On Jan 31, 1:25 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 30 Jan 2012, at 21:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Jan 30, 5:09 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 29 Jan 2012, at 03:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> How do you know that they 'occur' in the computations rather than in
> >>> the eye of the beholder of the computations?
> >> The beholder of the computations is supported by the computations.
> >> Those exist independently of me, in the same way numbers are prime or
> >> not independently of me.
> > How would you know that they exist at all?
> Because their existence is a theorem in the theory which is assumed.

Right. So my logic is that the theory that there is a capacity to have
and assume theories (sense accumulated/entangled to cognitive level of
elaboration) is a stronger, more primitive theory than any other

> > Many people feel the same
> > way about God.
> We never know if something exists, except our consciousness here and
> now, but that's all. That is why we assume theories, which assumes the
> existence of the primary objects from which we start to derive
> theorems, including different sort of existence.

Which is why I think that the primary object should be our
consciousness here and now as well as the idea of the opposite of that
(unconsciousness, there and then)

> >>> Universe means 'all that is' in every context.
> >> But "all that is" is what we are searching, testing, studying.  The
> >> word "is" is very useful in everyday life, but very ambiguous per.
> >> "is" or "exist" depends on the theory chosen. Something can exist
> >> ontologically, or epistemologically.
> > As long as it is something to something, then it 'is'. There is
> > nothing that it is not, as long as sense is respected. Unicorns are
> > not part of the universe as far as we know, but the idea of unicorns
> > is certainly part of the human universe and therefore the universe.
> That is what we have to clarify. You beg the question entirely. I have
> still no clue what your theory presuppose. You discourse technic is
> similar to the pseudo-priests and evangelists. I'm sorry.

I understand. Some of the ways you express your ideas are impossible
for me to parse too. Some people do say that they like my ideas
though. I get a few emails of thanks and encouragement and none that
are critical (surprisingly).

> >>> But it isn't the case, it's the idea of it being the case.
> >> It is the case that 17 is prime, independently of of it is the case
> >> that such or such human has the idea that it is the case that 17 is
> >> prime. You are confusing levels.
> > 17 is only prime in a symbolic system that defines primeness,
> > enumeration, and division of whole integers that way.
> You confuse arithmetical truth, and theories of arithmetic. The
> primeness of 17 is not a symbolic truth.

So you would say that primeness is present in all possible universes?
What about a universe that consisted only of flavor events. What would
be a prime flavor?

> > Internal
> > consistency of the rules a game, even a universal game, does not make
> > the game independent of players.
> This concerns *all* theories.

Not sure what you mean? Primeness? Rules?

> > The rules arise from the players
> > interactions with each other,
> Not for definable games. In game theory we can show the existence of
> game without us knowing any of the game rule.

If you define the game without the players understanding it, it is
your game that you are playing using game pieces as manipulated
objects, not subject-players.

> > and that interaction is the game.
> In which theory?

I guess mine?

> > Comp
> > says that there are disembodied rules that assemble themselves
> > mechanically as games which then dreams it is separate players.
> More or less.
> >>> You're just
> >>> saying 'Let p ='. It doesn't mean proposition that has any causal
> >>> efficacy.
> >> The fact that 17 is prime has causal efficacy. It entails many facts.
> > It entails only arithmetic facts, but there is nothing to say that
> > arithmetic by itself causes anything outside of arithmetic.
> But a lot inside, and *from* inside.

I don't think there is an inside of arithmetic, I think it's a
subjective channel which delineates the edge of sensorimotive
interiority and electromagnetic exteriority. There is an inside of
experience and iconic representation is part of that; ideal forms,
precision and accuracy, logic, etc. They are part of the canon of
common sense, no more primary than linguistic, artistic, or pragmatic
concepts. All I'm trying to say is that my view is a framework with
which to arrange all possible views of consciousness and cosmos, and
through that arrangement, underlying principles of symmetry emerge
which reveal a much broader and deeper sense of the universe - one
that redefines some aspects of physics.

> > Even
> > within arithmetic, it is the execution of a program or function by a
> > mind or body, that is through energy exerted within matter, which
> > produces causes.
> What is matter? What is energy? How does it come from?

Matter is the exterior view of pieces of the singularity - so it is
volumes of mechanical entropic densities - quantitative topological
expressions of sense.

Energy is the interior view *through* the pieces of the singularity -
so it is sequences of animated signifying intensities - qualitative
motive expressions of sense (see the symmetry of each word of the
matter and energy description? volumes::sequences, mechanical
(manipulated from without)::animated (from within),
entropic::signifying, densities::intensities, etc?)

It doesn't come from, it is the source of 'comes from'. They are the
consequences of the folding of the singularity into primordial monad
vs Big Bang.

> What is the
> relation with mind?

A human mind is the sensorimotive side of the energy that we are, the
electromagnetic side is brain activity. The electromagnetic side of
the matter that we are is the body and it's physical environment, The
sensorimotive side of the matter that we are is our biography.

> You said that you agree that matter is not primary. So what is your
> theory?

Sense is primary. Matter is a topological, density based expression of

> >>>>> I have no reason to believe that a machine can observe
> >>>>> itself in anything more than a trivial sense.
> >>>> It needs a diagonalization. It can't be completely trivial.
> >>> Something is aware of something, but it's just electronic components
> >>> or bricks on springs or whatever being aware of the low level
> >>> physical
> >>> interactions.
> >> A machine/program/number can be aware of itself (1-person) without
> >> knowing anything about its 3p lower level.
> > We don't really know that machine/program/number can be aware of
> > anything.
> We just know nothing. That is why we use theories, which are
> collections of assumption/hypothesis.

True, but it only seems that machines can be thought of as having
awareness only when we build them explicitly to do that.

> > It may only be material interpreters which are aware of
> > anything and the degree to which they are aware of 1p and 3p may be
> > inversely proportional to their complexity. Being fantastically
> > complex, we are aware of only some of our 1p and 3p self. Simpler
> > organisms or particles may in fact have awareness of 100% of their 1p
> > and 3p selves.
> The idea that simple organism might be "more conscious" than complex
> organism might make sense in the comp theory. What does not make sense
> is the need for matter.

Matter is needed in this universe though. It's how the universe keeps
a lid on eternity and infinity. It makes a distinction between private
games that are free to expand in fiction and public games that are
chiseled in granite and stained with blood. It give reality the
authenticity and structure necessary for games to ... matter.
Substance. It's the diametric opposite to your view - 99% techne and
1% logos instead of comp 99% logos and 1% techne. Logos can explain
techne as an idea, techne can make logos irrelevant in practice.
Opposite views, opposite strategies of control.

> >>>>> It is not a conscious
> >>>>> experience, I would guess that it is something like an
> >>>>> accounting of
> >>>>> unaccounted-for function terminations. Proximal boundaries. A
> >>>>> silhouette of the self offering no interiority but an
> >>>>> extrapolation of
> >>>>> incomplete 3p data. That isn't consciousness.
> >>>> Consciousness is not just self-reference. It is true self-
> >>>> reference.
> >>>> It belongs to the intersection of truth and self-reference.
> >>> It's more than that too though. Many senses can be derived from
> >>> consciousness, true self-reference is neither necessary nor
> >>> sufficient. I think that the big deal about consciousness is not
> >>> that
> >>> it has true self-reference but that it is able to care about itself
> >>> its world that a non-trivial, open ended, and creative way. We can
> >>> watch a movie or have a dream and lose self-awareness without being
> >>> unconscious. Deep consciousness is often characterized by
> >>> unselfconscious awareness.
> >> This is not excluded by the definition I gave.
> > How does caring and creating follow from true self-reference? A camera
> > that recognizes itself in a mirror would not automatically care about
> > something or become conscious.
> A camera cannot recognize itself in a mirror.
> If it can, it means it has some brain, in which case it might care and
> be conscious.

It might, but it doesn't have to. It would be simple to take a picture
of a camera in the mirror and load that into memory so that every time
a similar image was recognized as itself in the mirror, a light would
go on. That doesn't mean anything to the camera about itself. It
cannot possibly know or care what that image means.

> >> I am not sure. I don't see the relevance of that mechanist point.
> > I'm saying the complexity of the immune system suggests that complex
> > function does necessarily give rise to consciousness.
> Yes. But that is trivial. Nobody claimed that consciousness is just
> complexity.

No? Isn't complexity the only thing that makes Deep Blue different
from a pocket calculator (remember those? pre-LCD even). Isn't
complexity the only thing separating Deep Blue from AGI machines that
will be fully conscious? If not, what besides complexity is required?

> >>>>> Consciousness does nothing to speed decisions, it would only cost
> >>>>> processing overhead
> >>>> That's why high animals have larger cortex.
> >>> Their decisions are no faster than simpler animals.
> >> Complex decision are made possible, and are done more faster.
> > That only requires more processing power, not consciousness.
> Processing power progress are bounded by contingent slow origin.
> That's the reason mind exist, it accelerate the processing much more
> quickly. In fact, just by software change, the slower machine can
> always beat the faster machines, on almost inputs, except a finite
> number of them.

There's no reason to think that the same acceleration wouldn't occur
unconsciously though. You don't need mind, you just need logic.

> >>>>> and add nothing to the efficiency of unconscious
> >>>>> adaptation.
> >>>> So, why do you think we are conscious?
> >>> I think that humans have developed a greater sensorimotive capacity
> >> I still don't know what you mean by that. You can replace
> >> "sensorimotive" by "acquainted to the son of God" in all your
> >> argument
> >> without them having a different meaning or persuasive force.
> > Sensorimotive is the interior view of electromagnetism.
> You already told me this, and I asked you what you mean by "interior",
> "view", and "electromagnetism".

Interior view is literally that. If I am inside a sphere, the inside
is a sensorimotive show that I am watching, and the outside is a
charged sphere that interacts with other changed particles. I happen
to be inside a trillion celled human body and brain, so it interacts
with other charged bodies and brains on all kinds of different levels
and scales. Chemicals, organisms, objects, people, planets, etc.

> > Electromagnetism is orderly dynamic changes in material objects across
> > space relative to each other, sensorimotivation is the perception of
> > change through time in subjective experience relative to one's self.
> > Like electromagnetism is electricity and magnetism, sensorimotivation
> > is sensation and motive. They correspond to receiving of sense
> > experience (sensation) and embodying and projecting an intention
> > (motive).
> Theory? Definitions?

Why does it need to be defined or theorized any further than that? I'm
just making a map of the cosmos in the simplest terms possible. I'm
suggesting the possibility of a subjective and objective version of
addition and multiplication which are perpendicular to logos and

> >>> as
> >>> a virtuous cycle of evolutionary circumstance and subjective
> >>> investment. Just as hardware development drives software development
> >>> and vice versa. It's not that we are conscious as opposed to
> >>> unconscious, it's that our awareness is hypertrophied from
> >>> particular
> >>> animal motives being supported by the environment and we have
> >>> transformed our environment to enable our motives. Our seemingly
> >>> unique category of consciousness can either be anthropic prejudice
> >>> or
> >>> objective fact, but either way it exists in a context of many other
> >>> kinds of awareness. The question is not why we are conscious, it is
> >>> why is consciousness possible and/or why are we human.
> >> Why we are human is easily explained, or not-explainable, as an
> >> indexical geographical fact, by comp. It is like "why am I the one in
> >> W and not in M?". Comp explains why consciousness is necessary. It is
> >> the way we feel when integrating quickly huge amount of information
> >> in
> >> a personal scenario.
> > 'the way we feel' doesn't relate to information though. Where is the
> > feeling located?
> Feelings are not the type of thing for which location applied.

I agree as far as the experience of feeling, but there is always a
scope to which feelings apply. If a number had a feeling then every
instance of that number would have to have every feeling corresponding
to every instance at the same time. You and I feel things and walk
around and our body is addressable in spatial coordinates, but a
simulation has arbitrary spatial coordinates. The simulated batter has
the same feeling as the simulated baseball because they are drawn by
the same program.. where does one begin and the other leave off? Does
the program feel like the bat or the ball? It doesn't work to feel
like both. It's like trying to tickle yourself.

> > In the information, in the informed, or somewhere
> > else?
> You might say: in the mind of the person. But even this is a way to
> speak.

This is a more serious problem than I think you want to look at. It
flies in the face of our most basic and universal experience as a
person in a world of finite objects and other people.

> >>>>> Anything that is conscious can also be unconscious. Can
> >>>>> Peano Arithmetic be unconscious too?
> >>>> Yes. That's possible if you accept that consciousness is a logical
> >>>> descendent of consistency.
> >>> Aren't the moons of Saturn consistent?
> >> The material moons are not programs, nor theories. "consistent"
> >> cannot
> >> apply to it without stretching the words a lot.
> > Why aren't they programs?
> By UDA, which explains why observable matter cannot be program, but
> the a priori non computable result of infinities of programs.

Why isn't the UDA itself made of matter?

> > They undergo tremendous logical change over
> > time. Why discriminate against moons?
> If not being a program is discrimination, then you are the one
> discriminating a lot of possibly conscious entities.

I don't have a problem with discrimination. I think it's useful for my

> > I don't see any stretch at all
> > in calling them consistent. You could set a clock by their orbits.
> A clock is till not something on which the consistency predicate
> applies. Consistency applies only to collection of beliefs.

That seems arbitrary to me. Beliefs predicate on consistency as much
as the other way around.

> >>> Will consciousness logically
> >>> descend from their consistency?
> >> If ever the moon have to become conscious. Yes. No if this has not to
> >> happen. There is few chance moons becomes conscious, for they are not
> >> self-moving and have very few degrees of freedom.
> > Computers are 'solid state' though?
> With internal write/read and delete subroutines.

Maybe the moon has those too?

> > Moons have all kinds of geological
> > changes going on over thousands of years.
> That's a poor evidence of thinking.

Why? If you slowed yourself down to that frequency, your brain would
show poor evidence of thinking too. Speed up the Earth a few thousand
times and it would look pretty interesting, The biosphere and
atmosphere are quite computationally rich. The thermodynamics of the
crust, mantle, and core would be very fluid and dynamic, pumping with
thermal respiration and cellular convection patterns. The solar system
as a whole would be magnificent at it's natively scaled speed - a
whirling dynamo of organo-metallic spheres and stellar nuclear furnace
flashing out AM/FM/Multiband transmissions like a galactic E-M
transmitter (which it probably is)

> >>>> It follows then from the fact that
> >>>> consistency entails the consistency of inconsistency (Gödel II). Of
> >>>> course, the reality is more complex, for consciousness is only
> >>>> approximated by the instinctive unconscious) inductive inference of
> >>>> self-consistency.
> >>> You need some kind of awareness to begin with to tell the difference
> >>> between consistency and inconsistency.
> >> Not necessarily. Checking inconsistency does not require a lot of
> >> cognitive ability.
> > It does necessarily require awareness of some kind. Something has to
> > detect something and know how to expect and interpret a 'difference'
> > in that detection. Cognition has nothing to do with it. That's much
> > higher up the mountain, in true vs false land. Consistency is only
> > same v different.
> ?

If I pour hot water on an ice cube, there is no cognition involved,
but the ice responds to the hot water because there are collisions.
The molecules have to embody a susceptibility to collision - which is
a simple form of sense. There is no rule book, they actively respond
to momentum with momentum. We are the ones who observe the consistency
of their interaction and derive a rule book, just as an alien
astronomer studying our civilization from space could derive a rule
book which is probabilistic and misses entirely our perception.

> >> I was just alluding to the fact that replication, although not
> >> providing Turing universality, do that in company of the while loop.
> > I was just saying that while loops and replication don't imply the
> > generation of feeling.
> That's the non-comp assumption.

I don't see that labeling it adds anything.

> >>> Conscious and unconscious are aspects of the inherent subject-object
> >>> symmetry of the universe.
> >> Which you assume.
> > What choice do I have? My only experience of the universe is 100%
> > definable by the subject-object symmetry.
> ?


> >>> Why isn't arithmetic truth physical?
> >> Because it does not rely on any physical notion. You can do number
> >> theory without ever doing physics.
> > But you can't do number theory without a physical subject doing the
> > theorizing.
> In which theory?

No theory, in reality. In any possible here and now that is real.

> >>>  Why not have some
> >>> creatures with smart skulls or shells and stupid soft parts
> >>> inside? It
> >>> seems to be a strong indicator of material properties consistently
> >>> determining mechanism and not the other way around.
> >> Seeming is deceptive.
> > What would be an explanation, or counterfactual?
> Comp.

So you are citing comp itself to support comp? The counterfactual to
the idea that intelligence is invariably associated with one specific
category of living tissue tends to invalidate comp is that comp says
that doesn't mention categories of living tissue? That's my point, if
it doesn't explain that obvious correlation, how can it be any more
unlikely to be true?

> >>> Arithmetical truth does make sense, definitely, but so do other
> >>> kinds
> >>> of experiences make sense and are not arithmetic truths.
> >> If they are conceptually rich enough, you can take them instead of
> >> arithmetic, without changing anything in the explanation of
> >> consciousness and matter. I use numbers because people are more
> >> familiar with them.
> > I use sense because it makes more sense.
> But sense is what I want to explain, like matter, I cannot assume it

You have to assume it. Assuming and explaining are aspects of making
sense. You are trying to put your mind outside of a system that has no

> in the TOE, although I have to ask people if they agree on some
> consciousness property, like being invariant for some substitution, to
> connect the TOE with their own sense.

It all begins and ends with sense.

> >> If you deposit your Gödel number code at the bank, or something like
> >> that. You stretch the meaning of comp, which is just the bet that our
> >> body is Turing emulable and that we can survive through any of its
> >> Turing emulation.
> > Isn't that what money is really all about now though? Instead of a
> > body, we have accounts. You can't get more Turing emulable that that.
> > It's practically Turing-maniacal.
> >>> All of those Wall Street quants... where is the
> >>> theology and creativity?
> >> It is buried by the materialists since 1500 years.
> > 60% of the stock trades in the US markets are automated. I would say
> > that makes AI the dominant financial decision maker in the world.
> The problem is not money, nor machines. It is humans when they steal
> money, with whatever is the technological means.

How do you know? Maybe it is the agenda of the numbers behind the
money to consolidate in the fewest hands possible? It doesn't care who
the players are, it just makes sure that those who are closer to the
source of the numbers get more and more while everyone else gets less
and less. It's a program, or more like a memory leak in the program of
civilization, draining out significance.

> >> There is no ontological brain, yet we are.
> > Aren't we the ontological brain already?
> No. Our brain are epistemological. You have to grasp the UDA by
> yourself to see this.

My stab at understanding UDA is that if you have a program that writes
all possible programs, some of those programs are also going to write
programs that write programs, some of which would refer to themselves.
In referring to themselves, you would get programmatic relations in
the runtime that would not be anticipated and would explain our own
situation as conscious beings. Is that close? The brain being
epistemological is a function of each entity to represent the other in
some way, although I'm not sure why it is in that form and not some

> >>>>> We cannot be
> >>>>> simulated anymore than water or fire can be simulated.
> >>>> Why? That's a strong affirmation. We have not yet find a phenomenon
> >>>> in
> >>>> nature that cannot be simulated (except the collapse of the wave,
> >>>> which can still be Turing 1-person recoverable).
> >>> You can't water a real plant with simulated water or survive the
> >>> arctic burning virtual coal for heat.
> >> What is a real plant? A plant is epistemologically real relatively to
> >> you and your most probable computations. It is not an absolute
> >> notion.
> > It might be an absolute notion.
> In which theory?

In universally shared reality. Common sense.

> > At my level of description it is a
> > plant, at another it's tissues, cells, molecules, etc. Anything that
> > satisfies all of those descriptions within all of those perceptual
> > frames may be a real plant. If it only looks like a plant, then it's a
> > cartoon or a puppet.
> You assume a lot.

I assume my direct experience and extrapolate from there.

>If only you could start thinking to distinguish what
> you assume, and what you derive, we would be able to understand better
> what you try to convey.

If you focus on what you assume, then you codify in cognitive theory
from the start. You limit your sense of the universe to prefrontal
cortex logic arbitrarily.

> >>> If you look at substitution
> >>> level in reverse, you will see that it's not a matter of making a
> >>> plastic plant that acts so real we can't tell the difference, it's a
> >>> description level which digitizes a description of a plant rather
> >>> than
> >>> an actual plant. Nothing has been simulated, only imitated. The
> >>> difference is that an imitation only reminds us of what is being
> >>> imitated but a simulation carries the presumption of replacement.
> >> This makes things more complex than they might be.
> > It makes more sense though. Otherwise we would have movies that we
> > could literally live inside of already.
> What makes you sure that is not the case?

Because when we dream we may think we are awake, but when we are awake
we do not think we are dreaming. Because physical conditions can wake
us up out of a sound sleep but our dream worlds cannot summon us to
sleep suddenly. Because we can tell the difference between media
presentations and live events.

> >>> If you say that human consciousness exists independently of a human
> >>> brain, you have to give me an example of such a case.
> >> UDA shows that you are an example of this.
> > But drinking some scotch or smoking a cigar tells me that I am not
> > independent of my brain.
> Nice. If you can prove that, then you refute comp. Good luck.
> With comp, the human material brain is a construct of the immaterial
> human minds, with respect of infinities UMs in a complex but
> conceptually and mathematically very precise statistical competition.
> We can already axiomatize completely the propositional logic for the
> "probability one" in each points of view.

Why do we use the idea of nicotine to change the idea of the brain
instead of just using the idea of changing our minds directly with

> Keep in mind that comp is not what most Aristotelians want it to be.
> You have to understand that comp contradicts the usual very common old
> naturalist conception of reality, which is a probable efficacious
> locally correct animal instinctive extrapolation.

I understand. I'm only saying that comp is not valid as the ultimate
and absolute truth of the universe, not that it is not a valid
perspective to make sense of the universe. Multisense realism is about
showing how comp coexists with it's opposite (techne) and right-angle
paradigms (subject and object).

> >>>>>>> We, unfortunately cannot be digitized,
> >>>>>> You don't know that. But you don't derive it either from what you
> >>>>>> assume (which to be franc remains unclear)
> >>>>> I do derive it, because the brain and the self are two parts of a
> >>>>> whole. You cannot export the selfness into another form, because
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> self has no form, it's only experiential content through the
> >>>>> interior
> >>>>> of a living brain.
> >>>> That's the 1-self, but it is just an interface between truth and
> >>>> relative bodies.
> >>> Truth is just an interface between all 1-self and all relative
> >>> bodies.
> >> In which theory? This does not make sense.
> > It's an implication of multisense realism. Truth (a kind of Sense) is
> > an interface between all 1-self (sensorimotive experiences) and all 3-
> > p relative bodies (electromagnetic objects). It is the synchronization
> > of interior dreams and external bodies.
> That looks like a not too much wrong comp phenomenon.

That's probably what it would look like to comp. Comp isn't a realism
though, it's a theoretical logic - a non-realism.

> >>>> Not really. The physical universe is not made of any patterns.
> >>>> Nor is
> >>>> it made of anything. It is a highly complex structure which appears
> >>>> in
> >>>> first person plural shared dreams.
> >>> That's what I'm saying. 'Structure' = pattern.
> >>>> You might, like many, confuse
> >>>> digital physics (which does not work) and comp.
> >>>> "I am a machine" makes it impossible for both my consciousness, and
> >>>> my
> >>>> material body to be Turing emulable.
> >>> But your material body is Turing emulable (or rather, Turing
> >>> imitatable).
> >> At the comp subst level: imitable is emulable. You seem to lower that
> >> level in the infinite.
> > The subst level is proportional to the distance (literal and
> > figurative) from the self. (You should like this actually?) The more
> > distant from the self - say looking at a map of the Earth, the higher
> > the subst level is. Any old substrate for the map will do. The closer
> > you get to the self, the subst level gets exponentially lower.
> > There may be a mirror image of the uncanny valley involved. A
> > 'character spike' so to speak, where people enjoy watching a person
> > act like a robot, statue, mime, or other starchy, would-be dehumanized
> > character. There is certainly something comedic about it. Like when
> > the uncanny valley drops off, when the character is taken too far and
> > becomes too convincing for too long, the substitution level becomes
> > uncomfortably high and we begin to wonder if there is something really
> > wrong with them (the Andy Kauffman valley).
> That looks nice, but I am not sure I follow you on this. By lowering
> the level that much you make everything more contingent and more
> geographical. You make matter, and the quantum, more mysterious at the
> start. You make mind unintelligible. By putting the level *infinitely*
> down, you get the theory "don't ask".

I don't think it makes them mysterious, it makes them primordial by
necessity. Once you realize that the universe does nothing but sense
and make sense, there is no need to ask anything more, because asking
is part of the show. Asking is a way of making sense.

> >>> My whole point is revealing a universe description in which logic
> >>> and
> >>> direct experience coexist in many ways. Limiting it to logical
> >>> language defeats the purpose,
> >> That's what the machine can already explain. You consider it as a
> >> zombie.
> > Not a zombie, a puppet.
> Whatever.
> If comp is correct, this is an insult of my friends.

You can still have puppets for friends. Most people's friends are
probably largely psychological projections anyhow.

> >>> although I would love to collaborate
> >>> with someone who was interested in formalizing the ideas.
> >> Convince people that there is an idea. But by insisting that your
> >> ideas contradict comp, you shoot in your theory, because you add a
> >> magic where the comp theories explains the appearance of the magic
> >> without introducing it at the start.
> > Comp introduces magic at the start. 'Arithmetic Truth' is very much a
> > digital Dreamtime.
> But it is believed even more than Aristotle doctrine. We appreciate
> arithmetic since the Sumerians. The Pythagorean triples were known
> since many thousand of years (6000 up to 8000 before JC). You are
> using right now a machine entirely based on arithmetic. We use it
> everyday, and we teach it in high school.

Unquestionably. I'm not arguing that arithmetic itself is exclusive to
human minds, any sufficiently evolved organism will discover some form
of arithmetic I think. I only say that the idea that arithmetic exists
independently of any subjective discovery by a material entity is a
creation myth.

> Yes, it is a bit of Magic, when we get familar to its many surprises.
> Unfortunately most people see it as boring number crunching, or number
> tables and not so much appreciate the music, but that's just a reflect
> of lack of education.

You underestimate my esteem for arithmetic drastically. I only
antagonize you here because I need you to see the limits of arithmetic
in order for you to even consider my ideas. That and the fact that I'm
not talented or skilled with complex arithmetic. I'm more of a verbal
guy, yes? I have nothing but respect for quant power, I just take
issue with quant suprematism.

> > I don't add any magic
> What are you assuming?
> Apparently you assume a lot: matter, space, wave, sense, persons,
> electrons, motives, etc.
> I have no clue what you mean by any of those terms, nor basic
> principle you assume on them, nor how you relate them.
> All I know is that you postulate something non Turing emulable,
> playing some role in matter and consciousness.

As a theoretical logician, you start from nothing but assume logic. Bp
and p. Numbers. Arithmetic, information, machines, computation,
memory, addressability, pattern recognition, looping, branching,
decision, digital and analog compression, isomorphism, simulation, set
theory, Platonia, all kinds of conceptual architecures. That's great,
and you can do almost anything with almost anything through that
methodology. The trouble is that if there were nothing to oppose that
set of assumptions, there would be no feeling and meaning to doing
anything at all. That is gambled away in wishful thinking about qualia
chasing the quanta.

In multisense realism, I represent comp as one cardinal point in a set
of four that mark the extremes of the continuum. I therefore have to
assume everything that every cardinal point assumes. I have to map the
entire universe and leave nothing out.

> > and nothing appears except
> > different levels of sense recapitulation in inertial frames.
> > Everything in multisense realism works with a universe of only the
> > typical experiences that we live through every day, plus it explains
> > why extraordinary experiences are harder to ground in public
> > certainty.
> Let the others say so, or not.


> >>> Logic is a
> >>> 3p language - a mechanistic, involuntary form of reasoning which
> >>> denies the 1p subject any option but to accept it.
> >> This is false. The right side of the hypostases with "& p& are
> >> provably beyond language, at the level the machine can live.
> > You're making my point.
> Well, the point was made by the machine I am interviewing.
> > The notion of anything being literally false
> > or true is just what I said: an involuntary form of reasoning.
> ?  (why not?)


> > Then
> > you proceed to deny me, the 1p subject, any option to accept it.
> ?

To say that something is objectively true or false is involuntary. The
universe gives us an alternative to that in our subjectivity. We can
care or not care whether something seems true or false and decide to
question it.

> I just try to understand.
> I fail, because of vagueness together with strong negative assumptions
> bearing on a very large class of entities ad-hoc-ly segregated.

We can only do what we can do. I don't see it in terms of failure,
it's just a measure of how alike and different we are.
> >>> The 1p experience
> >>> is exactly the opposite of that. It is a 'seems like' affair which
> >>> invites or discourages voluntary participation of the subject.
> >>> Half of
> >>> the universe is made of this.
> >> With comp, it is the main part of the "universe".
> > That's why it's a little naive :)
> I don't think it is particularly naive to believe that the observable
> universe is just one *aspect* of something much larger.

Not at all, but it might be to believe that it is the 'main' part. The
universe is as much logos as it is techne, subject, and object, but
mainly it is the sense that is made in the circuits between and around


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