On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:14, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net > wrote:
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false.
Hi Joseph,

I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of " bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory and why one has to have something else in addition to propositions.

? Of course. The proposition heve to bear on something. But that's the case with arithmetic. We have numbers, universal numbers, their discourses, their experiences (defined with the intensional variants of G and G*), etc. On the contrary: UDA shows that you cannot add anything to it, without loosing the ability to distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Adding something might be useful in practice, but is conceptually a red herring.

This 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic as underlying structure.

You can't even compare "physical matter" (a metaphysical unclear controversial notion) and quantum logic (a formal system). Then you dismiss that comp already provides a couple of quantum logics exactly where UDA predicts it should be (on the measure 1 on consistent continuations). But now, it seems that you are assuming physical matter, contradicting your neutral monism.

This latter possibility works because of the non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional structure to derive the Born postulate.

And arithmetic gives exactly that, a quantum logic enriched by non trivial arithmetical constraints.

If we consider that they only can have this "side by side equivalence" in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is dependent on the choice,
How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet. Just because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal credence, doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming from.
One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and a selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting scheme to be possible.

You talk like if comp did not provide this, but it does.

The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or "fundamental".

I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to be, for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able to be generated or implemented somehow, otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or known. Would it even be a concept?

UDA is an informal (but rigorous) argument. I guess you mean UD. The UD is already implemented, infinitely often in arithmetic. Implementation is an arithmetical notions, as I have explain to you already.

Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer observes several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton mass, broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then reasonably concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his experience in the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is asleep, his brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the primitiveness of his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion.
This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known to contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences which are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream can deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for that "physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it as "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be "unreal".

That is incorrect. The dreamer can develop a belief in comp, extract the physics from it and then compare with the content of dream. this is actually what happen with QM. We know from the observation of nature that nature conforms (up to now) to the startling consequences of comp, like indeterminacy, MW, non locality, non cloning, core physical symmetries, etc.

It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever legitimately say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a cold day, or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I am dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take my reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!)

Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle issue.

No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that such a situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well as the possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives. Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist interpretation of it.

Comp eliminates the primary-materialist unclear metaphysical superstition, not the matter as we observe it.

One has to have real alternative states that co-exist at the level level even if they support propositions that are mutually contradictory.

We can't buy this if by "real" you mean primarily physical, which also contradicts you own neutral monism, which really does no more look neutral.

The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of arithmetic truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively stable substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.
How do you know this?


OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one Arithmetic Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a pair of non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs.

There is only one arithmetical truth (the standard one). I guess you mean arithmetical machine, or universal numbers, or Löbian machine.

To be consistent, we cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the per-assumed possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as primitive. Does this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like Descartes with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material interact?

They don't. The material is a construct of the mental. The mental is the first person point of view of universal numbers.

I claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions interact?

Pratt dualism should be embeddable in the dualities between the hypostases. The G/Z modality explains already the reversal of the arrows. If not comp, or Pratt is false. Comp makes just the situation mathematically richer and more precise.



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