On Feb 23, 12:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > 2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your > > > > unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start. > > > > Because it is... I don't know/care for you, but I'm conscious... the > > > existence of consciousness from my own POV, is not a discussion. > > > The whole thought experiment has to do specifically with testing the > > existence of consciousness and POV. If we were being honest about the > > scenario, we would rely only on known comp truths to arrive at the > > answer. It's cheating to smuggle in human introspection in a test of > > the nature of human introspection. Let us think only in terms of > > 'true, doctor'. If comp is valid, there should be no difference > > between 'true' and 'yes'. > > > > > It may seem innocent, but in this case what it does it preclude the > > > > subjective thesis from being considered fundamental. It's a straw man > > > > Read what is a straw man... a straw man is taking the opponent argument > > and > > > deforming it to means other things which are obvious to disprove. > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man > > > "a superficially similar yet unequivalent proposition (the "straw > > man")" > > > I think that yes doctor makes a straw man of the non-comp position. It > > argues that we have to choose whether or not we believe in comp, when > > the non-comp position might be that with comp, we cannot choose to > > believe in anything in the first place. > > > > > of the possibility of unconsciousness. > > > > > > >> If you've said yes, then this > > > > > >> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and > > 'personal > > > > > >> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a > > > > > >> computer program, so there's no contradiction. > > > > > > > Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a > > > > > > computer program can be happy'? > > > > > > A machine could think (Strong AI thesis) does not entail comp (that > > we > > > > > are machine). > > > > > I understand that, but we are talking about comp. The thought > > > > experiment focuses on the brain replacement, but the argument is > > > > already lost in the initial conditions which presuppose the ability to > > > > care or tell the difference and have free will to choose. > > > > But I have that ability and don't care to discuss it further. I'm > > > conscious, I'm sorry you're not. > > > But you aren't in the thought experiment. > > > > > It's subtle, > > > > but so is the question of consciousness. Nothing whatsoever can be > > > > left unchallenged, including the capacity to leave something > > > > unchallenged. > > > > > > The fact that a computer program can be happy does not logically > > > > > entail that we are ourself computer program. may be angels and Gods > > > > > (non machine) can be happy too. To sum up: > > > > > > COMP implies STRONG-AI > > > > > > but > > > > > > STRONG-AI does not imply COMP. > > > > > I understand, but Yes Doctor considers whether STRONG-AI is likely to > > > > be functionally identical and fully interchangeable with human > > > > consciousness. It may not say that we are machine, but it says that > > > > machines can be us > > > > It says machines could be conscious as we are without us being machine. > > > > ==> strong ai. > > > That's what I said. That makes machines more flexible than organically > > conscious beings. They can be machines or like us, but we can't fully > > be machines so we are less than machines. > > > Either we are machines or we are not... If machines can be conscious and > > we're not machines then we are *more* than machines... not less.
How do you figure. If we are A and not B, and machines are A and B, how does that make us more? > > > > > > Comp says that we are machine, this entails strong-ai, because if we are > > > machine, as we are conscious, then of course machine can be conscious... > > > But if you knew machine could be conscious, that doesn't mean the humans > > > would be machines... we could be more than that. > > > More than that in what way? > > We must contain infinite components if we are not machines emulable. So we > are *more* than machines if machines can be conscious and we're not > machines. It only means we are different, not that we are more. If I am a doctor but not a plumber and a machine is a doctor and a plumber then we are both doctors. Just because I am not a plumber doesn't mean that I am more than a doctor. If so, in what way? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
