On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:19, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any
difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was
substituted for a digital brain.
Hi Quentin,
OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?
It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as
conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel
*feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...
Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what might occur if a "digital
uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete
continuity?
It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.
Yes. There are *many sense* in which we can survive with a wrong
substitution.
Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and
vague, IMHO.
Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-
computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that
goes through your consciousness current state.
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure?
Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow
wrong...
Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent
any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for
Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes" in
the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via
digital uploading.
Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still
compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as
if it was wrong...
Not for the conceptual result. Physics remains a branch of digital
machine's theory. But FAPP, you are right, except for the death or
near death experiences. I think.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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