On 09 Feb 2012, at 17:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/9/2012 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Feb 2012, at 13:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
My best expression of my "theory", although it does not quite
rise to that level, is in my last response to ACW under the
subject line "Ontological problems of COMP". My claim is that your
argument is self-refuting as it claims to prohibit the very means
to communicate it. I point out that this problem can easily be
resolved by putting the abstract aspect of COMP at the same
ontological level as its interpersonal expressions, but this
implies dualism which you resist.
You keep telling me that you defend neutral monism, and now you
pretend that I am wrong because I resist to dualism?
I have explained that comp, and thus arithmetic alone, explains
many form of dualism, all embedded in a precise Plotionian-like
'octalism'.
[SPK]
Hi Bruno,
I don't see that you distinguish between the ontological nature
of the representation of a theory in terms of mathematics and the
mathematics itself.
?
You seem to identify the representation with the object but never
explicitly.
On the contrary. When you say "yes" to the doctor, you identify
yourself as a relative number, relative to some universal system you
bet on. So, with comp, we make precise where and when, and how, we
identify something and its local 3p incarnation. Else where, we keep
distinct the terms and their intepretations (by universal numbers),
which are many.
I am simply asking you why not? Could you elaborate on this
"octalism" and how does it relate to a neutral monism. How is its
neutrality defined?
Neutrality is defined more or less like in Spinoza. It is something,
which makes sense, and is neither mind, nor body. With comp UDA
proves, or is supposed to prove, to you, that with comp, arithmetic
(or recursively equivalent) is both necessary, and enough.
The octalism are the eight hypostases I have already described:
p
Bp
Bp & p
Bp & Dt
Bp & Dt & p
Which are 5 distinct variant of self-reference (Bp, Godël's
beweisbar('p'), p (sigma_1- arithmetical sentences).
The G/G* splitting, the difference between what machine can prove and
what is true about them" is inherited in three of those variants
leading to 8 hypostases. The three above matches well Plotinus "ONE,
INTELLECT and SOUL", and the two last, which both splits, matches well
the two MATTER notion of Plotinus, which is a "simple" platonic
correction of an idea of Aristotle. But I found the matter hypostases
as an attempt to define the measure one on the computational histories
when observed in self-duplicating machines. Physics is given by the
material hypostases, and the "G*" (divine, true) parts give the logic
of qualia. Quanta have to be part of it form making quantum
indeterminacy coherent with the comp indeterminacy, and this saves
comp from solipsism and allow interactions, and first person plural
notion, although this indeed has not yet been proved. Good difficult
exercise.
That is your choice, but you need to understand the consequences
of Ideal monism. It has no explanation for interactions between
minds.
It is not a matter of choice, but of proof in theoretical framework.
[SPK]
But I could, if I had the skill with words, construct a theory
of pink unicorns that would have the same degree of structure and
make the same claims.
Then do it, and let us compare it to comp.
How would I test it against yours? That is the problem.
I have no theory. Today probably 99% of the scientist believes in comp
(not always consciously), and in some primariness of physics. I just
explain that this does not work.
As a logician, I just explain that comp and materialism are not
compatible. The fundamental realm is computer science, and technically
we can extract the many dreams structure from number theory, including
intensional theory (with relative role to numbers, like codes).
If a theory claims that the physical world does not exist then it
throws away the very means to test it.
I can't agree more.
It becomes by definition unfalsifiable.
Sure.
The whole point is that comp proves the physical reality to be
observable. Physical reality exists, but is not primitive.
Then the neutral arithmetical monism explains very well the
interactions between minds a priori.
[SPK]
How is it neutral when it takes a certain set of properties as
ontologically primitive? Neutral monism cannot do that or it
violates the very definition of neutrality.
Something exist, right? Monism just take it as being neutral on the
body or mind side.
That should not prevent the ontology to be clear and intelligible.
Can you not see this? Additionally, you have yet to show exactly how
interactions between minds are defined.
I have yet to prove the existence of a particle.
The result is that anyone betting on comp is obliged do that, or to
disprove the existence of an electron, refuting comp.
Of course it is not technically easy, we are quickly led to open
problem in mathematical logic, but the contrary would have been
astonishing.
All I have see is discussion of a plurality of minds, but no where
is there anything like an example in detail that considered the
interaction of one mind with another. I know that minds do interact,
my proof is the fact that this email discussion is occurring, and
that is evidence enough. But how does your result explain it?
I am the one explaining that indeed we have to explain that, if we
assume comp, and we have to explain it from the interview of the
numbers themselves. AUDA explains how to do that in all detail, and up
to know we get of course general but non trivial information, like an
arithmetical quantization.
I formulate the problem, and show the conceptual revolution it force
us to do by accepting that physicalness is the border of something
else, which from inside is *very* big, but from outside is just
arithmetical truth.
Only UDA shows that we have to explain matter entirely through
dream interferences (say). That is a success, because it explains
conceptually the origin of the physical laws, and the explanation
is constructive, once we agree on the classical axioms for
knowledge, making comp testable.
But that is a problem because we have to chose a set of axioms
to agree upon and there is potentially an infinite number of axioms.
But that is the case for *any* theory.
Comp + the classical theory of knowledge is just simple, and believed
(for good of bad reasons).
I am reminded of the full extent of Pascal's Gambit. There is no a
priori way of knowing which definition of god is the correct one.
OK. That's a good refutation of Pascal Gambit.
Pascal's situation and the situation with Bp&p makes truth a mere
accident.
Not at all. Malebranche see the mechanist point, not Pascal. And the
relative probabilities should prevent comp from occasionalism. Just
that the proposition "truth is no accident" will belong to the non
communicable part of the machine, preventing the correct machine from
the argument per authority.
Maybe this is OK for you, but not for me.
You confuse Pascal and Malebranche, to be short. But anyway, you said
that you assume comp in your theory, and everything I say follows from
comp (normally).
Maybe I demand too much from explanations of our world, but I ask
that they at least explain the necessity of the appearances without
asking me to believe in the explanation by blind faith.
That is *exactly* my point.
If comp is true, we have to explain the appearance of matter, and this
without postulating it. Mainly by showing how and why machine discover
physics by pure self-introspection.
I explain that if comp is true, the physical universe, including
your head, *is* in your head. That gives a lovely non well founded
structure, BTW.
I show this is true for all universal numbers. I show that there exist
Löbian numbers who can already describe what they see when looking in
their head, so we can compare with the laws we infer from observation.
I just show that Everett' theory "comp+QM" is redundant. I explain
that if comp is true, then QM has to be a theorem in comp. That's all.
I show evidence that it is the case, and got in passing that
arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, which shows how far comp is
revolutionary (with respect to current Aristotelianism in metaphysics).
Unlike John Clark, I would say, that if he was a bad philosopher, he
was an excellent physicist and excellent theologian, because modern
physics refutes his physics, and comp refute his theology. And that is
the mark of great theories, to be refuted after some time. To allow
progress.
Bruno
PS I am losing my connection.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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