On 01 Feb 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 2/1/2012 3:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:I don't get it.Many people have discussed this idea that Existence, in-itself,is primitive and neutral (has no properties or divisions). It is notoriginal with me. For example, Bertrand Russell's discussion ofneutral monism and Russell Standish's ToN explain it well.

`There might exist phenomenological hermeneutic of the monist kind, but`

`this, once we chose to do science, is a private affair, which can`

`inspire but cannot be communicated.`

`So by a neutral monist theory, its is meant a theory which does not`

`assume mind, nor matter, and explain them from something else. That`

`something else needs to be able to be described in first order logic,`

`at least. It should have terms for the existing objects, and axioms`

`for the laws to which those objects obey. Without those two`

`components, we can do nothing.`

What I ask is a scientific theory, by which I mean a first orderlogical theory about what you assume to exist, and then theoremsjustifying the other form that "existence" can take.All that does not contradict itself and is thus necessarilypossible exists, thus I claim that existence is necessarypossibility.That's an old idea in philosophy. It is the indexical idea thatexistence is consistence seen from inside. In first order logic itmakes a lot of sense, given that consistence is equivalent with theexistence of a model.And in AUDA, the necessity of the possibility of p, BDp, is theconsequence of sigma_1 truth, and its leads to an arithmeticalquantization. Here Bp is for (Bew(p) & Diamond("1=1")), and Dp is(Diamond(p) v Bew(f) 'relative consistency)). p is sigma_1.Once you are using notion of necessity or possibility, beingprecise forces you to suggest in which modal logic you are working,and how you justify it. There are infinities of modal logics.UDA justifies the use of the self-reference modal logic, and theirvariants. Gödel's results (and Löb's one, and Solovay) don't letmany possible choice for the ideally correct machines. The variantdescribed above are the one needed to find the correct physic(correct with respect to comp, if you get UDA).I don't know if comp is true or not, but comp makes theoreticalcomputer science a lantern to find the key. It allows amathematical formulation of many subproblems of the (comp) mindbody problem.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/Hi Bruno,On these particulars we can agree. Our only disagreement is thatyou seem to consider that Arithmetic is at the same level as bareExistence and I see bare existence as neutral and that both logics(including arithmetic) and physicality are non-primitive.

`Then tell me what you mean by "Existence", and show me how you derive`

`logics, arithmetic and physicality from that.`

`Unfortunately, people mature enough in logic know that you can't do`

`that. No formal arithmetic can be deduced from anything less than`

`itself.`

`Our beliefs in the natural numbers is authentically mysterious. But`

`with comp we can, and we must, explain everything from them. And it`

`works, because arithmetic emulate the ... self-referential resonance`

`of numbers, which appears to be very rich and full of surprise.`

Have you noticed that I claim that the duality that I am consideringvanishes at the level of Existence itself?

I have still not the slightest clue of what you mean by "Existence".

This is because we cannot consider Existence to be partitionedwithout specifying a basis for the partition, in other words ourontological models have to start at our level of substitution andcannot remain coherent if we subtract out our existence as entitiesthat can distinguish, for example, 0 from 1.

`This does not follow logically. We, the distinguishers of 0 and 1,`

`certainly exist at some level, from some point of view. But that`

`existence might be derivable (and is derivable) in arithmetic, once we`

`assume comp.`

`Some aspect of it are not derivable, and yet are still true and`

`existing, and can be meta-justified for simpler machines than us, so`

`that we can grasp them indirectly, including our incompleteness with`

`respect to those truth, and which comes from our local relative`

`finiteness.`

`If not, like Craig, perhaps like Rex Allen and Benjayk, you are`

`postulating that comp is false.`

`If that is the case, I encourage you to make that precise, and to`

`study comp and computer science to even just define "non-comp".`

`That will not be easy. AUDA works, for example, for many transfinite`

`sequences of weakening of comp.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.