Dear Stephen, On 18 Feb 2012, at 20:09, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/17/2012 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 17 Feb 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:I agree with this but I would like to pull back a bit from theinfinite limit without going to the ultrafinitist idea. What weobserve must always be subject to the A or ~A rule or we could nothave consistent plural 1p, but is this absolute?I am not sure what we observe should always be subject to A or ~Arule. I don't think that's true in QM, nor in COMP.Dear Bruno,Think about it, what would be the consequence of allowing A ^ ~Ato occur in sharable 1p?

I thought we were discussing A V ~A.

If we start out with the assumption that all logics exist as possible

I have no referent for all logics. I can't assume this.

and then consider which logics allow for sharable 1p, then only thelogics that include the law of bivalence would have sharable 1p thathave arbitrarily long continuations.

?

We could get contradictions in the physics at least! This woulddisallow for any kind of derivation of physical laws. My thinking ismotivated by J.A. Wheeler's comments, re: It from Bit and Lawwithout Law. We are considering that our physical laws derive fromthe sharable aspects of first person content, after all... This is anatural implication of UDA, no? So either we are assuming thatphysical laws are given ab initio or that they emerge from sharable1p.

UDA shows them to have to emerge from sharable 1p. OK.

Either way, the logic of observables in any sharable 1p must be A or~A.

?

This is part of my reasoning that observer logic is restricted toBoolean algebras (or Boolean Free Algebras generally).

`This refuted in the material hypostases. You might elaborate on the`

`proof above, but the premise is fuzzy, for the experession "all`

`logics" does not make sense for me.`

My question is looking at how we extend the absolute space andtime of Newton to the Relativistic case such that observers alwayssee physical laws as invariant to their motions, for the COMP casethis would be similar except that observer will see arithmeticrules as invariant with respect to their computations. (I amequating computations with motions here.)OK.So do you understand my question about the Standard-ness ofarithmetic models? I am assuming that each 1p continuation has toimplement a model of arithmetic that would seem to be standard sothat it always is countable and recursive, if only to allow forcontinuation. Is this OK so far?

`Not really, because the model of the intensional variants of the self-`

`reference logics don't need to be defined in term of model of`

`arithmetic. An 1p continuation does not necessarily corresponds to a`

`standard/non-standard choice.`

I do not know where the arithmetic model would be implemented.

`What do mean by a model being implemented. Computations are`

`implemented in the arithmetical true and provable (sigma_1) relations.`

Would it be in the Loebian Machine or a sublogic of it?

In arithmetic.

The idea is that every observer thinks that it's arithmetic iscountable and recursive even though from the "point of view ofgod" (a 3p abstraction) every observers model is non-standard.

`Proof, or argument needed. The contrary occurs? For God everything is`

`simple (arithmetical truth), but for the machine inside in the`

`transfinite non computable unnameable mess.`

The alternate option to COMP being false is usually some formof infinitely complex matter and infinitely low subst. level.Either way, one option allows copying(COMP), even if at worstindirect or just accidentally correct, while the other justassumes that there is no subst. level.No, this is only the "primitive matter" assumption that youare presenting. I have been arguing that, among other things,the idea of primitive matter is nonsense. It might help if youwanted to discuss ideas and not straw men with me.This contradicts your refutation based on the need of having aphysical reality to communicate about numbers.OK, I will try to not debate that but it goes completelyagainst my intuition of what is required to solve the concurrencyproblem. Do you have any comment on the idea that the Tennenbaumtheorem seems to indicate that "standardness" in the sense of thestandard model of arithmetic might be an invariant for observersin the same way that the speed of light is an invariant of motionsin physics?My motivation for this is that the identity - the center ofone's sense of self "being in the world" - that the 1p captures isalways excluded from one's experience. Could the finiteness of theintegers result from the constant (that would make one's model ofarithmetic non-standard) being hidden in that identity? Thiswording is terrible, but I need to write it for now and hope toclean it up as I learn better.The feeling that + and * are computable, which most people havewhen coming back from school, can be used with Tennenbaum theoremto defend the idea that we share the standard model, in some way. Iwould not dare saying more than that. Do you know if Tennenbaumtheorem extends to non countable models?All this is a bit technical, and perhaps out of topic, I think.No, it is important because we cannot just assume a sharedstandard model of arithmetic because that would collapse all theplural 1p Loebian Universal Machines into a single solipsisticMachine.

`The distinction between G and G* and the other hypostases prevent this`

`to occur.`

Where has to be a reason for the separateness of the individual LUMand what I am proposing might accomplish that and also give us areasoning why physics is relativistic as opposed to absolute, i.e.why GR is possible.

Best wishes in your endeavor, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.