On 15 February 2012 16:27, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > OK? >
Thanks, that helped a lot. Sorry about the initial misunderstanding. David > > On 15 Feb 2012, at 01:21, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 14 February 2012 20:00, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>>> The reductio demolishes the possibility of this >>>> being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components >>>> have, in effect, been rendered impotent. >>> >>> >>> Gosh? Why? >>> >> >> Bruno, I think we must be at cross-purposes. I thought that the gist >> of both your and Maudlin's reductio arguments is the absurdity of >> associating conscious states with arbitrarily low or null physical >> activity, if one assumes that matter is primitive. > > > Those reasoning are reductio ad absurdo starting from the physical > supervenience thesis (PST). > The idea (used by comp materialist) is that consciousness is associated to > the physical activity needed to accomplish a computation, then MGA/Maudlin > shows that if that is true then consciousness can be associated with > arbitrary physical activity, or even with null physical activity, showing > the absurdity of the physical supervenience thesis. > Keeping comp we associate consciousness with the abstract computation, > together with a weigh inherited by the "natural" redundancy of the > somputations in the UD* or in arithmetic. > > Note that the PST can be criticized along the line of a a critics of Searles > Chinese room argument, because PST, by associating the consciousness to the > physical level already makes a level confusion (but this will not convince a > religious believer in the role of matter, and MGA get a more thorough > contradiction. > > > > > > >> Maudlin's >> conclusion (retaining the primitiveness assumption): CTM is false. >> Your conclusion: save CTM by reversing the relation of >> matter-mechanism. Isn't this how it goes? > > > Yes, maudlin and MGA shows that PST (or materialism) and COMP are > incompatible. > Both reasoning shows the equivalent formula: > > MAT -> ~COMP > COMP -> ~MAT > ~MAT V ~COMP > ~(MAT & COMP) > > I was working in COMP, so I get ~MAT. > > > > > >> >> So now let's assume computational supervenience as you propose and >> reconsider Maudlin's arguments. >> Presumably we aren't now in a position >> to deploy the same reductio argument with respect to "primitively >> physical" activity, because surely the alternative of computational >> supervenience was deployed precisely to save CTM by rescuing us from >> that horn of the dilemma. > > > Yes. We are saved from the paradox/epistemological contradiction. > > > > >> So my question was, in effect, what >> implication would this have for saying "yes" to a doctor who proposed >> a partial brain substitution by some such contrivance as that >> described by Maudlin? In short ;-) > > > From your 1p view, you survive in the reality (here: sheaf of computational > histories) where your brains functions "correctly", because the abstract > computation (by definition of computation) has the correct counterfactuals. > > And for the external observer, like the doctor, you (the first person) > remain or not conscious as far as you behave "correctly", but the > consciousness is no more associated with any physical activity at (be it > done by a brain or a movie graph). Your consciousness is associated with the > sheaves of computation in arithmetic, no more with any physical activity, > given that PST, and the idea of ontological matter is abandoned. The > "concrete" brain/machine is needed only for your consciousness to be > manifestable relatively to some sheaf of computations. > > Now, this can only work, if the sheaf of computations has the good > statistics justifying the persistence of the physical laws, by UDA1-7, but > this means that the physical laws have to be justified in term of relative > statistics on the computations. So physics continue to work (if comp is > true), but is no more primitive. If the statistics on computations does not > explains physics, then comp is refuted. The self-reference logics illustrate > that physics might very well continue to work, despite we might think a > priori that there exists too much aberrant histories. > > OK? > > Bruno > > > > >> >> David >> >> >>> On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's >>>> machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its >>>> computational states. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes. More precisely, in virtue of a bet we make on some local UM (the >>> computer, the boolean laser graph) to relate those states relatively to >>> us. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> The reductio demolishes the possibility of this >>>> being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components >>>> have, in effect, been rendered impotent. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gosh? Why? It means just that we are at the place where we understand >>> that >>> we will have to justify the persistent appearances of those physical >>> components from the computational structure (arithmetic). >>> We abandon physical supervenience, but we keep comp, so it is the place >>> where we associate our actual current mind no more to one phi_i(j)^k, >>> say, >>> but to the infinity of one (1p-indiscernible) belonging to the trace of >>> the >>> UD (say). >>> >>> Then the fact that we can survive with an physical artificial brain, >>> means >>> only that above the substitution level, there is a intelligible reality >>> with >>> stable universal beings (billiard, ball, computer, brain, chemical laws, >>> etc.). Nevertheless, stable can only mean that for the majority of >>> phi_i(j)^k "coding" us, the local universal beings belongs like us to >>> those >>> computation too. Our computations are contagious, if you want, so that we >>> share a deep level of substitution with our environment (in some sense). >>> The >>> quantum tensor confirms this aspect of comp, in Everett QM. And normally >>> the >>> arithmetical quantization (BDp in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) should justify >>> this >>> too (but this is complex technically). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> So are you saying that, if >>>> one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism >>>> reversal, >>> >>> >>> >>> What do you mean by this? >>> I am not sure it is the place to add a postulate. >>> Could you elaborate on this? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> either of these two devices can indeed be considered to >>>> instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but "qua >>>> computatio" rather than "qua materia"? Or not? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The consciousness is in Platonia, or in arithmetic. "you" are a local >>> universal history (the running of a computer) but intricated to a finite >>> number of computers (universal machines, other beings) themselves sharing >>> with you infinities of more lower grained computations, below the >>> substitution level. So you are a very complex double clouds of numbers, >>> if >>> you want a picture, with both a big important set of finite numbers >>> (changing all the time), and infinities of big and bigger invariant >>> numbers >>> competing in the building of your continuations. It is a whole complex >>> process from which emerges at infinity (but instantaneously from the 1p >>> view) the coupling consciousness/realities. >>> >>> So, does the device instantiate consciousness? No. >>> Does a brain instantiate consciousness? No. >>> >>> All what a device, a brain, or a well adapted machine (to probable >>> environment/computation) can do, is make higher the probability of a >>> person >>> to get a continuation in a similar environment. The big picture has to >>> conflict with the internal intuition, because, when "alive", it looks >>> like >>> we (first person plural) are singularize in some spatio-temporal unique >>> history. This appearance has to be justified, and that' why I interview >>> the >>> UMs on the question, which can already partially justify it (at the >>> propositional level). >>> >>> Comp does not solve the mind-body problem, but it reduces the mind-body >>> problem into a body problem in arithmetic, or a body problem appearance, >>> in >>> arithmetic. It shows the realm where the laws of physics come from >>> (basically nulber theory). >>> It shows also that the solution is in the head of all universal machines, >>> and that by interviewing them and their true extension (provided by the >>> double self-reference logics) we can get both the provable and the >>> unprovable but true part (at the propositional modal level, to begin >>> with). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming >>>>>>> COMP, >>>>>>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical >>>>>>> system. >>>>>>> Not >>>>>>> even a little. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection >>>>>> that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph >>>>>> setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of >>>>>> physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to >>>>>> regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a >>>>>> deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is >>>>>> currently related. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> OK. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But what are we now to make of the original >>>>>> proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an >>>>>> actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as >>>>>> "primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the >>>>>> reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The "material >>>>> aspect" of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely >>>>> many >>>>> computations going through our current state, but such a current state >>>>> does >>>>> still exist by the initial assumption. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> They're part of the >>>>>> general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it >>>>>> that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for >>>>>> consciousness, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement >>>>> the >>>>> right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not >>>>> accept >>>>> the >>>>> digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> because their physical behaviour is the result of >>>>>> "accidentally" contrived relations? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very >>>>> well >>>>> founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The >>>>> math >>>>> might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white >>>>> rabbit, >>>>> but this is not yet the case. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> IOW, they're not really UM's in >>>>>> any relevant sense. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ? >>>>> There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist >>>>> (in >>>>> arithmetic), and then the "observable local UMs", who bodies emerge >>>>> from >>>>> the >>>>> competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their >>>>> substitution >>>>> level. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> But then wouldn't the same argument for >>>>>> contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough >>>>> to >>>>> provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that >>>>> very >>>>> possibility testable. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm puzzled. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> David >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King >>>>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King >>>>>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi ACW, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or >>>>>>>>> religion), >>>>>>>>> that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, >>>>>>>>> let's >>>>>>>>> try >>>>>>>>> and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an >>>>>>>>> assumption: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a >>>>>>>>> digital >>>>>>>>> substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to >>>>>>>>> implement/run >>>>>>>>> such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would >>>>>>>>> have a >>>>>>>>> continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>>> Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff" >>>>>>>>> with another such that the functionality (that allows for the >>>>>>>>> implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing >>>>>>>>> equivalence!)) >>>>>>>>> program >>>>>>>>> to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> this substitution can be the replacement of completely different >>>>>>>>> kinds >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does >>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> require >>>>>>>>> a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of >>>>>>>>> smoothly >>>>>>>>> morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive >>>>>>>>> level. >>>>>>>>> B/c of >>>>>>>>> this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, >>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>> does >>>>>>>>> it really? >>>>>>>>> What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint >>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> material world is more about properties that remain invariant under >>>>>>>>> sets of >>>>>>>>> symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like >>>>>>>>> "primitive" >>>>>>>>> substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is >>>>>>>>> what >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>> trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> COMP >>>>>>>>> is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the >>>>>>>>> appearance >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is >>>>>>>>> invariant >>>>>>>>> and not >>>>>>>>> primitive. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the >>>>>>>>> shorter >>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>> to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the >>>>>>>>> UDA, >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any >>>>>>>>> role >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some >>>>>>>>> role. >>>>>>>>> So if >>>>>>>>> comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from >>>>>>>>> arithmetic >>>>>>>>> alone. >>>>>>>>> Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have >>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non >>>>>>>>> locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the >>>>>>>>> consistency: >>>>>>>>> the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter >>>>>>>>> cannot >>>>>>>>> use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can >>>>>>>>> sum >>>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>> the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman >>>>>>>>> answer >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually >>>>>>>>> complete. >>>>>>>>> Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the >>>>>>>>> mind-body >>>>>>>>> problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are >>>>>>>>> conceptually >>>>>>>>> complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and >>>>>>>>> uncompletable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to >>>>>>>>> define >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a >>>>>>>>> theory. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Bruno, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a >>>>>>>>> problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing >>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many >>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>> internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. >>>>>>>>> This is >>>>>>>>> illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff" can vary while >>>>>>>>> preserving >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from >>>>>>>>> neutral >>>>>>>>> monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. >>>>>>>>> Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that >>>>>>>>> "COMP >>>>>>>>> is true" or "COMP is false". In order to have a coherent notion of >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> bet, >>>>>>>>> both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false" have to exist side by side >>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>> equivalently possible. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Joseph, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a >>>>>>>> single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of " >>>>>>>> bracketing >>>>>>>> shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. This >>>>>>>> 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> underlying structure. This latter possibility works because of the >>>>>>>> non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional >>>>>>>> structure to >>>>>>>> derive the Born postulate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If we consider that they only can have this "side by side >>>>>>>>> equivalence" >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is >>>>>>>>> dependent >>>>>>>>> on the choice, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct >>>>>>>> bet. >>>>>>>> Just >>>>>>>> because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal >>>>>>>> credence, >>>>>>>> doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming >>>>>>>> from. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting >>>>>>>> scheme >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> be possible. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ok, but how is the "truth value dependent on the choice"? >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> truth is independent of belief. We have to look at COMP from the >>>>>>>>> point >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically >>>>>>>>> resisted >>>>>>>>> doing this. Why? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I >>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>> just a >>>>>>>>> curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me >>>>>>>>> learn. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to >>>>>>>>> reinstall a physical realism. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular realism >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> the sense of property definiteness prior to observation. We do not >>>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> go through all of the no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In >>>>>>>>> fact, >>>>>>>>> the logic of QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one >>>>>>>>> form >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> Boolean representation because it is only representable as an >>>>>>>>> Orthocomplete >>>>>>>>> Lattice. An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of >>>>>>>>> them >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> an a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between any >>>>>>>>> dualization >>>>>>>>> of a >>>>>>>>> finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces of the same # of >>>>>>>>> dimension >>>>>>>>> that shows this same property. >>>>>>>>> OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by >>>>>>>>> identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we >>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> many >>>>>>>>> observers, each with a set of local observables so that the >>>>>>>>> collection >>>>>>>>> acts >>>>>>>>> like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questions game. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: >>>>>>>>> a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that >>>>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / >>>>>>>>> organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> such a >>>>>>>>> principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not >>>>>>>>> correspond >>>>>>>>> to brain states and p. zombies. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical >>>>>>>>> parallelism. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical >>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>> *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical >>>>>>>>> truth >>>>>>>>> see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> logics >>>>>>>>> of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no >>>>>>>>> psycho-physical >>>>>>>>> parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? An illusion >>>>>>>>> cannot act >>>>>>>>> as a coherent substrate upon which representations can be >>>>>>>>> implemented. >>>>>>>>> So in >>>>>>>>> effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitor with >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> are reading this email, and the whiteboards upon which you write >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> symbolic systems of equations and your eyes that read this and >>>>>>>>> everything >>>>>>>>> else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one >>>>>>>>> arithmetic >>>>>>>>> truth can be compared to another. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or >>>>>>>> "fundamental". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming >>>>>>> COMP, >>>>>>> consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical >>>>>>> system. >>>>>>> Not >>>>>>> even a little. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to >>>>>>>> be, >>>>>>>> for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be >>>>>>>> able >>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>> generated or implemented somehow, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or >>>>>>>> known. >>>>>>>> Would it even be a concept? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ????? >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer >>>>>>>> observes >>>>>>>> several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton >>>>>>>> mass, >>>>>>>> broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then >>>>>>>> reasonably >>>>>>>> concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his >>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is >>>>>>>> asleep, >>>>>>>> his >>>>>>>> brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the >>>>>>>> primitiveness of >>>>>>>> his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>> deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> "physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be >>>>>>>> "unreal". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is >>>>>>>> dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever >>>>>>>> legitimately >>>>>>>> say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a >>>>>>>> cold >>>>>>>> day, >>>>>>>> or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>> dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take >>>>>>>> my >>>>>>>> reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle >>>>>>>> issue. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK, but would you affirm or reject the statement "One cannot >>>>>>> legitimately >>>>>>> say 'I am dreaming'"? If you affirm it, you would be consistent with >>>>>>> what >>>>>>> you have said about the UDA, but I think you would be incorrect for >>>>>>> obvious >>>>>>> reasons. If you deny it then either you are being inconsistent or I >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> misunderstood you. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p >>>>>>>> indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist >>>>>>>> interpretation of it. One has to have real alternative states that >>>>>>>> co-exist >>>>>>>> at the level level even if they support propositions that are >>>>>>>> mutually >>>>>>>> contradictory. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is >>>>>>>>> singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of >>>>>>>>> arithmetic >>>>>>>>> truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively >>>>>>>>> stable >>>>>>>>> substrate. There is no escape from this necessity. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> How do you know this? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one >>>>>>>> Arithmetic >>>>>>>> Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>> pair >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs. To be consistent, >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the >>>>>>>> per-assumed >>>>>>>> possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as >>>>>>>> primitive. >>>>>>>> Does >>>>>>>> this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find >>>>>>>> ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like >>>>>>>> Descartes >>>>>>>> with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material >>>>>>>> interact? >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better >>>>>>>> question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions >>>>>>>> interact? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying, but I will look at >>>>>>> Pratt's >>>>>>> stuff. Like I mentioned, I can't read them at full comprehension just >>>>>>> yet. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism >>>>>>>>> holds. >>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>> dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate >>>>>>>>> substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel >>>>>>>>> tracks. As >>>>>>>>> Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the >>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>> processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite >>>>>>>>> directions. >>>>>>>>> Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory >>>>>>>>> diagram >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> this duality: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ---- > X -----> Y -----> >>>>>>>>> | | >>>>>>>>> <----- A <------B <----- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms >>>>>>>>> contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between >>>>>>>>> "intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does >>>>>>>>> reverse >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or >>>>>>>>> anti-parallelism, >>>>>>>>> though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an >>>>>>>>> informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to >>>>>>>>> comprehend >>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> just your discussion of the hypostases. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [JK] >>>>>>>> I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a >>>>>>>> little >>>>>>>> technical, either. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [SPK] >>>>>>>> I am hopeful that Bruno will see the benefit in writing this >>>>>>>> description up. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Onward! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Stephen >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups >>>>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Joseph Knight >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups >>>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups >>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> [email protected]. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
