On 2/2/2012 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Feb 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/1/2012 3:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't get it.

Many people have discussed this idea that Existence, in-itself, is primitive and neutral (has no properties or divisions). It is not original with me. For example, Bertrand Russell's discussion of neutral monism and Russell Standish's ToN explain it well.

There might exist phenomenological hermeneutic of the monist kind, but this, once we chose to do science, is a private affair, which can inspire but cannot be communicated.

Hi Bruno,

I do not understand what "phenomenological hermeneutic of the monist kind" is.

So by a neutral monist theory, its is meant a theory which does not assume mind, nor matter, and explain them from something else. That something else needs to be able to be described in first order logic, at least. It should have terms for the existing objects, and axioms for the laws to which those objects obey. Without those two components, we can do nothing.

Neutral monism does not assume that mind or matter have primitive existence. Neutral monism considers that both Mind and Matter emerge from a common neutral ground that is, in-itself, neither. My proposed dualism becomes neutral monism in the limit of lower levels of entities (assuming well foundedness <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-founded_relation>). This is different from "material monism" that assumes that the material physical would is primitive, or "ideal monism" that assumes that Mind is primitive. Your ideas seems to be a form of Ideal Monism.

What I ask is a scientific theory, by which I mean a first order logical theory about what you assume to exist, and then theorems justifying the other form that "existence" can take.

All that does not contradict itself and is thus necessarily possible exists, thus I claim that existence is necessary possibility.

That's an old idea in philosophy. It is the indexical idea that existence is consistence seen from inside. In first order logic it makes a lot of sense, given that consistence is equivalent with the existence of a model. And in AUDA, the necessity of the possibility of p, BDp, is the consequence of sigma_1 truth, and its leads to an arithmetical quantization. Here Bp is for (Bew(p) & Diamond("1=1")), and Dp is (Diamond(p) v Bew(f) 'relative consistency)). p is sigma_1.

Once you are using notion of necessity or possibility, being precise forces you to suggest in which modal logic you are working, and how you justify it. There are infinities of modal logics. UDA justifies the use of the self-reference modal logic, and their variants. Gödel's results (and Löb's one, and Solovay) don't let many possible choice for the ideally correct machines. The variant described above are the one needed to find the correct physic (correct with respect to comp, if you get UDA).

I don't know if comp is true or not, but comp makes theoretical computer science a lantern to find the key. It allows a mathematical formulation of many subproblems of the (comp) mind body problem.

On these particulars we can agree. Our only disagreement is that you seem to consider that Arithmetic is at the same level as bare Existence and I see bare existence as neutral and that both logics (including arithmetic) and physicality are non-primitive.
Then tell me what you mean by "Existence", and show me how you derive logics, arithmetic and physicality from that. Unfortunately, people mature enough in logic know that you can't do that. No formal arithmetic can be deduced from anything less than itself.

It is a basic axiom of ontology, but not the only one. It is a necessary but not sufficient part of any ontology. I do not understand how the idea that I am discussing is confusing to you! Existence (noun) exists (verb). I am not claiming that it alone is stipulated. What does the word "exist", as in "A number exists" mean? What does the word "existence" in the following sentence "the existence of numbers in independent of any particular person or persons knowledge of them" mean? Am I being unclear?

Our beliefs in the natural numbers is authentically mysterious. But with comp we can, and we must, explain everything from them. And it works, because arithmetic emulate the ... self-referential resonance of numbers, which appears to be very rich and full of surprise.
I reject that our belief in numbers is "mysterious" as we can easily match up one set of objects with another set of different objects. We can observe physical objects, we can distinguish between them as they are present in differing locations or, if present in the same location, are located at differing times. Objects can have a wide variety of properties that our observations can determine. This is kindergarten material, Bruno, why are we tripping all over it as if it where a conundrum or requiring many years of meditation and training?

Have you noticed that I claim that the duality that I am considering vanishes at the level of Existence itself?
I have still not the slightest clue of what you mean by "Existence".

Is it possible for you to think of the most primitive ontological level, prior to even hypostases? What is "at" that level? Bare and naked Existence, undifferentiated, unnamed and raw. It is obviously neutral with respect to properties and it cannot be a property for if Existence where a property then it could not be a fundamental primitive as it would necessarily supervene on something deeper.

This is because we cannot consider Existence to be partitioned without specifying a basis for the partition, in other words our ontological models have to start at our level of substitution and cannot remain coherent if we subtract out our existence as entities that can distinguish, for example, 0 from 1.
This does not follow logically. We, the distinguishers of 0 and 1, certainly exist at some level, from some point of view. But that existence might be derivable (and is derivable) in arithmetic, once we assume comp.
We must assume existence as prior to even numbers, for numbers are, at least, differentiated aspects of existence. A "differentiated aspect of existence" is a thing, it is not existence per se. You are thinking of existence as being dependent on something else. It simply cannot be dependent as it is neither a property or emergent. It seems that you need to take a review course in Ontology! http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#Ont

Some aspect of it are not derivable, and yet are still true and existing, and can be meta-justified for simpler machines than us, so that we can grasp them indirectly, including our incompleteness with respect to those truth, and which comes from our local relative finiteness.
That a logical sentence is true and that it exists are completely different situations that must not be conflated or considered at the same level. You seem to tacitly assume that numbers have properties completely independent of the ability of any entity of knowing of them. This is what I call the error of "implicit meaningfulness". A string of numbers, combinatorials, hierarchical sets or whatever, stripped of all relation to the possibility of physical instantiation, is less than a "ghost of a departed quantity", it is vacuous and vapid. This is obvious Platonism, and it fails for the same reason that Plato's theory of Forms fails. It cannot account for knowledge, even in the /Theaetet/ian sense, because prior to the consideration of what "Bp&p" is as different from "%r*0" or "Pb&b" or "1234" or ... as a possible meaningful statement, it has no meaning. This is the inevitable flaw of idealism: taking Mind or Consciousness as a singular primitive removes the possibility of distiguishing what something *is* from *what it is not*. Additionally, absent the ability that space and time provide to multiply representations of values, concepts, and other mental objects, there is simply no more than undifferentiated oneness. The ability to distinguish "this" from "that" requires the physical and cannot be sustained in its absence. For example, in your result you use the notion of teleportation and digital substitution. Both of these concepts require the multiplicity of place and time that the physical world gives to be coherent, therefore your result cannot even be considered absent the physical. The idea of "implementing the UD" requires that it is possible for a physical system to implement it. This does *NOT* mean that the physical is primitive in the ontological sense, but neither does the UD itself exist as a primitive "idea". Neither ideas nor physical objects can be fundamental primitives as they require each other for their actuality. You wrote in http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm :

"Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)."

This assumes that the "arithmetical Platonia" has specific properties that involve distinctions between them to follow simply from the necessary possibility of the sentence "Arithmetical Platonia exists". This is a hollow and empty statement as absent the disctinctions that the physical world provides, there can be no Platonia except as a abstraction within the thoughts of conscious entities. You are assuming that you can have all of the gifts of consciousness without having to pay the price of consciousness. Sorry, Bruno, there is no free lunch. The mere existence of numbers does nothing at all to indicate their properties.

If not, like Craig, perhaps like Rex Allen and Benjayk, you are postulating that comp is false.

No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to isomorphisms) as primitives. I am trying to point out the obvious and even trivial fact that comp is meaningless and mute as an explanatory model or "result" absent the physical world with its chalkboards, paper, computer screens, etc. Its existence, per se, has nothing to do with its meaningfulness. You wrote: "Physics is given by a measure on the consistent computational /histories/, or /maximal/ consistent extensions as seen from some first person point of view." What exactly is this "First Person point of view" if there is nothing that can act as such by your account? You wrote: "Laws of physics, in particular, should be inferable from the true verifiable "atomic sentences"." Inferable by *what* or *whom*? The Atomic sentences themselves can do nothing at all, must less "infer" anything from themselves because they have no means to reflect back upon themselves. Even a Godel Number must be different from that it is representing in some way. "The number seven is prime" is meaningless if we cannot write it down somewhere and somehow and evaluate its implications.

If that is the case, I encourage you to make that precise, and to study comp and computer science to even just define "non-comp". That will not be easy. AUDA works, for example, for many transfinite sequences of weakening of comp.

However one might "weaken comp" it still requires the possibility of implementation in a substrate no matter how universal it might be. Universality merely makes the computation free from specific physical implementations, it does *NOT* obviate the need for the possibility of physical implementation. Ideal monism still fails because it contradicts the requirement that it be meaningful. Something cannot be said to be meaningful when there is no object (that it is not) to whom it has a meaning. To claim the opposite is to claim that "I can have meaning to my self but I have no self".



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