On 2/9/2012 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite rise
to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject line
"Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument is
self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to communicate
it. I point out that this problem can easily be resolved by putting
the abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level as its
interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you resist.
You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you
pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism?
I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains many
form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like 'octalism'.
I don't see that you distinguish between the ontological nature of
the representation of a theory in terms of mathematics and the
mathematics itself. You seem to identify the representation with the
object but never explicitly. I am simply asking you why not? Could you
elaborate on this "octalism" and how does it relate to a neutral monism.
How is its neutrality defined?
That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of
Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.
It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.
But I could, if I had the skill with words, construct a theory of
pink unicorns that would have the same degree of structure and make the
same claims. How would I test it against yours? That is the problem. If
a theory claims that the physical world does not exist then it throws
away the very means to test it. It becomes by definition unfalsifiable.
Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the
interactions between minds a priori.
How is it neutral when it takes a certain set of properties as
ontologically primitive? Neutral monism cannot do that or it violates
the very definition of neutrality. Can you not see this? Additionally,
you have yet to show exactly how interactions between minds are defined.
All I have see is discussion of a plurality of minds, but no where is
there anything like an example in detail that considered the interaction
of one mind with another. I know that minds do interact, my proof is the
fact that this email discussion is occurring, and that is evidence
enough. But how does your result explain it?
Only UDA shows that we have to explain matter entirely through dream
interferences (say). That is a success, because it explains
conceptually the origin of the physical laws, and the explanation is
constructive, once we agree on the classical axioms for knowledge,
making comp testable.
But that is a problem because we have to chose a set of axioms to
agree upon and there is potentially an infinite number of axioms. I am
reminded of the full extent of Pascal's /Gambit/
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_Wager>. There is no a priori
way of knowing which definition of god is the correct one. Pascal's
situation and the situation with Bp&p makes truth a mere accident. Maybe
this is OK for you, but not for me. Maybe I demand too much from
explanations of our world, but I ask that they at least explain the
necessity of the appearances without asking me to believe in the
explanation by blind faith.
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