On Feb 23, 12:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2012/2/23 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
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> > On Feb 23, 9:26 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
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> > > > I understand that is how you think of it, but I am pointing out your
> > > > unconscious bias. You take consciousness for granted from the start.
>
> > > Because it is... I don't know/care for you, but I'm conscious... the
> > > existence of consciousness from my own POV, is not a discussion.
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> > The whole thought experiment has to do specifically with testing the
> > existence of consciousness and POV. If we were being honest about the
> > scenario, we would rely only on known comp truths to arrive at the
> > answer. It's cheating to smuggle in human introspection in a test of
> > the nature of human introspection. Let us think only in terms of
> > 'true, doctor'. If comp is valid, there should be no difference
> > between 'true' and 'yes'.
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> > > > It may seem innocent, but in this case what it does it preclude the
> > > > subjective thesis from being considered fundamental. It's a straw man
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> > > Read what is a straw man... a straw man is taking the opponent argument
> > and
> > > deforming it to means other things which are obvious to disprove.
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> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man
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> > "a superficially similar yet unequivalent proposition (the "straw
> > man")"
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> > I think that yes doctor makes a straw man of the non-comp position. It
> > argues that we have to choose whether or not we believe in comp, when
> > the non-comp position might be that with comp, we cannot choose to
> > believe in anything in the first place.
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> > > > of the possibility of unconsciousness.
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> > > > > >> If you've said yes, then this
> > > > > >> of course entails that you believe that 'free choice' and
> > 'personal
> > > > > >> value' (or the subjective experience of them) can be products of a
> > > > > >> computer program, so there's no contradiction.
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> > > > > > Right, so why ask the question? Why not just ask 'do you believe a
> > > > > > computer program can be happy'?
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> > > > > A machine could think (Strong AI thesis) does not entail comp (that
> > we
> > > > > are machine).
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> > > > I understand that, but we are talking about comp. The thought
> > > > experiment focuses on the brain replacement, but the argument is
> > > > already lost in the initial conditions which presuppose the ability to
> > > > care or tell the difference and have free will to choose.
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> > > But I have that ability and don't care to discuss it further. I'm
> > > conscious, I'm sorry you're not.
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> > But you aren't in the thought experiment.
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> > > > It's subtle,
> > > > but so is the question of consciousness. Nothing whatsoever can be
> > > > left unchallenged, including the capacity to leave something
> > > > unchallenged.
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> > > > > The fact that a computer program can be happy does not logically
> > > > > entail that we are ourself computer program. may be angels and Gods
> > > > > (non machine) can be happy too. To sum up:
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> > > > > COMP implies STRONG-AI
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> > > > > but
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> > > > > STRONG-AI does not imply COMP.
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> > > > I understand, but Yes Doctor considers whether STRONG-AI is likely to
> > > > be functionally identical and fully interchangeable with human
> > > > consciousness. It may not say that we are machine, but it says that
> > > > machines can be us
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> > > It says machines could be conscious as we are without us being machine.
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> > > ==> strong ai.
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> > That's what I said. That makes machines more flexible than organically
> > conscious beings. They can be machines or like us, but we can't fully
> > be machines so we are less than machines.
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> > Either we are machines or we are not... If machines can be conscious and
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> we're not machines then we are *more* than machines... not less.

How do you figure. If we are A and not B, and machines are A and B,
how does that make us more?

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> > > Comp says that we are machine, this entails strong-ai, because if we are
> > > machine, as we are conscious, then of course machine can be conscious...
> > > But if you knew machine could be conscious, that doesn't mean the humans
> > > would be machines... we could be more than that.
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> > More than that in what way?
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> We must contain infinite components if we are not machines emulable. So we
> are *more* than machines if machines can be conscious and we're not
> machines.

It only means we are different, not that we are more. If I am a doctor
but not a plumber and a machine is a doctor and a plumber then we are
both doctors. Just because I am not a plumber doesn't mean that I am
more than a doctor. If so, in what way?

Craig

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