On 1/28/2012 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Jan 2012, at 21:02, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/27/2012 9:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Pierz, Craig, I disagree. Consciousness can be explained as a non 3p describable fixed
point when machine's observe themselves.
Why is this not 3p describable? Your explanation of it seems to imply a
Yes, but the explanation is not consciousness itself.
In the UDA, you are supposed to know what consciousness is. You are asked to believe
that your consciousness remains invariant for a functional digital substitution.
In the AUDA, consciousness is not mentioned. It is handled indirectly via knowledge,
which is defined via an appeal to truth, which (by Tarski theorem) is not definable by
the mechanical entity under consideration.
In B'"1+1=2" & 1+1=2, the "1+1 = 2" is a description, but 1+1=2 is not. It is true fact,
and as such cannot be described. We cannot translate True("1+1=2") in arithmetic. We can
do it at some meta-level, when we study a simpler machine than us, that we believe to be
correct, like PA. But then we can see that neither PA, nor any correct machine can do
this for *itself*.
Consciousness, knowledge, truth, are concept which does not admit formal definition;
when they encompass ourselves.
I wasn't asking for a formal definition, just a 3p description. You are saying that
B"1+1=2" is a description of being conscious that 1+1=2? This confuses me though because
I read B as "provable"; yet many things are provable of which we are not conscious.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at