On 15 February 2012 16:27, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> OK?
>

Thanks, that helped a lot.  Sorry about the initial misunderstanding.

David

>
> On 15 Feb 2012, at 01:21, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 14 February 2012 20:00, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>>  The reductio demolishes the possibility of this
>>>> being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components
>>>> have, in effect, been rendered impotent.
>>>
>>>
>>> Gosh? Why?
>>>
>>
>> Bruno, I think we must be at cross-purposes.  I thought that the gist
>> of both your and Maudlin's reductio arguments is the absurdity of
>> associating conscious states with arbitrarily low or null physical
>> activity, if one assumes that matter is primitive.
>
>
> Those reasoning are reductio ad absurdo starting from the physical
> supervenience thesis (PST).
> The idea (used by comp materialist) is that consciousness is associated to
> the physical activity needed to accomplish a computation, then MGA/Maudlin
> shows that if that is true then consciousness can be associated with
> arbitrary physical activity, or even with null physical activity, showing
> the absurdity of the physical supervenience thesis.
> Keeping comp we associate consciousness with the abstract computation,
> together with a weigh inherited by the "natural" redundancy of the
> somputations in the UD* or in arithmetic.
>
> Note that the PST can be criticized along the line of a a critics of Searles
> Chinese room argument, because PST, by associating the consciousness to the
> physical level already makes a level confusion (but this will not convince a
> religious believer in the role of matter, and MGA get a more thorough
> contradiction.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> Maudlin's
>> conclusion (retaining the primitiveness assumption): CTM is false.
>> Your conclusion: save CTM by reversing the relation of
>> matter-mechanism.  Isn't this how it goes?
>
>
> Yes, maudlin and MGA shows that PST (or materialism) and COMP are
> incompatible.
> Both reasoning shows the equivalent formula:
>
> MAT -> ~COMP
> COMP -> ~MAT
> ~MAT V ~COMP
> ~(MAT & COMP)
>
> I was working in COMP, so I get ~MAT.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> So now let's assume computational supervenience as you propose and
>> reconsider Maudlin's arguments.
>> Presumably we aren't now in a position
>> to deploy the same reductio argument with respect to "primitively
>> physical" activity, because surely the alternative of computational
>> supervenience was deployed precisely to save CTM by rescuing us from
>> that horn of the dilemma.
>
>
> Yes. We are saved from the paradox/epistemological contradiction.
>
>
>
>
>> So my question was, in effect, what
>> implication would this have for saying "yes" to a doctor who proposed
>> a partial brain substitution by some such contrivance as that
>> described by Maudlin?  In short ;-)
>
>
> From your 1p view, you survive in the reality (here: sheaf of computational
> histories) where your brains functions "correctly", because the abstract
> computation (by definition of computation) has the correct counterfactuals.
>
> And for the external observer, like the doctor, you (the first person)
> remain or not conscious as far as you behave "correctly", but the
> consciousness is no more associated with any physical activity at (be it
> done by a brain or a movie graph). Your consciousness is associated with the
> sheaves of computation in arithmetic, no more with any physical activity,
> given that PST, and the idea of ontological matter is abandoned. The
> "concrete" brain/machine is needed only for your consciousness to be
> manifestable relatively to some sheaf of computations.
>
> Now, this can only work, if the sheaf of computations has the good
> statistics justifying the persistence of the physical laws, by UDA1-7, but
> this means that the physical laws have to be justified in term of relative
> statistics on the computations. So physics continue to work (if comp is
> true), but is no more primitive. If the statistics on computations does not
> explains physics, then comp is refuted. The self-reference logics illustrate
> that physics might very well continue to work, despite we might think a
> priori that there exists too much aberrant histories.
>
> OK?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>> On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's
>>>> machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its
>>>> computational states.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. More precisely, in virtue of a bet we make on some local UM (the
>>> computer, the boolean laser graph) to relate those states relatively to
>>> us.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>  The reductio demolishes the possibility of this
>>>> being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components
>>>> have, in effect, been rendered impotent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gosh? Why? It means just that we are at the place where we understand
>>> that
>>> we will have to justify the persistent appearances of those physical
>>> components from the computational structure (arithmetic).
>>> We abandon physical supervenience, but we keep comp, so it is the place
>>> where we associate our actual current mind no more to one phi_i(j)^k,
>>> say,
>>> but to the infinity of one (1p-indiscernible) belonging to the trace of
>>> the
>>> UD (say).
>>>
>>> Then the fact that we can survive with an physical artificial brain,
>>> means
>>> only that above the substitution level, there is a intelligible reality
>>> with
>>> stable universal beings (billiard, ball, computer, brain, chemical laws,
>>> etc.). Nevertheless, stable can only mean that for the majority of
>>> phi_i(j)^k "coding" us, the local universal beings belongs like us to
>>> those
>>> computation too. Our computations are contagious, if you want, so that we
>>> share a deep level of substitution with our environment (in some sense).
>>> The
>>> quantum tensor confirms this aspect of comp, in Everett QM. And normally
>>> the
>>> arithmetical quantization (BDp in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) should justify
>>> this
>>> too (but this is complex technically).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> So are you saying that, if
>>>> one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism
>>>> reversal,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you mean by this?
>>> I am not sure it is the place to add a postulate.
>>> Could you elaborate on this?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> either of these two devices can indeed be considered to
>>>> instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but "qua
>>>> computatio" rather than "qua materia"?  Or not?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The consciousness is in Platonia, or in arithmetic. "you" are a local
>>> universal history (the running of a computer) but intricated to a finite
>>> number of computers (universal machines, other beings) themselves sharing
>>> with you infinities of more lower grained computations, below the
>>> substitution level. So you are a very complex double clouds of numbers,
>>> if
>>> you want a picture, with both a big important set of finite numbers
>>> (changing all the time), and infinities of big and bigger invariant
>>> numbers
>>> competing in the building of your continuations. It is a whole complex
>>> process from which emerges at infinity (but instantaneously from the 1p
>>> view) the coupling consciousness/realities.
>>>
>>> So, does the device instantiate consciousness? No.
>>> Does a brain instantiate consciousness? No.
>>>
>>> All what a device, a brain, or a well adapted machine (to probable
>>> environment/computation) can do, is make higher the probability of a
>>> person
>>> to get a continuation in a similar environment. The big picture has to
>>> conflict with the internal intuition, because, when "alive", it looks
>>> like
>>> we (first person plural) are singularize in some spatio-temporal unique
>>> history. This appearance has to be justified, and that' why I interview
>>> the
>>> UMs on the question, which can already partially justify it (at the
>>> propositional level).
>>>
>>> Comp does not solve the mind-body problem, but it reduces the mind-body
>>> problem into a body problem in arithmetic, or a body problem appearance,
>>> in
>>> arithmetic. It shows the realm where the laws of physics come from
>>> (basically nulber theory).
>>> It shows also that the solution is in the head of all universal machines,
>>> and that by interviewing them and their true extension (provided by the
>>> double self-reference logics) we can get both the provable and the
>>> unprovable but true part (at the propositional modal level, to begin
>>> with).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming
>>>>>>> COMP,
>>>>>>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical
>>>>>>> system.
>>>>>>> Not
>>>>>>> even a little.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection
>>>>>> that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph
>>>>>> setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of
>>>>>> physics-mechanism is actually accepted.  Clearly, we now have to
>>>>>> regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a
>>>>>> deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is
>>>>>> currently related.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  But what are we now to make of the original
>>>>>> proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an
>>>>>> actual conscious state?  After all, we don't regard them as
>>>>>> "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the
>>>>>> reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The "material
>>>>> aspect" of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely
>>>>> many
>>>>> computations going through our current state, but such a current state
>>>>> does
>>>>> still exist by the initial assumption.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> They're part of the
>>>>>> general computational state of affairs, like everything else.  Is it
>>>>>> that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for
>>>>>> consciousness,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement
>>>>> the
>>>>> right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not
>>>>> accept
>>>>> the
>>>>> digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> because their physical behaviour is the result of
>>>>>> "accidentally" contrived relations?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very
>>>>> well
>>>>> founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The
>>>>> math
>>>>> might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white
>>>>> rabbit,
>>>>> but this is not yet the case.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>  IOW, they're not really UM's in
>>>>>> any relevant sense.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ?
>>>>> There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist
>>>>> (in
>>>>> arithmetic), and then the "observable local UMs", who bodies emerge
>>>>> from
>>>>> the
>>>>> competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their
>>>>> substitution
>>>>> level.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> But then wouldn't the same argument for
>>>>>> contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough
>>>>> to
>>>>> provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that
>>>>> very
>>>>> possibility testable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm puzzled.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King
>>>>>>> <stephe...@charter.net>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King
>>>>>>>> <stephe...@charter.net>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi ACW,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or
>>>>>>>>> religion),
>>>>>>>>> that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However,
>>>>>>>>> let's
>>>>>>>>> try
>>>>>>>>> and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an
>>>>>>>>> assumption:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a
>>>>>>>>> digital
>>>>>>>>> substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to
>>>>>>>>> implement/run
>>>>>>>>> such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would
>>>>>>>>> have a
>>>>>>>>> continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>>  Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff"
>>>>>>>>> with another such that the functionality (that allows for the
>>>>>>>>> implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing
>>>>>>>>> equivalence!))
>>>>>>>>> program
>>>>>>>>> to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> this substitution can be the replacement of completely different
>>>>>>>>> kinds
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> require
>>>>>>>>> a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of
>>>>>>>>> smoothly
>>>>>>>>> morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive
>>>>>>>>> level.
>>>>>>>>> B/c of
>>>>>>>>> this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws,
>>>>>>>>> but
>>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>> it really?
>>>>>>>>>  What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint
>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>> the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff"
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> material world is more about properties that remain invariant under
>>>>>>>>> sets of
>>>>>>>>> symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like
>>>>>>>>> "primitive"
>>>>>>>>> substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants
>>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>>> derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is
>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>> trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> COMP
>>>>>>>>> is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the
>>>>>>>>> appearance
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is
>>>>>>>>> invariant
>>>>>>>>> and not
>>>>>>>>> primitive.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true,
>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>> to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the
>>>>>>>>> shorter
>>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>>> to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the
>>>>>>>>> UDA,
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any
>>>>>>>>> role
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some
>>>>>>>>> role.
>>>>>>>>> So if
>>>>>>>>> comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> alone.
>>>>>>>>> Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have
>>>>>>>>> already
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non
>>>>>>>>> locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the
>>>>>>>>> consistency:
>>>>>>>>> the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter
>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>> use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can
>>>>>>>>> sum
>>>>>>>>> up
>>>>>>>>> the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman
>>>>>>>>> answer
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually
>>>>>>>>> complete.
>>>>>>>>> Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the
>>>>>>>>> mind-body
>>>>>>>>> problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are
>>>>>>>>> conceptually
>>>>>>>>> complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and
>>>>>>>>> uncompletable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to
>>>>>>>>> define
>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>> from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that
>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>> primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a
>>>>>>>>> theory.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi Bruno,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a
>>>>>>>>> problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing
>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many
>>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>>> internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity.
>>>>>>>>> This is
>>>>>>>>> illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff" can vary while
>>>>>>>>> preserving
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from
>>>>>>>>> neutral
>>>>>>>>> monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it.
>>>>>>>>>  Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that
>>>>>>>>> "COMP
>>>>>>>>> is true" or "COMP is false". In order to have a coherent notion of
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> bet,
>>>>>>>>> both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false" have to exist side by side
>>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>>> equivalently possible.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Joseph,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a
>>>>>>>> single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of "
>>>>>>>> bracketing
>>>>>>>> shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based
>>>>>>>> theory
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. This
>>>>>>>> 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> underlying structure. This latter possibility works because of the
>>>>>>>> non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional
>>>>>>>> structure to
>>>>>>>> derive the Born postulate.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If we consider that they only can have this "side by side
>>>>>>>>> equivalence"
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is
>>>>>>>>> dependent
>>>>>>>>> on the choice,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct
>>>>>>>> bet.
>>>>>>>> Just
>>>>>>>> because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal
>>>>>>>> credence,
>>>>>>>> doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming
>>>>>>>> from.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>  One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting
>>>>>>>> scheme
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> be possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ok, but how is the "truth value dependent on the choice"?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> truth is independent of belief. We have to look at COMP from the
>>>>>>>>> point
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically
>>>>>>>>> resisted
>>>>>>>>> doing this. Why?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I
>>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>>> just a
>>>>>>>>> curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me
>>>>>>>>> learn.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to
>>>>>>>>> reinstall a physical realism.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular realism
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> the sense of property definiteness prior to observation. We do not
>>>>>>>>> need
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> go through all of the no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In
>>>>>>>>> fact,
>>>>>>>>> the logic of QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one
>>>>>>>>> form
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> Boolean representation because it is only representable as an
>>>>>>>>> Orthocomplete
>>>>>>>>> Lattice. An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of
>>>>>>>>> them
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> an a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between any
>>>>>>>>> dualization
>>>>>>>>> of a
>>>>>>>>> finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces of the same # of
>>>>>>>>> dimension
>>>>>>>>> that shows this same property.
>>>>>>>>>  OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by
>>>>>>>>> identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we
>>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>>> many
>>>>>>>>> observers, each with a set of local observables so that the
>>>>>>>>> collection
>>>>>>>>> acts
>>>>>>>>> like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questions game.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and
>>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>>> belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons:
>>>>>>>>>  a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that
>>>>>>>>> consciousness
>>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional /
>>>>>>>>> organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> such a
>>>>>>>>> principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not
>>>>>>>>> correspond
>>>>>>>>> to brain states and p. zombies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical
>>>>>>>>> parallelism.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical
>>>>>>>>> physical
>>>>>>>>> *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical
>>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>>> see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> logics
>>>>>>>>> of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no
>>>>>>>>> psycho-physical
>>>>>>>>> parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? An illusion
>>>>>>>>> cannot act
>>>>>>>>> as a coherent substrate upon which representations can be
>>>>>>>>> implemented.
>>>>>>>>> So in
>>>>>>>>> effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitor with
>>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> you
>>>>>>>>> are reading this email, and the whiteboards upon which you write
>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>> symbolic systems of equations and your eyes that read this and
>>>>>>>>> everything
>>>>>>>>> else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> truth can be compared to another.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or
>>>>>>>> "fundamental".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>  I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming
>>>>>>> COMP,
>>>>>>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical
>>>>>>> system.
>>>>>>> Not
>>>>>>> even a little.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to
>>>>>>>> be,
>>>>>>>> for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be
>>>>>>>> able
>>>>>>>> to be
>>>>>>>> generated or implemented somehow,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or
>>>>>>>> known.
>>>>>>>> Would it even be a concept?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ?????
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer
>>>>>>>> observes
>>>>>>>> several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton
>>>>>>>> mass,
>>>>>>>> broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then
>>>>>>>> reasonably
>>>>>>>> concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his
>>>>>>>> experience
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is
>>>>>>>> asleep,
>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>> brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the
>>>>>>>> primitiveness of
>>>>>>>> his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>  This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences
>>>>>>>> which
>>>>>>>> are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream
>>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>>> deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> "physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be
>>>>>>>> "unreal".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I agree.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is
>>>>>>>> dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever
>>>>>>>> legitimately
>>>>>>>> say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a
>>>>>>>> cold
>>>>>>>> day,
>>>>>>>> or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I
>>>>>>>> am
>>>>>>>> dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take
>>>>>>>> my
>>>>>>>> reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle
>>>>>>>> issue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that
>>>>>>>> such
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> OK, but would you affirm or reject the statement "One cannot
>>>>>>> legitimately
>>>>>>> say 'I am dreaming'"? If you affirm it, you would be consistent with
>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>> you have said about the UDA, but I think you would be incorrect for
>>>>>>> obvious
>>>>>>> reasons. If you deny it then either you are being inconsistent or I
>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>> misunderstood you.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p
>>>>>>>> indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist
>>>>>>>> interpretation of it. One has to have real alternative states that
>>>>>>>> co-exist
>>>>>>>> at the level level even if they support propositions that are
>>>>>>>> mutually
>>>>>>>> contradictory.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is
>>>>>>>>> singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively
>>>>>>>>> stable
>>>>>>>>> substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> How do you know this?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one
>>>>>>>> Arithmetic
>>>>>>>> Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a
>>>>>>>> pair
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs. To be consistent,
>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>> cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the
>>>>>>>> per-assumed
>>>>>>>> possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as
>>>>>>>> primitive.
>>>>>>>> Does
>>>>>>>> this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find
>>>>>>>> ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like
>>>>>>>> Descartes
>>>>>>>> with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material
>>>>>>>> interact?
>>>>>>>> I
>>>>>>>> claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better
>>>>>>>> question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions
>>>>>>>> interact?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying, but I will look at
>>>>>>> Pratt's
>>>>>>> stuff. Like I mentioned, I can't read them at full comprehension just
>>>>>>> yet.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism
>>>>>>>>> holds.
>>>>>>>>> A
>>>>>>>>> dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate
>>>>>>>>> substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are
>>>>>>>>> two
>>>>>>>>> distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel
>>>>>>>>> tracks. As
>>>>>>>>> Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the
>>>>>>>>> physical
>>>>>>>>> processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite
>>>>>>>>> directions.
>>>>>>>>> Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory
>>>>>>>>> diagram
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> this duality:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ---- > X -----> Y ----->
>>>>>>>>>       |           |
>>>>>>>>> <----- A <------B <-----
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms
>>>>>>>>> contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between
>>>>>>>>> "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does
>>>>>>>>> reverse
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or
>>>>>>>>> anti-parallelism,
>>>>>>>>> though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>  The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an
>>>>>>>>> informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to
>>>>>>>>> comprehend
>>>>>>>>> it
>>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>>> just your discussion of the hypostases.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [JK]
>>>>>>>> I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a
>>>>>>>> little
>>>>>>>> technical, either.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [SPK]
>>>>>>>>  I am hopeful that Bruno will see the benefit in writing this
>>>>>>>> description up.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Onward!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Stephen
>>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Joseph Knight
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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