2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your > > > unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start. > > > > Because it is... I don't know/care for you, but I'm conscious... the > > existence of consciousness from my own POV, is not a discussion. > > The whole thought experiment has to do specifically with testing the > existence of consciousness and POV. If we were being honest about the > scenario, we would rely only on known comp truths to arrive at the > answer. It's cheating to smuggle in human introspection in a test of > the nature of human introspection. Let us think only in terms of > 'true, doctor'. If comp is valid, there should be no difference > between 'true' and 'yes'. > > > > > > It may seem innocent, but in this case what it does it preclude the > > > subjective thesis from being considered fundamental. It's a straw man > > > > Read what is a straw man... a straw man is taking the opponent argument > and > > deforming it to means other things which are obvious to disprove. > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man > > "a superficially similar yet unequivalent proposition (the "straw > man")" > > I think that yes doctor makes a straw man of the non-comp position. It > argues that we have to choose whether or not we believe in comp, when > the non-comp position might be that with comp, we cannot choose to > believe in anything in the first place. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of the possibility of unconsciousness. > > > > > > >> If you've said yes, then this > > > > >> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and > 'personal > > > > >> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a > > > > >> computer program, so there's no contradiction. > > > > > > > Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a > > > > > computer program can be happy'? > > > > > > A machine could think (Strong AI thesis) does not entail comp (that > we > > > > are machine). > > > > > I understand that, but we are talking about comp. The thought > > > experiment focuses on the brain replacement, but the argument is > > > already lost in the initial conditions which presuppose the ability to > > > care or tell the difference and have free will to choose. > > > > But I have that ability and don't care to discuss it further. I'm > > conscious, I'm sorry you're not. > > But you aren't in the thought experiment. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's subtle, > > > but so is the question of consciousness. Nothing whatsoever can be > > > left unchallenged, including the capacity to leave something > > > unchallenged. > > > > > > The fact that a computer program can be happy does not logically > > > > entail that we are ourself computer program. may be angels and Gods > > > > (non machine) can be happy too. To sum up: > > > > > > COMP implies STRONG-AI > > > > > > but > > > > > > STRONG-AI does not imply COMP. > > > > > I understand, but Yes Doctor considers whether STRONG-AI is likely to > > > be functionally identical and fully interchangeable with human > > > consciousness. It may not say that we are machine, but it says that > > > machines can be us > > > > It says machines could be conscious as we are without us being machine. > > > > ==> strong ai. > > That's what I said. That makes machines more flexible than organically > conscious beings. They can be machines or like us, but we can't fully > be machines so we are less than machines. > > > > > Comp says that we are machine, this entails strong-ai, because if we are > > machine, as we are conscious, then of course machine can be conscious... > > But if you knew machine could be conscious, that doesn't mean the humans > > would be machines... we could be more than that. > > More than that in what way? Different maybe, but Strong AI by > definition makes machines more than us, because we cannot compete with > machines at being mechanical but they can compete as equals with us in > every other way. > > > > > > - which is really even stronger, since we can only > > > be ourselves but machines apparently can be anything. > > > > No read upper. > > No read upper. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > When it is posed as a logical > > > > > consequence instead of a decision, it implicitly privileges the > > > > > passive voice. We are invited to believe that we have chosen to > agree > > > > > to comp because there is a logical argument for it rather than an > > > > > arbitrary preference committed to in advance. It is persuasion by > > > > > rhetoric, not by science. > > > > > > Nobody tries to advocate comp. We assume it. So if we get a > > > > contradiction we can abandon it. But we find only weirdness, even > > > > testable weirdness. > > > > > I understand the reason for that though. Comp itself is the rabbit > > > hole of empiricism. Once you allow it the initial assumption, it can > > > only support itself. > > > > Then you could never show a contradiction for any hypothesis that you > > consider true... and that's simply false, hence you cannot be correct. > > You are doing exactly what I just said. You assume initially that all > truths are bound by Aristotelian logic. You cannot contradict any > hypothesis that says you aren't a zombie, hence you are a zombie. My > whole point is that consciousness is not like any other subject. You > cannot stand aloof from it and point to it's parts in a power point. > It is the elephant in every room. > > > > > > Comp has no ability to contradict itself, > > > > You say so. > > Is it not true? >
no it is not true.. for example, proving consciousness cannot be emulate on machines would proves computationalism wrong. Showing an infinite components necessary for consciousnes would prove computationalism wrong, showing that a biological neurons is necessary for consciousness would prove computationalism wrong... and so on. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.