On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute "consciousness"... such as you could not feel any difference (in your consciousness from your POV) if your brain was substituted for a digital brain.

 Hi Quentin,

    OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

It means an hypothetical "you" after mind uploading would feel as conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Hi Quentin,

We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there is no "you", as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant with respect to substitution?

As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one, which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist becomes person eliminativist.

The "you" is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in many representations.

And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's "second diagonalization" construction.

It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can certainly construct a program D capable of doing some simple duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters:

Dx gives T(...., xx, ....),

Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a self-referential program:

DD gives T(...., DD, ...).

You might add "quotes" to prevent an infinite loop:

Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that

DD gives T(... 'DD'...).

This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract biology (see my paper "amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine".

That define a relative "you", trivially relative to you. It is the "I" of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a build in control structure called SELF.

This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is more "my body" than my "soul", and that if why, to do the math, we have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of first person. By the non definability of truth, this "I" cannot be defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non definable (by the machine) truth.

Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave the same, and feel to be the same.

Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong substitution level, different from what might occur if a "digital uploading" procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of continuity... it's not binary outcome.

At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail down the details of this idea.

The details are in the mathematics of self-reference.

Those "does not feel any difference" terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non- computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...

AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that "we are only that which is within our skin". We might finally escape from the modular clock world of gears and levers that the Parminidean and Newtonian world view entails.

But comp escapes this. If "I" am a machine, then the reality, globally cannot be a machine, and from the point of view of any machine, his 1- I cannot be a machine either, even if it *is* a machine ... from God (Truth) point of view.

Here there is a quite difficult idea, made simple by the self- reference logic, which is that:

G* proves that Bp is extensionally equivalent to Bp & p. (they prove the same arithmetical p),

But G, and thus the machine, does not prove that, which makes them intensionally different. The first obeys to G, and the second obeys to a logic of knowledge (S4Grz).

Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire "universes" in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital uploading.

Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong...

I am not so sure. I think that the way that QM systems are linear will still allow substitution, but not in the usual way of thinking. The problem that I see is the lack of understanding of QM's implications.

Comp does not assume QM. It is just not part of the theory. And then the reasoning shows that as far as QM is a physically correct law, it has to be derived from comp.

To understand comp, you have to abstract yourself of any *theory* on the physical reality. It is easy, if you grasp Church thesis, which makes the definition of computation general enough, and purely arithmetical.

Ihope Quentin will not mind too much I answered the question addressed to him.

I hope also this helps a bit. You should try to have a complete understanding of the UDA, which asks only for a passive understanding of Church thesis and of universal Turing machine, before digging on the more complex translation of UDA in arithmetical terms, where the billions of confusions possible are handled by the nuances made obligatory by the subtle counter-intuitive logics of self-reference.



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