On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi ACW,I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's Englishpapers and participated in these discussions, at least. You do notneed to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes theexistence of the equivalent machine and from there the argumentfollows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that therestill is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that ispossible *in principle*, I just direct you atwww.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm which merelyrequires a random oracle to get you there (which is given to you ifMWI happens to be true).Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements ofthermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of assumptionsthat might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I like the ideaof a random Oracles, but to use them is like using sequences oflottery winnings to code words that one wants to speak. The mainproblem is that one has no control at all over which numbers will popup, so one has to substitute a scheme to select numbers after theyhave "rolled into the basket".This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio signalsare embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random Oracle.If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then youconsider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTMbeing false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we don'tknow that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're willing tosomeday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor and find out forourselves).All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibilitythat the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. Itwould be helpful if we first established that a Turing Machine iscapable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I am pretty wellconvinced that it cannot based on all that I have studied of QM andits implications. For example, one has to consider the implicationsof the Kochen-Specker<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/> and Gleason<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/#1> Theorems - sincewe hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a reasoning,it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence hasoccurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical world toobtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see discussion thatassume the physical world to be completely classical therefore itassumes a model of Reality that is not true.Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality isassumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps, where we use theneuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical reason, and thatassumption is explicitly eliminated in the step seven. You forget thatQuantum reality is Turing emulable.

Dear Bruno,

`I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the`

`infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we observe`

`must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not have`

`consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute? My question is looking at`

`how we extend the absolute space and time of Newton to the Relativistic`

`case such that observers always see physical laws as invariant to their`

`motions, for the COMP case this would be similar except that observer`

`will see arithmetic rules as invariant with respect to their`

`computations. (I am equating computations with motions here.)`

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form ofinfinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Eitherway, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect orjust accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that thereis no subst. level.No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you arepresenting. I have been arguing that, among other things, the idea ofprimitive matter is nonsense. It might help if you wanted to discussideas and not straw men with me.This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having aphysical reality to communicate about numbers.

`OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against my`

`intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem. Do you`

`have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem seems to`

`indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard model of`

`arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same way that the`

`speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?`

`My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of one's`

`sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is always`

`excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the integers`

`result from the constant (that would make one's model of arithmetic`

`non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording is terrible,`

`but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up as I learn better.`

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