On 22 Feb 2012, at 23:07, Terren Suydam wrote:

On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote:
Hey Bruno,

I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the 1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm
glad to clear up my misunderstanding.


OK. What happens, if there is no flaw in the UDA-MGA, is that your futures can only be determined by the statistics bearing on all computations going
through your state.

The 1p nature of that consciousness will rely on the logic of (machine) knowledge (or other modalities), which put some structure on the set of
accessible computational states.

Sorry for being unclear,  and for the many misspellings, and other
grammatical tenses atrocities.

The problem is also related to the difficulty of the subject, which is necessarily counter-intuitive (in the comp theory), so that we have some trouble in using the natural language, which relies on natural "intuitive
prejudices".

In fact I can understand why it might look like I was saying that the 1p needs the many computations. The reality is that one is enough, but the others computations, 1-p undistinguishable, are there to, and even for a slight interval of consciousness, we must take into account that we are in
all of them, for the correct statistics. So the 1p is attached to an
infinity of computation, once you "attach" it to just one computation.

Indeed, it is very counter intuitive and full of subtleties. I have
been lurking for a few years now and I am finding that only by
engaging with you and others on the list do I begin to comprehend the
subtleties.

Thanks for saying.




However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single
continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a
counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a
"concrete" example?


You should really find this by yourself, honestly. It is the only way to be
really convinced. Normally this follows from the reasoning.
Please ask if you don't find your "error".
Oh! I see Quentin found it.

Your mistake consists in believing that when you simulate your friend Mary in the deterministic sim, completely closed, as you say, you have succeeded
to prevent Mary, from her own pov, to "escape"  your simulation. Her
1-indeterminacy remains unchanged, and bears on the many computations,
existing by the + and * laws, or in the UD.

The counterfactuals, and the indeterminacy comes from the existence of an infinity of computations generating Mary's state. Your deterministic sim can
be runned a million times, it will not change Mary's indeterminacy,
relatively to the infinities of diverging (infinite) computations going
through her 1-state.

You might also reason like that. The consciousness of Mary is only in
Platonia. We have abandoned the idea that consciousness is related to any
singular physical activity.

Here was the "aha!" moment. I get it now. Thanks to you and Quentin.
Even though I am well aware of the consequences of MGA, I was focusing
on the "physical activity" of the simulation because "I" was running
it.

Yes, that's why reasoning and logic is important. It is understandable that evolution could not have prepared us to the possibly true 'big picture", nor for fundamental science, nor for quickly developing technologies. So it needs some effort to abstract us from build-in prejudices. Nature, a bit like bandits, is opportunist. At the same time we don't have to brush away that intuition, because it is real, and it has succeeded to bring us here and now, and that has to be respected somehow too. Note that the math confirms this misunderstanding between the heart/ intuition/first-person/right-brain (modeled by Bp & p) and the scientist/reasoner/left-brain (modeled by Bp). The tension appears right at the start, when a self-aware substructure begin to differentiate itself from its neighborhood.




The fascinating thing for me is, if instead of a scan of Mary, we run
an AGI that embodies a cognitive architecture that satisfies a theory
of consciousness (the kind of theory that explains why a particular UM
is conscious) so that if we assume the theory, it entails that the AGI
is conscious. The AGI will therefore have 1p indeterminacy even if the
sim is deterministic, for the same reason Mary does, because there are
an infinity of divergent computational paths that go through the AGI's
1p state in any given moment. Trippy!

Yeah. "Trippy" is the word.
Many people reacts to comp in a strikingly similar way than other numerous people react to the very potent Salvia divinorum hallucinogen. People needs a very sincere interest in the fundamentals to appreciate the comp consequence, or to appreciate potent dissociative hallucinogen. I should not insist on this. Some would conclude we should make comp illegal. Like "thinking by oneself" is never appreciated in the neighborhood of those who want to think for the others, and control/ manipulate them.





Her consciousness and other 1p-attributes
depends only on her arithmetical relative state, relatively to the infinity of UMs running her in Platonia. In that sense, all the Mary you interact with are zombie, but this is just due to the trivial fact that you can
interact only with Mary's body or local 3p description.

This I disagree with (or don't understand) because if we acknowledge
that as you said "even just one emulation can be said involving
consciousness" then interacting with even a "single" Mary is an
interaction with her "soul" in platonia. I think the admission of any
zombie in any context (assuming comp) is a refutation of comp.

You are right. That's why I prefer to say that comp entails non zombie. But let me give you a thought experience which *seems* to show that a notion of zombie looks possible with comp, and let us see what is wrong with that.

Let us start from the beginning of MGA, or quite similar. You have a teacher doing a course in math (say). Then, by some weird event, his brain vanishes, but a cosmic explosion, by an extreme luck, send the correct information, with respect to that very particular math lesson, at the entry of the motor nerves interfaces to the muscles of the teacher, so that the lesson continue like normal. The students keep interrupting the teacher, asking questions, and everything is fine; the teacher provides the relevant answers (by luck). Is the teacher-without-brain a zombie? At first sight, it looks like one, even with comp. He behaves like a human, but the processing in the brain is just absent. He acts normal by pure chance, with a very small amount of peripheral interface brain activity. So what? Again, the solution is that the consciousness should not be attributed to the body activity, but to the teaching person and its logically real genuine computation (distributed in Platonia). The "concrete brain" just interfaces the person in a relative correct way, unlike the "absent brain + lucky cosmic ray", which still attaches it, in this experience, but by pure luck. In both case, with "real brain" or "without a brain", the consciousness is attached to the computations, not a particular implementation of it which in fine is a building of your mind itself attached to an infinity of computation.

We might say that the teacher was a zombie, because he has no brain activity at all, but then we might say that even with a brain, he is a zombie. The comp plausible truth is better described, as you say, by negating the presence of a zombie, by attributing the consciousness to the abstract person, be it interfaced with a counterfactually correct brain or by a lucky accident. Obviously, in practice, a relatively counterfactually correct machine will, in general, be much more efficacious in implementing, on "earth" the consciousness of the person, which is in Platonia-Heaven, than a cosmic explosion which needs an unaffordable amount of luck to succeed.

Bruno




Once you grasp that
you too are in Platonia, there is no more zombie because bodies become only local interface between "soul" in Platonia. But intuition fails us, and
that's why we need the math and the computer science.

The indeterminacy might be too big, and the comp counterfactuals might be too large, but that remains to be proved, and would be a refutation of comp
(CTM, mechanism).

Let me comment your last paragraphs (the entire post is below for ease)


In the second scenario, her computational state is traced in the UD*
and it is clear there is 1p indeterminacy, as the splitting entailed
by the quantum number generator "brings Mary along", so to speak.



That's partially correct. But as Quentin said, you have no means to isolate Mary in the scenario you want. You propose a logically impossible though
experiment. Mary belongs already to an infinity of computations.
Even if you run a program dovetailing your friend on the reals, assuming a robust universes you will not change much the measure, because those states will not be distinguishable by Mary. You have to bifurcate them enough, if I
can say, and that will be equivalent to an UD.


So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a
zombie.


Let us say that she is as much conscious in one scenario, and the other. But her consciousness is in Platonia, and the physical embodiments is a complex
structure made by the consciousness and infinities of UMs.



The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to
insist that the substitution level must be at the quantum level.


So this does not necessarily follow.
But with Everett, we might have evidences that the level is determined by
the Heisenberg uncertainty relations.
There are higher level, where you can survive, but with consciousness
changes, though.




If OTOH she is conscious, then consciousness does not require 1p
indeterminacy.


I would say consciousness, with comp, implies 1p indeterminacy. It requires it logically, in the sense that if you have consciousness then you have the 1p indeterminacy. Your Mary enclosed in the deterministic local sim, is deterministic only for you, she is really, that is her 1-pov, distributed in the UD*. I use the same reasoning to explain that with comp, we cannot enclose people in simulation. Either the simulation is comp- physically correct, but then it simulates locally what the UD does in the limit, and like Mary, it makes no sense to say that they are only in the simulation, or the simulation is not comp-physically correct, and the simulated people will
figure out at some moment.

Bruno

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