On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:14, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]
> wrote:
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
[JK]
Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false.
Hi Joseph,
I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a
single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of "
bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP
based theory and why one has to have something else in addition to
propositions.
? Of course. The proposition heve to bear on something. But that's the
case with arithmetic. We have numbers, universal numbers, their
discourses, their experiences (defined with the intensional variants
of G and G*), etc.
On the contrary: UDA shows that you cannot add anything to it, without
loosing the ability to distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Adding
something might be useful in practice, but is conceptually a red
herring.
This 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum
logic as underlying structure.
You can't even compare "physical matter" (a metaphysical unclear
controversial notion) and quantum logic (a formal system). Then you
dismiss that comp already provides a couple of quantum logics exactly
where UDA predicts it should be (on the measure 1 on consistent
continuations).
But now, it seems that you are assuming physical matter, contradicting
your neutral monism.
This latter possibility works because of the non-distributive nature
of its logic but it requires additional structure to derive the Born
postulate.
And arithmetic gives exactly that, a quantum logic enriched by non
trivial arithmetical constraints.
If we consider that they only can have this "side by side
equivalence" in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their
truth value is dependent on the choice,
[JK]
How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct
bet. Just because you hold two contradictory propositions to have
equal credence, doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where
this is coming from.
[SPK]
One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives
and a selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a
betting scheme to be possible.
You talk like if comp did not provide this, but it does.
[JK]
The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or
"fundamental".
[SPK]
I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. What you need
to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to be, for it to
be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able to be
generated or implemented somehow, otherwise it is much like a
concept that cannot be communicated or known. Would it even be a
concept?
UDA is an informal (but rigorous) argument. I guess you mean UD. The
UD is already implemented, infinitely often in arithmetic.
Implementation is an arithmetical notions, as I have explain to you
already.
Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer
observes several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong
proton mass, broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He
then reasonably concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he
reduces his experience in the dream to a "more fundamental"
physical reality wherein he is asleep, his brain is in state X, and
so on. He is therefore denying the primitiveness of his
dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion.
[SPK]
This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be
known to contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of
experiences which are a standard of correctness against which the
content of the dream can deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences
another world except for that "physics violating" version it would
never know and would accept it as "real", in fact it would have no
reason to consider that it might be "unreal".
That is incorrect. The dreamer can develop a belief in comp, extract
the physics from it and then compare with the content of dream. this
is actually what happen with QM. We know from the observation of
nature that nature conforms (up to now) to the startling consequences
of comp, like indeterminacy, MW, non locality, non cloning, core
physical symmetries, etc.
[JK]
It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is
dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever
legitimately say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting
hotter on a cold day, or have conversations with long-dead
relatives, I cannot say that I am dreaming, because if I am
dreaming then there is no reason to take my reasoning seriously. (A
lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!)
Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle
issue.
[SPK]
No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that
such a situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as
well as the possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in"
alternatives. Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows
how 1p indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the
eliminatist interpretation of it.
Comp eliminates the primary-materialist unclear metaphysical
superstition, not the matter as we observe it.
One has to have real alternative states that co-exist at the level
level even if they support propositions that are mutually
contradictory.
We can't buy this if by "real" you mean primarily physical, which also
contradicts you own neutral monism, which really does no more look
neutral.
The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is
singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of
arithmetic truths and for this to be possible there has to be a
relatively stable substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.
[JK]
How do you know this?
[SPK]
OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one
Arithmetic Truth act upon another such that there is a difference
between a pair of non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs.
There is only one arithmetical truth (the standard one). I guess you
mean arithmetical machine, or universal numbers, or Löbian machine.
To be consistent, we cannot project the ATs into and onto entities
that have the per-assumed possibility of interaction or not, we have
to take them as primitive. Does this construction even make sense?
No! If we force it then we find ourselves, as evaluators of those
ATs, in a quandary much like Descartes with his version of dualism.
How does the mental and material interact?
They don't. The material is a construct of the mental. The mental is
the first person point of view of universal numbers.
I claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A
better question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or
propositions interact?
Pratt dualism should be embeddable in the dualities between the
hypostases. The G/Z modality explains already the reversal of the
arrows. If not comp, or Pratt is false. Comp makes just the situation
mathematically richer and more precise.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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