On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:


I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's English papers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)

The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that there still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that is possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you if MWI happens to be true).

Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptions that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the idea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences of lottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The main problem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after they have "rolled into the basket". This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signals are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.

If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then you consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don't know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing to someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out for ourselves).

All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to consider the implications of the Kochen-Specker <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!

We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning, it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.

All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence has occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion that assume the physical world to be completely classical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.

Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality is assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use the neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and that assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget that Quantum reality is Turing emulable.

Dear Bruno,

I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we observe must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not have consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute? My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and time of Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always see physical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case this would be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules as invariant with respect to their computations. (I am equating computations with motions here.)

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect or just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that there is no subst. level.

No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you are presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discuss ideas and not straw men with me.

This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a physical reality to communicate about numbers.

OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against my intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Do you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems to indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model of arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way that the speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics? My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one's sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is always excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integers result from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmetic non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording is terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as I learn better.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to