On 4 February 2012 12:22, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring
> that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to isomorphisms) as
> primitives.
>
>
> So you have to explicitly show what is not valid in the UDA1-8. You miss
> something, let us try to find out what.
>
>
>     I am not missing a thing, Bruno. You are missing something that is
> obvious to the rest of us.
>
>
> If someone else can confirm this, and put some light on what Stephen is
> saying, I would be pleased.

Bruno, I used to think that you were indeed missing "something that is
obvious to the rest of us".  I don't think so any longer, because I
understand now that you are presenting a theory and your arguments
consequently derive strictly from the axioms and assumptions of that
theory.  I don't pretend to understand all aspects of that theory of
course, but through discussion and the contrast of ideas I have come a
bit closer than when I started.

I don't know if it will help at all for me to state here my
understanding of what might motivate the theory in the first place,
but I'll try.  Firstly, as you have so often said, the
informational/computational theory of mind (CTM) is more or less the
default assumption in science.  Indeed this conclusion seems almost
unavoidable given that brain research seems to imply, more or less
unambiguously, the correlation of  mental states with relations,
rather than relata.  However, CTM in its uncritically-assumed form
continues to be combined with the additional assumption of an
Aristotelian primitively-physical state of affairs.  This leads
directly either to denialism of the first-person, or alternatively to
some ill-defined species of property dualism.  These consequences by
themselves might well lead us to reject such primitive-physicalism as
incoherent, even without an explicit reductio ad absurdum of the
unambiguous association of conscious states with "physical
computation".  Either way, in order to retain CTM, one is led to
contemplate some form of neutral monism.

The question of what form such a "neutral" theory should take now
arises.  Since the theory is explicitly *computational*, the axioms
and assumptions of such a theory should obviously be restricted to the
absolute minimum necessary to construct a "computational universe" (in
the traditional sense of "universe") or rather to indicate how such a
universe would necessarily construct itself, given those axioms and
assumptions.  The basic assumption is of a first-order combinatorial
system, of which numbers are the most widely-understood example.
Given the arithmetical nature of such a universe, construction and
differentiability of composite entities must necessarily derive from
arithmetical assumptions, which permits the natural emergence of
higher-order structural integration via the internal logic of the
system.  Of particular note is the emergence in this way of
self-referential entities, which form the logical basis of
person-hood.

Since the reality of first-person localisation is not denied in this
theory (indeed the theory positively seeks to rationalise it), the
system is not posited as having merely third-personal status, but as
possessing a first-person self-referential point-of-view which is
associated with consciousness.  Perhaps it is this aspect of the
theory which is the most tricky, as it cuts across a variety of
different intuitions about consciousness and its relation to the
phenomena it reveals.  For rather than positing a primitively-physical
universe which "instantiates" conscious states, the theory must
reverse the relation and posit conscious states that "instantiate"
physical phenomena.  In so doing, it exposes itself to empirical
refutation, since those phenomena must be, at least, consistent with
ordinary observation (although they also predict, in the limit,
observations of  high improbability).

It is this last issue of instantiation which seems to be one of main
bones of contention between Stephen and yourself, though I'm not sure
why this is the case.  From my own perspective, unsophisticated though
it may be, it seems reasonable that the emergence of "truly physical"
phenomena should indeed be the result of "personal instantiation" in
the conjunction of consciousness and computation.  After all, when do
questions as to what is "truly physical" emerge, other than in the
context of what is "truly experiential"?  The rest is calculation.

David


>
> On 03 Feb 2012, at 23:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
>
>     You might protest and say that numbers are universal and that you are
> considering the function that numbers and that the + and * laws perform is
> "neutral" in the sense of Neutral monism, but that claim also fails for the
> very same reason as I have outlined. We simply cannot have "specification of
> properties" and ontological neutrality at the same level. One is the
> exclusion of the other.
>
>
> In that case your notion of "existence" is so neutral that you can't derive,
> in the usual sense, anything from it. You don't present a theory, but are
> using a God-gap type of explanation, and this to pretend a reasoning is
> invalid, without providing any clue where, except attributing me a
> metaphysical belief in numbers, where I only assume to grasp them in high
> school and every day life.
> You cannot refute a reasoning with philosophical ideology.
>
>
> As to set theory, we should discuss that seperately, since I am confused as
> to how you think of set theory. For example, are you considering that there
> exist many different self-consistent set theories that differ in their
> choice of axioms?
>
>
> Is that a rethorical trick? You are repeating the reason why I avoid set
> theories. That problem does not exist on the integers. I assume the numbers,
> because everyone agree on them, and nobody can derive the axioms from
> conceptually less rich theory.
>
>
>
>
>
> This is different from "material monism" that assumes that the material
> physical would is primitive, or "ideal monism" that assumes that Mind is
> primitive. Your ideas seems to be a form of Ideal Monism.
>
>
> Not at all. Although UDA assumes consciousness (in its invariance for the
> comp substitution at some level), UDA+AUDA explicitly eliminates it at the
> ontological level, and is explained in the math of the epistemology of
> numbers, so that the TOE is literally only elementary arithmetic.
>
>
>     Then you are confirming that you assume the doctrine of inherent
> properties and thus contradict neutrality.
>
>
> I am not doing philosophy. If you don't assume elementary arithmetic, then
> there is no theory. neither comp, nor QM, nor GR, etc. You argument is a
> universal argument against fundamental science.
>
>
>
> My argument is that we cannot make what consciousness does remain if we make
> consciousness vanish.
>
>
> Are you telling me that we have to assume consciousness at the ontological
> level? Like Benjayk, and probably Craig. Then I am just not interested,
> because this assumes what I search an explanation for.
>
>
>
> It is like claiming that one can have, in physics, a sourceless field.
> Perhaps you do believe, like many physicists, in primitive scalar fields
> (which are sourceless!) but it does not take much reasoning to show that
> these simply cannot exists because if they did they allow the equivalent of
> work at no entropic cost. This is consistent with your thinking as your
> reasoning seems to assume that knowledge can exist (via Bp&p) without any
> cost what so ever. You have avoided this fatal flaw by the slight of hand of
> not considering the requirements of neutrality.
>
>
> You requirement of neutrality makes it impossible to derive anything from
> it.
>
>
>
> [BM]
> "Existence exist"  is equivalent to Snark borgles. Snark (noun) borgles
> (verb).
>
>
>     Please. Do not do that. You are insulting your own intelligence with
> remarks like those.
>
>
> No I was serious. If "existence exists" is different from "Snark borgles",
> then you introduce non neutrality in your neutral monism, and I have to ask
> you what is the meaning of "existence exists", and how you distinguish
> "existence" from "exists", and how you derive numbers (and matter, and mind)
> from it.
>
>
>
>     OK, but cannot you see that that entire argument is predicated upon the
> possibility of its implementation as distinguishable from alternatives?
>
>
> If that was clearer, I would ask a proof, or an argument. But I fail to see
> any sense here.
>
>
>
> How can distinguishability obtain without the means to produce it? When you
> make consciousness vanish so too does the distinguishably that it engenders.
>
>
> This is ridiculous.
>
>
>
> You simply cannot posit the existence of entities that have distinguishable
> properties and prohibit (even passively) the means by which the differences
> between the entities obtain.
>
>
> We do that all the time.
>
>
>
>
> If there is no "we" as physical entities that can distinguish a 1 from a 2
> from a 3 and a + operation from a * operations from a # operation or even to
> be able to speak the words or name them, how can we argue that such entities
> even exist?
>
>
> We don't have to argue. We posit them. If we don't we don't have any theory.
>
>
>
>
> To do so is no better that the claims of mystics and Scholastics, and
> ultimately, becomes prey to "might is right" argumentation: "7 exists and is
> prime because I say so..."
>
>
> No. Because it follows from the axioms which have been given. You can't
> object against a reasoning with ideology. You make a confusion of genre.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> What does the word "existence" in the following sentence "the existence of
> numbers in independent of any particular person or persons knowledge of
> them" mean? Am I being unclear?
>
>
> It means that the standard truth value of Ex(x = 0), Ex(x = s(0)), are
> independent of the intuitive existence of me, you, etc.
>
>
>     But that very statement vanishes when we disconnect the ability to
> physically express the sentence "the standard truth value of Ex(x = 0), Ex(x
> = s(0))" from its referent therefore its "truth value" is a "meaningless
> ASCII string", to quote John K Clark. If it is not possible to distinguish
> properties from each other then it is impossible to express what those
> properties might be.
>
>
> That's again science in general.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Our beliefs in the natural numbers is authentically mysterious. But with
> comp we can, and we must, explain everything from them. And it works,
> because arithmetic emulate the ... self-referential resonance of numbers,
> which appears to be very rich and full of surprise.
>
> [SPK]
>     I reject that our belief in numbers is "mysterious" as we can easily
> match up one set of objects with another set of different objects.
>
>
> In which theory?
>
>
>     In a theory whose claims are falsifiable.
>
>
> You don't answer the question.
>
>
>
>
>
> here you practice phenomenology again.
>
>
>     How can I not practice phenomenology? Phenomena is the general term
> referring to what can be experienced and represented and communicated about,
> no? Or are you thinking of the particular philosophical doctrine of
> "phenomenology" such as that of Sartre or Husserl?
>
>
>
> I am thinking of any reification of first person notion.
>
>
>
> By mysterious, I was meaning that we cannot derive them from any weaker
> theory. For example we cannot derive them from logic alone (contrary to what
> B. Russell thought in Principia Mathematica).
>
>
>     Maybe you are not noticing that this inability to derive them follows
> from your restriction to first order logic + Platonism?
>
>
> Platonism is in the result, not in the assumption. comp is "yes doctor" +
> "Church-Turing-Post thesis". And the minimum amount of math to give sense to
> that thesis.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You refutation here used "me", "sets" "objects", "matching" like if we knew
> how to recover that notion in your theory (which one?).
>
> You refer many times to paper which are correct from the formal points of
> view. You should work hard to write something similar.
>
>
>     I beg your indulgence, writing only comes with a great effort for me.
> For example it took me two hours to compose this response since I have to
> spend a great deal of time correcting the errors that my dyslexia causes.
>
>
> You have my compassion, but I will of course not take this as an argument.
>
>
>
>
>
> We can observe physical objects,
>
>
> This is either a tautology, or what?
>
>
>     It is a tautology and with good reason. It seems that sometimes you
> forget its implications.
>
>
> Which is?
>
>
>
>
> We cannot take physical object for granted if we assume comp. If you assume
> set theory + a physical reality, you have to say so.
>
>
>     I have to assume a set theory (or more primitively, a mereology) and
> existence of the physical world as I cannot avoid the direct evidence of my
> first person experience without opening myself to stultification and
> contradiction.
>
>
> Give the set theory explicitly, given that, as you remind us, there are many
> one.
>
>
>
> This is obvious. Where we differ on COMP is what you take Yes doctor and
> Arithmetic Realism to remain coherent at the primitive neutral level and I
> do not.
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
> we can distinguish between them as they are present in differing locations
>
>
> What is a location?
>
>
>     What is representable by a partly ordered set of numbers in a coordinate
> system or representable by a set membership function on a collection or
> representable by a "name" or ...
>
>
> So your neutral monism is your set theory, and you assume more than me, and
> your monism is less neutral than the comp monism.
> You cannot argue against a theory or a reasoning without making clear what
> is your theory. If you tell me in advance that you cannot write it in
> first-order logic, or in a first order theory, I take that as a mean to
> confess it is not a scientific theory, but a philosophical or ideological
> prejudice.
>
>
> Existence is for me, and many, a quantifier. We note it "E", and we use it
> following rules or axioms, like, if you can deduce in the theory that P(t),
> for some term t, then you can deduce ExP(x) (it exists something verifying
> P.
> I have no idea what you mean by "Bare and naked Existence, undifferentiated,
> unnamed and raw". It looks like the TAO, God, or things like that, which I
> can find very interesting, but to postulate them makes no sense (if only
> because they are unnameable indeed).
>
>
>     This is an example of what I mean when I ask you to stop acting like an
> automaton. Yes, Existence is unnameable in-it-self, but for the sake of
> conversation we can use a word for it, no?
>
>
> Not in the assumption, or you have to give some axiom, so that we can
> distinguish from Snark.
>
>
>
> I am just trying to be consistent with the requirement of informal and
> formal logic and not just leaving assumptions unstated.
>
>
> But you never put the assumptions on the table, as I do.
>
>
>
> [SPK]
>     We must assume existence as prior to even numbers, for numbers are, at
> least, differentiated aspects of existence.
>
>
> Sorry Stephen. This sentence does not help.
>
>
>     They you are worse off than I suspected. Bruno, you cannot complain that
> you and your ideas are not being taken seriously
>
>
> I have never said that. I might complains on people who ignore the work for
> special interests unrelated to the subject matter. It is different.
>
>
>
> when you insist in such an intransigent way on not noticing the obvious. As
> I explained above, we cannot make claims about entities having properties at
> the same time claiming that those properties are completely independent of
> our ability to know them. Yes, the primeness of 7 does not depend on any
> particular person or entity knowing so, but that does not necessitate that
> the primeness of 7 is a properties that is completely cut off from our
> physicality.
>
>
> It is certainly cut of, given that I explain why numbers will believe in
> physicality, just by obeying to + and *. So, I can cut them of in the
> assumptions. The MGA explains even that I have to cut them of.
>
>
>
> You do not see the flaw of idealism, it is in your mental blind spot I
> guess....
>
>
> You don't argue.
>
>
>
>
>     I have no problem with either version, the meaning is the same for me.
> Whether we bracket sentences or not, they still require some form of
> physical implementation to be said to have properties.
>
>
>
> In your imagination only, I'm afraid. Or give me your argument.
>
>
>
>
>
> You seem to tacitly assume that numbers have properties completely
> independent of the ability of any entity of knowing of them.
>
>
> Not tacitly. Explicitly.
>
>
>     So you explicitly contradict yourself. You are brave! How am I to
> falsify your claims if I can substitute any entity for numbers (as you
> define them) and obtain the same "result"? This is the epitome of nonsense!
> This is a return to the mysticism that science has struggled against. We
> might as well lobotomize ourselves and remove our ability to think
> critically about ourselves and our world.
>
>
> I don't find any sense in that paragraph.
>
>
>
>
> You are doing exactly that when you say that "existence exists" is an axiom.
>
>
>     No, I am being explicit in my axiomatics. We simply cannot avoid the
> fact that all of our claims, statements, thoughts, etc. necessitate the
> existence of at least ourselves to be meaningful. This is the first lesson
> of epistemology and ontology. Since I am not making the claim that the
> properties of entities, such as numbers, follow only from their "existence"
> I am not being vacuous.
>
>
> How do you go from "existence" to "existence of ourselves"?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     This is obvious Platonism, and it fails for the same reason that Plato's
> theory of Forms fails.
>
>
> That is an ultra-strong statement.
>
>
>     Indeed! I am not the first to state it.
>
>
> Indeed, it is a tradition since Aristotle. But it is ideological, and does
> not rely on observation and reasoning.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It cannot account for knowledge, even in the Theaetetian sense, because
> prior to the consideration of what  "Bp&p" is as different from "%r*0" or
> "Pb&b" or "1234" or ... as a possible meaningful statement, it has no
> meaning.
>
>
> The meaning is given by the axioms, and, at the meta-level, by the models.
> Like in algebra and math.
> You are confusing explanatory levels.
>
>
>     Please explain to me the difference of these levels and disabuse me of
> this confusion.
>
>
> This is explained in all textbook in mathematical logic. I suggest you take
> the time to study a good book like the book by Mendelson. It is a bit
> tricky, and long and tedious to explain in a mail. Hofstadter GEB got it
> right, but he might be the only physicist right on this.
>
>
>
>
>
> This is the inevitable flaw of idealism: taking Mind or Consciousness as a
> singular primitive removes the possibility of distiguishing what something
> *is* from *what it is not*.
>
>
> I keep insisting that I do not take consciousness or mind as primitive. Only
> numbers, with the + and * laws.
>
>
>     Numbers and the + and * laws, are entities with specific properties.
> They are different from other possible entities as they are, at least, the
> unique possessors of the property of "being a number such that 1 +1 = 2, 2+2
> = 4, etc." Therefore to take them as primitives requires that there exists
> an asymmetry at the primitive level and such an asymmetry violates the
> definition of neutrality.
>
>
> Of your special purpose notion of neutrality which makes it impossible to be
> handled in the scientific way.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Additionally, absent the ability that space and time provide to multiply
> representations of values, concepts, and other mental objects, there is
> simply no more than undifferentiated oneness.
>
>
> That's the first hypostases, and we get 8 different ones, including the two
> plotinian (sensible and intelligible) matters.
>
>
>     OK. I have no problem with the hypostases per se, I only have a problem
> with the assertion that the properties of the hypostases are differentiable
> from each other at the primitive level.
>
>
> This follows from the axioms.
>
>
>
>
>
> The ability to distinguish "this" from "that" requires the physical and
> cannot be sustained in its absence.
>
>
> You said that you were not assuming physical as primitive, and here you talk
> like you do.
> Please, send us your theory. I try hard to attribute some sense and
> intuition, but once you make strong negative statement, you need a very
> precise theory to do that.
>
>
>     I am still learning how to write up my theory, if I even have a
> "theory"! At this point I am merely a student trying to find a consistent
> set of ideas and concepts. I see a paradox in your explanation of COMP and
> am trying to fix it.
>
>
> But you never mention any part of the reasoning. Have you grasp the first
> person indeterminacy? Have you grasp the seven steps of UDA?
> You fail to provide any clue of what could have been wrong in the UDA. You
> keep making vague philosophical remarks which are simply not relevant for
> the reasoning.
>
>
>
>
>
>     For example, in your result you use the notion of teleportation and
> digital substitution. Both of these concepts require the multiplicity of
> place and time that the physical world gives to be coherent, therefore your
> result cannot even be considered absent the physical.
>
>
> UDA is not at the same level of AUDA. UDA assumes comp, and thus some
> physical universe. But the consequence of UDA is that the universe is not an
> ontological object. It is a shared dream of numbers.
>
>
>     No, numbers cannot have dreams or anything else if they are ontological
> primitives as ontological primitives must be neutral with respect to
> properties.
>
>
> In that case dreams cannot exist at all, unless you postulate them as
> primitive, in which case I am not interested.
>
>
>
> You are also conflating the representations of concepts with the referent of
> those representations,
>
>
> Where?
>
>
>
> so your accusation that I am confusing levels is aimed in the wrong
> direction.
>
>
> The idea of "implementing the UD" requires that it is possible for a
> physical system to implement it.
>
>
> Not at all. Implementation is a purely arithmetical concept. It needs only
> (N,+,*).
>
>
>     And why not {Z, @, %} or [R, ^, #] or "WTFWTFWTFWTFWTF" or .... ? You
> are violating neutrality!
>
>
> I point on something rich that everyone has study in high school. If you
> don't postulate the numbers, then you cannot have them, nor universal one,
> and your theory fails at the start. Comp cannot have any sense.
> Just give me an example of an explanation of numbers without violating
> neutrality, in *your* sense. I don't see how that would be possible. You
> argument kills all axiomatic theory, and you are making consciousness
> primitive.
>
>
>
>
> Not at all. You need only predicate calculus with equality (first order
> logic). PA can prove ~(0=1).
>
>
>     And the sentence "PA can prove ~(0=1)." requires some means of being
> physically implemented to be distinguishable and thus have a meaning that is
> different from any other ASCII string.
>
>
> I have no clue why physical implementation can play a role in providing
> meaning. You refer to an absence of theory.
>
>
>
>
> This is where your idea fails and it is the same failure as any other form
> of idealism. It cannot account for the necessity of the physical world nor
> the causal efficacy of ideas.
>
>
> It does exactly that. You lost me. Not sure you have really take the time to
> study UDA.
>
>
>
>
>
> This is a hollow and empty statement as absent the disctinctions that the
> physical world provides,
>
>
> What is a physical world?
>
>
>     For example, what you experience as you read the text of this message.
>
>
> And what is "you" and "experience", and in which theory. You just confessed
> that you have no theory. So your point is only that there is a flaw in the
> UDA. Where?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> there can be no Platonia except as a abstraction within the thoughts of
> conscious entities.
>
>
> Proof?
>
>
>     The fact that this sentence has a meaning to you.
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You are assuming that you can have all of the gifts of consciousness without
> having to pay the price of consciousness. Sorry, Bruno, there is no free
> lunch. The mere existence of numbers does nothing at all to indicate their
> properties.
>
>
> This contradicts the fact that numbers do have a very rich self-reference
> logic.
>
>
>     So? That fact only obtains because there exists the possibility of
> physically implementing,
>
>
> Why?
>
>
>
> say as a set of symbols on a chalk board, a set of equations of a "very rich
> self-reference logic". You would have us believe that absent that
> possibility that the ASCII string "very rich self-reference logic" is has
> different properties from the ASCII string "WNW()Q DHW)D E" or the ASCII
> string "IK_((&M)_" or ... .
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If not, like Craig, perhaps like Rex Allen and Benjayk, you are postulating
> that comp is false.
>
>
>     No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring
> that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to isomorphisms) as
> primitives.
>
>
> So you have to explicitly show what is not valid in the UDA1-8. You miss
> something, let us try to find out what.
>
>
>     I am not missing a thing, Bruno. You are missing something that is
> obvious to the rest of us.
>
>
> If someone else can confirm this, and put some light on what Stephen is
> saying, I would be pleased.
>
>
>
>
> The very fact that we can read your paper and come to some understanding of
> the subject of your symol strings is proof that concepts, including numbers,
> cannot have properties absent the possibility of a physical reality.
>
>
> The fact that apes can eat banana is a proof that banana would not exist in
> a world without apes?
>
>
>
> This proof implies that numbers and physical reality exist at the same
> level, so that if numbers are primitive then so too is physical reality.
>
>
> I will kindly put this in your dyslexia problem.
>
>
> But we agree that physical reality cannot be primitive therefore neither can
> numbers be considered as primitive.
>
>
> So what is you theory about what is primitive. Don't tell me "existence". I
> need a theory, not a word.
>
>
>
>
>
> I am trying to point out the obvious and even trivial fact that comp is
> meaningless and mute as an explanatory model or "result" absent the physical
> world with its chalkboards, paper, computer screens, etc. Its existence, per
> se, has nothing to do with its meaningfulness.
>
>
> UDA explains that concrete chalkboards are epinoumena. Even if they exist,
> we cannot use them to explain the observation of chalkboards. Occam trows
> the epinoumena out.
>
>
>     OK, but you need to understand that this is equivalent to requiring that
> OCCAM is refuting itself. You are denying the very possibility of having
> properties, such as truth values or primeness, by reducing concretes to
> epiphenomena.
>
>
> To epinoumena. Like invisible horses. By MGA, concrete matter cannot have a
> role in consciousness and observation of the physical reality, so we can't
> introducing them by the usual weak Occam.
> Occam cannot be contradicted, as it is only a criteria for conceptual
> elegance in applied science. But comp would be contradicted by an argument
> that concrete matter does exist, but such an argument does not exist in the
> literature.
>
>
>
>
>
> You wrote: "Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational
> histories, or maximal consistent extensions as seen from some first person
> point of view." What exactly is this "First Person point of view"
>
>
> It is the person associated to a machine/number whose knowledge obeys the
> S4Grz modal logic, in virtue of being described by the Theaetetu's
> definition of knowledge (Bp & p), when Bp means "asserted soon or later by
> that machine", for machine ideally correct.
> It is the third hypostase. The only one which does not split in two.
>
>
>     That is not relevant to the argument. The problem is that you are
> attributing properties that are definite to entities that by your definition
> cannot have definite properties.
>
>
> By your unreasonable neutrality assumption.
>
>
>
> This is equivalent to the ouroboros that has completely consumed itself.
>
>
> It would be if I took arithmetic granted, but I do explicitly postulate it.
>
>
>
>
>
> In UDA, you can already get the intuition, it is the one who wrote in his
> diary "I am in W", and who is in W.
>
>
>     No, there is no difference between "the one who wrote in his diary "I am
> in W"" and "who is in W" if there is not a means to tell the difference
> between the two. You cannot claim that difference exists if there is no
> means for those differences to obtain.
>
>
> Those difference are obtained from the axiom of the theory. They cannot be
> obtained in your "existence" theory, given that you start from an
> undifferentiated thing lacking properties and meta-properties. You critics
> applies to your theory, not comp and its concequences.
>
>
>
>
> At that moment you get a new machine with "I am in W" as new axiom.  And you
> know that his physics will be given by the consistent extension, whose
> correct self-referential logic is given by Bp & Dt. The fourth "intelligible
> matter" hypostases.
>
>
>     No, there is no machine, axiom or anything else because there is only
> "epiphenomena". You have stultified your own result.
>
>
> There is no epiphenomena. But reifying consciousness and/or matter would
> introduce epinoumena, and Occam eliminates them.
>
>
>
>
>
> if there is nothing that can act as such by your account?
>
>
> There are infinitely many things, in (N,+,*) which plays that role. All the
> universal Löbian numbers.
>
>
>     And they have a meaning and express coherent meaningful implications
> because it is possible to implement them physically.
>
>
> That's correct at some level. But physical implementation are not primitive.
> It explained how they appear from something else.
>
>
>
>
> When remove the possibility of physical implementation my claiming that such
> are "epiphenomena" then they lose what ever meaningful content they might
> have.
>
>
> There is no epiphenomena in comp. Only phenomena in the mind of Löbian
> universal numbers.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     You wrote: "Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the
> true verifiable “atomic sentences”." Inferable by *what* or *whom*?
>
>
> By the ideally correct universal Löbian numbers. Like Everett, arithmetic
> extracts its own correct (theological) internal interpretations.
>
>
>     Sure, and again, we can distinguish Löbian from non- Löbian machines by
> the effects that their physical implementation causes.
>
>
> You don't have to implement RA and PA to see their difference of discourses.
> Your statement is not justified, and meaningless in the comp theory.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> The Atomic sentences themselves can do nothing at all,
>
>
> They corresponds to the existence of the accessible computational states.
> The atomic sentences are the true Sigma_1 sentences. They are provable, and
> their proofs are, in that setting, computations. (Except that we must
> generalize a bit the notion of proof, to get the measure genuine with
> respect to UDA).
>
>
>     And we distinguish the referents of " true Sigma_1 sentences" from
> "false Sigma_1 sentences" because we can physically implement them as, say,
> a set of symbols on a chalkboard a possibility that vanishes when we reduce
> the physical world to Epiphenomena.
>
>
> This does no make sense at all.
>
>
>
>
>     This is the fatal flaw of idealism and ironically, it the same same flaw
> of materialism: epiphenomena. The material world is epiphenomena for ideal
> monism
>
>
> No. The primitive material world is epinoumena (*invisible* horse). The rest
> are numbers and phenomena defined by finite and infinite relations among
> numbers due to their rich additive-multiplicative reality.
>
>
>
> and the mental world is epiphenomena for materialism. WE can only break this
> impasse by some form of dualism that puts the mater and mind on the same
> level.
>
>
> Why? Why could a theory explains them, and yet distinguish their levels. If
> you want put the primary hypostases (p, Bp, Bp & p) and the same level as
> the material hypostases (Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p), you can.
>
>
>
>
>
> must less "infer" anything from themselves because they have no means to
> reflect back upon themselves.
>
>
> The universal sigma_1 sentence, like Bp, does exactly that. They extrapolate
> by self-completion. But she go bezerk, because the arithmetical truth run
> deep and strange (and uncomputable).
>
>
>     I agree, but that is not the flaw.
>
>
> I don't see the flaw. I might see a critics of the comp hypothesis.
> Arithmetical truth would be a pure human invention. All right then. Still,
> you cannot say yes to the doctor in that condition, because comp does not
> postulate anything metaphysical about the numbers. It postulate simple laws,
> like adding 0 to x gives x, etc.
>
>
>
>
> Even a Godel Number must be different from that it is representing in some
> way.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>     OK, so does the difference flow merely from the necessary possibility of
> a Godel number? Again, existence does not distinguish properties from each
> other.
>
>
> Then existence can do nothing, and your theory explains nothing.
>
>
>
>
>
> "The number seven is prime" is meaningless if we cannot write it down
> somewhere and somehow and evaluate its implications.
>
>
> Who is we? tell me his name, so that I will add its existence to the Peano
> axioms.
>
>
>     The entity that can understand the Peano axioms and thus distinguish
> them from non-Peano axioms.
>
>
> Universal numbers can do precisely that.
> Also, you seem again to postulate that "we" exist as part as the primitive
> ontology.
>
>
>
>
>
> Is "we" Stephen Paul King?
>
> In that case here is my new theory:
>
> Ax ~(0 = s(x))  (For all number x the successor of x is different from
> zero). With
> AxAy ~(x = y) -> ~(s(x) = s(y))    (different numbers have different
> successors)
> Ax x + 0 = x  (0 adds nothing)
> AxAy  x + s(y) = s(x + y)   ( meaning x + (y +1) = (x + y) +1)
> Ax   x *0 = 0
> AxAy x*s(y) = x*y + x
> ExAy(x = STEPHEN & (Bew(y) -> STEPHEN(y)).
>
> With STEPHEN a new constant term, denoting you in the union of the standard
> model of arithmetic with {you}.
>
>
>     Sorry Bruno, I am not isomorphic to any particular representation of me.
> At worse, my "being" supervenes on all possible representations of Stephen
> Paul King + the possibility of at least one form of physical implementation
> of all of those representations.
>
>
> So your (primitive) theory is that there is a physical reality with us
> inside.
> With comp I do not have to derive the the possibility of at least one form
> of physical implementation of all of those representations, I got them from
> the intensional variant of self-reference.
>
>
>
>
>
> Well, that will give a conservative extension of PA. So it changes nothing,
> except for a trivial explanation of the existence of you, which, probably
> like adding primitive matter, can only make the relation between the "real
> comp stephen(s)" and STEPHEN quite mysterious.
>
>
>     OK, but you forgot to notice that you have to do that same extension for
> each and every possible entity that can be named; so we have at least a
> countable infinity of theories such as:
>
> "Ax ~(0 = s(x))  (For all number x the successor of x is different from
> zero). With
> AxAy ~(x = y) -> ~(s(x) = s(y))    (different numbers have different
> successors)
> Ax x + 0 = x  (0 adds nothing)
> AxAy  x + s(y) = s(x + y)   ( meaning x + (y +1) = (x + y) +1)
> Ax   x *0 = 0
> AxAy x*s(y) = x*y + x
> ExAy(x = S & (Bew(y) -> S(y)).
> With S a new constant term, denoting you in the union of the standard model
> of arithmetic with {you}.
> Where {you} is a referent of the class of entities that can make and note
> differences."
>
>     The argument that I am making, indeed maybe a sketch of a proof, is that
> these ASCII strings have a meaning only because there exists the possibility
> that they can be implemented as some pattern of differences in a substrate
> capable of being differentiated. If this substrate is epiphenomena then the
> possibility of meaningfulness itself vanishes.
>
>
> But the substrate is not an epiphenomenon. As a primitive thing, it does not
> exist, but it exist as a number's phenomenon.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If that is the case, I encourage you to make that precise, and to study comp
> and computer science to even just define "non-comp".
> That will not be easy. AUDA works, for example, for many transfinite
> sequences of weakening of comp.
>
>
>     However one might "weaken comp" it still requires the possibility of
> implementation in a substrate no matter how universal it might be.
>
>
> Why? Once you have N and +, and *, you can't avoid the universal numbers and
> all their relative implementations.
> And numbers get an explanation why some implementations (like the quantum
> one) are observable in they neighborhood (by first person indeterminacy).
>
>
>     Explanations that contradict themselves are not explanations, they are
> maybe myths or "just so" tales.
>
>
> You failed in showing a contradiction.
> All I see is a non scientific notion of "neutral monism" which can destroy
> *any* theory, including the vague one like yours.
> You are in contradiction, though. You need a so neutral existence that
> no-one can derive anything from it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Universality merely makes the computation free from specific physical
> implementations, it does *NOT* obviate the need for the possibility of
> physical implementation.
>
>
> It does obviate that needs. That's the consequence of UDA-step-8
> specifically. The physical implementations are just very particular
> computations occurring below our level of substitution, where all universal
> numbers compete. It is the consequence of the global first person
> indeterminacy with respect to the sigma_1 complete arithmetical truth.
>
>
>
>     UDA-step-8 must be physically implemented to be distinguishable from any
> other of the countable(?) infinity of finite strings of symbols, thus if
> physical implementation is "epiphenomena" then so is the meanign of
> UDA-step-1 or UDA-step2 or ..., UDA-step-8.
>
>
> ?
> You confuse levels of explanation.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Ideal monism still fails because it contradicts the requirement that it be
> meaningful.
>
>
> Sure. Comp is neutral monist. The mind is "easily" explained by computer
> science, and the self-reference logic is a shortcut. It is an interview of a
> wise universal number.
>
>
>    It is "neutral monist" only if it satisfied the requirements of neutral
> monism. I have repeatedly shown here in this post how it does not and thus
> your claim is false.
>
>
> It does not, but nothing does. Not even "existence".
>
>
>
> There is no such thing as an interview of a number, wise or ignorant, if we
> also claim that the physical world is epiphenomena.
>
>
> The primitive physical world is not existing at all. So it is not an
> epiphenomenon.
> The physical world is a phenomenon, not an epiphenomenon.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Something cannot be said to be meaningful when there is no object (that it
> is not) to whom it has a meaning.
>
>
> But if you say "yes" to the doctor, you have to understand that arithmetic
> truth is full of such "whom".
>
>
>     Yes, and I can know the "whom" only because it is possible to physically
> write a string of symbols on a substrate that has semi-permanence over time.
>
>
> You can repeat this a billions times, but that will not make it true. You
> have to make clear your assumption and present an argument.  Why would that
> argument also not apply to the string "existence exists". If it applies,
> then what you are saying is that we have to postulate a physical primitive
> reality. If it does not apply, then you put some incredible magic in the
> sentence "existence exists".
>
>
>
> If such is not permissible then there can be no "to whom".
>
>
> To claim the opposite is to claim that "I can have meaning to my self but I
> have no self".
>
>
> The 8 hypostases, which no universal machine/numbers can avoid, are given by
> their self-reference logics. Once you say "yes" to the doctor, you can trust
> computer science on the notion of self. It is were theoretical computer
> science excels the most. The key tool is again diagonalization. The 8
> hypostases are 8 variants of the universal number's self, for any self
> believing in the arithmetical induction axioms (or equivalent).
>
>
>     I cannot trust any idea that contradicts itself even to the point of
> eliminating its meaningfulness. To do so your to bet on a sure loser. There
> is an escape from this conundrum: admit that neither the numbers nor the
> physical is primitive and embrace truly neutral monism and its dualistic
> finite model.
>
>
> You cannot derive arithmetic from less than arithmetic. So your neutral
> monism, if it makes some sense (which I don't believe), but even if it could
> make sense, would make comp non sensical.
> If you don't assume or believe in elementary arithmetic, there is nothing I
> can do to help.
> But I know that you do believe in arithmetic, so I feel now that your theory
> is inconsistent, which is not bad for a so much vague and quasi-absent
> theory+ a philosophical assumption preventing any theory (your neutral
> monism is so neutral that it is an epiphenomenon at the start, I think, to
> sum up).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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