On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi ACW,I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno'sEnglish papers and participated in these discussions, at least.You do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes theexistence of the equivalent machine and from there the argumentfollows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet thatthere still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation thatis possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htmwhich merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which isgiven to you if MWI happens to be true).Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements ofthermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set ofassumptions that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? Ilike the idea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like usingsequences of lottery winnings to code words that one wants tospeak. The main problem is that one has no control at all overwhich numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme toselect numbers after they have "rolled into the basket".This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radiosignals are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-randomOracle.If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, thenyou consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/CTM being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but wedon't know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we'rewilling to someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctorand find out for ourselves).All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon thepossibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal TuringMachine. It would be helpful if we first established that a TuringMachine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. Iam pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I havestudied of QM and its implications. For example, one has toconsider the implications of the Kochen-Specker and GleasonTheorems - since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of areasoning, it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherencehas occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classicalworld to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we seediscussion that assume the physical world to be completelyclassical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicalityis assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps,where we use the neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogicalreason, and that assumption is explicitly eliminated in the stepseven. You forget that Quantum reality is Turing emulable.Dear Bruno,I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from theinfinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What weobserve must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could nothave consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?

`I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~A`

`rule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.`

My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and timeof Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always seephysical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case thiswould be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules asinvariant with respect to their computations. (I am equatingcomputations with motions here.)

OK.

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form ofinfinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Eitherway, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirector just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes thatthere is no subst. level.No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that youare presenting. I have been arguing that, among otherthings, the idea of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help ifyou wanted to discuss ideas and not straw men with me.This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having aphysical reality to communicate about numbers.OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely againstmy intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem.Do you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theoremseems to indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standardmodel of arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the sameway that the speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?My motivation for this is that the identity - the center ofone's sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures isalways excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of theintegers result from the constant (that would make one's model ofarithmetic non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wordingis terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it upas I learn better.

`The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people have when`

`coming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theorem to defend`

`the idea that we share the standard model, in some way. I would not`

`dare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaum theorem extends`

`to non countable models?`

All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.