On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/17/2012 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
I understand the UDA, as I have read every one of Bruno's
English papers and participated in these discussions, at least.
You do not need to keep repeating the same lines. ;-)
The point is that the "doctor" assumption already includes the
existence of the equivalent machine and from there the argument
follows. If you think such a doctor can never exist, yet that
there still is an equivalent turing-emulable implementation that
is possible *in principle*, I just direct you at www.paul-almond.com/ManyWorldsAssistedMindUploading.htm
which merely requires a random oracle to get you there (which is
given to you if MWI happens to be true).
Does this "in principle" proof include the requirements of
thermodynamics or is it a speculation based on a set of
assumptions that might just seem plausible if we ignore physics? I
like the idea of a random Oracles, but to use them is like using
sequences of lottery winnings to code words that one wants to
speak. The main problem is that one has no control at all over
which numbers will pop up, so one has to substitute a scheme to
select numbers after they have "rolled into the basket".
This entire idea can be rephrased in terms of how radio
signals are embedded in noise and that a radio is a non-random
If such a substitution is not possible even in principle, then
you consider UDA's first assumption as false and thus also COMP/
CTM being false (neuroscience does suggest that it's not, but we
don't know that, and probably never will 100%, unless we're
willing to someday say "yes" to such a computationalist doctor
and find out for ourselves).
All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the
possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing
Machine. It would be helpful if we first established that a Turing
Machine is capable of what we are assuming it do be able to do. I
am pretty well convinced that it cannot based on all that I have
studied of QM and its implications. For example, one has to
consider the implications of the Kochen-Specker and Gleason
Theorems - since we hold mathematical theorems in such high regard!
We don't assume physics. When you check the validity of a
reasoning, it makes no sense to add new hypotheses in the premises.
All talk of Copying has to assume a reality where decoherence
has occurred sufficiently to allow the illusion of a classical
world to obtain, or something equivalent... In Sane04 we see
discussion that assume the physical world to be completely
classical therefore it assumes a model of Reality that is not true.
Absolutely not. Show me the paragraph on sane04 where classicality
is assumed. You might say in the first six UDA steps,
where we use the neuro-hypothesis, but this is for pedagogical
reason, and that assumption is explicitly eliminated in the step
seven. You forget that Quantum reality is Turing emulable.
I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from the
infinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What we
observe must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could not
have consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?
I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~A
rule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.
My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space and time
of Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers always see
physical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP case this
would be similar except that observer will see arithmetic rules as
invariant with respect to their computations. (I am equating
computations with motions here.)
The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some form of
infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level. Either
way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worst indirect
or just accidentally correct, while the other just assumes that
there is no subst. level.
No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that you
are presenting. I have been arguing that, among other
things, the idea of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if
you wanted to discuss ideas and not straw men with me.
This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having a
physical reality to communicate about numbers.
OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completely against
my intuition of what is required to solve the concurrency problem.
Do you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaum theorem
seems to indicate that "standardness" in the sense of the standard
model of arithmetic might be an invariant for observers in the same
way that the speed of light is an invariant of motions in physics?
My motivation for this is that the identity - the center of
one's sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures is
always excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of the
integers result from the constant (that would make one's model of
arithmetic non-standard) being hidden in that identity? This wording
is terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope to clean it up
as I learn better.
The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people have when
coming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theorem to defend
the idea that we share the standard model, in some way. I would not
dare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaum theorem extends
to non countable models?
All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think.
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