On 02.02.2012 21:49 meekerdb said the following:
On 2/2/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:54 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 3:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 30, 6:08 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 1/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: So kind of you to
inform us of your unsupported opinion.
I was commenting on your unsupported opinion.
Except that my opinion is supported by the fact that within the
context of chess the machine acts just like a person who had
those emotions. So it had at least the functional equivalent of
those emotions. Whereas your opinion is simple prejudice.
I agree my opinion would be simple prejudice had we not already
been over this issue a dozen times. My view is that the whole idea
that there can be a 'functional equivalent of emotions' is
completely unsupported. I give examples of puppets, movies,
trashcans that say THANK YOU, voicemail...all of these things
demonstrate that there need not be any connection at all between
function and interior experience.
Except that in every case there is an emotion in your examples...it's
just the emotion of the puppeter, the screenwriter, the trashcan
painter. But in the case of the chess playing computer, there is no
person providing the 'emotion' because the 'emotion' depends on
complex and unforeseeable events. Hence it is appropriate to
attribute the 'emotion' to the computer/program.
Craig's position that computers in the present form do not have emotions
is not unique, as emotions belong to consciousness. A quote from my
Jeffrey A. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.
The last sentence from the chapter "10.2 Conscious computers?"
p. 128 "Our further discussion here, however, will take it as
established that his can never happen."
Now the last paragraph from the chapter "10.3 Conscious robots?"
p. 130. "So, while we may grant robots the power to form meaningful
categorical representations at a level reached by the unconscious brain
and by the behaviour controlled by the unconscious brain, we should
remain doubtful whether they are likely to experience conscious
percepts. This conclusion should not, however, be over-interpreted. It
does not necessarily imply that human beings will never be able to build
artefacts with conscious experience. That will depend on how the trick
of consciousness is done. If and when we know the trick, it may be
possible to duplicate it. But the mere provision of behavioural
dispositions is unlikely to be up to the mark."
If we say that computers right now have emotions, then we must be able
exactly define the difference between unconscious and conscious
experience in the computer (for example in that computer that has won
Kasparov). Can you do it?
Hence I personally find this particular Craig's position as supported.
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