On 2/16/2012 19:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote:
On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote:
Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all
kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia,
etc. We
intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous
behavior of
the brain is almost endless. How does this occur given COMP? But I
digress. Explaining "physical reality" is to explain the properties
it has as opposed to those that it does not, UDA does not do
that. It
even presupposes things that are simply not possible in the physical
world, such as teleportation and computations generating knowledge
without the use of resources. Even a Reversible computer requires
to compute and memory is a physical quantity.
The notion of teleportation used in UDA is nothing magical or
requiring new physics. The experiments in the UDA can be read as
someone said "yes" to the doctor and became a SIM(Substrate
Independent Mind), thus after the substitution, they can know one of
their godel numbers/programs (assuming correct observation). This
essentially means that said program state can be transmitted and
ran/instantiated anywhere you want and with any delay or order or
form. A "teleportation" from A to B would merely require the SIM to
stop itself in A, have another program transmit it to B(for example
through the Internet or some other communication channel) and have
someone run it in B, for example on a general purpose
Turing-equivalent computer or more likely a special-purpose digital
brain (for better performance within our physics) with access to an
environment(or more, such as VRs). For all intents and purposes this
isn't any different from me writing a program and you downloading it
and running it on your own hardware. For UDA 1-5 this works
For UDA 6, it also works, with changes in software. UDA 7 does make a
stronger assumption: the sufficiently robust universe, however one
doesn't really assume strong physical continuity by now (by 1-6),
so I
don't see UD even has to be coherently ran all at once and in a
continuous manner (for example a running like that in "Permutation
City" would work just well, "in the dust"). If you do consider some
other 'everything' theories like Tegmark's or Schmidhuber, they also
grant you an UD (and I would venture to say that your neutral
Existence might also grant you such robust universes). UDA 8 you seem
to disagree with, but I don't see what explanatory power could any
primitively physical structure grant you: all possible digitalised
observers and their continuations already have to be in the UD, thus
you cannot use primitive physics for prediction. Thus the only claim
that one could make for saving primitive physics would be that it
allows for consciousness to manifest (for example by implementing the
body). UDA 8 and MGA show that such a claim is specious and
unnecessary. You seem to disagree with it, although its not clear to
me as to why or how. You seem to claim that physical reality isn't
primary (COMP agrees, it emerges from arithmetical/computational
truth), although don't agree with the way it emerges in COMP or its
nature(?)? Does that mean that you don't think that all possible
observers are contained in the UD? To be frank, I'm still rather
confused at what point your theory becomes incompatible or predicts
different things than COMP (given the standard assumptions used in

Dear ACW,

Please rethink exactly what teleportation requires to be possible.
It is
not any different from the ability to copy information.

Yes, COMP assumes that there is a subst. level, which means that stuff
below the subst. level may vary (or even look like noise, due to
1p-indeterminacy, we tend to think of this, in our universe, as the
quantum foam and the like). A doctor (which is included in the
assumption, but if it weren't...) only need be able to copy/emulate
either exactly at the right subst. level or slightly below it (copying
at a higher level may entail memory loss or functionality loss or
worse). What this effectively means is that you don't need to be able
to read the full quantum state (which is not possible), but just
quasi-classical states, which we can do and which should be either at
subst. level or below. (If the subst. level was below, COMP would be
practically false, as we do assume that the observer's universal
number is at least partially stable at the subst. level). No violation
of the no-cloning theorem here. And aside from that we can
copy/transmit quasi-classical information pretty well.


There is a problem with this way of thinking in that it assumes that all
of the properties of objects are inherent in the objects themselves and
have no relation or dependence on anything else. This is is wrong. We
know from our study of QM and the experiments that have been done, that
the properties of objects are definite because of interdependence and
interconnections (via entanglement) between all things within our event
horizon. You seem to be laboring under the classical Newtonian view. To
have a consistent and real idea of teleportation one has to consider,
for example, the requirements of quantum teleportation
The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main
assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can eventually
implement the brain (or a partial version of it) in a (modified)
TM-equivalent machine (by CTT). It does not deny the quantum reality,
merely says that the brain's functionality required for consciousness
is classical (and turing-emulable). Although, I suppose some versions
including oracles should be possible, and a weakening of COMP into
simple functionalism may also be possible.


I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English papers
and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not need to keep
repeating the same lines. ;-)

The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the
existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument
follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there
still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is possible
*in principle*, I just direct you at
www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merely
requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you if
MWI happens to be true).

Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions that
might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea of a
random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of lottery
winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main problem is that
one has no control at all over which numbers will pop up, so one has to
substitute a scheme to select numbers after they have "rolled into the
This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals are
embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.
You can buy or build various RNGs which utilize quantum effects (or even use freely available ones), see:
Many others exist.

If MWI is true, some of these devices will generate true random outputs, that is, because in a world, the state is 0 and in another is 1, and so on for each next state. In the case of the thought experiment, you write a simple program that utilizes such a QRNG to generate a program (or a more advanced program that limits it to some specific types, for example a neural network map or a physics simulation or whatever) then run it. In MWI, all possible programs up to some resource bound you specified (as our hardware is resource bound) will run in some world. That's the basic idea. If you think a digital subst. exist, *in principle* a sheaf of continuations will exist somewhere in some world after running this program. It's a rather ad-hoc and not very pretty solution, but if one admits a digital subst., then such an experiment would succeed (although the measure of such continuations may be low). I don't see anything contradicting thermodynamics here.

If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you
consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being
false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know
that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday
say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves).

All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that
the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be
helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is capable of what
we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it
cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and its implications. For
example, one has to consider the implications of the Kochen-Specker
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - since we
hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!

Then you assume COMP is false. I don't particularly see why a TM wouldn't be able to emulate a human brain at some level (such as neuron level with some reasonable approximation of a neuron). Most neuroscience suggests that such an emulation would be possible, although it might not be perfect. A lot of high-level concepts in the human psychology are assumed to exist at much higher levels than neurons as well. Quantum effects may or may not play a role, but you'd have to show that they do play a substantial role absent which intelligence would be human general intelligence is impossible. That said, even if they would play a substantial role, what about imperfect copies, would they just be utterly broken in your view?
All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has
occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to
obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that
assume the physical world to be completely classical therefore it
assumes a model of Reality that is not true.

Copying in UDA is done after the digital brain substitution, thus it's all perfectly digital. Your claim would be that no doctor could make an accurate substitution, thus you reject the premise?
The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way,
one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just
accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there is no
subst. level.

No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are
presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of
primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss
ideas and not straw men with me.

We can discuss the ontology that results after UDA, the arithmetical one, however one should keep in mind that that ontology is the result of a certain argument based on certain assumptions. You seem to reject the assumptions, but seem to be interested in discussing the resulting ontology. I think that's the main point of confusion, because most of us are taking those assumptions for granted when discussing COMP.


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