On 15 Feb 2012, at 01:21, David Nyman wrote:

On 14 February 2012 20:00, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

 The reductio demolishes the possibility of this
being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components
have, in effect, been rendered impotent.

Gosh? Why?


Bruno, I think we must be at cross-purposes.  I thought that the gist
of both your and Maudlin's reductio arguments is the absurdity of
associating conscious states with arbitrarily low or null physical
activity, if one assumes that matter is primitive.

Those reasoning are reductio ad absurdo starting from the physical supervenience thesis (PST). The idea (used by comp materialist) is that consciousness is associated to the physical activity needed to accomplish a computation, then MGA/Maudlin shows that if that is true then consciousness can be associated with arbitrary physical activity, or even with null physical activity, showing the absurdity of the physical supervenience thesis. Keeping comp we associate consciousness with the abstract computation, together with a weigh inherited by the "natural" redundancy of the somputations in the UD* or in arithmetic.

Note that the PST can be criticized along the line of a a critics of Searles Chinese room argument, because PST, by associating the consciousness to the physical level already makes a level confusion (but this will not convince a religious believer in the role of matter, and MGA get a more thorough contradiction.





Maudlin's
conclusion (retaining the primitiveness assumption): CTM is false.
Your conclusion: save CTM by reversing the relation of
matter-mechanism.  Isn't this how it goes?

Yes, maudlin and MGA shows that PST (or materialism) and COMP are incompatible.
Both reasoning shows the equivalent formula:

MAT -> ~COMP
COMP -> ~MAT
~MAT V ~COMP
~(MAT & COMP)

I was working in COMP, so I get ~MAT.





So now let's assume computational supervenience as you propose and
reconsider Maudlin's arguments.
Presumably we aren't now in a position
to deploy the same reductio argument with respect to "primitively
physical" activity, because surely the alternative of computational
supervenience was deployed precisely to save CTM by rescuing us from
that horn of the dilemma.

Yes. We are saved from the paradox/epistemological contradiction.



So my question was, in effect, what
implication would this have for saying "yes" to a doctor who proposed
a partial brain substitution by some such contrivance as that
described by Maudlin?  In short ;-)

From your 1p view, you survive in the reality (here: sheaf of computational histories) where your brains functions "correctly", because the abstract computation (by definition of computation) has the correct counterfactuals.

And for the external observer, like the doctor, you (the first person) remain or not conscious as far as you behave "correctly", but the consciousness is no more associated with any physical activity at (be it done by a brain or a movie graph). Your consciousness is associated with the sheaves of computation in arithmetic, no more with any physical activity, given that PST, and the idea of ontological matter is abandoned. The "concrete" brain/machine is needed only for your consciousness to be manifestable relatively to some sheaf of computations.

Now, this can only work, if the sheaf of computations has the good statistics justifying the persistence of the physical laws, by UDA1-7, but this means that the physical laws have to be justified in term of relative statistics on the computations. So physics continue to work (if comp is true), but is no more primitive. If the statistics on computations does not explains physics, then comp is refuted. The self- reference logics illustrate that physics might very well continue to work, despite we might think a priori that there exists too much aberrant histories.

OK?

Bruno




David


On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote:

On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this.


The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's
machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its
computational states.


Yes. More precisely, in virtue of a bet we make on some local UM (the
computer, the boolean laser graph) to relate those states relatively to us.






 The reductio demolishes the possibility of this
being true "qua materia", because the relevant physical components
have, in effect, been rendered impotent.


Gosh? Why? It means just that we are at the place where we understand that
we will have to justify the persistent appearances of those physical
components from the computational structure (arithmetic).
We abandon physical supervenience, but we keep comp, so it is the place where we associate our actual current mind no more to one phi_i(j)^k, say, but to the infinity of one (1p-indiscernible) belonging to the trace of the
UD (say).

Then the fact that we can survive with an physical artificial brain, means only that above the substitution level, there is a intelligible reality with stable universal beings (billiard, ball, computer, brain, chemical laws,
etc.). Nevertheless, stable can only mean that for the majority of
phi_i(j)^k "coding" us, the local universal beings belongs like us to those computation too. Our computations are contagious, if you want, so that we share a deep level of substitution with our environment (in some sense). The quantum tensor confirms this aspect of comp, in Everett QM. And normally the arithmetical quantization (BDp in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) should justify this
too (but this is complex technically).






So are you saying that, if
one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism
reversal,


What do you mean by this?
I am not sure it is the place to add a postulate.
Could you elaborate on this?




either of these two devices can indeed be considered to
instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but "qua
computatio" rather than "qua materia"?  Or not?



The consciousness is in Platonia, or in arithmetic. "you" are a local
universal history (the running of a computer) but intricated to a finite number of computers (universal machines, other beings) themselves sharing
with you infinities of more lower grained computations, below the
substitution level. So you are a very complex double clouds of numbers, if
you want a picture, with both a big important set of finite numbers
(changing all the time), and infinities of big and bigger invariant numbers competing in the building of your continuations. It is a whole complex process from which emerges at infinity (but instantaneously from the 1p
view) the coupling consciousness/realities.

So, does the device instantiate consciousness? No.
Does a brain instantiate consciousness? No.

All what a device, a brain, or a well adapted machine (to probable
environment/computation) can do, is make higher the probability of a person to get a continuation in a similar environment. The big picture has to conflict with the internal intuition, because, when "alive", it looks like we (first person plural) are singularize in some spatio-temporal unique history. This appearance has to be justified, and that' why I interview the
UMs on the question, which can already partially justify it (at the
propositional level).

Comp does not solve the mind-body problem, but it reduces the mind- body problem into a body problem in arithmetic, or a body problem appearance, in
arithmetic. It shows the realm where the laws of physics come from
(basically nulber theory).
It shows also that the solution is in the head of all universal machines, and that by interviewing them and their true extension (provided by the
double self-reference logics) we can get both the provable and the
unprovable but true part (at the propositional modal level, to begin with).

Bruno






On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote:

On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight <joseph.9...@gmail.com> wrote:

Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming
COMP,
consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system.
Not
even a little.



Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie- graph
setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of
physics-mechanism is actually accepted.  Clearly, we now have to
regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a
deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is
currently related.



OK.



 But what are we now to make of the original
proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an
actual conscious state?  After all, we don't regard them as
"primitively physical" objects any longer, so we can't now apply the
reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we?



I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The "material aspect" of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely many computations going through our current state, but such a current state
does
still exist by the initial assumption.




They're part of the
general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it
that they instantiate the "wrong" sort of computation for
consciousness,



Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement
the
right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not accept
the
digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter.




because their physical behaviour is the result of
"accidentally" contrived relations?



I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very well founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The
math
might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white
rabbit,
but this is not yet the case.




 IOW, they're not really UM's in
any relevant sense.



?
There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist
(in
arithmetic), and then the "observable local UMs", who bodies emerge from
the
competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their
substitution
level.




But then wouldn't the same argument for
contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio?



Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough to provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that
very
possibility testable.



I'm puzzled.



David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this.

Bruno





David




On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net>
wrote:



On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:



On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net>
wrote:



On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi ACW,

  Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!!

On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote:

Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or
religion),
that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However,
let's
try
and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption:

- The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a
digital
substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to
implement/run
such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would
have a
continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption?

[SPK]
Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff"
with another such that the functionality (that allows for the
implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!))
program
to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is
that
this substitution can be the replacement of completely different
kinds
of
stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not
require
a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of
smoothly
morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level.
B/c of
this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws,
but
does
it really?
What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint
from
the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of
the
material world is more about properties that remain invariant under
sets of
symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like
"primitive"
substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to
be
a
wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me
that
to
test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can
be
derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what
I
am
trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that
COMP
is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance
of
space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant
and not
primitive.


So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it
has
to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the
shorter
time
to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the
UDA,
that
whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any
role
in
consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role.
So if
comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic
alone.
Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already
the
symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non
locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the
consistency:
the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter
cannot
use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can
sum
up
the UD by "comp is not completable". It is the Bell-von Neuman answer
to
Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually
complete.
Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the
mind-body
problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the
measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are
conceptually
complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and
uncompletable.

Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define
it
from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word "existence" which is not defined, nor even a
theory.


Hi Bruno,

  You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a
problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from
an
internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many
different
internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity.
This is
illustrated by the discussion of how "stuff" can vary while
preserving
the
functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from
neutral
monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it.
Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that
"COMP
is true" or "COMP is false". In order to have a coherent notion of a
bet,
both "COMP is True" and "COMP is false" have to exist side by side as
equivalently possible.



[JK]
Yet ""COMP is true" AND "COMP is false"" is necessarily false.

Hi Joseph,

I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of " bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory
and
why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. This 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic as underlying structure. This latter possibility works because of the
non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional
structure to
derive the Born postulate.



If we consider that they only can have this "side by side
equivalence"
in
the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is
dependent
on the choice,



[JK]
How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet.
Just
because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal
credence,
doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming from.

[SPK]
One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and
a
selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting
scheme
to
be possible.




Ok, but how is the "truth value dependent on the choice"?





but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate
that
truth is independent of belief. We have to look at COMP from the
point
of
view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically
resisted
doing this. Why?



OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or
that
the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am
just a
curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn.


Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to
reinstall a physical realism.


This makes no sense to me. QM disallows for any particular realism
in
the sense of property definiteness prior to observation. We do not
need
to
go through all of the no-hidden-variable theorems again, I hope! In
fact,
the logic of QM is proven to not be faithfully capture in any one
form
of
Boolean representation because it is only representable as an
Orthocomplete
Lattice. An OL is similar but not surjective to an infinite number of Boolean Algebras and there does not exist a way to pick out one of
them
in
an a priori way. There is also the isomorphism between any
dualization
of a
finite vector space and between Hilbert spaces of the same # of
dimension
that shows this same property.
OTOH, we can use the SSA idea to pick out a Boolean algebra by identifying some sub-lattice of the OL, but this only works if we
have
many
observers, each with a set of local observables so that the
collection
acts
like the questioners in a Surprise 20 Questions game.



I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a
belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons:
a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness
is
utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional /
organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that
such a
principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not
correspond
to brain states and p. zombies.


  Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical
parallelism.


But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical
physical
*is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical
truth
see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by the
logics
of observation Bp & Dt (& p), at the G and G* levels).


  But cannot you see that this claim that "there is no
psycho-physical
parallelism" completely undermines the entire result? An illusion
cannot act
as a coherent substrate upon which representations can be
implemented.
So in
effect you are denying the existence of the computer monitor with
which
you
are reading this email, and the whiteboards upon which you write your
symbolic systems of equations and your eyes that read this and
everything
else that acts as a relatively stable substrate upon which one
arithmetic
truth can be compared to another.



[JK]
The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or
"fundamental".


[SPK]
  I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative.




Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming
COMP,
consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system.
Not
even a little.


What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to
be,
for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able
to be
generated or implemented somehow,

otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or
known.
Would it even be a concept?




?????





Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer observes several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton
mass,
broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then reasonably
concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his
experience
in
the dream to a "more fundamental" physical reality wherein he is
asleep,
his
brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the
primitiveness of
his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion.

[SPK]
This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known to contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences
which
are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream
can
deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for
that
"physics violating" version it would never know and would accept it as "real", in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be
"unreal".




I agree.




[JK]
It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is
dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever
legitimately
say "I am dreaming". If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a cold
day,
or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I am dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take my reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!)

Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is a somewhat subtle
issue.

[SPK]

No, you are making a good point. My comment in response is that such
a
situation requires the ability to distinguish alternatives as well as
the
possibility of "being in" or "finding oneself in" alternatives.




OK, but would you affirm or reject the statement "One cannot
legitimately
say 'I am dreaming'"? If you affirm it, you would be consistent with
what
you have said about the UDA, but I think you would be incorrect for
obvious
reasons. If you deny it then either you are being inconsistent or I
have
misunderstood you.


Comp covers this with the cut and paste idea and shows how 1p
indeterminism works. My only difficulty with COMP is the eliminatist interpretation of it. One has to have real alternative states that
co-exist
at the level level even if they support propositions that are mutually
contradictory.





  The physical cannot be just the arithmetic truth for such is
singular, it has to be at least the comparison between a pair of
arithmetic
truths and for this to be possible there has to be a relatively
stable
substrate. There is no escape from this necessity.



[JK]
How do you know this?


[SPK]

  OK, lets reason our way through this. How exactly does one
Arithmetic
Truth act upon another such that there is a difference between a pair
of
non-interacting ATs and a pair of interacting ATs. To be consistent,
we
cannot project the ATs into and onto entities that have the
per-assumed
possibility of interaction or not, we have to take them as primitive.
Does
this construction even make sense? No! If we force it then we find
ourselves, as evaluators of those ATs, in a quandary much like
Descartes
with his version of dualism. How does the mental and material
interact?
I
claim, with Vaughn Pratt, that they do not interact at all! A better question, asked by Pratt, is how can a pair of minds or propositions
interact?




I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying, but I will look at
Pratt's
stuff. Like I mentioned, I can't read them at full comprehension just
yet.









My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism
holds.
A
dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of "separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti- parallel
tracks. As
Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the
physical
processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite
directions.
Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram
of
this duality:

---- > X -----> Y ----->
       |           |
<----- A <------B <-----


I am OK with this. This is already derivable from the many dualisms contained in the octalist machines points of view, notably between
"intelligible" (Bp) and (matter intelligible Bp & Dt). It does
reverse
the
arrow in a way akin to Pratt. It is not a parallelism, or
anti-parallelism,
though, for the 1p and 3p are not symmetrical. Then the qualia, and
the
first person plural quanta, are given by the machine's semantics for
the
logic obeyed by Bp & Dt & p.


The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend
it
from
just your discussion of the hypostases.



[JK]
I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a
little
technical, either.

[SPK]
  I am hopeful that Bruno will see the benefit in writing this
description up.

Onward!

Stephen

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