On 09 Feb 2012, at 17:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/9/2012 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite rise to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the subject line "Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your argument is self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means to communicate it. I point out that this problem can easily be resolved by putting the abstract aspect of COMP at the same ontological level as its interpersonal expressions, but this implies dualism which you resist.

You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism? I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains many form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like 'octalism'.


Hi Bruno,

I don't see that you distinguish between the ontological nature of the representation of a theory in terms of mathematics and the mathematics itself.


You seem to identify the representation with the object but never explicitly.

On the contrary. When you say "yes" to the doctor, you identify yourself as a relative number, relative to some universal system you bet on. So, with comp, we make precise where and when, and how, we identify something and its local 3p incarnation. Else where, we keep distinct the terms and their intepretations (by universal numbers), which are many.

I am simply asking you why not? Could you elaborate on this "octalism" and how does it relate to a neutral monism. How is its neutrality defined?

Neutrality is defined more or less like in Spinoza. It is something, which makes sense, and is neither mind, nor body. With comp UDA proves, or is supposed to prove, to you, that with comp, arithmetic (or recursively equivalent) is both necessary, and enough.
The octalism are the eight hypostases I have already described:
Bp & p
Bp & Dt
Bp & Dt & p

Which are 5 distinct variant of self-reference (Bp, Godël's beweisbar('p'), p (sigma_1- arithmetical sentences).

The G/G* splitting, the difference between what machine can prove and what is true about them" is inherited in three of those variants leading to 8 hypostases. The three above matches well Plotinus "ONE, INTELLECT and SOUL", and the two last, which both splits, matches well the two MATTER notion of Plotinus, which is a "simple" platonic correction of an idea of Aristotle. But I found the matter hypostases as an attempt to define the measure one on the computational histories when observed in self-duplicating machines. Physics is given by the material hypostases, and the "G*" (divine, true) parts give the logic of qualia. Quanta have to be part of it form making quantum indeterminacy coherent with the comp indeterminacy, and this saves comp from solipsism and allow interactions, and first person plural notion, although this indeed has not yet been proved. Good difficult exercise.

That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences of Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between minds.

It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.

But I could, if I had the skill with words, construct a theory of pink unicorns that would have the same degree of structure and make the same claims.

Then do it, and let us compare it to comp.

How would I test it against yours? That is the problem.

I have no theory. Today probably 99% of the scientist believes in comp (not always consciously), and in some primariness of physics. I just explain that this does not work.

As a logician, I just explain that comp and materialism are not compatible. The fundamental realm is computer science, and technically we can extract the many dreams structure from number theory, including intensional theory (with relative role to numbers, like codes).

If a theory claims that the physical world does not exist then it throws away the very means to test it.

I can't agree more.

It becomes by definition unfalsifiable.


The whole point is that comp proves the physical reality to be observable. Physical reality exists, but is not primitive.

Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the interactions between minds a priori.

How is it neutral when it takes a certain set of properties as ontologically primitive? Neutral monism cannot do that or it violates the very definition of neutrality.

Something exist, right? Monism just take it as being neutral on the body or mind side.
That should not prevent the ontology to be clear and intelligible.

Can you not see this? Additionally, you have yet to show exactly how interactions between minds are defined.

I have yet to prove the existence of a particle.

The result is that anyone betting on comp is obliged do that, or to disprove the existence of an electron, refuting comp.

Of course it is not technically easy, we are quickly led to open problem in mathematical logic, but the contrary would have been astonishing.

All I have see is discussion of a plurality of minds, but no where is there anything like an example in detail that considered the interaction of one mind with another. I know that minds do interact, my proof is the fact that this email discussion is occurring, and that is evidence enough. But how does your result explain it?

I am the one explaining that indeed we have to explain that, if we assume comp, and we have to explain it from the interview of the numbers themselves. AUDA explains how to do that in all detail, and up to know we get of course general but non trivial information, like an arithmetical quantization. I formulate the problem, and show the conceptual revolution it force us to do by accepting that physicalness is the border of something else, which from inside is *very* big, but from outside is just arithmetical truth.

Only UDA shows that we have to explain matter entirely through dream interferences (say). That is a success, because it explains conceptually the origin of the physical laws, and the explanation is constructive, once we agree on the classical axioms for knowledge, making comp testable.

But that is a problem because we have to chose a set of axioms to agree upon and there is potentially an infinite number of axioms.

But that is the case for *any* theory.
Comp + the classical theory of knowledge is just simple, and believed (for good of bad reasons).

I am reminded of the full extent of Pascal's Gambit. There is no a priori way of knowing which definition of god is the correct one.

OK. That's a good refutation of Pascal Gambit.

Pascal's situation and the situation with Bp&p makes truth a mere accident.

Not at all. Malebranche see the mechanist point, not Pascal. And the relative probabilities should prevent comp from occasionalism. Just that the proposition "truth is no accident" will belong to the non communicable part of the machine, preventing the correct machine from the argument per authority.

Maybe this is OK for you, but not for me.

You confuse Pascal and Malebranche, to be short. But anyway, you said that you assume comp in your theory, and everything I say follows from comp (normally).

Maybe I demand too much from explanations of our world, but I ask that they at least explain the necessity of the appearances without asking me to believe in the explanation by blind faith.

That is *exactly* my point.

If comp is true, we have to explain the appearance of matter, and this without postulating it. Mainly by showing how and why machine discover physics by pure self-introspection.

I explain that if comp is true, the physical universe, including your head, *is* in your head. That gives a lovely non well founded structure, BTW.

I show this is true for all universal numbers. I show that there exist Löbian numbers who can already describe what they see when looking in their head, so we can compare with the laws we infer from observation.

I just show that Everett' theory "comp+QM" is redundant. I explain that if comp is true, then QM has to be a theorem in comp. That's all. I show evidence that it is the case, and got in passing that arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, which shows how far comp is revolutionary (with respect to current Aristotelianism in metaphysics).

Unlike John Clark, I would say, that if he was a bad philosopher, he was an excellent physicist and excellent theologian, because modern physics refutes his physics, and comp refute his theology. And that is the mark of great theories, to be refuted after some time. To allow progress.


PS I am losing my connection.


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