On 2/9/2012 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite rise to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject line "Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument is self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to communicate it. I point out that this problem can easily be resolved by putting the abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level as its interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you resist.

You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism? I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains many form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like 'octalism'.


Hi Bruno,

I don't see that you distinguish between the ontological nature of the representation of a theory in terms of mathematics and the mathematics itself. You seem to identify the representation with the object but never explicitly. I am simply asking you why not? Could you elaborate on this "octalism" and how does it relate to a neutral monism. How is its neutrality defined?

That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.

It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.

But I could, if I had the skill with words, construct a theory of pink unicorns that would have the same degree of structure and make the same claims. How would I test it against yours? That is the problem. If a theory claims that the physical world does not exist then it throws away the very means to test it. It becomes by definition unfalsifiable.

Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the interactions between minds a priori.

How is it neutral when it takes a certain set of properties as ontologically primitive? Neutral monism cannot do that or it violates the very definition of neutrality. Can you not see this? Additionally, you have yet to show exactly how interactions between minds are defined. All I have see is discussion of a plurality of minds, but no where is there anything like an example in detail that considered the interaction of one mind with another. I know that minds do interact, my proof is the fact that this email discussion is occurring, and that is evidence enough. But how does your result explain it?

Only UDA shows that we have to explain matter entirely through dream interferences (say). That is a success, because it explains conceptually the origin of the physical laws, and the explanation is constructive, once we agree on the classical axioms for knowledge, making comp testable.

But that is a problem because we have to chose a set of axioms to agree upon and there is potentially an infinite number of axioms. I am reminded of the full extent of Pascal's /Gambit/ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_Wager>. There is no a priori way of knowing which definition of god is the correct one. Pascal's situation and the situation with Bp&p makes truth a mere accident. Maybe this is OK for you, but not for me. Maybe I demand too much from explanations of our world, but I ask that they at least explain the necessity of the appearances without asking me to believe in the explanation by blind faith.



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