad diffraction is the interior experience of the big bang. Instead
of a fragmentation across space (really an induction of space into the
1), it is the induction of frequency and amplitude (time, energy) into
the now. 'Now' is what 1 feels like.

> The expression might have a sense in the comp theory. In my early
> writings I do describe self-observation, under the substitution level,
> as a processes of self-diffraction, putting you into infinities of
> computational continuations.  Matter is, well not generated, but
> recover, through that process. But this is just a way to describe the
> first person indeterminacy, and terms like diffraction have physical
> (optical) precise meaning, so I keep that for the pause café.

Right, this is more of a figurative diffraction, especially since
there is 'nothing' doing the diffracting (literally, it is 0 which
gaps the ÷ of the 1?).

> > Carved out of the singularity
> > using the knife of interior figurative diffraction (feeling/being,
> > sequence, significance, time) which is expressed as literal
> > diffraction on the exterior (indirect detection, objects, space,
> > relativity, topology)
> Too much sense here. Sorry. You have to find a way to make your
> statement more precise if you want to convince a scientist.

I'm trying to get at the primordial interior-exterior divisions, and
how the interior is diffracted one way, using an alphabet of feeling
and being through time and the exterior is diffracted the opposite
way, using indirect representations of objects across space.

> >>> The subjective correlate would be silent and dark void as
> >>> well as solar fusion and stellar profusion. This is realism.
> >> This is imagination.
> > Imagination is part of realism.
> At a different level. If you forget this you blur fiction and the
> reality we are searching. (Not the reality we would have found).

There is a level at which fiction and reality are blurred, and a level
at which they are rigorously demarcated. Both levels are real as well
as the continuum of levels between them. I am calling the former the
profound edge and the latter the pedestrian fold (of the multisense

> > It is our experience, but it is
> > impossible to emulate mechanically.
> This looks like non-comp, but it can be derived from comp. Experience,
> consciousness are NOT Turing emulable. Only local bodies, through
> which experience can be manifested relatively to experience and bodies
> of other (universal or not) machines.
> The picture we get is counter-intuitive. It is the price of comp, but
> it is natural for Platonists, and comp leads to Platonism, even to
> some Neoplatonism à-la Plotinus.

It's valuable to look at it that way too. My view is counter-intuitive
as well, but mainly because our intuition has been numbed by our
culture of occidental instrumentalism. We see with our own eyes what
happens when we turn on a light, but we disqualify it from
consideration because of optics, physics, biology, evolution, blah
blah blah. We become disenchanted with our own perception in favor of
knowledge about the mechanism associated with it's delivery. All we
have to do is realize that seeing is not just a complex process of
billions of discrete particles and 'signals', but it is also a very
simple and biologically common non-process. Many organisms have eyes,
others have antennas, others have cilia. From quorum sensing we can
infer that the molecules which make up living bacteria are able to
sense molecules of chemicals being produced by other bacteria. How do
we know this is not a form of seeing or tasting?

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to